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ABSTRACT 
 
The terrorist attack at September 11, 2001 in the United States of America had a huge 
impact on the security of international cargo transportation. In order to minimize the 
threat of terrorism and secure the movement of goods in the supply chain, security 
initiatives such as ISPS code and CSI are adopted by the United Nations and the United 
States. Also, the term ‘security’ has emerged as an independent area of study in supply 
chain management studies after the 2000s. The objective of this study is to examine the 
impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on Port Performance in the context of Korea. 
In order to explore the causal relationships, this study utilized Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) to examine the relationships. Also, a multi-group analysis between port 
group (port A and B) and port user group (shipping companies, forwarding companies, 
etc) was conducted to investigate the differences of the perceptions in two groups. This is 
to fill the gaps from previous studies by conducting quantitative and confirmatory 
research in the field of supply chain security.  
 
This study develops a conceptual model by literature review and semi-structured 
interviews in order to identify the impact of the constructs: Antecedents, Supply Chain 
Security Orientation, and Port Performance. There are 11 variables in total, and in-depth 
analysis of the inter-relationships among variables is identified. In conclusion, this study 
empirically develops a structural model and identified the importance of Financial 
Resources (FR), Supply Chain Security Initiatives (SCSI), Security Preparation and 
Planning (SPP), Security Related Partnership (SRP), Security Dedicated Communication 
and Technology (SDCT), Security Culture (SC), and Security Education (SE) on Port 
Performance. Also, the differences in perceptions between port group and port user group 
of the variables in the construct were also explored.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the overview of the thesis to explain the research questions this 
study aims to address, why the questions are worth investigating, and how the questions 
are explored. Section 1.2 presents the background of this study by explaining the 
importance of security in supply chains and the maritime transport industry driven by the 
United States and the United Nations mainly after the 9/11 terrorism attack. Section 1. 3 
outlines the research objectives and questions. After that, section 1.4 briefly introduces 
the research methodology and section 1. 5 presents the academic positioning of this study. 
Section 1. 6 presents the structure of the thesis and section 1. 7 concludes this chapter.  
 
1.2 Background of the research 
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America (hereafter 
U.S.A.) had a huge impact on the security of international cargo transportation and 
passenger movement. After this devastating event, increased risks of terrorism became 
one the most important agendas for national security not only for the U.S.A, but for 
international society. Statistically, it is evident that the threat of terrorism is growing. In 
the 2000s, there were twenty three thousand cases of terrorism growing from around four 
thousand and seven hundred in the 1990s, and three thousand and four hundred in the 
1980s (MIPT 2008). In addition, there has been an increase in cases of theft, hijacking, 
counterfeiting, and contamination related to cargo transportation that have had a huge 
impact on supply chains (Ekwall 2009; Anderson 2007). Previous studies indicate that 
enhanced security is the driving strategy for many practitioners in order to minimize risks 
(Manuj and Mentzer 2008; Sheffi 2001; Williams et al. 2008). Many organizations have 
started to set security as their top priority because accidents related to supply chain 
security are occurring more frequently (Thomas 2006). Supply chain security is now 
becoming increasingly important not only for business environments but for 
governments’ role and their activities as well in terms of securing cargo and people from 
terrorism (Voss et al. 2009; Autry and Bobbit 2008; Sheffi 2001). Thus, in order to 
minimize the threat of terrorism and secure the movement of goods in the supply chain, 
several security-related initiatives have been adopted by the U.S.A and the United 
Nations (hereafter the U.N.). The focus was initially on security vulnerability in air 
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passenger transport after the 9/11 event. However, the attention shifted rapidly to the flow 
of cargo and maritime transport, containerized port operation and secure supply chain 
management in order to prohibit the importation of illegal Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) and dangerous cargo around the globe. This urgent trend can be best 
characterized by various mandatory and voluntary security programs implemented around 
the world after the 2000s. As for the most important mandatory rule, the International 
Maritime Organization (hereafter the IMO) introduced the ISPS Code (International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code) in 2004 which has been approved and implemented by 
member states in the IMO. It contains detailed compulsory security requirements for port 
authorities, shipping companies, and governments with regulatory guidelines to satisfy a 
high level of security standards. Also, the World Customs Organization (hereafter the 
WCO) introduced a security initiative called “Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade” to upgrade the security level and facilitate the flow of trading 
cargo. Furthermore, the International Standardization Organization (hereafter ISO) 
introduced an industry-based and business-led security management program called ISO 
28000 to improve the security of supply chains. The U.S.A has led the global security 
strengthening trend by introducing a variety of security programs such as the 24-hour rule, 
Container Security Initiatives (CSI), and the Customs and Trade Partnership against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT). There are also other voluntary programs such as the Authorized 
Economic Operator (AEO), Smart and Secure Trade lanes (SST), and the Secure Freight 
Initiative (SFI). These security initiatives and their impacts are discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
This study concerns the cultural phenomenon of organizations being “security oriented” 
based on environmental changes in ports and their supply chains in Korea driven by the 
growth of terrorism and compulsory/voluntary security programs. In other words, it aims 
to identify the impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on organizational 
performance. Recent literature suggest evidence of a distinctive movement towards 
security orientation of ports in Korea (Hwang and Min 2009; KMI 2007). In several 
aspects of their operations, ports and their supply chains are highly security oriented. Also, 
it has been identified by some researchers that port security should be analyzed from a 
supply chain perspective, not as a single entity (Bichou 2004; Brooks and Pelot 2008). 
For example, KMI (2008) attempted to analyze different perceptions of ports and port 
users on security issues, and found distinct perceptional differences in security issues. 
However, although numerous researchers have stressed the fact that security in ports and 
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supply chains is important for organizations and governments, very few studies have been 
conducted on security issues and their impacts on organizational performance as 
confirmatory and quantitative studies (Williams et al. 2008). This might mean that port 
authorities and port users are not sure about the benefits of being security oriented, which 
can be seen as the outcome of mandatory requirements from the U.N. and the U.S.A. In 
particular, security measures entail a certain amount of financial investment which can be 
justified only if security measures can be beneficial to them. This is the first study that 
attempts to identify the impact of security orientation on port performance from a supply 
chain perspective as a confirmatory and quantitative study. This study can be useful not 
only for ports/port users, but for governments as well in terms of setting a better policy 
based on the findings of this study. Based on the research model, the policy builders can 
set a certain level of priority among the variables which lead to better organizational 
performances. Moreover, in terms of performance, port operators and port users can 
clearly identify which aspects lead to efficiencies, effectiveness, and so on.  
 
1. 3 Research objectives and research questions 
This study aims to examine the relationship between Supply Chain Security Orientation 
and port performance. Based on the findings and research gaps from previous studies, 
Antecedents, Supply Chain Security Orientation and Port Performance are introduced for 
further statistical investigation, which are introduced in the following chapters. In order to 
achieve the research aims of this study, the following research questions are developed 
below: 
 
-Research question 1. What are the main components and dimensions of the Supply Chain  
Security Orientation framework in relation to particular supply chains in Korean ports? 
 
-Research question 2. What are the impacts of the Supply Chain Security Orientation on  
Port Performance?  
 
-Research question 3. What are the differences in the perceptions of Supply Chain  
Security Orientation by the port group and the port user group? 
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Table 1. 1 below presents the research questions and the methods used to obtain data.  
 
Table 1. 1 Research questions and relevant research method 
Research question 1 
Literature review and 
Semi-structured interview 
Research question 2 
Questionnaire and 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
Research question 3 SEM and multi group analysis 
Source: Author 
 
As for the adopted methodology, this study is mainly quantitative in order to identify the 
relationship between variables in the research model. However, because the adopted 
research framework was based on a limited number of people and samples (Autry and 
Bobbitt 2008), a qualitative approach using interviews was also adopted in order to 
explore the components of Supply Chain Security Orientation specifically in the context 
of Korea by using a wide range of experts’ ideas and perceptions in Korea. This process 
developed the “adopted framework” into “a complete research model” for this study.  
The first research question pertains to the supply chain security concept and its 
application to port operation and security from a supply chain perspective. In order to 
identify the components of the construct in the research model, pre-suggested constructs 
and variables are re-examined and modified through an extensive literature review and 
semi-structured interviews. This conceptualization and these observed variables are 
validated and tested through Confirmatory Factor Analysis in Chapter 7. The second 
question is related to quantitative analysis using Structural Equation Modelling (hereafter 
SEM). This chapter examines the causal relationships of variables in three constructs 
suggested in the research model. The third question is about identifying the difference of 
the perceptions in two groups. The two groups: the port group and port user group are 
tested to find out whether there are statistically significant differences in the perceptions 
of the variables in the research model.  
 
To achieve and answer the purpose of this research question, the following objectives and 
goals must be met: 
1. Critically review the literature of security of supply chains and ports. 
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2. Review and analyze previous studies on the Supply Chain Security Orientation 
framework and port performance measurement. 
3. Review various security regulations of the U.N. and the U.S.A. in relation to the 
security of supply chains and ports in Korea.  
4. Modify and justify the research framework by combining the findings from the semi-
structured interviews and previous studies.  
5. Build up and complete the measurement scales for questionnaire based on reliable 
and valid sources from widely referred literature.  
6. Collect data for the questionnaire and analyze the impact of Supply Chain Security 
Orientation of ports in Korea and compare the different perceptions of the two 
groups. 
 
In summary, this study aims to identify the relationship between Supply Chain Security 
Orientation and organizational performance of ports in Korea. It aims to help the port 
authorities and supply chain members who are using the ports to understand what the 
most important factors are that drive ports to be more security oriented and their impacts 
on organizational performance. Since there are very few quantitative studies in the area of 
supply chain security, the findings of this study can provide an initial insight to the impact 
of security related variables on organizational performance.  
 
1. 4 Overview of research methodology 
This study aims to test the impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on port 
performance. There are three constructs for this: Antecedents (Antecedents), Supply 
Chain Security Orientation (SCSO), and Port Performance (PP). The latent variables are 
conceptualized and proposed for causal relationship examination. To achieve this goal, 
mixed methods combining qualitative and quantitative analysis are followed. First, semi-
structured interviews with 20 practitioners and academics in maritime and port security 
were conducted in order to apply their ideas, experience, and knowledge to the process of 
adding and omitting the variables in comparison to the pre-developed variables and 
attributes in previous studies. This part is the process of creating a more sophisticated 
research model to reflect the environment around supply chain security and port 
operations in Korea. Then, the complete research model is proposed for the quantitative 
testing of causal relationships using SEM. This mixed method is often suggested in order 
to overcome the weaknesses that each methodology has and maximize the benefits 
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(Bryman 2008). Triangulation of the mixed method often provides a wider understanding 
of a social phenomenon (Saunders et al. 2007). The specific research methodology is 
explained in Chapter 4. Table 1. 2 and Table 1. 3 introduce the research plan for this thesis 
and two major sample groups for the questionnaire.  
 
Table 1. 2 Research plan for this thesis 
Exploratory stage Empirical testing stage 
1. Propose the structural model developed from 
previous studies 
2. Add and omit components in the research model 
from semi-structured interviews 
1. Examine the causal relationship 
 
2. Compare and contrast between two groups 
Aim: Propose interim research and complete 
research model 
Aim: Test the complete research model 
  
Method: Literature review and semi-structured 
interview 
Method: Questionnaire and SEM with multi group 
analysis 
Source: Author 
 
Table 1. 3 Two groups in the questionnaire 
Port 
group 
Port A 
(including security-specialized  
subsidiary company A for Port A) 
Port B 
(including security-specialized  
subsidiary company B for Port B) 
Port user 
group 
Port users A (shipping companies, forwarding 
companies, warehousing management, 
manufacturing companies) 
Port users B (shipping companies, forwarding 
companies, warehousing management, 
manufacturing companies) 
Source: Author 
 
The next stage is the quantitative analysis. Overall, this study is more quantitative than 
qualitative in terms of the importance and the nature of this research because this research 
is basically ‘testing’ and ‘quantifying’ rather than ‘exploring’ or ‘investigating’. A 
questionnaire survey is utilized in order to obtain a larger number of peoples’ perceptions 
of the variables in the research model. There are two ports (port A and B) and port users 
(shipping companies, manufacturing companies, freight forwarders, and warehousing 
companies using port A and B) which are the main respondents for the questionnaire. The 
two ports are both implementing the ISPS code and in particular, port A is also 
implementing the CSI program. The port users of these two ports are all supply chain 
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security certified (AEO and ISO28000) companies. The process of choosing the sample is 
all based on the findings and suggestions from the previous literature which is specified 
in Chapter 6. Various aspects are analyzed including direct impact, indirect impact, total 
impact, and multi group analysis between the port group and the port user group. Table 1. 4 
presents the quantitative analysis stages using statistical techniques.  
  
Table 1. 4 Quantitative analysis stage 
First process: Questionnaire 
-Questionnaire development (latent and observed variables) 
-Ethical issues in questionnaire collection 
-Questionnaire collection  
Second process: Descriptive statistics 
-Demographic information of the respondents 
-Other related information about the respondents and groups 
Third process: Empirical analysis 
-Empirical testing (Structural Equation Modeling) 
-Direct, indirect, and total impacts of variables in the construct 
Fourth process: multi-group analysis 
-Multi-group analysis (port group and port user group) 
-Comparison of perceptions in variables of two groups 
Source: Author 
 
1. 5 Academic positioning of this study 
The main theme of this study is to identify the impact of Supply Chain Security 
Orientation on Korean ports and port users. It is widely mentioned in the literature that 
maritime transportation and port operation are significantly affected by the increased risks 
of terrorism and security initiatives such as the ISPS code and the CSI which go beyond a 
single port perspective (KMI 2007; Bichou 2004; Brooks and Pelot 2008). Other 
organizations in the supply chains are involved such as shipping companies, warehousing 
companies, government agencies, and forwarding companies for the security of ports 
(KMI 2007). These companies constitute the “port user group” which is the part of the 
sample for this study. This makes this thesis fall into the category of “port in the supply 
chains studies” because the concept of Supply Chain Security Orientation is applied as a 
cultural and behavioral phenomenon to port and supply chain security which views ports 
as active participants of supply chain operations that connect and influence other 
members within the supply chain. Although there are many studies related to the 
integration strategies and phenomenon of ports in the supply chains, this study aims to 
serve as the initial confirmatory research for security related issues of ports from a supply 
chain perspective.  
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1. 6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter one provides a brief overview of the research. It explains the research 
background, objectives, and questions that aim to fill the research gap identified from the 
literature.  
Chapter two outlines the background of this study. It provides the environmental changes 
such as the growth of terrorism and security initiatives for supply chains and maritime 
transport. In particular, this chapter delineates how security initiatives are being 
implemented around the world and their importance to supply chain and port operations. 
Figure 1. 1 shows the structure of the thesis.  
 
Figure 1. 1 The structure and progression of the thesis 
Chapter 1 : Introduction to the Thesis 
-Research background 
-Research questions & aims 
-Research methodology and domains of the study 
-Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 : 
The Development of Supply Chain Security 
-Supply chain/maritime terrorism 
-Supply chain security initiatives  
-Maritime security initiatives 
 
Chapter 3 : Literature Review: 
The Concept of Supply Chain Risk Management, 
Supply Chain Security, Risk and Security of Ports, 
and Port Performance 
-Supply chain risk management 
-Supply chain security 
-Risk and security of ports 
-Port performance 
-Research gap 
                                          
Chapter 4 : Methodology 
-Research philosophy 
-Research design 
-Data collection methods (interview, SEM) 
-Data analysis methods 
(direct, indirect, multi group analysis) 
 
Chapter 5 : Justification of the Research Model 
-Findings from the interview 
-Conceptual development of the variables 
-Introduce the complete research model 
 
Chapter 6 : Descriptive Statistics 
-Demographic response of the participants 
-Missing data and other issues in the questionnaire 
-Statistics of the main constructs in the model  
 
Chapter 7 : Empirical Analysis: 
Structural Equation Modelling 
-CFA (reliability and validity tests) of the SEM 
-Provide results of the statistical analysis  
(direct, indirect, and multi group analysis) 
-Provide discussions of the statistical results  
 
Chapter 8 : Conclusions 
-Summarize the research 
-Provide research findings 
-Contributions and limitations of the research 
-Provide the future research directions 
Source: Author 
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Chapter three is the critical literature review. Starting from the concept of risks, supply 
chain risk management and security are explained. Because the concepts are inter-related, 
it aims to explain the concepts and divide the related literature into two categories from 
broad to specific ones. After that, the risks and security issues around ports and port 
performance measurement are explained. At the end of the chapter, the research gap is 
introduced.   
Chapter four introduces the methodology adopted for this study. Most of all, various 
issues related to the two main research methods for this study: semi-structured interview 
(qualitative) and SEM are introduced. Also, the research philosophy, the research 
approach, and other ethical issues are mentioned in this chapter. Furthermore, it explains 
the justification for why SEM has been adopted for this study and this is explained in 
comparison to other statistical analysis methods. 
Chapter five is mainly about the justification of the research model. This study develops 
an initial research framework proposed by Autry and Bobbitt (2008), it is modified based 
on the findings from multiple semi-structured interviews. This chapter also introduces the 
operationalization of the research model and proposes the measurement scales adopted 
from widely referred literature. Then, the complete research model adopted for this study 
is introduced with all the latent and observed variables which are adopted for designing 
the questionnaire for this study. 
Chapter six introduces the descriptive statistics of the samples. This process provides the 
outline of the participants and their answers from the questionnaire according to each 
variable. Also, it shows the response rate, the non-response bias, and the demographic 
profile. This is particularly important for this study because the types of respondents are 
revealed and analyzed. This chapter also offers the demographic responses and other 
issues around the basic construct for this study (Antecedents, Supply Chain Security 
Orientation and Port Performance).  
Chapter seven explains the results of the analysis using SEM with the software AMOS 
version 8.0. The results of the statistical analysis are explained in detail in this chapter. 
There are a predetermined set of analysis tools and stages when using SEM such as 
checking the outliers, missing data, and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in order to 
test the reliability and validity. The structural model is tested to see whether there are any 
statistical significances in causal relationships among the variables. In addition, the two 
groups: port users in the supply chain and port authorities are also tested using a multi-
group analysis to see whether there are significant differences in the perceptions of the 
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variables and their causal relationships.  
Chapter eight is the last chapter of the thesis. It provides the summary, findings, and 
implications of the research. A brief summary of this study is presented with limitations 
and future research directions. 
 
1. 7 Summary 
This chapter has provided the overview of the thesis. In particular, the importance of 
supply chain security initiatives has been mentioned as a background to this study. Then, 
it has presented the research objectives and questions with the adopted methodologies to 
address these questions. Specifically, semi-structured interviews and SEM have been 
briefly introduced which are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. Also, this chapter 
has introduced the contents and structure of the thesis. The next two chapters are the 
environmental background and literature review for this study which provide the 
theoretical and academic background.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY 
 
2. 1 Introduction  
This part of the thesis presents the environmental changes around the port operations and 
supply chain especially after the event of the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S.A. In 
particular, with the launch of international security regulations driven by the U.S.A. and 
the U.N., compulsory or voluntary security-related initiatives have become a must for 
international trade. It is vital to discuss the importance of these programs because ports 
and supply chains are directly affected by these mandatory/voluntary security regulations. 
Based on this background, this chapter discusses how environmental changes were made 
after the 9/11 attacks with a special emphasis on the growth of terrorism and supply chain 
security programs. Section 2. 2 discusses terrorism threats in the supply chain, and 
section 2. 3 introduces the voluntary supply chain security initiatives and maritime 
security programs. Finally, section 2. 4 concludes this chapter. This chapter is mainly 
devoted to discussing the background related to the practical and regulatory framework 
around supply chains and port security.  
 
2. 2 Terrorism threats in the supply chain   
Terrorism can be defined as a political action or behaviour in order to accomplish political, 
religious, and ideological purposes (KMI 2006). It appears as a coercion of violence 
mainly for political purposes, and sometimes provokes enormous loss of life, damage of 
property, and tremendous fear in the minds of people. After the devastating terrorism of 
9/11 in the U.S.A., “the war against terrorism” began. The demise of communism led to 
the rise of political and diplomatic conflicts in various places in the world. Although the 
U.S.A. has shown many successful cases in suppressing various terrorists’ activities 
around the world, the threat of terrorism is far from decreasing especially after the 2000s. 
According to the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (2007), there has 
been considerable growth of international terrorism so far (2,100 incidents in 1970s, 
3,400 in 1980s, 4,700 in 1990s, and more than 23,300 after the 2000s). Table 2. 1 shows 
the specific statistics of terrorism. Casualties per incidents grew from 0.70 in 1970s to 
1.71 in 2000s. This shows the statistical trend of the increasing number of terrorist 
activities especially after the 2000s.  
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Table 2. 1 Growth of terrorism  
Categories 
Year 
No. of Terrorism 
Incidents 
Wounded Casualties Casualties per incident 
1970s 2,150 3,631 1,504 0.70 
1980s 3,408 9,366 3,868 1.13 
1990s 4,707 26,126 5,693 1.21 
2000s 23,352 78,782 40,027 1.71 
Source: Commercial sources 
 
According to the Table 2. 2 below, it can be seen that the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
areas (42.5%) are the most vulnerable areas for terrorism. Those places had the biggest 
number of casualties (53.3%) and wounded people (46.7%). East and Central Asia are 
shown to be a relatively safe place from terrorism (0.7%) compared to other areas in the 
world. Japan had 85 incidents and the Republic of Korea had 38 terrorism incidents 
which are mostly related to diplomatic and military concerns (KMI 2008). However, 
according to the IISS (2005), although very few Islamic political terrorism incidents take 
place in Northeast Asia, Korea and Japan could easily be the target of terrorism 
considering the diplomatic environment in which North Korea is willing to develop 
nuclear weapons and China’s military and political power is getting stronger. Korea and 
Japan are the traditional allies of the U.S.A., and it has been pointed out that the countries 
could possibly be the target of terrorism based on political and diplomatic reasons.  
 
Table 2. 2 Terrorism in different areas 
Categories Terror (%/total) Wounded (%/total) Casualties (%/total) 
East & Central Asia 242 (0.7%) 5,584 (4.7%) 253 (0.5%) 
Africa 1,094 (3.2%) 9,451 (8.0%) 3,559 (7.0%) 
Eastern Europe 1,489 (4.4%) 5,134 (4.3%) 1,999 (3.9%) 
Latin America & the Caribbean 3,641 (10.7%) 3,953 (3.3%) 2,342 (4.6%) 
Middle East/Persian Gulf 14,358 (42.5%) 55,216 (46.7%) 27,288 (53.3%) 
North America 588 (1.7%) 4,344 (3.7%) 3,568 (7.0%) 
South Asia 5,110 (15.1%) 23,422 (19.8%) 8,749 (17.1%) 
Southeast Asia & Oceania 1,753 (5.2%) 5,383 (4.6%) 1,929 (3.8%) 
Western Europe 5,542 (16.4%) 5,671 (4.8%) 1,441 (2.8%) 
Total 33,817 (100%) 118,158 (100%) 51,128 (100%) 
Source: Commercial sources 
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Terrorism normally needs a certain target to fulfil the objectives of the terrorists. The 
growing increase in terrorism also applies to various transportation modes. The terrorist 
attacks on transportation systems are highly related to the vulnerabilities of weak points 
which can lead to a loss of economic damage or even human casualties. Objects for 
terrorist attacks can be broadly divided into three categories: infrastructure of logistics 
such as ships and ports, operational aspects of transport, and cargo which are presented in 
Table 2. 3 below. 
 
Table 2. 3 Objects of terrorism attack in transport modes 
Categories 
Transportation mode 
Shipping Air Transport Rail Road 
Logistics 
Infrastructur
e 
Transport 
Route 
Maritime route Air route 
Rail route 
Tunnel 
Bridge 
Crossroad 
Road 
Tunnel 
Bridge 
Crossroad 
Trans-
Shipment 
Area 
Port terminal Airport terminal 
Cargo 
terminal 
Rail yard 
Logistics terminal 
Infrastructur
e 
Operation 
Regulation 
System 
Maritime transport 
management 
system 
Air transport 
system 
Central/ 
offshore 
regulation 
center 
Road transport 
management 
system 
Tele-
Communicatio
n System 
Telecommunicatio
n network 
Telecommunicatio
n network 
Signal 
system 
Telecommunicatio
n network 
Employees 
Seafarer 
Stevedoring 
Employees 
Air crew 
Stevedoring 
Employees 
Engineer 
Stevedoring 
Employees 
Driver 
Stevedoring 
Employees 
Transport 
Modes 
Ships/barge Airplane Trucks/cars Trucks/trailers 
Cargo 
Non-
Dangerous 
Cargo 
Explosives 
Toxic Cargo 
Inflammable 
Cargo 
Non-dangerous 
cargo 
Explosives 
Toxic cargo 
Inflammable cargo 
Non-dangerous 
cargo 
Explosives 
Toxic cargo 
Inflammable cargo 
Non-
dangerous 
cargo 
Explosives 
Toxic cargo 
Inflammabl
e cargo 
Non-dangerous 
cargo 
Explosives 
Toxic cargo 
Inflammable cargo 
Source: KMI (2007) 
 
Firstly, the infrastructure of logistics must be mentioned which is used to transport goods 
and cargo. The 9/11 attack on the U.S.A. was terrorism on an airplane, terrorism in 
Madrid, Spain in 2004 (also known as the “Madrid train bombings” in 2004) was on a 
train (casualties: 191, wounded: 1800), and terrorism in the Yemen in 2002 was on an oil-
tanker named “Limburg” (90 thousand barrels of oil spilled). These transportation modes 
can be used for terrorism purposes which can put a stop to logistics operations in airports, 
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seaports, and train stations in the supply chain. Secondly, operational aspects of transport 
are included. The best example of this is the terrorist group called the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which developed its own extensive and highly sophisticated 
network of forwarders and transport network in shipping (OECD 2003). These ships are 
in operation in the world of transport and funded by the LTTE for carrying weapons for a 
possible war against the Sri Lankan government. Thus, they are utilizing the transport 
system for possible terrorism in the future. Finally, the cargo itself is the object of 
terrorism which is actually moving through the supply chain. There are numerous cases 
especially with various kinds of illegal and dangerous goods loaded in moving containers 
in the supply chain. The explosion of dangerous cargo loaded in a ship named “Hanjin 
Pennsylvania” near Sri Lanka in 2002 and “Sea-Land Mariner” near Crete in 1998 are the 
most notable instances. Most containers in “Hanjin Pennsylvania” were seriously 
damaged and the ship lost its sea worthiness after the explosion (Figure 2. 1). Although 
legitimate cargo is loaded in a container, it can be utilized for terrorism purposes at any 
time (OECD 2003). 
 
Figure 2. 1 Explosion of dangerous cargo at “Hanjin Pennsylvania” in 2002 
 
Source: Commercial sources 
 
Vulnerabilities in the supply chain can have a huge impact on not only peoples’ lives but 
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lead to enormous economic losses. As for the U.S.A., Saxton (2002) pointed out that 
investment fell 2% because of the continued security threats in the supply chain.Farrow 
and Shapiro (2009) summarized the cost of potential terrorist attacks in the U.S 
transportation system which is shown in Table 2. 4. The cost estimations of various forms 
of terrorism on transport modes range from 1.1 billion to 421 billion U.S. dollars. Not 
only the economic loss from terrorism, but the enhancement of security also entails 
financial investment. This has been in the spotlight of several studies and it is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 2. 4 Costs of terrorists attack scenarios 
Author Attack Cost estimation 
Gordon et al. 2007 Aviation system $214 to $421 billion (not counting lives) 
Rose, Oladosu, Liao 
2007 
Los Angeles blackout 
$2.8 to $20.5 billion, depending on resilience 
(defined by the authors ability to respond to attack) 
Rosoff and 
Winterfeldt 2007 
Dirty bomb in ports in Los 
Angeles/Long Beach 
$130 million to $100 billion, depending on the 
length of the shutdown 
Gordon et al 2005 
Ports of Los Angeles/ 
Long Beach 
From $1.1 billion to $34 billion 
Park 2008 
Dirty bomb in ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach 
$34 billion in import/export losses. No estimate 
based on lives or property lost 
Cheng, Stough and 
Kocornik-Mina 2006 
Power plant attack in 
Washington DC 
$1.18 billion 
Abt 2005 Bioterrorist attack 
From $200 billion to $3 trillion; deaths from 
500,000 to 30 million 
Bae, Alaine and 
Bassok 2005 
Seattle highways From $1.2 to $1.5 billion 
Source: Adapted from Farrow and Shapiro (2009) 
 
Also, the Commonwealth of Australia (2003) analyzed the estimation of loss if terrorism 
were to take place in American ports, which is shown in Table 2. 5. The estimated 
financial and trade losses are huge, ranging from 1 billion to 500 billion US dollars from 
nuclear and biochemical terrorist attacks. It was also analyzed that the countries in the 
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) areas have less foreign direct investment 
because of piracy threats and maritime transport vulnerabilities.  
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Table 2. 5 Estimate of financial loss in terrorism of American ports (in US$) 
Categories Nuclear attack Biochemical attack 
Casualties 50,000 – 1,000,000 30,000 – 3,000,000 
Financial loss 50 billion – 500 billion 1 billion – 10 billion 
Trade loss 100 billion – 200 billion 20 billion – 200 billion 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 
 
2. 2. 1 Maritime terrorism on ships and ports 
Maritime terrorism refers to terrorism which takes place in areas touched by water such 
as ports and other related infrastructures (Quentin 2003). The security of shipping and 
ports is a critical part of international trade because most trading cargo moves through 
maritime transport (16,852 million tons in 2010/UNCTAD 2012). However, Hecker 
(2002) and Harrald et al. (2004) point out the difficulties of keeping the security level 
high in maritime transport because of the complexity of port operations. Van de Voort et 
al. (2003) stressed the importance of the security of the cargo by providing the fact that 
only 2% of the entire cargo goes through inspection at the destination. Also, the 
registration and ownership of ships are mentioned as security threats with those targets 
(OECD 2003). The flag of convenience policy in shipping allows terrorists to register 
ships with anonymous names which should be changed in order to keep the security level 
high by having all the information about ships, ports, and ownership issues clear (OECD 
2003). Also, piracy issues in the Malacca Straits and other areas of the world are also 
widely known security problems in maritime transport. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) announced that piracy incidents around the world occurred 445 times 
in 2010, 410 times in 2009, and 293 times in 2008 (Kim 2011).  
Since 1968, maritime terrorism incidents have totalled 134, which is less than 1% of the 
entire terrorism activities in the world. The reason why maritime terrorism has had so 
little attention from terrorists is that they can do it more easily on land or in the air, and 
maritime activities are somewhat unnecessary for them to fulfil their purposes (Murphy 
2007). However, from the point of international trade, maritime terrorism is of particular 
concern because in a case of terrorism, logistics activities for trade would be paralyzed, 
big cities in the hinterland of major ports would be highly affected by the terrorism, and 
therefore the results of maritime terrorism would be colossal (KMI 2007). Historically, 
the first widely known maritime terrorism attack was the Achille Lauro in 1985. Terrorists 
from the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) took more than 400 hostages and asked for the 
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release of 50 other terrorists from Palestine. During the incident, they killed one 
American hostage and caused a wide range of political problems among the U.S.A., Italy, 
Israel, and Palestine. It was an iconic maritime incident in terms of causing political and 
diplomatic tensions using maritime terrorism. The City of Poros, a Greek passenger ship, 
was another good example of maritime terrorism in 1988. Arabian terrorists threw 
grenades, nine people were killed and 98 were injured. Also, the Al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization, suicide-attacked the U.S. Navy missile destroyer called USS Cole when it 
was refuelling in the Yemeni of Aden in 2000. 17 people were killed and 39 were injured 
because of this event, and this is referred to as the biggest maritime terrorist attack on the 
American Navy after 1987 (Figure 2. 2). In 2004, the terrorist attack on the 10,000 ton 
Superferry 14 in the Philippines is widely known as the deadliest incident of terrorism at 
sea. 116 people were killed (63 from an explosion and 53 from jumping from the ship) 
and ultimately, the ship sank.  
 
Figure 2. 2 Suicide bombing on the USS Cole in 2000 
 
Source: Commercial sources 
 
Geographically, Africa had 43 incidents of maritime related terrorism, which is the 
highest number of incidents in the world, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
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and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf from 1968 to 2007. The most common type of 
terrorism uses explosive devices (71.6%), followed by armed attacks and hijacking (Table 
2. 6). There are several characteristics of maritime terrorism. Firstly, out of all the 
terrorism incidents in the world, maritime terrorism incidents are comparatively low in 
number. Maritime terrorism accounts for only 2 per cent of all terrorism in the world 
(MIPT 2007). Secondly, political terrorism normally occurs in the Middle East or the 
Persian Gulf, maritime terrorism normally takes place in Africa. Thirdly, the portion of 
terrorism using explosives is greater than that of other forms of terrorisms. Table 2. 7 
presents the type of maritime terrorism attacks in the past few decades introduced by 
Parfomak and Fritelli (2007).  
 
Table 2. 6 Categories of maritime terrorism 
Category Terror Injured Casualties 
Armed Attack 15 58 10 
Barricade/hostage 5 0 10 
Bombing 96 234 98 
Hijacking 9 1 2 
Kidnapping 7 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 
Unconventional attack 1 0 10 
Total 134 293 130 
Source: Commercial sources 
 
Table 2. 7 Example of maritime attack characteristics 
Dimensions Example characteristics 
Perpetrators 
-Al Qaeda and affiliates -Islamist unaffiliated -Foreign nationalists -Disgruntled 
employees  
Objectives -Mass casualties -Port facility disruption -Trade disruption -Environmental damage 
Locations -360+ US ports -165 foreign trade partners -9 key shipping bottleneck 
Targets 
-Military vessels -Cargo vessels -Fuel tankers -Ferries/cruise ships -Port facility area 
populations -Ship channels –Port industrial plants –Offshore platforms 
Tactics 
-Explosives in suicide boats –Explosives in light aircraft –Ramming with vessels –Ship 
launched missiles –Harbour mines –Underwater swimmers –Unmanned submarine bombs 
–Exploding fuel tankers –Explosives in cargo ships –WMDs(Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) in cargo ships 
Source: Parfomak and Fritelli (2007) 
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2. 3 Security initiatives 
After a series of terrorism incidents and the tragic event of the 9/11 attack, the U.S.A. 
started to set out comprehensive plans to cope with a terrorists attack. As a counter 
measure to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and a growing increase in terrorism all over the 
world, the U.S.A. and the U.N. started to create various kinds of security initiatives. 
Essentially, this started from passenger security of air transport systems, and then the 
attention shifted to the development of better security systems for shipping and inland 
cargo transportation in order to regulate the movement of weapons of mass destruction to 
the U.S.A. There are two kinds of security measures regarding the security of maritime 
transportation. First, maritime trade related security initiatives exist such as ISPS code, 
24-hour advance manifest rule, and maritime Container Security Initiatives. In particular, 
the ISPS code is a mandatory rule for all member states enrolled in the IMO which has a 
direct impact on the operation of imports/exports in numerous ports in the world. 
Moreover, Container Security Initiative (CSI) has been implemented in the biggest 
trading ports in the world which also has a huge impact on maritime security. A 24-hour 
advance manifest rule has been enforced since 2003, and transport operators are 
responsible for transmitting information about the cargo to the customs department of the 
U.S.A. The other kind of security initiatives are supply chain security certification 
programs. There are various kinds of voluntary security programs in existence such as the 
AEO (Authorized Economic Operator), ISO28000 (International Standardization 
Organization), and C-TPAT (Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). They 
have different focuses, but they are all based on voluntary participation. Table 2. 8 
presents the overview of these security programs being implemented around the world.  
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Table 2. 8 Overview of global security initiatives 
Category Organization Regulations Other 
Shipping/port 
security 
U.S.A. Safe port act 
US-based evaluation of foreign ports’ 
security and ships’ tracking system 
Compulsory 
IMO ISPS code 
UN-based compulsory application of 
security regulations to all ships under 500 
tons 
Compulsory 
Container security 
United States US-based 100% container scanning Compulsory 
WCO 
UN-based container scanning regulations 
if necessary 
Voluntary 
Supply chain 
security 
certification 
C-TPAT US-based export related certification Voluntary 
WCO Framework 
UN-based mutual recognition of security 
between countries 
Voluntary 
ISO 28000 
UN-based field-based security 
management standard certification 
Voluntary 
Cargo information 
notification 
24 hour rule,  
10+2 rule 
US-based Cargo information notification 
rule 
Compulsory 
WCO cargo 
information 
notification 
UN-based Cargo information notification Voluntary 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
Also, Figure 2. 3 presents the timeline of the implementation of security initiatives in the 
world. From the event of 9/11 in the U.S.A., various kinds of voluntary and compulsory 
security programs have been developed. Before 9/11 event in 2001, the only 
maritime/supply chain security related initiatives were the SOLAS Convention from the 
IMO in 1988. This shows how important the 9/11 event was to the world and the 
development of various security initiatives from the U.S.A. and the U.N.  
 
Figure 2. 3 Timeline of global security initiatives after 9/11 attacks in the U.S. 
 1988 2001 2002 2004 2007 2009 2014 
U.S.  9/11 
C-TPAT, 
CSI 
24- Rule SFI 10+2 
100% 
scanning 
ISO     ISO28000   
WCO    
SAFE 
Framework 
   
IMO 
SOLAS 
Convention 
 ISPS Code     
Source: Author 
Note: ISO: International Organization for Standardization, WCO: World Customs Organization, IMO: 
International Maritime Organization, C-TPAT: Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, SFI: Secure 
Freight Initiative, 10+2: Importer Security Filing, CSI: Container Security Initiative, ISO28000: 
Specification for security management systems for the supply chain, SAFE Framework: Authorized 
Economic Operator, ISPS code: International Ship and Port Facility Security code, SOLAS Convention: 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
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2. 3. 1 Supply chain security certification programs 
The U.S.A. adopted a security related private and public partnership program called C-
TPAT in April of 2002. The WCO (hereafter World Customs Organization) adopted the 
‘Framework of Standard to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade’ in 2005 which is normally 
implemented as AEO (hereafter Authorized Economic Operator) around the world. 
Countries like Singapore adopted their own private and public partnership supply chain 
security programs called STP (hereafter Secure Trade Partnership). ISO (hereafter 
International Organization for Standardization) adopted an industry-based program called 
ISO28000 to secure the supply chain (Table 2. 9). Security certification programs focus 
on obtaining a certain level of security requirements in the supply chain. If they are 
certified, several benefits will be awarded to facilitate trade and spread the certification to 
other companies. Contrary to the mandatory maritime security rule led by the U.S.A. and 
the U.N. to enhance the level of security, most security certification programs aim to 
facilitate the trade and flow of goods by providing several benefits when they are certified. 
There are various kinds of security certification programs worldwide and the next section 
of this chapter introduces the most popular programs being implemented. 
 
Table 2. 9 Various security certification programs  
Countries Name Scope of Application Date of Enforcement 
The U.S.A. 
C-TPAT (Customs and 
Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism) 
Importer (US based) 
Transport Operators 
Manufacturer  
(Foreign based) 
4. 2002. 
European Union 
AEO (Authorized 
Economic Operator) 
All companies under 
customs regulations 
1. 2008. 
Singapore 
STP (Secure Trade 
Partnership) 
Companies in Singapore 5. 2007. 
World Customs 
Organization 
SAFE Framework 
All companies 
participating in the 
movement of goods across 
borders 
8. 2006. 
International 
Organization for 
Standardization 
ISO28000 
All companies in the 
supply chain 
5. 2005 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
2. 3. 1. 1 C-TPAT (Customs and Trade Partnership against Terrorism) 
C-TPAT is a US based voluntary security program that aims to obtain security across the 
supply chain involving various participants. This program was started in April 2002. The 
companies that can apply for the certification are: importers, shipping companies, airline 
  22 
companies, road transport operators, forwarders, terminal operators, and foreign 
manufacturers. The foreign manufacturers are normally in adjacent countries to the 
U.S.A.: Canada and Mexico. These countries have massive numbers of trucks because of 
the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). In order to be certified, companies 
should meet the requirements of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the U.S.A. 
There are many benefits for being C-TPAT certified: 1) reduction of cargo inspection and 
delays at borders 2) Account manager support at customs 3) low risk importer status for 
low risk companies 4) Special account support for tariff payment. Diop et al. (2007) 
analyzed various aspects of adopting C-TPAT and found that the biggest advantage is the 
reduction of cargo release lead time followed by cargo inspection time, cargo pilferage, 
and the safety of employees (Table 2. 10). The biggest additional advantages were less 
delay and the quicker moving of shipments through customs and borders followed by 
wanting to see the real advantages from non C-TPAT members and more education on C-
TPAT certification. It is fair to say that the biggest advantage that the certified companies 
can obtain is related to the faster, safer, and more efficient cargo movement in customs 
and borders. Table 2. 11 presents the U.S.A., E.U., and Singapore based security 
certification programs.  
 
Table 2. 10 Additional benefits of being C-TPAT certified 
Additional benefits n 
% of 
responses 
Less delay/quicker moving shipments through customs/borders 100 19.2 
Want to see other actual benefits/recognition/differenti100ation from non C-TPAT 
members 
88 16.9 
More training, awareness, conferences, and education about the C-TPAT program 62 11.9 
Improved communications 59 11.3 
Lower costs or lower taxes if C-TPAT certified 45 8.6 
Less exams, inspections, fines, or penalties if C-TPAT certified 42 8.1 
Security related issues 29 5.6 
No additional benefits- the program is currently fine 25 4.8 
No additional benefits needed- it’s too early to tell 15 2.9 
Other 56 10.7 
Total 521 100 
Source: Diop et al. (2007), p. 51.  
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Table 2. 11 Security certification programs (U.S.A., E.U., and Singapore based) 
C-TPAT (U.S.A.) AEO (EU) STP/Plus (Singapore) 
Business partner requirements 
Business partner requirements 
Outside service 
Business partner requirements 
 
Container security Container security Cargo security 
Transport mode security Transport security Transport security 
Regulation of physical contact Entrance and exit regulation Infrastructure and access control 
Worker/people security Worker/people security Worker/people security 
Procedural security Procedural security - 
Physical security 
Physical security, procurement, 
storage, manufacture, 
warehousing 
Infrastructural security and access 
control 
Information technology security Accounting and logistics system Information technology security 
- - - 
- Security evaluation Risk evaluation 
- 
Corporate information/size and 
customs tariff statistics 
- 
- Legal compliance - 
- Financial resources - 
- - Accident/risk management, 
security management system 
  
  
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
2. 3. 1. 2 AEO (Authorized Economic Operator) 
AEO was adopted by the WCO in order to facilitate the cargo movement especially in 
trading activities. Because the security of cargo is becoming more and more important, 
the smooth flow of trading cargo should be guaranteed in order to cope with the 
inefficiencies of the security activities. WCO adopted the program and suggested to 
worldwide customs departments to create partnerships with private organizations. The 
purpose of this program is to guarantee a high level of security and the smooth flow of 
goods at the same time. In particular, in order to minimize the inefficiencies that higher 
security might cause, the AEO aims to provide various benefits to customs procedures of 
international moving goods around the world. The ‘SAFE Framework’ was adopted in 
June 2005, and ‘Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) guidelines’ were adopted in the 
general assembly of the WCO in June 2006. All companies that are subject to customs 
clearance are applicable to this program. There are various benefits for being AEO 
certified: 1) quick customs clearance, quick transhipment, and reduction or storage costs 
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2) access to customs information 3) priority measures are taken in an emergency 4) 
priority is given when special care for cargo is needed. AEO also offers a mutual 
recognition policy between two countries. If AEO is approved by the partner country, 
then the cargo will be treated the same way as it is certified domestically. It is basically 
trying to minimize the number of cargo inspections, security procedures, and other 
security related costs of customs and borders. Thus, it aims to facilitate the global trade 
with enhanced level of security around the world. There are currently 366 companies that 
are AEO certified in Korea (KITA 2008), and there are several countries that have agreed 
to mutual recognition recently which is shown in Table 2. 12.  
 
Table 2. 12 Mutual recognition agreement of AEO 
Category 
US ↔  
New Zealand 
US ↔ Jordan US ↔ Canada 
Japan ↔ 
New Zealand 
US ↔ Japan 
Place of 
agreement 
Brussels 
(WCO) 
Brussels 
(WCO) 
Brussels (WCO) Japan Brussels 
Agreed date 6. 2007 6. 2008 6. 2008 5. 2008 6. 2009 
Negotiation 
period 
1. 6 years 1. 6 years 1. 6 years 1 year 2. 2 years 
Mutual 
recognition 
focus 
Export 
companies in 
New Zealand 
Export 
companies in 
Jordan 
Export 
companies in 
Canada 
Export 
companies in 
both countries 
Export 
companies in 
Japan 
Benefits 
Reduction in 
number of 
inspection, fast 
customs 
clearance 
Reduction in 
number of 
inspection, fast 
customs 
clearance 
Reduction in 
number of 
inspection, fast 
customs 
clearance 
Reduction in 
number of 
inspection, 
fast customs 
clearance 
Reduction in 
number of 
inspection, fast 
customs 
clearance 
Affiliated 
security 
program 
C-TPAT in the 
U.S.A. 
C-TPAT in the 
U.S.A. 
C-TPAT in the 
U.S.A. 
N/A N/A 
Source: Adapted from KITA (2008) 
 
2. 3. 1. 3 ISO28000 
ISO28000 is a global security standard adopted by the International Organization for 
Standardization in 2005. It is a business system that can manage security threats in the 
supply chain that is applicable to all kinds of organizations such as logistics, service, and 
manufacturing companies. This program aims to prevent the threats and risks of 
smuggling and terrorist attacks, and establish a security oriented business management 
system. The program includes various aspects of business management principles that can 
plan, implement, sustain, and develop the requirement for security. The development of a 
global standard for security can upgrade the level of security for companies. The benefits 
for being certified are: 1) to upgrade the level of trust and reliability 2) improved security 
management 3) a better relationship with the trading partners. Despite being a non-
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governmental organization, the ISO standard has a huge impact on the supply chain 
because their standard is widely adopted by many countries in the world. The ISO28000 
has a unique feature compared to other security initiatives which is the “security risk 
assessment procedure”. This is focused on preventing and minimizing the risks of 
security breaches and incidents in any kind of emergency situation. Gutiérrez et al.  
(2007) conducted an empirical study on the impacts of voluntary security programs and 
found that improving the corporate image and reduction of smuggling and theft were the 
most important benefits perceived by companies (Figure 2. 4). Peleg-Gillai et al. (2006) 
and Lee and Whang (2005) also conducted a study on supply chain security and found 
that supply chain security initiatives are beneficial for improving business efficiency, theft, 
reduction in customs inspection time which is consistent with the findings from the study 
conducted by the Diop et al. (2007). However, the program is still in its infancy. In Korea, 
Choi and Choi (2010) and Lee et al. (2010) found that in Korean companies, the 
perception of supply chain security initiatives and their importance are quite low 
compared to their importance to the Korean economy. Hwang and Min (2009) conducted 
a study on the comparison of perception of ISO28000 and supply chain security between 
Korean and foreign firms. It was found from the study that the perception of supply chain 
security was low in Korean firms compared to foreign companies.  
 
Figure 2. 4 Potential security programs benefits ranked by degree of importance 
Source: Gutiérrez et al. (2007) 
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2. 3. 2 Maritime security programs 
2. 3. 2. 1 ISPS code 
As for the security of ports and ships, the most important security related initiative is the 
ISPS code. The ISPS code is different from other voluntary security initiatives in that it is 
a set of compulsory regulations for all member states registered in the IMO. The ISPS 
code was driven by the IMO and the U.S.A. after the 9/11 attacks. It became effective 
from 2004, after a series of diplomatic debates in 2002 to organize the best solution for 
the security of ships and ports. The ISPS code is a version of the amendment of the 
SOLAS (Safety of Life At Sea) convention which was developed in 1974 at the U.N. The 
SOLAS convention had a chapter of security related measures, but it was more focused 
on the safety of passengers in a maritime context (KMI 2007). After 9/11, with an 
additional chapter on maritime security regulations, the ISPS code was developed. There 
are basically five categories with a series of regulations: 1) regulations on contracting 
governments 2) regulations on ships 3) regulations on shipping companies 4) regulations 
on ports and 5) regulations on documentations and certification. There are two parts: part 
A and part B. The most widely recognized feature of the ISPS code is part A which is a 
set of compulsory regulations (Bichou 2004). First of all, all passenger and cargo ships 
over 500 tons and mobile offshore drilling units should prepare an authorized ships 
security plan by the related governmental agencies (Brooks and Pelot 2008). It should be 
designed in three steps of the level of security. Step 1 is a normal condition, and step 2 
and step 3 should be connected to stronger security related measures in terms of a crisis. 
Second, port facilities also have to prepare a security plan according to the risk level 
based on a security evaluation. This includes all kinds of inspections and regulations of 
dangerous cargo such as weapons and inflammable chemicals. The process of security 
planning is similar to that of ships in the ISPS code, and the security of a port is affiliated 
and linked to the security of ships at the same time (KMI 2008). This is because the 
security level can be different according to the ships that are carrying different types of 
dangerous cargo. For instance, port security level 3 requires no cargo stevedoring 
activities, no ships’ operations at the same time. Also, the ISPS code requires shipping 
companies to keep to the various kinds of regulations. Shipping companies must have a 
ship security officer and a company security officer for the ships’ security planning. In 
particular, the ship’s security officer should implement the security plan with close 
collaboration with the port security officer. The company security officer should 
implement the consulting and the ships’ security evaluation process. For this, shipping 
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companies must guarantee the security related education of the captain and security 
officers. There are many other compulsory regulations. Companies should prepare a 
certificate of ship’s security after a series of inspections from an authorized agency for 
security of ships and ports. This is especially important because without this certificate, a 
ships’ operation is banned (KMI 2006). The ships’ identification number from the IMO 
and continuous synopsis record (official certificate of ship’s history) are also required to 
strengthen the security of the ships. An identification and tracking system for ships have 
been required to be loaded on all ships over 300 tons since 2008. Finally, captains of ships 
have more authority to secure the security of ships. A captain can refuse some cargo to 
load or people from embarkation if it is considered dangerous to do so even if the cargo is 
cleared by customs. Table 2. 13 shows the outline of ISPS code and selected US-led port 
and maritime security measures and Table 2. 14 presents the United Nations-based 
security initiatives regulations.  
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Table 2. 13 Outline of ISPS code and selected US-led port and maritime security measures (compiled from IMO, 2004 and CBP, 2006) 
 Aim Legal arrangements Targets/participants Main requirements and responsibilities Inspection and certification 
IS
P
S
 c
o
d
e 
-Security of maritime network 
-Prevention of terrorism threats 
-International 
amendments to SOLAS 
1974 mainly: 
ISPS code and the new 
SOLAS XI-2 chapter 
1. Ship: 500+ GT vessels engaged 
in international voyage 
2. Ship-owning or operating 
company 
3. Port facility, MODUS included 
when in port or in transit 
4. Port/port operator 
5. Contracting government 
1/2. Install SSAS & AIS. Keep security records. 
Display SIS. Provide security equipment. Develop 
SSP. Appoint SSO & CSO. Undertake SSA. Keep 
records. Carry out training & drills. → Obtain ISSC 
3/4. Undertake PFSA. Develop and implement PFSP. 
Appoint PFSO. Provide security equipment. Carry out 
security training & drills.  
5. Nominate designated authority and RSO. Approve, 
review and certify SSP, PFSP/PFSA. Set and notify 
appropriate security levels. Issue CSR. Issue & verify 
ISSC. Exercise compliance measures. Communicate 
information to IMO.  
1/2. ISSC issued by flag-state 
government or RSO (e.g. 
classification society) for ships and 
shipping companies. 
Maintenance of certification is up to 
5 years for ISSC. 
Interim ISSC is valid for 6 months.  
3/4. Validity period of PFSP/PFSA 
compliance statements is to be 
decided locally by the contracting 
government. 
N
o
n
 I
S
P
S
 U
S
 m
ea
su
re
s C
S
I 
Secure container trading 
systems/ lanes between major 
foreign ports and the USA. 
Bilateral agreements 
between the US customs 
and foreign countries or 
port authorities 
Foreign ports (US ports under 
reciprocity) with substantial and 
direct waterborne container traffic 
to the USA. 
Establish security procedures to identify high-risk 
container cargo. Work with deployed CBP officers to 
target containers at risk. Provide NII equipment for 
container screening & inspection. 
Validation process and risk 
assessment mechanism (updated 
regularly). 
2
4
-h
o
u
r 
ru
le
 
Identify/target high-risk US-
bound cargo (including cargo 
being transhipped or remaining 
on-board the ships) 24 hours in 
advance of loading on board 
vessels. 
Compulsory regulation, 
not applicable to bulk 
cargo 
Ocean carriers or their agents, 
Licensed or registered NVOCCs. 
Electronic reporting to CBP, via AMS and 24 hours 
prior to loading at foreign ports, of complete manifest 
information (14 data elements) for all cargo on board 
ships calling in US ports, even if the cargo is being 
transhipped or continues on the ship to a third country 
after it departs the US. 
CBP identification and/or clearance 
of transmitted information, Non-
issuance or delay of permits to 
unload suspected cargo, or cargo 
with incomplete or late advance 
manifest, 
Penalties may also apply. 
Source: Adapted from Bichou (2008) 
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Table 2. 14 Overview of United Nations-based security initiatives regulations 
Category ISO 28000 WCO Framework IMO ISPS code 
General 
Requirement 
Security management 
system building and 
implementation 
- - 
Security 
Guidelines 
CEO should approve the 
security guidelines as 
documents 
- Security declaration 
Security Risk 
Evaluation and 
Planning 
Security risk evaluation - 
Shipping company/port 
infrastructure security 
evaluation 
Legal and other related 
regulations 
Customs regulations 
Commercial management 
Financial availability 
Shipping company/port 
infrastructure requirement 
Security management 
objectives 
- - 
Specific security 
objectives 
- - 
Security programs - - 
Operation and 
Implementation 
Security management - Security officer 
Security Training Education and training Training and education 
Communication Counsel, communication - 
Documentation - 
Security plans 
(ports/shipping) 
Data control Information exchange - 
Operational management 
Cargo, building, 
transportation, people, 
trading partner security 
Shipping and port 
infrastructure security 
Emergency plans Emergency management Emergency plans 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Security monitoring Crisis management - 
System evaluation Measurement - 
Security incident 
prevention 
Analysis - 
Documentation Improvement - 
Evaluation - - 
Future 
Improvement 
Continuous evaluation Certification - 
Operational 
Method 
Evaluation/Certificate Evaluation/Certificate Evaluation/Certificate 
Leading 
Governmental 
Body 
Department of knowledge Customs department 
Ministry of maritime 
affairs and land 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources 
 
2. 3. 2. 2 United States Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002  
The United States Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 primarily reflects the 
position of the U.S.A. to strengthen the security of maritime transport. There are several 
features of this law. First, the evaluation of ships’ and ports’ security vulnerabilities is 
required. Also, security planning for shipping, Automated Identification System (AIS) for 
ships, and a declaration of cargo manifest are required. These regulations are almost the 
same as those of the ISPS code in the IMO. However, the difference is that the United 
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States can evaluate the level of security in foreign ports outside the country. This means 
that they can regulate the shipping service based on this law if the foreign ports seem 
vulnerable to any kinds of security threat (KMI 2007). If the security level of foreign 
ports seems vulnerable, the U.S.A. can run the port security program in the foreign port, 
or even ban the ships from those ports from entering American ports. From this legal 
initiative, not only can the U.S.A. set rules for national ships and ports, but they can also 
evaluate the level of security of foreign ports which are the origin of exporting cargo 
outside the country. This implies that if foreign ports are not following the standards of 
the U.S.A.’s security regulations, they can regulate foreign ships from entering American 
ports. Namely, it is fair to say that the United States, the biggest victim of the 9/11 attacks, 
wants to globalize and somewhat force foreign countries to follow their security rules and 
regulations (KMI 2007).  
 
2. 3. 2. 3 CSI (Container Security Initiative) 
The United States adopted the CSI to strengthen the maritime transport and supply chain 
security. It aims to identify and inspect all the containers that carry dangerous cargo at the 
port of origin going to ports in the U.S.A. The objective of the CSI is to examine 
containers especially in countries that have massive numbers of containers in the export 
trade bound for the U.S.A. The bilateral agreement has been made between customs 
departments of both countries, and now there are 58 countries implementing this initiative 
worldwide accounting for almost 85% of the containers going to the U.S.A. There is an 
additional security requirement called the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) which demands 
100% scanning of the containers with special detection facilities. There are several ports 
that are implementing the SFI with varying degrees of implementation level which are 
shown in Table 2. 15 below marked with an *. Yang (2011) analyzed the perceptions of 
the CSI and 24-hour rule on Taiwan’s shipping industry and found that most risk factors 
related to both initiatives belong to moderate level risks and proposed various risk 
management strategies such as insurance and loss prevention. The research was focused 
on analyzing the impact of risk factors related to the CSI on the transport industry in 
Taiwan by adopting the risk management matrix and found that keeping the right balance 
between supply chain security measures and efficiency aspects is one of the most 
important factors for the maritime industry. The ports implementing the CSI initiative are 
shown in Table 2. 15.  
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Table 2. 15 Ports implementing CSI initiative 
Location Ports implementing CSI (SFI*) 
America 
Montreal, Vancouver, and Halifax, <Canada> Santos, <Brazil> Buenos Aires, 
<Argentina> Puerto Cortes*, <Honduras> Caucedo, <Dominican Republic> 
Kingston, <Jamaica> Freeport, <The Bahamas> Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo, 
<Panama> Cartagena, <Colombia> 
Europe 
Rotterdam, <The Netherlands> Bremerhaven and Hamburg, <Germany> Antwerp 
and Zeebrugge, <Belgium> Le Havre and Marseille, <France> Gothenburg, 
<Sweden> La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, <Italy> 
Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, <United 
Kingdom> Piraeus, <Greece>, Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia, <Spain> 
Lisbon, <Portugal> 
Asia/Middle East 
<Singapore*>, Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, <Japan>, <Hong Kong> 
Pusan*, <South Korea> Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, <Malaysia> Laem 
Chabang, <Thailand> Dubai, United Arab Emirates <UAE> Shenzhen and 
Shanghai<China>, Kaohsiung and Chi-Lung<Taiwan> Colombo, <Sri Lanka> 
Port Salalah*, <Oman> Port Qasim, <Pakistan> Ashdod, Haifa, <Israel> 
Africa Alexandria, <Egypt> Durban, <South Africa> 
Source: U.S.A. official website of the Department of homeland security online (2013) 
Note: compiled in the order of Ports, <Country>  
 
It has been mentioned that the initiatives from the U.S.A. focus more on the application 
of security initiatives in the U.S. territories which means that although geographic 
coverage is smaller than those developed by the U.N., the scope of participating 
companies in the supply chain is much bigger and wider (Bichou 2008). Although 
maritime security regulation measures are covering a smaller scope of organizations 
compared to supply chain security certification initiatives, they all are connected to other 
organizations in the supply chain to meet the regulatory framework of security programs. 
It is clearly shown from Figure 2. 5 that supply chain security measures also involve 
various organizations in the supply chain. The ISPS code, which covers the smallest 
number of organizations in the supply chain, also involves ports, ships, and governments 
that have to comply with various security regulations. Thus, maritime security measures 
also can be seen as a form of broader sense of supply chain security measures. The 
difference between those two is that maritime security measures, especially the ISPS code, 
is a mandatory requirement, while other supply chain security measures are voluntary. 
Also, although they are both strengthening security, voluntary supply chain security 
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measures are also aiming to facilitate trade among organizations in supply chains.  
 
Figure 2. 5 Security initiatives and the scope of their application to the supply chain  
 
Source: KITA (2008) 
 
2. 3. 2. 4 100% container scanning and 24 hour advance manifest rule  
100% container scanning requires the exporting country to scan and inspect all the 
containers bound for the U.S.A. The CSI is trying to maximize the cargo security coming 
into ports in the U.S.A. and ensure the safety and resilience of the global supply chain. 
Unless the containers are scanned before coming into ports in the U.S.A., access will not 
be granted. The CSI is aiming for the maximum level of security in all paths of importing 
containers bound for the U.S.A. This needs additional investment on inspection related 
facilities in ports with varying degrees of standards and specifications. However, the grant 
of this new initiative was deferred by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) until 
July 2014 considering the significant and negative impact it can have on global trade.  
The 24 hour advance manifest rule requires specific information of the containers bound 
for the U.S.A. The manifest, which specifies that all the information about the cargo such 
as consignor, consignee, weight, and price, should be submitted to the U.S.A. based AMS 
(Automated Manifest System) electronically 24 hours before loading by transport 
operators. This initiative has two advantages. First, U.S. customs can obtain detailed 
information about the arriving containers from overseas, and second, containers can be 
scanned and inspected at ports in the U.S.A. if necessary. Thus, this initiative can be 
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utilized as a supplementary program to the CSI. The 24-hour advance manifest rule has 
been implemented in ports with cargo going to the U.S.A. since the 4
th
 of May 2003. The 
requirements of the 24 hour rule for transport operators are shown in the Table 2. 16 
below. 
 
Table 2. 16 Requirements of 24 hour rule  
Category 24 hour rule requirements 
Shipper -Must give shipping information (15 points) to shipping companies 
Shipping Companies 
-Report to U.S.A. customs 24 hour before cargo loading  
-Report to U.S.A.-based destination ports about the information of 
unloading cargo 
Responsibility When Violating 
-Non-permission of unloading the cargo 
-5000$/per penalty if violating 
-Detainment of ship and confiscation of cargo if weapons of 
Mass-destruction are found 
Other Shipper/Shipping 
Companies Measures 
Shipper 
-Shippers should provide information of the cargo to 
the shipping companies 72 hour before loading 
-Shippers should carry into ports 24 hours before 
departure of ships 
Shipping 
Companies 
-Shipping companies should report to the U.S.A. 
customs 24 hours before loading 
-Cargo loading plan should be made before the end of 
loading 
Other Issues 
-Cargo information should be correct (expressions such as FAK, 
consolidated cargo, said to contain are not allowed) 
Source: KITA (2009) 
 
2. 4 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented the general background of supply chain security with a special 
emphasis on supply chain security initiatives. It illustrated the global trend of the growing 
threat of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks and showed how the international society 
responded to this political and diplomatic change by setting high security standards for 
supply chains and ports. In particular, there are various voluntary and compulsory 
security programs which are practically driving the world to be more secure from various 
threats in the supply chains. As for ports, the ISPS code has been implemented as a 
compulsory rule for all major ports around the world since 2004. These programs involve 
a series of organizations in supply chains and have now become a ‘must’ for transport 
industries. The next chapter presents an academic review of supply chain risk 
management, supply chain security, risk and security of ports, and port performance.  
 
 
 
  34 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
THE CONCEPT OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT,  
SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY, RISK AND SECURITY OF PORTS,  
PORT PERFORMANCE, AND SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ORIENTATION 
 
3. 1 Introduction  
This chapter of the thesis introduces the critical literature review related to supply chain 
risk management, supply chain security, and port performance. The purpose of this 
chapter is to propose the academic background to this study. This chapter introduces: 1) 
the major concepts utilized in this study, 2) how previous studies have been undertaken 
according to each concept, and 3) the research gap derived from previous studies. Section 
3. 2 starts with the concept of supply chain risk, which provides the fundamental 
understanding of supply chain risk management and its various risk sources. After that, 
section 3. 3 provides definitions of supply chain security and suggests previous studies in 
its four different categories. Section 3. 4 presents the risks and security of ports. Next, 
section 3. 5 explains port performance and its measurement. After that, section 3. 6  
introduces the SCSO framework suggested by Autry and Bobbitt (2008). In section 3. 7, 
research gap is derived from previous studies, and briefly outlines what has to be done 
academically to fill the research gap. Finally, section 3. 8 concludes this chapter.  
 
3. 2 Supply chain risk management 
3. 2. 1 Risk in the supply chain 
It is important for every study to correctly define the terminology related to the concept of 
risk because it has various meanings, definitions, and interpretations (Baird and Thomas 
1990). Historically, there have been various types of studies conducted on the concept of 
risk and its application in the fields of Decision Theory (Arrow 1965), Finance 
(Markowitz 1952), and Marketing (Cox 1967). However, risk as a managerial concept has 
long been a focal point of research for numerous studies so far (Zsidisin 2003). The origin 
of risk concept can be found in the mathematical study of gambling by Blaise Pascal and 
Pierre de Fermat in the 17
th
 century (Frosdick 1997). It was then applied to various fields 
of study such as Purchasing (Robinson et al. 1967) and Economics (Williamson 1979). In 
a business management context, it is applied to numerous concepts such as Strategy 
(Ruefli et al. 1999), Operation Management (Pagell and Krause 1999), and Finance 
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(Chow and Denning 1994). It is related to the behaviour and attitude that influences more 
than just the results and possibilities of things when it comes to the concept of risk 
(Bernstein 1996). Moore (1983) mentioned that the concept of risk has two important 
aspects: 1) the varying degrees of results, and 2) their possibilities. All these definitions 
include these elements: 1) the possibility of events; 2) the result of those possible events; 
3) other causal outcomes from these possible events (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986). 
There are various definitions of the concept of risk as a managerial concept which are 
summarized in Table 3. 1 below. 
 
Table 3. 1 Summary of definitions of risk 
Authors Definitions 
Rowe (1980) 
Risk is the potential for unwanted negative consequences to arise from an 
event or activity 
March and Shapira (1987) 
Risk refers to the negative variation in business outcome variables such as 
revenues, costs, profits, etc. 
Lowrance (1980) Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects 
Miller (1991) 
Risk refers to the variance in outcomes or performance that cannot be 
forecasted ex-ante 
Yates and Stone (1992) 
Risk is an inherently subjective construct that deals with the possibility of 
loss 
Chiles and Mackin (1996) Risk refers to the possibility of loss 
Mitchell (1999) 
Risk is defined as a subjectively determined expectation of loss; the greater 
the probability of this loss, the greater the risk 
Sitkin and Pable (1992) 
Risk is the extent to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially 
significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized 
Source: Adapted from Rao and Goldsby (2009) 
 
Holton (2004) mentioned that there are few clear definitions of the concept of risk in the 
extensive risk management studies. This is because of the argument of two sides: one side 
argues that risk encompasses not only the positive outcomes, but also negative results 
(Mitchell 1995). The first notion is the process of creating positive or negative outcomes 
by making choices under risk pressure/risk taking situations (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Arrow 1965). The other side is arguing that risk is referring to the negative 
outcomes only rather than the positive ones (Khan and Burnes 2007; Lowrance 1980). 
Simon et al. (1997) also argued that risk is predominantly related to the negative effects 
on performance. Mitchell (1999) and Rowe (1980) mentioned that risk refers to internally 
and subjectively perceiving the sense of loss. Harland et al. (2003) also stated that risk is 
related to possibilities which may lead to unwanted outcomes. March and Shapira (1987) 
stated that a negative perception of risk is general in most peoples’ minds which is found 
in several quantitative business studies. Wagner and Bode (2008) also stated that risk is 
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related to the negative and downside of business performance in the context of supply 
chain management. Wagner and Bode (2008) argued that risk is a multi-dimensional 
concept and that there should be the best definition for each context rather than trying to 
find one definition that can be applied to every situation. Based on this background, this 
study follows the negative downsides of risk in the business environment because this 
study falls into the category of business management studies and focuses more on the 
negative side of risk such as the impact that various types of terrorism and catastrophes 
have on supply chains and its minimizing strategies than ‘positive accidents’ or 
‘intentional gambles’ on risks.  
 
The concept of risk was traditionally focused more on problems in the product flow and 
information data before the 1990s (Treleven and Schweikhart 1998). From a supply chain 
point of view, there have been traditional negative security threats and risks in the supply 
chain due to intensive global competition and an increased flow of international trade 
(Sarathy 2006). However, after terrible incidents such as the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.A. in 
2001 and a series of catastrophic events such as the Asian tsunami after the 2000s, supply 
chain managers and researchers started to pay more attention to risk management 
strategies and security issues. The threat of terrorism and risks grew so much bigger in the 
2000s than the traditional comprehension of risks (Manuj and Mentzer 2008), and risk 
management started to take the supply chain perspective rather than a single firm 
approach (Gould et al. 2010). Many studies (Sheffi 2005; Zsidisin and Ritchie 2008; 
Wagner and Bode 2008) started to explore various types of risk and security issues in the 
supply chain and provide the best solution to minimizing the possibility of risky events. 
Lin et al. (2006) argued that companies are more sensitive now to adverse accidents and 
problems in their complicated supply chain management. Helferich and Cook (2002) 
mentioned that firms are facing bigger risks of number, scope, and intensity of accidents 
than before. Elkins et al. (2005) also pointed out that these accidents and disruptions in 
the supply chain take place on a bigger scale. Generally, supply chain risks concentrate 
more on types of risk such as various acts of theft, pilferage, and terrorism pertaining to 
the various supply chain activities (Paulson 2004). Continuing on from the concept of risk, 
there have been many studies conducted on the types of supply chain risk sources which 
are explained in the next section.  
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3. 2. 2 Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) 
Supply chain risk management can be seen as part of a broad view of general risk 
management practices (McCormack 2008). Tang (2006) argued that the way of dealing 
with risks should be connected to the concept of the supply chain which can be seen as 
overall supply chain risk management. It concentrates its focus on the flows of the supply 
chain processes (Paulsson 2004), and because the general notion of risks has been 
extended by the event of the 9/11 terrorism attacks, it began to take the supply chain 
standpoint which goes beyond the previous understanding of risk and vulnerability 
concepts (Manuj and Mentzer 2008). Norman and Lindroth (2002) also stressed that 
supply chain risk management is related to the activities trying to minimize risks with 
supply chain members. Just like the definition of risks, there are numerous ways to 
approach the concept of supply chain risk management. Definitions of supply chain risk 
management are summarized in Table 3. 2 below.  
 
Table 3. 2 Definitions of supply chain risk management 
Authors Definitions 
Christopher (2002) 
“SCRM is the management of external risks and supply chain risks 
through a coordinated approach among supply chain members to reduce 
supply chain vulnerability as a whole” 
Norrman and Lindroth (2002) 
“SCRM is to, collaboratively with partners in a supply chain, apply risk 
management process tools to deal with risks and uncertainties caused by 
or impacting logistics-related activities or resources” 
Tang (2006) 
“SCRM is the management of supply chain risks through coordination or 
collaboration amongst the supply chain partners so as to ensure 
profitability and continuity” 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008) 
“(Global) SCRM is the identification and evaluation or risks and 
consequent losses in the global supply chain and implementation of 
appropriate strategies through a coordinated approach among supply 
chain members with the objective of reducing one or more of the 
following- losses, probability, speed or event, speed of losses, the time 
for detection of the events, frequency, or exposure- for supply chain 
outcomes that, in turn, lead to close matching of actual cost savings and 
profitability with those desired” 
Jüttner et al. (2003) 
“SCRM aims to identify the potential sources of supply chain risk and 
implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain supply chain 
vulnerability” 
Source: Adapted from Rao and Goldsby (2009) 
 
3. 2. 3 Identifying supply chain risk sources   
There has been growing academic interest in supply chain risk management practices in 
the past few years (Jüttner 2005; Wagner and Bode 2008; Seshadri and Subhramanyam 
2005; Paulson 2004). Instead of analyzing the risk concept at a firm level, it was stressed 
by Christopher (2002) and Tang (2006) that risk management practices and strategies 
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should be studied at a supply chain level. However, there are few studies that clearly 
investigate the sources of risk in the supply chain (Kouvelis et al. 2006). Instead, there 
are a number of studies that categorize the sources of supply chain risks which can be 
differentiated from other types of business/management-related risks. There are many 
different types of frameworks and typologies proposed by many scholars that categorize 
and classify the concept of supply chain risk based on different types of scope and 
application levels according to the various types of industry. The point is that the types of 
risks introduced are all different. According to Richie and Marshall (1993), there are five 
dimensions of risk: environmental, industry, organizational, problem-specific, and 
decision maker related factors. These factors constitute overall risk in the organizations. 
Also, Tang and Tomlin (2008) categorized risk into six dimensions: supply, process, 
demand, intellectual property, behavioural, and political and social risks. Chopra and 
Sodhi (2012) classified risk into: delays, systems, intellectual property, procurement, 
receivables, inventory, and capacity. Moreover, Sinha et al. (2004) classified risk into: 
standards, technology, practices, and supplier risks. Finch (2004) categorized risk into 
three groups: organizational, inter-organizational, and application risks, and Wu et al. 
(2006) divided risk into internal and external factors for inbound logistics flows from a 
firm level analysis. Natarajarathinam et al. (2009) expanded the model proposed by Wu et 
al. (2006) by extending the application from a firm level to the whole supply chain with 
variations in the internal and external risk factors categorization.  
Jüttner et al. (2003) categorized risk into three groups: internal, external, and network 
related risk. Wagner and Bode (2008) proposed five areas of risk: demand side, supply 
side, regulatory, legal and bureaucratic, infrastructure, and catastrophic risk. Other ways 
of classifying risks and typologies can be found in several studies such as Mason-Jones 
and Towill (1988), Peck (2005), and Cousins et al. (2004). Based on these diverse 
classifications, it is true that the types of risks are different in every industry and its 
application should be also different (Vanany et al. 2009). Table 3. 3 summarizes the types 
of supply chain risk. 
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Table 3. 3 Summary of types of supply chain risks 
Authors Categories of supply chain risks 
Jüttner et al. (2002) External risk, internal risk, and network related risk 
Huchins (2003) Corporate governance and homeland security 
Cavinato (2004) Physical, financial, informational, relational, and innovational risks 
Tang and Tomlin (2007) 
Supply, process, demand, intellectual property, behavioural, political and social 
risks 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) 
Delays, systems, forecast, procurement, receivables, inventory, capacity, and 
disruptions 
Christopher (2002) Supply chain risks and external risks 
Zsidisin et al. (2000) 
Quality, availability, supplier, legal, design, cost, environmental, health and 
safety 
Johnson (2001) Supply and demand risks 
Wu et al. (2006) Internal and external factor based risks 
Wagner and Bode (2008) 
Demand side, Supply side, regulatory, legal and bureaucratic, infrastructure, 
and catastrophic risks 
Sources: compiled by the author from various sources 
 
3. 2. 4 Supply chain risk mitigating strategies 
In order to reduce the number of risks in the supply chain, there are several suggested 
strategies to build more resilient supply chains. The two most commonly accepted 
strategies are: having multiple sourcing/procurement or better relationships within the 
supply chain. Vanany et al. (2009) and Zsidisin (2003) suggested outsourcing and 
multiple sub-contracting strategies which will reduce the risk of overdependence on a 
single partnership. Jüttner et al. (2003) suggested that having a better relationship and 
cooperation with the supply chain members will reduce the overall risk in the supply 
chain. Building long term relationships such as strategic alliances and supplier selection 
will be effective in reducing risk (Zisidisin et al. 2000; Zisidisin et al. 2003). Zisidisin 
(2000) suggested strategic alliances, Smeltzer and Sirderd (1998) proposed supplier 
improvement programs. Another strategy such as product differentiation was proposed by 
Lonsdale (1999) who suggested that risk mitigating strategies are mostly related to the 
quality of relationships with the supply chain members or better procurement/supply 
network in the supply chain. Table 3. 4 summarizes the various strategies that were 
adopted, and next section outlines the concept of supply chain security. 
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Table 3. 4 Risk management strategies adopted by scholars 
Approaches Authors 
Purchasing partnerships Ellram (1991) 
Multiple sources of supply vs. single sourcing 
Treleven and Schweikhart (1998), Kraljic 
(1983), and Zsidisin (2003) 
Supplier quality/auditing/certification programs 
Smeltzer and Siferd (1998), Newmand et 
al. (1993), and Zsidisin (2003) 
Supplier improvement programs Smeltzer and Sirderd (1998) 
Closer working relationships with suppliers 
Zsidisin et al. (2000), Zsidisin and 
Ellram (2003), and Eisenhardt (1989) 
Communication and early involvement of suppliers in strategic 
decisions 
Krause (1999) 
Buffer Newman et al. (1993) 
Strategic alliances Zsidisin et al. (2000) 
Risk sharing/ knowledge transfer 
Eisenhardt (1989), Zsidisin et al. (2000), 
and Krause (1999) 
Focus on core competence Zsidisin et al. (2000) 
Product differentiation Lonsdale (1999) 
Entrepreneurial/ risk taking 
March and Shapira (1987) and Lonsdale 
(1999) 
Proactive supply management 
Smeltzer and Sifered(1998) and Kraljic 
(1983) 
Source: Khan and Burnes (2007) 
 
3. 3 The concept of supply chain security 
Supply chain risk management is academically in a developing stage and there are many 
areas that have not yet been explored (Vanany 2009). As an initial starting point of 
describing supply chain security, Jüttner et al. (2003) proposed four fundamental sub-
concepts that comprise the supply chain risk management concept based on literature 
review and filed work: risk sources, risk consequences, risk drivers, and risk mitigating 
strategies. Because supply chain security, one of the main concepts in this study, can be 
regarded as a part of risk mitigating strategies (Williams et al. 2008), this study follows 
the classification of supply chain risk management proposed by Jüttner et al. (2003). Risk 
sources and consequences are uncertain environmental and organizational factors that 
cannot be predicted. Risk sources can be divided into three categories: environmental, 
network related, and organizational risk sources. Environmental risks refer to any 
unexpected accidents such as natural disasters, tsunami, or political strikes. Network 
related risks refer to the problems in the relationships of the supply chain members 
(Jüttner et al. 2003). Organizational risks refer to various uncertain problems within the 
supply chain from human resources to information technology. From the supply chain 
point of view, network related risks are problems with the relationships, and 
environmental and organizational risks are external uncertainties with the supply chain 
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(Das and Teng 1998). Risk mitigation strategies refer to the plans that companies or 
organizations undertake to avoid any kind of risks and uncertainties (Miller 1992). Figure 
3. 1 shows the basic constructs of supply chain risk management categorized by Jüttner et 
al. (2003). The construct has four conceptual categorization: (1) risk sources refer to 
identifying the types of risk sources in the supply chain, (3) assessing/identifying supply 
chain risk drivers in the supply chain strategy which can increase the level of risk, (4) 
identifying the risk mitigating strategies for supply chains which can mitigate the level of 
supply chain risk, and (2) adverse supply chain risk consequences. 
 
Figure 3. 1 Supply chain risk management conceptual categorization 
 
Source: Adapted from Jüttner et al. (2003) 
 
In this particular construct, supply chain security can be seen as part of the risk 
management strategies to reduce the overall risk in the supply chain, and it is this 
particular form of supply chain risk management strategy that is more related to social 
and political risks rather than other type of risks such as natural disasters or catastrophic 
events, and the aim of supply chain security is to reduce the total number of risks in the 
supply chain (Williams et al. 2008). Therefore, supply chain security is a part of risk 
mitigating strategies aiming to reduce the overall risk in the supply chain. Supply chain 
security is a smaller conceptual construct compared to supply chain risk management, and 
this became an independent area of research mainly after 9/11 in the U.S.A (Gould et al. 
2010). The conceptual descriptions of supply chain and supply chain risk management are 
shown in Figure 3. 2. 
 
Risk Drivers 
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Figure 3. 2 Conceptual categorization of supply chain security  
 
Source: Author 
 
The topic of supply chain security has nowadays become an independent area of research 
in supply chain management studies (Gould et al. 2010). First of all, understanding the 
concept of supply chain vulnerability is important to understand the concept of supply 
chain security risks. The term risk and vulnerability are used interchangeably, and it is 
widely accepted that security is utilized to upgrade the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
business practices and minimize the vulnerabilities of the supply chain (Gould et al. 
2010). Although Peck (2005) and Jüttner et al. (2003) mentioned its immatureness as an 
academic concept, there are various definitions of supply chain vulnerability. According 
to Wagner and Bode (2006), vulnerability refers to the weak point in the supply chain 
which makes it sensitive to undesired outcomes. Christopher and Peck (2004) defined it 
as “an exposure to serious disturbance”. Barnes and Oloruntoba (2005) mentioned that 
supply chain vulnerability is a perceived susceptibility to loss or damage due to 
organizational processes or practices and argued that there are multiple vulnerabilities in 
the supply chain such as complexity, lack of transparency, and complicated 
interconnections of transport industry. Jüttner et al. (2005) argued that supply chain 
management activities are essentially quite vulnerable, and Francis (2008) mentioned that 
a lack of visibility leads to difficulties in dealing with supply chain vulnerabilities. 
However, the common notion is that security can be seen as a tool or strategy to enhance 
Supply Chain 
Risk Management Supply Chain 
Risk Mitigating 
Strategies 
 
 
Supply Chain Security 
  43 
the efficiency level to make the supply chain less vulnerable (Gould et al. 2010). Supply 
chain security goes beyond the supply chain as an organizational concept where 
vulnerabilities can take place anywhere in the supply chain according to its structure and 
activities. This requires analysis of the vulnerabilities, operation, and design of supply 
chains in order to improve the level of security. There are three aims for supply chain 
security: enhanced security level, better efficiency, and improved resilience to security 
accidents (Gutierrez et al. 2007). Conceptually, security originally meant an insurance 
policy from harm and difficulties (Fairchild 1944). Sometimes, it referred to activities 
which minimize human emotions such as fear and apprehension (Sullivan 1941; Berne 
1947). Actually, the concept of security has two meanings: 1) ‘a general sense of well-
being, and a confidence in the continuity of the present, especially business, conditions’. 
2) ‘any modifications made to supply chain processes, both organizational and technical, 
that are taken to prevent undesired events from taking place, such as theft, terrorism, 
crime, or sabotage’ (Gould et al. 2010, p.291). Before 2007, the concept of security was 
widely used in the literature without any proper definition (Gould 2007), and security is 
often related to the risk minimizing activities of a country or a nation from external 
dangers or risks (Newman and van Selm 2003). Table 3. 5 summarizes the definitions of 
supply chain security. 
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Table 3. 5 The summary of definitions of supply chain security  
Definitions Sources 
“Supply chain security management covers all processes, technologies and 
resources exploited in a systematic way to fight against end-to end supply chain 
crime; the primary goal of each single supply chain security measure is either to 
prevent a crime, to detect a crime, or to recover from a crime incident in the fastest 
possible time; single supply chain security measures fall typically within one of the 
following five categories: cargo, facility, human resources, information technology, 
and business network; the typical supply chain crime includes theft, smuggling, 
counterfeiting, sabotage, blackmailing for financial gain, terrorism for destruction, 
and any type of fraud and corruption (the detailed crime definitions subject to 
national and international regulations)”. 
Hintsa et al. (2009) 
“Within IBM, supply chain security is defined as protecting products, facilities, 
equipment, information, and personnel from theft, damage, or terrorism, and 
preventing the introduction into the supply chain of unauthorized people, 
contraband, or weapons of mass destruction or effect. Such weapons, for example, 
are capable of inflicting grave destructive, psychological and/or economic damage, 
and include chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or explosive weapons”. 
Fletcher (2007) 
“Supply chain security management is the application of policies, procedures, and 
technology to protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, 
information, and personnel) from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the 
introduction of unauthorized contraband, people, or weapons of mass 
destruction/effect into the supply chain”. 
Crutch (2006) 
“The application of policies, procedures, and technology to protect supply chain 
assets (product, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) from theft, 
damage, or terrorism and to prevent the introduction or unauthorized contraband, 
people or weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain (Closs and McGarral 
2004, p.8)”.  
Williams et al. 
(2009); 
Voss et al. (2009); 
Whipple et al.(2009); 
Williams et al.(2008) 
Source: Adapted from Gould et al. (2010), p. 292. 
 
From a supply chain and transportation point of view, supply chain security was 
particularly in the spotlight of many practitioners and academics after the events of 9/11 
(Williams et al. 2008; Christopher and Peck 2004). The risks of terrorism grew at the 
highest level, and the security of logistics and transportation became stronger both at the 
national and private company level. At the private company level, hiring a private 
security company could be seen as a historical example of strengthening supply chain 
security in the construction of the railway from the east to the west coast of the U.S.A 
(Williams et al. 2008). Also, boosted by the global movement against terrorism and 
security from the U.N. and its international legal enforcement such as the ISPS code, the 
security of the supply chain has become one of the biggest national concerns for 
practitioners and academics. The security of logistics involves all the members and 
aspects of the supply chain such as products, transportation, people, and information 
(Sarathy 2006). It is important to maintain and deal with security issues considering its 
importance and the possible impact it might have (Quinn 2003).  
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One of the problems of the concept of supply chain security is the lack of well-established 
definitions (Gould et al. 2010). However, as has also been suggested by Williams et al. 
(2008), this study follows the definition of the supply chain security by Closs and 
McGarrell (2004) which is: ‘the application of policies, procedures, and technology to 
protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) 
from theft, damage, or terrorism and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized 
contraband, people or weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain’.  
 
3. 3. 1 Categories of the studies conducted on supply chain security 
The previous studies on supply chain security can be divided into four categories: 1) 
intra-organizational, 2) inter-organizational, 3) both intra and inter-organizational, and 4) 
no security efforts in the organization (Williams et al. 2008). The first category; intra-
organizational security efforts means internal security endeavours and efforts to secure 
the supply chain. Prevention strategy is widely considered as an example of internally 
securing the supply chain from a governmental or private company level (Cha 2000). This 
includes all kinds of activities such as packaging, facility control, and prohibiting people 
from accessing (Rice and Spayd 2005; Knight 2003). The two particular types of 
prevention strategies are: inventory control (Knight 2003) and detection (Sheffi 2005). 
Inventory control normally includes multiple inventory sources management in order to 
reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions (Martha and Subbakrishna 2002). Also, 
instead of “Just In Time” (JIT) management, having more transportation and logistics 
services available would be an effective strategy to deal with supply chain security 
breaches. On the other hand, the detection process normally involves security-purpose 
video recording devices (Knight 2003). This can identify security emergencies so that 
organizations can cope with the problems in the supply chain. Other approaches such as 
adopting Total Quality Management and Six Sigma are suggested by Williams et al. 
(2008) to enhance the security in the supply chain. These measures can enhance the 
efficiency level of intra-organizational security. However, culture of the organization is 
mentioned as the most important part of the internal security efforts. There are numerous 
studies that show that the culture of an organization can have a positive impact on the 
performance of the supply chains (Whitfield and Landeros 2006; Hult et al. 2007; Mello 
and Stank 2005). Many studies have pointed out that the culture of security can be critical 
in developing and cultivating the overall security efforts permeated in the organization 
(Sheffi 2005; Rick and Spayd 2005; Williams et al. 2009). Also, creating a positive 
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culture towards security can make employees more vigilant and sensitive about attacks 
and disruptions of the supply chain (Christopher and Peck 2004; Peleg-Gillai et al. 2006; 
Rick and Caniato 2003).  
 
An inter-organizational approach means coordinating all the activities related to security 
with affiliated organizations in the supply chain. It is widely recognized that supply chain 
security normally involves many organizations which means that the concept goes 
beyond a single firm (Gould et al. 2010). The Intra-organizational view is focused more 
on the internal aspect of the coordination of security, while the inter-organizational view 
concentrates its focus more on the relationship with other entities in the supply chain. 
Closs and McGarrell (2004) suggested three levels of relationships of supply chain 
security: 1) basic, 2) typical, and 3) advanced. The level of relationships and partnerships 
is the critical part of supply chain security (Sheffi 2001). The most widely recognized 
change in the relationships of supply chain entities has been the development of various 
voluntary/mandatory security programs from the U.N. and the U.S. After 9/11, there have 
been many different types of security programs with different levels of involvement from 
private/public entities in the supply chains. The most widely implemented programs are: 
ISO28000, AEO, CSI, and the ISPS code. These programs require partnerships and better 
relationships between public and private organizations in order to enhance the level of 
security which is an example of inter-organizational supply chain security efforts. These 
programs are critical in affecting the level of security based on meeting the standardized 
security requirements. In particular, public and private partnerships are strengthened by 
C-TPAT certification in America (Sheu et al. 2006). Other studies also support the fact 
that C-TPAT certification enhances the relationships and partnerships (Thibault et al. 
2006; Diop et al. 2007). However, although good relationships among supply chain 
members are important for supply chain security (Sheffi 2005), not all the relationships 
are at the same level, thus it is not a prerequisite condition to have a certain level of 
security for all the organizations in the supply chain (Williams et al. 2008). Different 
approaches for different levels of security are required for the organizations in the supply 
chain. The point is, the deeper the relationship, the better the level of supply chain 
security becomes (Rick and Spayd 2005; Sheffi 2005; Rick and Caniato 2003). 
 
Williams et al. (2008) argued that both intra-organizational and inter-organizational views 
can be found in the concept of Supply Chain Security Orientation introduced by Autry 
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and Bobbitt (2008). The levels of awareness in supply chain security can positively 
impact on the performance of organizations, and it was introduced as a cultural 
phenomenon that affects the mind set of people and security activities in the organization. 
It is the awareness and behaviour of the employees that can affect the level of security in 
the supply chain. This encompasses various external and internal factors including intra-
organizational and inter-organizational approaches. The Supply Chain Security 
Orientation is the interim research framework as a starting point for this study, and it is 
explained in detail in Chapter 5. Ritter et al. (2007) also suggested approaching supply 
chain security from an internal security evaluation and external cooperation with the 
supply chain members’ point of view. This approach encompasses both external and 
internal directions of security in the organization.  
 
However, there are also companies reluctant to adopt any security related measures 
(Eggers 2004; Thibault et al. 2006). This category includes the various financial 
investments and cost/benefits analysis of adopting security initiatives for organizations 
which is critical for companies. Diop et al. (2007) mentioned that possible benefits of an 
enhanced security level can be perceived by companies in the United States such as better 
visibility, reduction of cargo inspection time, security of employees, and reduction of 
cargo theft. Sarathy (2006) mentioned various costs and benefits according to security 
from a supply chain efficiency and effectiveness standpoint which is shown in Table 3. 6. 
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Table 3. 6 Costs and benefits of security-related supply chain enhancements  
Effect on Supply Chain Efficiency Supply Chain Effectiveness 
Costs/negative 
impacts 
-Cost of security related technology  
investments-which may deter  
approval of necessary investments 
-Time to implement security  
processes 
-Additional personnel cost of  
security-related hiring 
-Multiple standards across partners  
and countries, as solutions still under 
development and field evaluation,  
leading to duplication and  
communication difficulties 
-Higher costs of deliberate  
redundancy, emergency inventory, 
reserve capacity 
-Increased security-related cycle time  
stretching out delivery 
-Supply chain partner choices constrained by 
security profile and capabilities 
-Difficulties in integrating enhanced supply 
chain information with exiting manufacturing 
and marketing databases 
-Security-related costs passed on to users in 
the form of incremental user fees 
-Cost and complexity of compliance with 
government-mandated security measures and 
regulations 
-Under-investment in security due to difficulty 
of quantifying their long-term benefits 
Benefits/positive 
impacts 
-Enhance security 
-Reduced pipeline and buffer stock 
inventories due to better information 
-Better shipment tracking 
-Reduced pilferage 
-Reduced out of stock states 
-Enhanced customer service, due to greater 
supply chain visibility 
-Reduced delays caused by security concerns-
“green lane” 
-Supply chain redesign aided by wider  
availability of accurate and timely metrics 
Supply chain redesign leading to robust and 
resilient supply chains 
-Improved linkage of market demand with 
manufacturing schedules and quantities 
Source: Adapted from Sarathy (2007) 
 
Firms are clearly gaining the benefits of having increased security such as better supply 
chain visibility, supply chain efficiency, customer satisfaction, and inventory management. 
Despite the benefits, some firms are reluctant to adopt security initiatives. Thibault et al. 
(2006) mentioned that there are many companies in the U.S.A. that have not adopted any 
security measures. The main reason is the cost related to security initiatives. The biggest 
challenges that organizations have to face are the financial aspects of security 
(Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005). Bernasek (2002) mentioned that it takes over 65 
billion U.S.$ to improve security in the supply chain. From a maritime transport point of 
view, OECD (2003) estimated various costs of security measures. For ISPS code 
compliance costs for American ports, it reached 963 U.S.$ for the initial cost, and 509 
million U.S.$ for the annual cost. For shipping, direct costs for ships and vessel 
management, it reached 304.4 million U.S.$ for direct cost only. The financial investment 
is what keeps companies from actively adopting security measures. Because the pre-
mentioned benefits are long-term advantages, and costs are short-term disadvantages 
which makes organizations reluctant to invest in security (KMI 2007). Some companies 
cannot even find reasons to invest in security hoping their supply chains will have no 
disruptions or problems in the future, or all the companies are negatively affected by 
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those breaches in the supply chain which also makes companies become reluctant invest 
in security (Williams et al. 2008). Finally, there have been some studies that focused on 
the effects of disruptions in possible risks such as the closure of ports for emergency 
situations. Saywell and Borsuk (2002) analyzed and estimated the effect of the closure of 
the ports in the U.S. on other economies and found that economic loss accounted for 
almost 1.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong 
Kong combined. Hamilton (2002) analyzed the simulation of a war scenario in U.S.A 
based ports for 8 days and found almost 50 billion U.S.$ of economic loss which is 
shown in Figure 3. 3 below.  
 
Figure 3. 3 Port security war game  
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2003) 
 
In terms of the ISPS code, initial investment in ship identification, security planning and 
alarm systems would reach 19.8 billion U.S.$ (OECD 2003). The U.S. based security 
program C-TPAT also required a considerable amount of investment in partnership 
building, security training, security threat planning, and operational costs (KMI 2006). 
Goulielmos and Anastasakos (2005) suggested that financial investment in port security 
should be seen as part of a global shipping policy instead of disturbing the smooth flow of 
international cargo transportation. There have been a few studies that have approached the 
financial investments of security using survey questionnaires and the risk modelling 
approach. First, UNCTAD (2007) found that the implementation of the ISPS code would 
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cost 0.08 US$ for a ton and 3.6 US$ for a TEU (Twenty feet Equivalent Unit). Other than 
financial issues, it has also been shown that ports showed positive responses (64%) to 
assessing the applicability and legitimacy of the ISPS code to port operation, and smaller-
sized ports have to make more financial investments in terms of implementing the ISPS 
code. This requires many things including security related equipment and an 
infrastructure which needs a certain amount of investment which is different according to 
the size of the ports. It has also been shown that theft and other crimes are considerably 
reduced because of the indirect impact of the ISPS code. Mazaheri and Ekwall (2009) 
concluded that with the ISPS code, a higher level of security and costs are the 
consequences of applying the code into the port operation. Table 3. 7 shows the summary 
of OECD and USCG estimates of ISPS code cost compliance for ports in US$ millions. 
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Table 3. 7 Summary of ISPS ex-ante cost estimates as computed by various regulatory risk assessment impacts 
Source of 
Estimates 
Cost Items Scope 
Initial 
costs 
Annual 
costs 
Total costs over 10 years 
(2003-13)@7% DFC 
USCG 
Total ISPS US ports 
226 port authorities, of which 5000 facilities are computed 
(from Fairplay) ISPS Parts A&B MARSEC Level 1 
1125 656 5399 
Total ISPS US-SOLAS and non-SOLAS 
vessels subject to the regulation 
3500 US-flag vessels, as well as domestic and foreign non-SOLAS 
vessels (i.e. operating in US waters) (ISPS parts A&B MARSEC level 1) 
218 176 1368 
Automated Identification System 30 1 50 
Maritime Area (contracting government) 47 COTP US zones 120 46 477 
OSC facility (offshore installations) 40 U.S. OCS facilities under US jurisdiction 3 5 37 
U.S. cost for ISPS implementation (ISPS parts A and B) 115 884 7331 
Cost of elevating MARSEC level from  
1 to 2 
Based on a twice MARSEC level 2 per annum, each for 21 days 16 per day 
UK Total ISPS UK port facilities 430 facilities (ISPS part A MARSEC level 1) 26 2.5  
OECD 
Total ISPS UK-flagged ships and 
company related costs 
620 UK flag vessels (ISPS part A, MARSEC level 1) 
(calculation based on an exchange rate of UK=￡1.6 USD) 
7.4 5.2  
AIS 
Based on 43,291 international commercial fleet of more than 1,000 
GT(passenger and cruise vessels not included), MARSEC level 1, ISPS 
part A only 
649.3 Undecided  
Other vessel measures 115.11 14.6  
Ship operating companies 1163.89 715.4  
Total ships & shipping companies 1279 730  
PFSA, PFSA, PFSP 2180 port authorities worldwide of which 6500 facilities are computed 
(from Fairplay) (ISPSA only MARSEC level 1) 
390.8 336.6  
Total ISPS ports Undecided Undecided  
Global cost for ISPS implementation (MARSEC level 1, ISPS part A only) Undecided Undecided  
Australian 
Government 
Total cost for Australia 70 Australian flag ships, 70 ports and 300 port facilities 240 AUD 240 AUD  
Source: Adapted from Bichou (2005) (USD $ million standard, except for Australia where costs are expressed in 2002 AUD $ million) 
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3. 4 Risk and security of ports 
Ports are a complicated mixture of natural characteristics, infrastructure, and other 
facilities linked by various transport modes to other ports and hinterland (Kidd and 
Stumm 2005). Because they are related to the national infrastructure and commercial 
activities, they are exposed to a variety of risks in their operation. Risks in ports are a 
mixture of the possibility of risk perception and the outcome (Srikanth and Venkataraman 
2007). In other words, it is a mixture of the possibility of hazardous perception and its 
outcome (Srikanth and Venkataraman 2007). Risk assessment for ports should start with 
an analysis of the hazards in ports that can damage environment/property or hurt 
people/stakeholders (Maanu and Ora 2004). Not only ports themselves, but there are 
numerous organizations involved that are using ports as customers also face variety of 
risks that could possibly happen in ports. Therefore, ports, as economic gateways for 
cargo and people, are places of various types of risk (Chlomoudis et al. 2010). Normally, 
ports face usual risks that are related to operational and environmental factors because of 
the geographical, economical, and political coverage (Handley-Schachler and Navare 
2010). There are various types of risks such as theft of freight (Conley 2000), acts of 
terrorism (Atkinson 2002), and risks related to employees (Saundry and Turnbull 1999). 
Also, they face risks related to the connections to hinterlands and other ports including 
inland transport companies, forwarding companies, and other modes of transportation 
(Handley-Schachler and Navare 2010). Also, collisions of ships have made ports focus 
more on navigational safety (Chin and Debnath 2009). These maritime connection/traffic 
related risks have been coupled with other themes such as safety and distribution 
accountability (Chlomoudis et al. 2010). Ronza et al. (2003) analyzed 828 port accidents 
from the early 20
th
 century and built an event possibility model called a ‘tree model’ 
which can be utilized to predict future accidents in ports. Darbra and Casal (2004) 
analyzed 471 port incidents and found more than half (57%) of the accidents take place 
during transportation. Alderton (2004) and Darbra et al. (2007) constructed a ranking of 
the most dangerous accidents which occurred in ports, and Debnath and Chin (2010) 
analyzed various types of ship collisions. Pinto and Talley (2006) provided cycles of the 
security incidents of ports in the U.S.A with four stages: prevention, detection, response, 
and recovery, and showed how ports have responded and recovered to the series of port 
security incidents.  
Environmental risks in ports are quite diverse. Yip et al. (2002) provided an 
environmental categorization of port pollution sources, and Van Der Veen and Kolk 
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(2002) analyzed how ports deal with environmental issues according to future strategies 
with other affiliated organizations. Also, environmental accidents in ports include 
pollution related subjects such as water quality downgrading (Grifoll et al. 2010), air 
quality degradation for example the eruption of toxic chemicals (Peris-Mora et al. 2005). 
Sharma (2006) offered a typology of port pollution: oil spillage, air, noise, ship scraping, 
ballast water control, dredging, toxic substance emissions, and diesel. Bailey and 
Solomon (2004) analyzed the impact of air quality degradation which has shown that the 
effect of air pollution on ports can be huge. EcoPorts (2009) analyzed 122 ports in 20 
European countries and found that noise pollution was the biggest environmental risk 
followed by air quality in the European port industry as a whole. Chang and Reuveny 
(2010) also suggested that climatic disasters caused by climate change might hinder the 
growth of the global seaborne trade. Few academic studies have focused on the topic of 
natural disasters such as earthquakes in ports (Na and Shinozuka 2009). Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 renewed attention on ports showing diverse threats from natural disasters 
(Government Accountability Office 2007). The best example for this is the damaged 
infrastructure after Hurricane Katrina in the port of New Orleans in 2005 (Machalaba 
2005; Roberts et al. 2005).  
Ports also face business related commercial risks such as customer demand variation and 
supplier capacity (Comtois and Dong 2007). The fluctuation of demand and supply for 
port management can be critical in covering the costs investment in infrastructure, 
construction, and other partnership building costs. Also, financial risks exist such as 
currency exchange rate and interest rate fluctuation. Although Handley-Schanchler and 
Navare (2010) mentioned that the overall risks suggested by previous studies so far are 
not effective in describing possible risks in ports, several types of risk in ports have been 
suggested. Table 3. 8 presents the summary of various types of risk in ports. 
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Table 3. 8 Risks in ports 
Risk Studies and reports 
Security 
Examples: import of illegal goods, terrorism, piracy in coastal waters, 
attacks on shipping in harbours, hijacking, arson 
Influences: political factors, strength of security forces, ability to patrol 
installations, tariffs and other economic factors affecting the market for 
contraband goods 
Vagg (1995), Conley (2000), Enders 
and Sandler (2002), Price (2004), 
United States Government Accounting 
Office (2005), Spayd (2006) and 
Spielmann (2007) 
Environmental 
Examples: effects on the environment, including artificial alteration of 
coastlines and waterways, destruction of natural habitats, import of alien 
species, channelling of epidemic illnesses, air, water and soil pollution, oil 
spills in coastal waters; loading and unloading oil and other cargoes, 
effects of the natural environment, including coastline changes, epidemics 
affecting employees, natural disasters 
Influences: nature of projects, location and natural environment inflation 
rates, services delivery timescales 
Wheeler (1993), McEwan (1994), 
Larcerda et al. (1996), Christen (1999; 
2004). Navare (2001), Stanaway et al. 
(2001), Nunes and van den Bergh 
(2004), Perakis and Yang (2004), 
Bowers (2005), Machalaba (2005), 
Phillips and Crossen (2005), Roberts et 
al. (2005), Batabyal and Beladi (2006), 
Ruquet (2006) and Shine (2007) 
Operational 
Example: risks that may affect employees, owners or environment, 
including, accidents, shipping movements, including movements of oil 
tankers, and large and small boats, loading and unloading oil and other 
cargoes, ferry services; cargo storage and forwarding operations, human 
error and mismanagement, industrial disputes 
Influences: raining, quality of facilities, geographical features, expertise in 
risk management, quality of partnership arrangements 
Fowler and Sogard (2000), McLeod 
(2001), Ronza (2003), Wang et al. 
(2004), Turnbull (2006), and Bragdon 
(2007) 
Financial 
Examples: interest rates on borrowing, ability to refinance projects at a 
later date, currency fluctuations affecting foreign currency loans, residual 
values of land and buildings 
Influences: supply and demand for loan capital, central bank interest rates 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981), Turnbull 
and Wass (1995) and Glaister (1999) 
Demand 
Examples: sufficiency of demand to cover costs of infrastructure and other 
fixed costs 
Influences: global trade, hinterland connectivity and access to other ports, 
quality, location and suitability of the service offered, competition 
Rimmer (1998) and  
Comtois and Dong (2007) 
Supply-side 
Examples: design, construction time and cost, ongoing cost of service 
provision, service interruptions, connectivity 
Influences: efficiency of construction and service, quality of construction, 
supply and demand for labour, supply and demand for labour, supply and 
demand for raw materials, partnerships arrangements, hinterland 
connectivity and access to other ports, geological factors and rescue 
archaeology affecting construction 
Yochum and Agarwa (1987), Turnbull 
and Wass (1995), Razzaque (1996), 
Compes Lopez and Poole (1998) and  
Roberts et al. (2005) 
Source: Adapted from Handley-Schachler and Navare (2010) 
 
On the other hand, port security can be defined as: “the absence of and/or the perception 
of the absence of threat to port assets, cargoes, and the ship-port interface from 
unauthorized acts (personnel, procedures, and technology) to reduce the threat and/or the 
perception of threat to port assets, cargoes, and the ship-port interface from unauthorized 
acts” (Talas and Menachof 2010). It can be viewed as an important part of the risk 
management process of ports (Harrald et al. 2004). The security aspects of maritime 
transport and ports have been in the spotlight mainly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 
the adoption of global security initiatives such as the ISPS code, CSI, and the 24 hour rule 
(Helmick 2008; Shin 2006; Stasinopoulos 2003). Although various types of risk have 
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always existed in ports, the security of ports has suddenly become one of the most 
important agendas of the maritime society since 9/11 for most countries in terms of global 
trade (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; KMI 2007; KMI 2008; Bichou 2004; Choi and 
Choi 2010). Actually, despite the dearth of studies on port security, many studies on the 
topic stress the importance of the security initiatives like the ISPS code and its impact on 
assessment (Pinto and Talley 2006; Stasinopoulos 2003; Goulielmos and Anastasakos 
2005; Bichou 2004). It was primarily driven by the U.S.A and the U.N. in order to 
strengthen national security after realizing their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and this 
led to the adoption of the ISPS code in the U.N. which created worldwide maritime 
security initiatives (KMI 2006). As explained in detail in Chapter 2, the ISPS code has a 
mandatory part A that government, shipping companies, and major trading ports enrolled 
as the member states in the IMO have to comply with. Goulielmos and Anastasakos 
(2005) argued that these security measures such as the ISPS code should be viewed as a 
shipping policy that facilitates trade and transport rather than hindering the movement of 
cargo in the maritime supply chain. KMI (2008) analyzed and compared the perceptions 
of port security in Korea and the ISPS code implementation in two different categories: 
port group and port user group. They found that the two groups both agreed that 
balancing port security and efficiency is a critical part of port security. Also, the groups 
both agreed that it was important to have security education and better security related 
information technology in ports. However, it was found that there were difference 
perceptions on how to finance the capital investment in security in the two groups which 
needs detailed analysis for future research. Moreover, the security level was shown that it 
is not a critical factor in selecting ports for port users. Also, Banomyong (2005) and Yang 
(2011) analyzed the impact of the CSI program on maritime supply chains and found that 
security requires financial investment and risk management strategies to balance both the 
trade facilitation and security. In particular, Banomyong (2005) stressed that CSI in 
Taiwan will enhance the security level of the maritime trade which will inevitably lead to 
more opportunities for trade in terms of accessibility to the global market. Thibault (2006) 
found that maritime container security initiatives lead to a better public and private 
partnership in the U.S.A based on interviewing people in shipping companies, port 
security, and terminal security officers. In addition, Thai (2007) found that in Vietnam, 
improvement of security levels have a significant impact on service quality. In particular, 
a better corporate image and trust from customers are chosen as the biggest benefits and 
this leads to a better perceived service quality of maritime transport services. Furthermore, 
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Choi (2008) argued that container security initiatives can lead to the development of the 
customs procedure in Korea in terms of better crisis management and advanced cargo 
management systems.  
On the other hand, another topic of study on port security is the role of technology 
especially the RFID technology in maritime transport and port security. OECD (2005) 
mentioned that the security of containers is important in maritime supply chains because 
they are moving through the supply chains including ocean carriers, road, rail, and inland 
waterways. Lun et al. (2008) argued that RFID technology can enhance container 
transport security in supply chains. RFID tags have many benefits in terms of tracking the 
information of cargo and containers which can lead to a higher level of security in 
containers and ports. Han and Choi (2010) stressed the role of RFID tags in order to track 
cargo through the maritime supply chains to have better visibility and transparency of 
cargo movement. Kim et al. (2007) and Han (2008) also stressed the role of RFID and 
technology in upgrading the security of ports and maritime supply chains in times of 
terrorism and crises. KMI (2009) conducted a study on the growth of the global security 
technology industry after 9/11 and found it has become a 3000 million U.S.$ business 
because the security technology market is a fast growing market driven by the global 
trend of a higher level of security in maritime transport and ports. They also argued that 
those who dominate the standard of security technology in advance will be the key to 
success in the business. Deulbecco and Laporte (2005) mentioned that investing in 
information technology systems and infrastructure to enhance the level of security will 
upgrade the efficiency of work for transport operators. Chao and Lin (2009) found that 
security affects the perception of convenience and cultural aspects of employees that lead 
to the adoption of container security services composed of RFID technologies. However, 
the studies conducted on the topic are mainly limited because little attention has been 
paid to them (Lun et al. 2008), and they are predominantly descriptive (Banomyong 
2005), and conceptual (Brooks and Button 2006).  
 
As it has been pointed out, studies on supply chain security are mainly normative, 
qualitative, and conceptual as a whole (Williams et al. 2008), and it is fair to say that 
previous studies on the security of ports are also conceptual and normative and lack 
quantitative, confirmatory research. However, despite the dearth of previous studies, there 
are many studies that stress port security from the perspective of the supply chain. Brooks 
and Pelot (2008) argued that ports are the capitals of logistics activities in supply chains, 
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and the impact of maritime security programs should be analyzed from the supply chain 
point of view. Ports are the places where different levels of logistics services are all 
brought together which includes the bigger framework of the supply chain (Bichou 2004). 
However, maritime supply chains, where ports are located, are open to a wide range of 
terrorist attacks and security vulnerabilities in terms of their openness and complexity 
(Van de Voort et al. 2003). The security related risks in ports are mainly concerned with 
terrorist attacks and contraband products. Most maritime containers are transported with a 
certain level of risk and security vulnerabilities in supply chains are particularly affected 
by the possibility of terrorism (Han 2008). More specifically, containers are the focal 
point of maritime security in terms of transporting Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs), illegal goods, and various types of weapons (Yang 2011). The adoption of 
technology also requires the perspective of supply chain management because cargo 
moves through the maritime supply chain (Lun et al. 2008). Table 3. 9 presents the 
players in the security of supply chains and ports. 
 
Table 3. 9 Players in the security of supply chains and ports 
The government 
Customs have the duty to protect the national economy and society instead of 
merely focusing on goods control at the border 
The traders 
Reliable, security and efficient supply chain will theoretically contribute to 
global trade expansion 
The ports Security will represent a critical variable in terms of competitiveness 
The service providers Key player in terms of security as they move goods and information 
The insurance 
providers 
Increase security less insurance premium 
Source: Adapted from Banomyong (2005) 
 
Furthermore, many studies indicate that after the adoption of the ISPS code in 2004, 
major trading ports in Korea have become very sensitive to security issues and 
regulations (Shin 2006; KMI 2006). Also, there have been many studies which have 
pointed out that ports in Korea are almost forced to become security oriented because of 
mandatory measures from the U.N. (KMI 2008; Han 2008; Han and Choi 2010). Also, 
ports must have education departments for employees to teach the security regulations of 
the ISPS code (KMI 2008; KITA 2008; Choi 2008). This includes not only the normal 
educational training for employees in ports, but also military-like exercises and drills in 
ports in times of emergency. They must prepare and train for terrorism or an emergency 
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situation such as sabotage or vandalism which is clearly written in the ISPS code part A 
and B. This process also includes joint training programs combining people in 
government, port security managers and shipping company security managers all taking 
part. The education of port security is widely comprehensive and mandatory for port 
management and also other organizations in the supply chain (KMI 2007). The details of 
training programs in Korean port security are shown in Table 3. 10.  
 
Table 3. 10 Port security training programs in Korea 
Training level Topic 
1 
-Overview of the ISPS code –Security management 
-Terminologies in ISPS code –Law of port security 
-Responsibilities of organizations in port security 
-Response to the crisis or emergency –ISPS code training and drill 
2 
-Security infrastructure –Port infrastructure security measures 
-Explosives detection –Security threatening people  
-Cargo and passenger luggage identification –Security administration 
3 
-Port security evaluation –Port infrastructure security planning  
–Security certification plan –Evaluation of the security level 
Mock Training 
-Port facility security manager should implement mock training program at least once 
every 3 months. 
-Mock training program should check all levels of port facilities  
(ships entered port in the day of mock training program do not have to participate) 
Overall Training 
-Overall training should take place at least once every 18 months 
-It must includes simulations and seminars of various crisis situations 
-It should be linked to ship security program and should be implemented with various 
cooperation with other organizations 
-Port security manager leads the whole process and governments and ships are part of this 
program if necessary 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources 
 
Organizational culture is widely mentioned as a critical factor for organizations in various 
studies (Williams et al. 2009). The overall culture of ports also became much more 
security-sensitive in order to cope with the security strengthened port environment (KMI 
2007; KMI 2006). In order to comply with the regulations, employees, organizations, and 
culture of port communities are significantly affected by security regulations and try their 
best to modify to these new environments (Han and Choi 2010). Because the U.S.A is 
Korea’s major trading partner, it is essential to comply with the rules and regulations of 
the ISPS code and other security regulations from the U.S.A in order to export without 
any problems (Shin 2006). Therefore, Korean ports have become more and more affected 
by these compulsory and non compulsory regulatory initiatives or else the ships and cargo 
cannot even reach the destination port because of the ISPS code and other initiatives 
(KMI 2008). Mandatory security education, exercises, drills, and much more complicated 
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work procedures led the employees and personnel to become more concerned and careful 
about the security of the organization. This led to an overall cultural phenomenon of 
being security oriented in every aspect of port operation in Korea (KITA 2008). 
Furthermore, companies in the supply chain, as port users, are now trying to become AEO 
and ISO28000 program certified because they have realized the significance of these 
programs and their benefits (Kim and Kim 2007; Huh 2008; Ahn 2008). These companies 
meet the requirements of the programs which demand many things to be fulfilled (Choi 
2008). They can be seen as security oriented companies in the supply chain as port users 
(Huh 2008; KMI 2008).  
 
3. 5 Port Performance  
Many previous studies on performance measurement (Mentzer and Konrad 1991; Coyle 
et al. 2003; Fawcett and Clinton 1997) provided different definitions of logistical 
performance measurement. Mentzer and Konrad (1991) defined performance 
measurement focusing on evaluating the concept of efficiency and effectiveness. They 
argued that there is no unified definition of performance measurement in the field of 
logistics. Also, Bowersox and Closs (1996) mentioned that performance should be 
measured by cost, customer service, asset management, and quality. Nevertheless, 
performance measurement of ports has been focusing on maritime service production 
indexes (Suykens 1983; Turnbill and Weston 1993; Kozan 2000; and Estache et al., 2002). 
This has been separated by port and terminal operation point of views (Paixao and 
Marlow 2003). Generally, port performance can be divided into two different styles: intra-
port and inter-port measurement perspectives.  
 
3. 5. 1 Intra-Ports Performance Perspective 
Heaver (1995) argued that port performance should be focused on developing benchmark 
programs in order to better measure performances. Tongzon (1995) argued for the need 
for a quantitative and systematic approach to ports using factor analysis based on 
previous theories. It was also argued that the standardized performance index should be 
developed including various indicators of port operations and similar studies can be found 
in various studies as well (Sachish 1996). Normally, the performance of ports was 
measured by simple indexes like throughputs or logistics production functions. The 
efficiency was measured by simple productivity indexes like the production of labor 
variables (UNCTAD 1983), productivity from quays (Frankel 1991), and productivity of 
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total cargo throughputs (Bendal and Stent 1987). Sachish (1996) used an engineering 
model to provide optimal throughput measuring methodology. However, this study 
presumes that the hinterland is included in the ports, which limits the potential of port 
operations and supply chain integration. Talley (1988) recognized the relationships of 
road, rail infrastructure and the hinterland of ports, and provided a port performance 
index including the analysis of both engineering and economic output. Port performance 
index was divided into financial and service production aspects, and the traditional index 
introduced by UNCTAD (1976) was widely used. UNCTAD divided port performances 
into macro (impact of economic activities on port) and micro (measuring input and output 
port operation) indexes (UNCTAD 1983), and provided a gamut of performance index 
based on numerous reports from UNCTAD (UNCTAD 1976; 1983; De Monie 1987). 
More specifically, port performance measurement can be divided into physical, factor 
productivity, and economic and financial indicators (Trujillo and Nombela 1999). For 
example, physical indicators are the time elapsed on ships such as time spent in working 
at the quayside. Factor productivity indicators focus on labor and capital input on 
stevedoring activities. Also, economic and financial indicators are concerned with cargo 
throughputs indexes such as GRT (Gross Register Ton), NRT (Net Register Ton), and 
TEU (Twenty Equivalent Unit). Economic indicators are concerned with evaluating the 
economic and social influences of logistics activities in ports and are used as statistical 
data. Thus, traditionally, the performance of ports has been focused on efficiency 
evaluation measured by container throughputs (TEUs) or weight of cargo in ports 
(Tongzon 1995). 
 
3. 5. 2 Inter-Ports Performance Measurement  
Inter-ports performance measurement has been conducted by comparing optimal 
throughputs and actual throughputs of ports. Many empirical studies fall into this 
category which compare and contrast the actual output and optimum level of output using 
an econometric approach such as DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) to analyze the 
production and efficiency of ports (Murillo and Vega 2000). Specifically, many empirical 
studies have used a Stochastic Frontier Model to compare and analyze the actual 
production with optimal size (Fare et al. 1994). The model was also used to analyze 
multiple countries’ ports efficiency (Song et al. 2001) in a single nation or across several 
countries. Recently, DEA has been widely used to evaluate the efficiency of ports as well 
(Roll and Hayuth 1993; Notteboom et al. 2000; Tongzon 1995; Vallentine and Gray 2001). 
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The best example of this perspective can be found in a study conducted by Roll and 
Hayuth (1993) which selected the twenty most efficient ports in the world and divided 
them into two sub-groups. However, these studies did not reach the same conclusion. For 
example, Cullinane et al. (2002) found that the size of ports and terminals has a positive 
impact on efficiency, while Coto-Millan et al. (2000) found that big ports are actually 
inefficient from a comparative standpoint. Also, the stochastic frontier model has its own 
limitations in that it was widely used mainly in the analysis of container terminals so far 
(Bichou and Gray 2004). These studies suggest the fact that it is hard to generalize from 
any findings and that the complexity of port organizations may have a negative impact on 
measuring the performance of ports. The difference is, intra-port performance 
measurement is focused more on the internal logistics activities of ports, while inter-port 
measurement is comparing and contrasting the actual output with optimal output with 
other ports using mathematical models as an empirical study. Table 3. 11 presents the 
summary of widely referred intra-port and inter-port performance measurements studies.  
 
Table 3. 11 Intra-port and inter-port performance measurements 
Category Researcher Ports Method Attributes 
Intra-port 
standpoint 
De Monie 
(1987) 
- 
Literature 
Review 
-ship waiting time 
-quality of cargo transport 
-quality of inland transport 
Dowd and 
Leschine 
(1990) 
Container 
terminals in US 
Literature 
Review 
-yard, quay productivity 
-crane, labor productivity 
-gate productivity 
UNCTAD 
(1979) 
- 
Literature 
Review 
-cargo throughput 
-time elapsed on ports 
Inter-port 
standpoint 
Martinez-
Budira et al. 
(1999) 
26 Spanish ports DEA 
-input: cargo throughput/rent 
-output: expenditure on labor, 
 depreciation, etc. 
Song and 
Cullinane 
(1999) 
Container 
terminals in 
Korea and the 
UK 
Stochastic 
Frontier 
Model 
-input: terminal turnaround 
-output: wage and capital 
 Investments 
Noteboom et 
al. (2000) 
36 European 
container 
terminals 
Stochastic 
Frontier 
Model 
Input: container throughput (TEU) 
Output: quay length, size of terminals, 
number of gantry cranes 
Source: compiled by author 
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Many studies regarded ports as business organizations which pursue profitability and 
conducted a study on the performance of ports from a value added perspective. In this 
study, value added can be defined as the difference of revenue and expenditure of ports, 
and it varies according to the size of ships and cargo types. However, this model also has 
its limitations in that the activities in ports are limited to voodoo aspects and supposed all 
the ports performed the same pricing and marketing strategy.  
These studies can be seen as a traditional approach to port performance measurement, and 
it can be fairly said that they have limited the possibility or application of the supply 
chain concept. Also, productivity-oriented quantitative measures were widely used in the 
traditional research which cannot explain qualitative variables such as quality perception, 
satisfaction criteria, and supply chain integration. Considering the fact that ports are now 
part of the global supply chain, performance can be better measured by applying the 
concept of supply chain management to port performance. 
Moreover, from a philosophical standpoint, it can be said that quantitative methods based 
on positivism are dominant in measuring port performance research. Because measuring 
performance has to have a metric of measurement, many different types of quantitative 
tools have been adopted in the research on port performance. Traditionally, simple 
indexes or indicators were used to better measure port performance. However, reflecting 
various variables of the environment, there have been a wide range of new variables and 
indicators introduced into the research on port performance. Also, new concepts and 
perspectives have been suggested as well especially after the 1990s with the emergence of 
the supply chain management concept, reflecting the fact that ports have become a part of 
the supply chain which had been an individual subject for most traditional port 
performance research. 
 
3. 5. 3 Port Performance in Supply Chain Perspective 
From the late 20
th
 century onwards, global trade has grown considerably. Companies and 
businesses have become more and more global with the advent of multinational 
corporations that produce and consume on a global scale. Thus, ports have become more 
than just a node of production and the consumption of cargo. It had to be more flexible 
and agile in terms of a better flow of goods and information throughout the supply chain. 
Companies can transform themselves into more flexible organizations that can react more 
actively to environmental changes based on cooperation and collaboration among a 
network of companies (King 1997). Ports are no exceptions to this, and they have started 
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to perform in a more agile and flexible way according to the changing environment. They 
have started to realize that they are a part of a global network of organizations including 
numerous companies, governmental offices, and individuals. Figure 3. 4 shows the 
evolution stages of ports. 
 
Figure 3. 4 Evolution of ports  
 
Source: Notteboom, T. E. and Rodrigue, J. P. (2005) 
 
Christopher (1998) mentioned that the supply chain is the management of relationships 
between suppliers and customers by minimizing costs and delivering better customer 
values. Lambert (2001) also stressed the importance of relationship management of the 
companies in the supply chain. This means that supply chain is a network of relationships 
of companies and organizations that provide opportunities to manage relationships of 
business management. Nevertheless, most research before the mid-1990s focused more 
on organizations’ physical flow of goods such as procurement, production, and 
distribution centers. However, more and more studies have been conducted on the 
relationship management of the supply chain after the mid-1990s, and various sub-
concepts have been suggested which made it possible to conceptualize the relationship of 
organizations (Bowersox and Closs 1997; Cox 1998). It can be said that research into 
supply chain management among organizations have been shifted from intra-
organizations to inter-organizations, and it has been linked with companies’ competition 
strategies and their implementation point of view. Therefore, performance measurement 
based on multiple partnerships among individuals is needed rather than focusing on one 
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specific company in the supply chain.  
 
Although traditional port performance measures are widely used, new measures have 
started to emerge. From the supply chain perspectives of port logistics services, individual 
carriers pursue perpendicular and horizontal integration (Nootteboom and Winkelmans 
2001). However, horizontal integration meets a limitation of profit in the low-profitability 
environment of the shipping industry (Notteboom and Winkelmans 2001). Therefore, 
shipping companies pursue perpendicular integration which is a new way of creating 
competitive edge. Ports compete with other ports in the adjacent geographical areas and 
are heavily influenced by the level of integration in terms of value creation standpoint 
(Bichou and Gray 2004; Paixao and Marlow 2003). Therefore, ports are required to seek 
performance measurement based on supply chain management (Bichou and Gray 2004). 
Although there have been many systematic approaches based on logistics and supply 
chain on port operations to address the problems in ports (Robinson 1976; Goodman and 
Lenze 1988; Evans and Marlow 1990), few researchers have stressed the importance of a 
systematic approach to the whole port organization (Wang 1999). Supply chain 
management facilitates the integration of entire companies in the supply chain by 
strategic alliances and cooperation (Carter and Ferrin 1995). Sheffi and Klaus (1997) 
stressed the importance of leanness and flexibility of the supply chain which facilitate a 
better interaction of all the individuals in the supply chain. Christopher and Towell (2000) 
emphasized the agile supply chain which can better cope with a fast-changing 
environment among the network of numerous organizations. Paixao and Marlow (2003) 
also argued for the agility of ports which can actively react to the environment around 
ports. It is fair to say that these studies have stressed leanness, agility, and flexibility of 
logistics activities around ports by sharing information and integration in the supply chain. 
Based on this background, this research is focusing on the performance of ports in the 
‘agile’ and ‘flexible’ supply chain. Table 3. 11 presents the concept of flexibility and its 
utilization in port performance measurement, and Figure 3. 5 shows the integration of 
land side and sea side logistics of ports. 
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Table 3. 11 Flexibility concept and its indicators of port operation  
Type of flexibility Meaning 
Access/distribution 
It is the capacity that ports have in covering the widest possible hinterland and 
foreland that very much depends on the road/rail accesses and on the relationship 
that the ports have with the authorities responsible for their development at the local 
and/or national levels 
Expansion 
It is the capacity that the port has to invest in resources should the need arise to meet 
future requirements 
Launch 
It is the capacity that the port has in introducing new tailored services rapidly, 
should the need arise 
Material handling 
It is the capacity that port equipment has in handling different types of cargo, which 
in some cases is difficult because of the overspecialization of ships talking place 
during recent years 
Process 
It relates to the speed at which the port can make decisions, alter schedules or amend 
existing orders. Because it cut across the ports’ value chain, ports require the 
collaboration of their suppliers and distributors. As such it can be defined as the 
ability that ports have in changing design processes quickly to meet customers’ 
demands 
Product 
It is defined as the variety of services that ports have to handle when transferring 
cargo from one mode to another. Therefore, it relates to how well the port adapts a 
product to meet customers’ specifications. Included in this classification is any other 
logistics service that adds value and that contributes to tailor services even further 
Routing 
It is the capacity that ports have in conveying cargo through the most diversified 
routes/modes at the least possible time to end-users premises 
Target 
It is the capacity that the ports have in delivering ever more tailored services to the 
different market segments to whom they offer their services 
Volume 
It relates to the number of ships and quantify of cargo that the port will be able to 
handle, without affecting the flow or even causing any sort of constraints 
Source : Paixao, A. C. and Marlow, P. B. (2003) 
 
Figure 3. 5 Integrated model of seaside and landside logistics of ports  
 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2004) 
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Nowadays, competition around ports is very fierce. Thus, port authorities and related 
organizations in ports try to integrate inland transportation and port logistics in order to 
strategically react to complex global trade patterns with various activities of terminal 
operators and strategic actions of mega-carriers. This means that ports have now become 
a central logistics node that integrates inland and maritime transportation. UNCTAD 
(2004) suggested the conceptual model which supposed the integration of internal and 
external aspects of maritime and inland transportation. The model suggested that ports 
naturally integrate internal logistics activities that flow through the physical movement of 
cargo. Then, external inland and maritime factors outside of ports integrate with internal 
side of port logistics which made the global supply chain integration. In summary, not 
only is non-physical flow visible such as the flow of capital, payment, and information, 
but agility and flexibility are also enhanced in port logistics. UNCTAD (2004) suggested 
various indicators for ports especially from inland and intermodal terminals and 
warehousing performance categories which are shown in the Table 3. 12.  
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Table 3. 12 Inland and terminal operation indicators 
Performance 
category 
Example of Indicators 
In
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 I
n
te
rm
o
d
a
l 
T
er
m
in
a
ls
 
Accessibility 
and 
connectivity to 
ports 
Infrastructure (railway tracks, large distance roads, bridge weight/height restrictions, 
pavement, sped limit, existence of railroad electrification), drayage distance, fluctuations in 
traffic volumes, number of accessing gates and facilities, traffic volume on access road/rail 
tracks, travel delay, prioritization of track/road access usage, adequacy of infrastructure 
connection by mode connectivity between modes, activity center by mode, number of 
intermodal facilities. 
Availability of 
port facilities 
Facility service areas, storage capacity and restrictions, number of intermodal facilities, 
volume to capacity ratios, average, dwell time, gate facilities, superstructure/ equipment 
availability (downtime), access time, system condition, working time, types of 
modes/commodities handled, track capacity, expansion capability 
Productivity 
and economic 
efficiency 
Operational standards and productivity, queuing of vehicles, turning radius into facility, 
average transfer time, cost/revenue per unit operated (ton, TEU, commodity, mode, etc), 
maintenance cost, hours of access lost, port charges and other user fees, market share by 
mode, number of users per transfer point, cargo handling and equipment speed, equipment 
maintenance. 
Safety and 
security 
Number of accidents per movement/year, loss and pilferage ratio, grade crossing safety 
improvement, number of accidents involving dangerous cargo, degree of compliance with 
relevant regulations. 
Time 
Customs/administrative processing time, congestion level, average travel time between 
facility and major origins/destinations, freight transfer time between modes, gates transfer 
time, in-transit time at terminal facility, border delays due to inspection services, mobility 
index (tons per mile/vehicle miles), mobility index by direct/indirect routes, immobilization 
time. 
Reliability and 
quality of 
services 
Real-time argo information, air quality congestion reduction, level of service, work value, 
level of co-ordination, adaptation of services to clients 
W
a
re
h
o
u
si
n
g
 Throughput/ 
output 
Warehouse service area, storage capacity and restrictions, stacking factor, holding capacity, 
warehouse occupancy, volume to capacity ratios, throughput/output levels, working hours, 
expansion capability. 
Operational 
efficiency 
Work efficiency, space utilization (both storage area and aisles), order structure (average 
order size, percentage of orders in different sizes, etc.), order cycle time, ease and flexibility 
of order placement, percentage of orders filled, equipment speed, equipment utilization. 
Safety and 
security 
Number of accidents per year, loss and pilferage ratio, safety systems. 
Service level Accuracy, perfect order rate, frequency, flexibility, working hours, reliability 
Source: UNCTAD (2004) 
 
3. 6 Supply Chain Security Orientation (SCSO)  
This section of the chapter briefly introduces the SCSO construct introduced by Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008) as an interim research framework. SCSO is a collective awareness and 
behaviour of security/risk related activities that affect the employees in an organization. 
Since the latent variables and their causal relationships have been identified by Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008), a brief review of the variables and the construct is presented in this 
section. Studies on supply chain security are briefly categorized and summarized under 
the proposed typology. The relationships between the variables and the constructs are 
found from the framework and this is explored based on the findings of the interviews. 
Figure 3. 6 presents the framework suggested by Autry and Bobbitt (2008). The 
framework represents firm/business level collective perceptions on risk and security 
issues which are implemented in the supply chains. It was stressed that it is a firm level 
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collective awareness on security planning and policy of the supply chain. Thus, the 
framework focuses more on the practical side of supply chain security management. 
Because subjective, individual, and emotional attributes such as fear and horror can not 
represent the business and practical side of supply chain security (KMI 2008; KITA 2008), 
those are excluded from the research framework in that they are not found to be effective 
in the research framework developed by Autry and Bobbitt (2008). To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, the framework has never been tested before. Also, this 
framework is the first to investigate the components of SCSO in firms. The framework 
proposed the variables and components of the SCSO which needs quantitative analysis. 
Considering the embryonic stage of research in supply chain security, it is the most 
comprehensive and the first research framework integrating the relevant literature and 
qualitative investigation in the field of supply chain security.  
 
Figure 3. 6 Initial research framework: Supply Chain Security Orientation Construct 
Source: Adapted from Autry and Bobbitt (2008) 
 
3. 6. 1 Antecedents  
Risk perception is a widely utilized concept in variety of studies (Dowling and Staelin 
1994; Zsidisin 2003). It is included as an antecedent indicator of security orientation 
because it could have a negative impact on the supply chain operation. Choi and Choi 
(2010) mentioned that it is a driving phenomenon for security orientation for exporting 
companies. They analyzed the level of risk perception and found that it is vital in 
Antecedents 
-Risk Perception 
-Security 
Vulnerabilities 
-Partner Directives 
Supply Chain Security 
Orientation 
-Security Preparation and 
Planning 
-Security-related Partnerships 
-Organizational Adaptation 
-Security-dedicated 
Communication 
And Technology 
Potential SCSO Moderators 
-Internal Moderators 
-External Moderators 
Firms/Supply Chain 
Outcomes 
-Performance 
-Customer satisfaction 
-Supply chain continuity 
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developing security related support and the level of security orientation for export 
companies from the government and partnerships with other supply chain members. KMI 
(2008) argued that the level of perceived risk is one of the indicators of port security. This 
includes various types of risks such as physical disruptions and information technology. 
Particularly connected to the employees’ attitudes, Risk Perception is mentioned as an 
important component of an organization’s SCSO.  
Security Vulnerabilities are also included as an antecedent of SCSO. The origin of the 
concept of security vulnerabilities can be found in studies of crime and victimization 
(LeGrange 1995; Warr 1987). With the fear of loss, damage, or contaminated products in 
supply chains are the primary focus of security vulnerabilities as the antecedent in the 
supply chain orientation (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). Moreover, KMI (2006) analyzed 
security breaches in the supply chain after the 2000s, and suggested that they are the 
primary reasons why organizations become more sensitive and interested in security 
related organizational activities. Especially with the loss or damage of cargo 
transportation and storage, it was widely argued that the risks in the supply chain are 
becoming higher, and the organizations are becoming more security oriented with various 
global security initiatives.  
Finally, Partner Directives are related to the request and encouragement of the partners in 
the supply chain. With the launch of the security initiatives such as AEO and ISO28000, it 
became a must for supply chain members to adopt security initiatives and guidelines. 
However, with the encouragement or request of the supply chain members, organizations 
can have a certain level of impact on their security orientation (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). 
There are also companies that adopt security measures based on the request of other 
affiliated companies in the supply chain (KITA 2008).  
 
3. 6. 2 Supply Chain Security Orientation 
1) Preparation and Planning Initiatives  
There have been many studies conducted on the topic of preparing and planning for 
disaster and disruptions in the supply chain. In order to cope with disruptions and risks in 
the supply chain, organizations should prepare a continuity plan that can manage and 
avoid any kind of disruption (Zsidisin et al. 2005). Sheffi (2001) and Helferich and Cook 
(2002) also pointed out the importance of preparedness for the whole range of supply 
chain security related risks. This planning process makes the organizations more security 
oriented which will be critical in dealing with operations in the supply chain in the case of 
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a crisis (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). KMI (2007; 2009) also pointed out the importance of 
security planning and the preparedness of Korean ports especially in relation to the global 
security trend and governmental support. The level of security preparedness decides the 
level of awareness and the attitude of the people in the organizations.  
 
2) Security Related Partnerships 
Partnerships have been found in numerous studies on supply chain security. Especially 
with the impact of the security programs, collaborations and partnerships have developed 
in the supply chain (Sheu et al. 2006; Choi 2008; Kim et al. 2007; KMI 2009). These 
studies examine the impact of security programs such as C-TPAT and AEO on the supply 
chain. Although maritime transport related regulations such as the ISPS code and CSI 
involve several organizations in order to implement the security measures, voluntary 
programs for security initiatives cover much wider collaborations in terms of the scope of 
coverage in the supply chain (Sheu et al. 2006; Bichou 2004). In particular, partnerships 
in voluntary security initiatives require a wider information flow and security related 
activities in the supply chain (Huh 2008). Government support and private/public 
partnerships for a better standard of security initiatives are also part of security related 
partnerships (Sheffi 2005). Prokop (2004) also mentioned that public and private 
partnerships can enhance the customs procedures and trading practices. 
 
3) Organizational Adaptation 
Organizational Adaptation refers to taking adaptive processes to cope with the sudden 
risks and security vulnerabilities of the supply chain. Sheffi (2001) stressed the 
importance of optimized resource investments in security improvements to deal with any 
kind of emergencies in the supply chain. Russell and Saldanha (2003) mentioned that 
adopting military agility concepts can enhance the level of security of organizations. 
Autry and Bobbitt (2008) argued that physical improvements such as buildings, facilities, 
and information network can reduce the risks in the supply chain in that these changes 
can make the organizations go back and recover from emergency situations. KMI (2007; 
2008) also argued that setting up more security related investment in ports can 
considerably enhance the level of responsiveness to disruptions or crisis. Organizational 
Adaptation is about how well people and organizations are getting used to the 
environment of security, and it is clearly a component of SCSO (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). 
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4) Security-Dedicated Communications and Technology  
There are various studies that support the relationship between security and 
communications technology. Several studies have indicated that technologies such as 
global location detection system and transportation tracking system can contribute to 
better security related communications among supply chain members (Zsidisin et al. 
2005). Also, along with communication with the government agencies, it has been widely 
mentioned that technologies such as EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) and other 
technology solutions can enhance the level of security. RFID (Radio Frequency 
Identification) was widely mentioned numerous times as a business solution that can 
promote the security aspect of supply chains in case of emergency and terrorism 
(Tsilingiris 2007; Lun et al. 2008; Han and Choi 2010; Kim et al. 2007; KMI 2009; 
Russell and Saldanha 2003). These studies indicate that RFID is being utilized on various 
occasions identifying the weak points of supply chains in terms of visibility and 
information sharing. When applied to export/import cargo tracking in port operations, the 
security of cargo can be enhanced with better visibility and tracking (Kim et al. 2007), 
and the security-dedicated communications technology industry will set the standard for 
security technology and support global security measures (KMI 2009).  
 
3. 6. 3 Potential Moderators 
Autry and Bobbitt (2008) introduced Internal and External Moderators for developing 
SCSO based on interview findings. As for internal factors, Top Management Support and 
Employee Attitude variables are selected. Top management support is regarded as 
leadership and if it drives the organization into a security oriented direction, it will be 
widespread in the entire organization. Also, the attitude of the employees plays a critical 
role in cultivating security orientation. How favourable an attitude towards security the 
employees have will be a moderating impact on how effective the organization is in being 
security oriented. As for external factors, Political/Legal Factors and Partner Support 
factors are introduced. Political support from governments is necessary when companies 
try to secure the goods and products in the supply chain and especially when they work in 
a multinational environment. Supply chain partners can be facilitators or inhibitors when 
it comes to developing SCSO in the organization. The internal and external variables can 
have an impact on developing and inhibiting SCSO.  
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3. 6. 4 Outcomes of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
The relationship between supply chain security and organizational performance is an 
unknown topic (Williams et al. 2008). This link is critical to the research because most 
security initiatives require a certain amount of investment in security measures. Also, it is 
necessary to understand this link in order to justify this relationship. A few studies have 
argued that security initiatives are financially positive through cost savings in security 
program certification (Gonzalez 2004; Eggers 2004). However others have suggested that 
it is negative (Peleg-Gillai et al. 2006; Bichou 2008; Erera et al. 2003). However, through 
security practices and measures, overall performance can be positive (Rice and Spayd 
2005; Sarathy 2006). Identifying this link is timely for researchers to identify whether it is 
positive to adopt any security related initiatives and measures.  
 
Autry and Bobbitt (2008) have suggested that there are three major components of SCSO 
Outcomes: performance, customer, and supply chain continuity. Concerning performance 
aspects, operational performance related to efficiency aspects such as lead time and 
delivery accountability of cargo transportation is mentioned. Firm performance is mainly 
related to the financial advantages and market performance is primarily concerned with 
comparative competitiveness against other companies that the organization can obtain 
from better security and risk management activities. Customer satisfaction is another 
topic related to outcomes of SCSO. This variable is related to how well the security 
orientation appeals to people and how much they are satisfied with it. This variable is 
suggested by Autry and Bobbitt (2008) as a part of SCSO outcomes which requires 
organizations to meet the customer’s satisfaction and how customers view the firm. If 
customers are dissatisfied with the level of security and response to variety of risks, ports 
may lose customers which are critical to port operations. The level of effectiveness 
pertains to how well customers are satisfied with the level of security related activities 
which is important in measuring outcomes of supply chain security orientation. The final 
variable is supply chain continuity. This relates to the resilience of the supply chain where 
it can recover from a crisis and maintain a stable level of supply chain operation.  
As identified in the literature review in Chapter 3, outcome and performance can be 
measured in many different ways, and it is vital to capture the right variable and 
components of dependent variables. This is specified in the interview process with 
experts in the field of supply chain and port security in the following sections. 
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3. 7 Research gap  
This chapter was devoted to present the academic background to this study. First, it was 
clearly shown that Korean ports in the supply chain have become security oriented 
organizations due to the compulsory regulations of the security initiatives such as the 
ISPS code and CSI (KMI 2007; KMI 2008; Lee 2008; KITA 2009; Hwang and Min 2009). 
Also, security program (AEO and ISO28000) certified Korean companies in supply 
chains can be judged to also be security devoted and oriented companies (Huh 2008; Kim 
and Kim 2007; Choi 2008). Moreover, it was found that the perception of ports and port 
users are quite different in security issues around ports, and that the difference should be 
analyzed and compared to measure the different perceptions to realize the difference 
(KMI 2008). Second, the phenomenon of port security should be analyzed from the 
perspective of supply chain management because security regulations involve various 
organizations in the supply chain not just a port as a single entity (Shin 2006; Brooks and 
Pelot 2008; Bichou 2004). Thus, this study views port security from the perspective of 
supply chain security which makes it fall in to the “ports in the supply chain” category.  
Third, supply chain security literature suggests that there have been very few quantitative 
and confirmatory studies conducted so far in the field (Williams et al. 2008; Autry and 
Bobbitt 2008). Most studies so far are mainly normative, qualitative, and conceptual 
(Williams et al. 2008; Autry and Bobbitt 2008). Also, it was also suggested that the link 
between supply chain security and organizational performance is unknown (Williams et 
al. 2008). Therefore, this study was designed to analyze and test the cultural phenomenon 
of Supply Chain Security Orientation on Korean ports and their port users in the supply 
chain. The framework as a starting point was adopted from Autry and Bobbitt (2008), and 
it is modified by adding more ideas and opinions of people in port security management 
which is explained in Chapter 5. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there has been 
no research paper that has tested the impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on 
ports and port users so far. Considering the dearth of empirical studies on port security 
and supply chain security, this study aims to identify many aspects of supply chain 
security as a quantitative and confirmatory research in a Korean ports context. In 
summary, in order to summarize the research gap, this study aims to address the elements 
below: 
 
1) Test the Supply Chain Security Orientation framework on Korean port industries and 
port users in the supply chain  
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2) Test the model quantitatively as a confirmatory research  
3) Ports and port users are all included in order to analyze the research model, and the 
differences of perceptions between the two groups should be analyzed and compared 
4) Apply more ideas of people in the industry through semi-structured interviews to 
modify the adopted research framework more sophisticatedly for particular supply chains 
and ports in Korea  
 
3. 8 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided the theoretical and conceptual foundation for this study. 
Specifically, starting from supply chain risk management, supply chain security, risk and 
security of ports, and port performance were explained. Each concept was explained 
primarily with definitions and the flow of research conducted. The concept of port 
performance was also introduced because this study involves the relationship between 
supply chain security and organizational performance. The research gap was identified 
from the previous studies as to why and how this study aims to investigate the research 
questions. The next chapter presents the main research methodologies employed in this 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4. 1 Introduction  
Previous chapters have provided the overview of the introduction, literature review, and 
theoretical background for this study. This chapter discusses the methodological 
considerations that can best answer the research questions that this study aims to address. 
Although no methodology is free from being faultless, it is important to explain and 
justify the reason why the methodology has been adopted for this study. This chapter 
mainly explains the research design, philosophical background, data collection methods, 
and data analysis methods. The data collection method involves semi-structured 
interviews and developing the questionnaire. The data analysis method involves the SEM 
which is presented as the main statistical methodology for this research. Moreover, other 
issues such as translation problems and ethical considerations are also discussed at the 
end of this chapter.  
 
4. 2 Research design 
The research design is the outline of the study which aims to find the answer to the 
research questions and hypothesis (McDaniel and Gates 1999). It helps the researcher to 
outline the project, study settings, and type of exploration. Thus, the research design is a 
series of tasks that guides the total data collection and analysis process to answer the 
research questions (Bryman and Bell 2007; Cooper and Schindler 2001). Kornhauser and 
Lazarsfeld (1995) stated that research design is the ‘master technique’ and the collected 
data are the ‘servant techniques’. It is fair to say that research design is a series of tasks 
that leads the whole data collection and analysis process to answer the research questions 
(Bryman and Bell 2007; Cooper and Schindler 2001). Although there is no such thing as 
the best research design, there is a best strategic research approach which can answer the 
research questions in the best possible way (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2002). It is vital for the 
researcher to have a sound understanding of research design which guides the direction 
and quality of data which will be collected accordingly. In order to select the best possible 
methodology for the research, it is important to understand the nature of the research 
project.  
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As mentioned in the previous chapters, this study aims to identify and test the causal 
relationships among the three constructs: Antecedents, Supply Chain Security Orientation 
(SCSO), and Port Performance (PP). The researcher identified and developed the causal 
relationships and hypotheses based on previous studies and exploratory studies using 
semi-structured interviews. This study aims to find out what drives ports to be more 
supply chain security oriented, and the impact of these approaches on performance. To 
ascertain the best methodology for the research, a survey methodology was used in order 
to capture the respondents’ ideas, feelings and thoughts, as this is suggested as the best 
way to obtain data when attitudes and beliefs are involved in the research (Yin 1994; 
Zikmund 2003). Creswell (1994) argued that survey methods provide researchers with 
better results when a generalization of a sample of a large population is involved. It is 
quick, economically feasible, and can handle large samples with ease (Churchill 1979; 
Sekaran 2000; Zikmund 2003). In summary, the basic process of research design for this 
study is proposed in Figure 4. 1.  
 
Figure 4. 1 The basic process of research design for this study 
Stage 1  Literature review/identify research needs 
    ↓ 
Stage 2  Theoretical framework/hypotheses development 
    ↓ 
Stage 3  Interim research model proposed 
    ↓ 
Stage 4  Semi-structured interview/modified interim research model 
    ↓ 
Stage 5  Construct the complete research model 
    ↓ 
Stage 6  Pilot study/survey/data collection 
    ↓ 
Stage 7  Model testing using SEM/hypotheses testing 
    ↓ 
Stage 8  Findings, discussions, recommendations, and conclusions 
Source: Author  
 
4. 2. 1 Research philosophy 
The research methodology represents the philosophy of the research. The research 
philosophy can be explained by dividing it into three components: ontology, epistemology, 
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and methodology (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). The research philosophy is often defined as 
the logical questions that lead the methodology and approach (Maylor and Blackmon 
2005). Thus, it is the basic underlying research principle of how to conduct research, 
collect data, and analyze it. This has often been analyzed in terms of ontology and 
epistemology by many researchers (Bryman and Bell 2007; Guba and Lincoln 1989). 
Every research project can be divided into several categories of ontology and 
epistemology in terms of the nature and its approach.  
Ontology, on the one hand, is the philosophical awareness of the basic nature of reality. 
According to Bryman (2008), ontology is the realization of the knowledge in the social 
context. It is the social individualities that really affect the nature of ontology in most 
cases (May 1993; Hughes and Sharrock 1997). The objective approach to social entities 
as individuals is the focal question of ontology, and it is divided into two different 
streams: objectivism and constructionism (Bryman and Bell 2007). It is, in other words, 
finding the true reality in the social world and individuals who are separated or integrated. 
Epistemology, on the other hand, concerns the questions of whether the research 
approaches the world of research in the same way as natural science or not which regards 
the research object as individuals, not social entities. This is divided into two different 
streams: positivism and interpretivism.  
Positivism is the method that adopts the approach of natural science (Bryman and Bell 
2007). It emerged in the late 19
th
 century and rejects metaphysical theory and emphasizes 
scientific investigation. Generally, it acknowledges knowledge that is obtained from 
scientific observation or experiment only. Thus, the methodology from natural science 
was adopted to also study social research targets (May 1993). Researchers who conduct 
studies based on positivism tend to perform free from values and view the research target 
as an objective being (Bryman and Bell 2003). Positivism opposes any transcendent being 
or metaphysical causes, and limits the recognition of things to empirical facts. Also, it 
tries to identify them by observing the facts and relationships as the way they really are. 
According to Table 4. 1, positivism can be summarized as the research perspective that 
supposes there is objectivity in the world we perceive. It usually uses mathematical and 
statistical tools to analyze the causal relationship among variables. They focus more on 
the facts rather than meanings or interpretations and tend to simplify the reality into a 
concise generalized model. Therefore, positivism emerged as an intellectual attitude that 
tries to synthetically explain not only the physical world but the social and mental 
phenomena based on modern natural science. It became an extensively used terminology 
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that trusts scientific methodologies and views the truth as the recognition of actual facts. 
It expanded the research of epistemology, foundation and the cause of science itself. It 
stresses the independence of the research objects from people’s intentions and ideas, 
finding the causal relationship among variables, testing and verifying the relationship 
using a large number of the population, and using mathematical and statistical 
methodology (Bryman 2008). The researchers’ interests or feelings are completely 
excluded in the process of research because it is not part of finding the scientific truth in 
the social world.  
Interpretivism is the approach that stresses the relationship of human beings in the social 
world. It is the approach that regards the truth in social science which cannot be separated 
from the social world that leads to maintain subjective and opinion-oriented types of 
findings. The beginning of quantitative research in the business field can be found in the 
application of skills of natural science to social science. Social science aims to study 
social phenomena, while natural science focuses on studying natural phenomena. Social 
science adopts the objectivity of natural science research philosophy, divides facts from 
values, and generates theories which can explain and predict various social phenomena. 
Qualitative research begins with a criticism of the objectivity which is adopted from 
natural science. It argues that the free will of humans cannot be ignored in studying social 
science although it can be neglected in natural science. Therefore, the qualitative research 
tradition claims that the objectivity standpoint cannot be adopted as it is or should be 
limited to a large extent. This means that qualitative research can be applied to studying 
the social world that human beings are directly related to interpreting the social 
phenomena. From an ontological perspective, it is rather inter-subjective (Berg 2004) or 
subjective idealism, while quantitative research relies on objective realism. 
Epistemologically, the foundation of qualitative research is non-positivism or 
normativism, while quantitative research is based on positivism. It has been suggested 
that data can be obtained by participating the reality and social phenomena because it is 
impossible to collect data by simply performing questionnaires or statistical data (Mason 
2002). Also, close interaction with the research target and the researcher may lead to a 
frequent change in the research plan that can be seen as flexibility not an unplanned 
discursiveness (Mason 2002). The word ‘qualitative’ means the standpoint of non-
positivism and applies philosophy to the research of social phenomena. It does not aim to 
compare the objective facts, but to utilize various possible data into the research in a 
flexible way. In summary, they are two types of research approach in social science and 
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they are both complementary in filling in their weaknesses. In order to select the best 
possible approach and methodology for this study, an objective approach and positivism 
have been selected because it is believed that it is the best approach with which to answer 
the research questions derived from the research gap from previous studies. This is 
basically testing the causal relationships from the qualitative findings from previous 
research. 
The critical realism approach emerged as an alternative research method to positivism 
after the 1970s in the United Kingdom (Benton and Craib 2001). It combines realism 
philosophy and critical social science which was developed by Roy Bhaskar, Andrew 
Sayer, Andrew Collier, and Margaret Archer based on works such as ‘A Realist Theory of 
Science’ (1975) and ‘The Possibility of Naturalism’ (1979). It argues that causal 
mechanisms exist independently to the knowledge we perceive, and realism is needed to 
deeply understand science (Bhaskar 1975). As for the epistemology, Bhaskar (1989) 
pointed out that positivism underestimates social phenomena while the hermeneutic’s 
standpoint overestimates it. Critical realism argues that we cannot empirically prove the 
existence of structure, and that structure makes facts connected by causal interaction. It 
has the same attitude to positivism that exists in the real world. However, positivism 
supposes epistemological objectivity that in the real world can be observed by experiment 
and observation. Critical realism however supposes that it is hard to fully understand the 
real world objectively. Therefore, it can be said that critical realism is in the position of 
modified objectivism (Sayer 2000). The knowledge we know is not the true knowledge, 
but something close to real knowledge and it is not derived from experience, but 
fundamentally theoretical. Thus, social science research based on critical realism is 
basically trying to identify the causal mechanism of the phenomena. The main 
characteristics of critical realism can be divided into two qualities: realism and criticism. 
It supposes the real object of the research target exists independently to our consciousness 
(Guba and Lincoln 2005). Whether we follow empiricism or rationalism, it argues that we 
must acknowledge the world of that object in order to study scientifically.  
 
Qualitative researchers perceive academic knowledge as influenced by the social world 
whereas quantitative researchers believe that the appropriate knowledge is influenced by 
the tradition of natural science (Bryman and Bell 2007). This study can be categorized 
more as a positivism paradigm research because the researcher believes the transport, 
logistics, and security activities are objective entities. It involves statistical testing which 
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aims to generalize the finding which is explained in the following chapters. However, this 
study also involves qualitative methods in the process of developing and justifying the 
research model. It aims to maximize the strengths of each method rather than relying only 
on a single methodology. Thus, this study adopts both methodologies, but puts more 
importance on the ‘confirmatory’ side with statistical analysis than the ‘exploratory’ side 
with qualitative interviews. These processes are explained in the following chapters in 
detail. Table 4. 1 compares and contrasts the differences of these three research paradigms. 
 
Table 4. 1 Positivism, interpretivism, and critical realism research paradigms  
Category Positivism Interpretivism Critical Realism 
Ontology 
‘Naïve realism’ in which an 
understandable reality is 
assumed to exist, driven by 
immutable natural law. True 
nature of reality can only be 
obtained by testing theories 
about actual objects, 
processing or structures in 
real world. 
Relativism-local and specific 
constructed realities; the social 
world is produced and reinforced 
by humans through their actions 
and interactions. 
Critical realism-‘real’ reality 
but only imperfectly and 
probabilistically 
apprehendable. 
Epistemology 
Dualistic/objectivist; 
verification of hypothesis 
through rigorous empirical 
testing; search for universal 
laws of principles; tight 
coupling among 
explanations, predictions and 
control. 
Transactional/subjectivist; 
understanding of the social world 
from the participants’ perspective 
through interpretation of their 
meaning and actions; researchers; 
prior assumptions, beliefs, value. 
Interests always intervene to shape 
their investigations. 
Modified dualist/ objective; 
critical tradition/ community; 
findings probably true. 
Methodology 
Hypothetical-deductive 
experiments/ manipulative; 
verification of hypotheses; 
mainly quantitative methods 
Hermeneutical/ dialectical; 
interpretive case study; action 
research; holistic ethnography. 
Modified 
experimental/manipulative; 
falsification of hypotheses; 
may include quantitative 
methods 
Inquiry aim 
Explanation: prediction and 
control 
Understanding; reconstruction 
Explanation: prediction and 
control 
Nature of 
Knowledge 
Verified hypotheses 
established as facts of laws 
Individual and collective 
reconstructions sometimes 
coalescing around consensus 
Non-falsified hypotheses that 
are probable facts or laws 
Knowledge 
Accumulation 
Accretion-“building blocks” 
adding to “edifice of 
knowledge”: generalizations 
and cause-effect linkages 
More informed and sophisticated 
reconstructions; vicarious 
experience 
Accretion-“building blocks” 
adding to “edifice of 
knowledge”: generalizations 
and cause-effect linkages 
Source: Guba and Lincoln (2005) 
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4. 2. 2 Research approach and strategy 
The research approach is based on philosophical grounds which need a scientific way of 
drawing logical conclusions. Deductive, inductive and abductive approaches were 
detailed by Spens and Kovacs (2006). The deductive approach is based on pre-established 
theories, and many times it leads to testing those with various mathematical and statistical 
methodologies. Philosophically, it is highly related to positivism, and it is leads the 
research to generalizing the hypotheses which need the statistical testing of a large 
number of samples. The inductive approach is the opposite way of approaching 
knowledge. It is more interested in creating knowledge from real-world observations 
which generate a logical ground for building hypotheses and their verification 
(Danermark 2001). This approach is highly related to the interpretivist approach and 
many times, it adopts qualitative methodologies. They are both complementary, and it is 
suggested by Taylor et al. (2002) that interdisciplinary approaches that adopt both 
methods were widespread in most of the greatest scientific research. Table 4. 2 and Figure 
4. 2 compare the deductive, inductive, and abductive approach in research.  
 
Table 4. 2 The deductive and inductive approaches to research 
Deductive Approach Inductive Approach 
-Scientific principles 
-Moving from theory to data 
-The need to explain causal relationships  
-The collection of quantitative data 
-The application of controls to ensure validity of 
data 
-The operationalisation of concepts to ensure clarity 
of definition 
-A highly structured approach 
-Researcher independence of what is being 
researched 
-The necessity to select samples of sufficient size in 
order to generalize conclusions 
-Gaining an understanding of the meanings humans 
attach to events 
-A close understanding of the research context 
-The collection of qualitative data 
-A more flexible structure to permit changes of 
research emphasis as the research progresses 
-A realization that the researcher is part of the 
research process 
-Less concern with the need to generalize 
Source: Saunders et al. (2000) 
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Figure 4. 2 Deductive, inductive, and abductive approaches in research  
 
Source: Developed from Spens and Kovács (2006) 
 
Exploratory research is required to obtain initial knowledge about the world that has little 
understanding and knowledge. Descriptive research aims to offer an objective observation 
about the research target and explanatory research aims to test the previous theory or 
hypothesis, often in the form of a causal relationship among several variables. This study 
adopts the questionnaire methodology to collect data which will be used for future 
statistical analysis. In order to test the concept of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
(SCSO), collecting a large size of samples is crucial. Also, it is required to test the model 
using the Structural Equation Model (SEM) which is mainly concerned with examining 
the causal relationships among variables and checking whether not only the variables, but 
also the model as a whole produces significant statistical results.  
 
4. 2. 3 From positivism to research triangulation  
Because this study uses statistical hypotheses testing based on previous studies, it is fair 
to say that it has relied more on positivism. However, this study also adopts qualitative 
methods using semi-structured interviews in order to answer the research questions. It is 
argued that mixed methods, using both quantitative and qualitative tools, can be useful if 
the advantages of both methods can be maximized and the findings can be reliable 
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(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Especially in this study, variables such as relationships 
and performance are objective research concepts that affect the supply chain integration 
and performance of ports. By reviewing relevant studies in various disciplines, the 
researcher will set up the research model that can be tested by several hypotheses using 
Structural Equation Model (SEM). Thus, it can be inferred that a deductive logical 
process is dominant in this study. However, in order to capture the perception of 
practitioners and academics to the research model, qualitative methods using in-depth 
semi-structured interviews are also adopted to support the logical arguments in this study. 
By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the research can maximize its 
strengths and minimize the weaknesses of adopting a single methodology. This is called 
methodological triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002), which means adopting 
multiple research strategies to maximize their virtues by combining different 
methodologies. This approach goes along with the trend against widespread research 
based on a positivism approach (Mangan et al. 2004). Despite the argument towards its 
effectiveness, this method aims to overcome the shortages and bias which stem from 
using only one strategy. Table 4. 3 shows the summary of research approach and 
methodology for this study. 
 
Table 4. 3 Summary of research approach and methodology for this study 
Philosophical background Positivism 
Research Logic Deductive and inductive 
Research Approach Quantitative and qualitative 
Main Methodology 
Questionnaire and Interviewing 
Synthesis and Interpretation 
Source: The author 
 
4. 3 The empirical analysis process for this study 
The main process of empirical analysis is shown below in Figure 4. 3, which is composed 
of three stages: instrument development, exploratory study, and confirmatory study. This 
section explains the research process, validity, and reliability for the research.  
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Figure 4. 3 Empirical analysis process for this study 
Research Instrument Development 
-Research background 
-Literature review 
-Theoretical background and causal relationship construct and hypothesis building 
↓ 
Exploratory Study to Develop and Justify the Research Model 
-Semi-structured interviews for development and justification of the research model 
-Develop variables for each construct: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP 
-Discard variables based on the responses from the interview 
↓ 
Confirmatory Study using SEM 
-Confirmatory Factor Analysis(CFA) 
-Convergent Validity (T-value, R
2
 value) 
-Construct Reliability 
-Average Variance Extracted 
-Discriminant Validity 
-Direct, indirect, total impacts, and multi-group analysis 
 
Reviewing literature provides a sound theoretical foundation in step 1. After that, in step 
2, an exploratory study is conducted to provide robust support as there has been little 
empirical research in this area. The exploratory study is utilized in order to explore the 
components of the research model in order to apply more of the perceptions and ideas of 
the people in the industry. However, because it is impossible to conduct statistical or 
empirical testing on factors extracted from qualitative methods, it is inevitable to evaluate 
uni-dimensionality (Koufteros 1999; O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka 1998; Segar 1997). In 
order to overcome the limitations of an exploratory study, many researchers perform 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Segar 1997). This study performs the same analysis for the 
quantitative investigation. Then, the confirmatory study that tests the model is conducted 
in stage 3 using SEM and utilizing many validity and reliability supports from statistical 
tools. According to Churchill (1979), content validity is about measuring how well the 
measurement instrument performed. In other words, fundamental factors about the 
research topic are normally included at the measurement instrument stage (Nunnally 
1978).  
 
  85 
 
4. 4 Data collection methods 
Churchill (1987) mentioned that the data collection procedure needs the gathering of 
relevant answers and information from the respondents. There are many different kinds of 
data collection methods in previous research such as telephone calls, postal mail, e-mails, 
and interviews, etc. (Zikmund 2000; Sekaran 2000). This study adopts two kinds of data 
collection methods: semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey which are 
widely adopted methods for many researchers (Wang et al. 2003). Using different kinds 
of data collection methods allows the researcher two advantages. Interview responses are 
utilized to capture the perception of practitioners, academics, and international policy 
makers. The findings are applied to the development and justification of the research 
model and its empirical analysis. The details of the interviews are discussed in Chapter 5. 
As for the questionnaire collection, the researcher visited two of the biggest trading port 
authorities in Korea and their subsidiary companies devoted to security to distribute the 
questionnaire sheets. Some respondents filled out the sheets immediately, others filled 
and gave the forms back later by e-mail or post. Also, with the help of the Internet, the 
researcher collected a large amount of responses from an on-line survey. On-line data 
collection has become a normal academic procedure in Korea, a large number of the 
supply chain members responded in this way.  
 
4. 4. 1 Qualitative method: semi-structured interview 
The interview is normally designed to get answers from interacting with people to address 
the research topic or problems (Mason 2002). Denscombe (2003) argued that an interview 
has multiple presumptions and it does not normally deal with normal dialogue. Thus, it is 
developed in various ways to obtain the relevant knowledge about the research topic by 
having a sound research structure (Rapley 2004). The structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured are all different especially in the question of structure and size of sample 
(Jankowicz 2000). Structured interviews have a fixed and standardized way of asking 
questions which often leads to a basic systemized categorization and statistical analysis 
(Ghauri and Grønhaug 2002). This method often uses a number of questions similar to 
conducting a questionnaire survey for the interview which are used to ask standardized 
questions to all the respondents. Although a structured interview has many advantages, 
there are disadvantages as well in terms of flexibility, time, and the number of 
respondents. The unstructured interview has the most freedom to discuss the research 
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topic with the respondents (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2002). This method has no set 
questions which require the researcher to have a clear and sound understanding about the 
research topic. This allows the discussion to go further than the research topic which can 
enrich the quality of interview process. Nevertheless, this may require more time and the 
responses can be influenced to a large extent by the attitude and atmosphere of the 
interviewer. Thus, the researcher must avoid any leading questions or bias during the 
interview. The findings of the unstructured interview are normally not suitable for 
immediate generalization because they are subject to change (Saunders et al. 2000). 
Semi-structured interviews are more flexible in structure and let the interview process 
proceed more freely compared to the structured one (Bryman and Bell 2003). In the semi-
structured interview, some flexibility such as changing or omitting questions is allowed to 
gain a deeper understanding about the research topic. This is obtained by interpreting 
social and economic phenomena and interacting with the respondents using interview 
research methodology.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were designed to identify the respondents’ awareness, 
knowledge, and understanding relevant to the research (Mason 2002). This is very 
effective tool to obtain deeper insight into the research target as an exploratory study 
(Saunders et al. 2003). Specific interview questions and topics are raised before actually 
performing the interviews (Bryman 2008). In order to get a deeper understanding about 
the research, semi-structured interviews are chosen in that they allow the interviewer 
some flexibility although there are a set of questions used for the interview. It is a useful 
tool with which to conduct an exploratory study in order to make new discoveries 
(Saunders et al. 2003). The semi-structured interviews for this study were all conducted 
by means of face to face meetings from April to August 2011. They were conducted in 
multiples venues in three countries (Table 4. 4). Most interviews were conducted in 
Busan and Incheon, Republic of Korea. The participants from the United Nations located 
in London, United Kingdom and Bangkok, Thailand were also selected for the interview 
because of their expertise and knowledge in this field. They all have practical experiences 
in Korean government and port security for more than 20 years and they are involved in 
making global policies for secure maritime supply chains and ports.  
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Table 4. 4 Participants of the semi-structured interviews for this study 
No. Participant Years of experience Method Venue 
1 Port security officer 1 22 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
2 Port security officer 2 24 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
3 Port security officer 3 21 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
4 Port security officer 4 25 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
5 Terminal security officer 1 18 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
6 Terminal security officer 2 19 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
7 Terminal security officer 3 22 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
8 United Nations 1 31 In person London, United Kingdom 
9 United Nations 2 33 In person London, United Kingdom 
10 United Nations 3 32 In person London, United Kingdom 
11 United Nations 4 29 In person Bangkok, Thailand 
12 Academic 1 27 In person Seoul, Republic of Korea 
13 Academic 2 32 In person Seoul, Republic of Korea 
14 Academic 3 23 In person Seoul, Republic of Korea 
15 Domestic carrier 1 15 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
16 Domestic carrier 2 15 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
17 Domestic carrier 3 17 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
18 Domestic carrier 4 21 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
19 Forwarder 1 23 In person Busan, Republic of Korea 
20 Forwarder 2 24 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
21 Forwarder 3 21 In person Incheon, Republic of Korea 
Source: Author 
 
As for the sampling of the interviewees, it is very important to select the right sample for 
this study. Out of many sampling techniques, purposive and snowball sampling were 
utilized. The purposive sampling method depends on the researcher’s experience and 
knowledge to select the right sample for the research. On the other hand, snowball 
sampling uses a small number of people to extend their connections to contact more 
people for research (Saunders et al. 2007). Thus, port security officers at port authorities 
and terminal security officers in Busan and Incheon, Korea, director level employees at 
the security policy building divisions in the United Nations in London, the United 
Kingdom and Bangkok, Thailand were selected for interview. There were 21 interviewees 
that each had at least more than 15 years of experience which suggests that they have 
enough professional experience in the field to provide accurate, robust, and reliable 
responses. In order to gain fairness of the interview findings, the participants were 
divided into three groups: a port security group, a global security policy building group, 
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and a port user group in order to capture all of those perceptions and ideas. The most 
important reason for choosing semi-structured interviews for this research was to develop 
the hypotheses and justify the research model used in the quantitative analysis using SEM. 
The advantages and disadvantages are shown in Table 4. 5 below. 
 
Table 4. 5 Advantages and disadvantages of conducting interviews 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Flexible data collection 
-Suitable for exploratory study 
-Ideas and feelings of respondents are 
given priority 
-Insight into the field where few research  
have been done 
-Time and money problems 
-Transcribing 
-Difficulty in generalization 
-Specific bias and prejudice 
-Problems in consistency 
Source: Bryman and Bell (2003); Denschombe (2003) 
 
The major questions that the interviewer asked were:  
“Could you explain which factors drive your organizations to be more security 
oriented?” 
“What drives your organizations to become more security oriented?”  
 
The answers were:  
“Financial resources and supply chain security initiatives such as ISPS code are the most 
crucial part of us being security oriented. ISPS code and AEO programs force us to be 
security oriented, and financial resources enable us to be security oriented. It is that 
simple. Those two factors are definitely the most important factors”.  
 
Also, in order to encourage the respondents to become more involved with the interview 
topic, basic questions such as these were asked: 
“Which security program does your organization abide by?” 
“Are there any obstacles implementing security regulations in your company?” 
 
The answers were:  
“We are implementing ISPS code and CSI programs. These programs have many 
  89 
obligations and regulations that we have to learn, train, and implement according to the 
rules of the IMO which is hard to follow”. Also, companies implementing AEO and 
ISO28000 program answered: “We are AEO and ISO28000 certified companies, and 
there were a little bit of obstacles persuading people in the company to invest money on 
being security program certified. Some people thought the cost may outweigh the 
benefits”. 
 
To explore any motivations for driving the terminals to be more security oriented: 
“Why does the terminal require more procedures and attention to the security 
regulations?” 
“What are the biggest sources of risk if your organization is paying more attention to 
supply chain security?” 
 
The answers were:  
“It is mainly because the ISPS code is a mandatory program for the member states of the 
IMO. We have to pay more attention to it because if we do not, ships and cargoes may not 
reach the destination ports. It is now that important. In terms of risk, it is the financial 
resources and their balance with other areas of port management can be regarded as the 
biggest source of risk. Within the limited amount of revenue, it is very important to invest 
the financial resources in security and other areas as well to be competitive”. 
 
To explore the factors that hinder the organization to be security oriented: 
“What are the biggest factors that hinder the organization to be security oriented?”  
 
The answers were:  
“I think there is no question about whether we are security oriented or not. We have to be. 
It is obvious that security is a cost. If you can not invest money on security, then it is 
impossible to be security oriented. Thus, the availability of money on security is the most 
crucial factor for being security oriented”.  
 
To explore the concept of performance in light of the supply chain security: 
“How would you define performance from the perspective of supply chain security of 
your organization?” 
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The answers were:  
“In terms of performance, external effectiveness and internal efficiency are the variables 
that need detailed analysis in terms of supply chain security orientation. Nobody 
identified the link before, and it is important to investigate the relationship between 
supply chain security and performance”. 
 
Basic information about the research topic and related terminologies were offered to give 
the respondents an initial idea about the topics and themes of the research. The date and 
time for the interviews were decided mainly based on the schedules of the respondents. In 
order to maintain the confidentiality of the respondents, the code of participants was 
changed into terms such as port security officers1 and United Nations 2. The questions for 
the interviews were all thoroughly examined and cleared by the Research Ethics 
Committee of Cardiff Business School. Most of the interviews lasted more than 30 
minutes, some lasted more than an hour. The interview processes were recorded and 
transcribed which are the normal processes for analyzing an academic interview. The 
respondents were asked almost the same questions with a small amount of variation of the 
responses and job title of the participants. These questions were all kept consistent, but at 
times flexibly used according to the answers of the respondents. All the answers were 
recorded and transcribed using note taking and voice recorders.  
 
4. 4. 2 Development of the questionnaire  
A questionnaire is an efficient and effective way to collect data when the researcher 
knows exactly what to measure and ask the respondents (Sekaran 2000; Zikmund 2000). 
However, developing a questionnaire is both a scientific and artistic endeavor (Malhotra 
1999). It should be designed in a way that can draw the best scientific answers to the 
research questions (Malhotra 1999). The questions are developed to make the respondents 
feel comfortable, to be easy to read and understand for the respondents. It is a basic 
requirements for a questionnaire not to contain any leading questions or bias (Cooper and 
Schindler 2001; Frazer and Lawley 2000). Figure 4. 4 presents the process of developing 
the questionnaire for this study. This study aims to capture the opinions and thoughts of 
the respondents related to the research topic. Thus, questions for the survey should be 
brief, concise, simple, positive, and without any leading questions (Cooper and Schindler 
2001). Every effort was made to avoid any ambiguous or leading questions, and standard 
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wording was thoroughly followed during the entire steps of the questionnaire 
development. Many experts and practitioners are also involved in this wording process, 
especially with the technical academic terminologies and explanation of the research in 
the questionnaire. This is to minimize the mistakes of making incorrect subtle nuances 
and expressions so that the best possible questionnaire for the research can be created. 
 
Figure 4. 4 Questionnaire development 
Stage 1  Specify what information will be sought 
                       ↓ 
Stage 2  Determine the types of questionnaire and methods for administration 
                       ↓ 
Stage 3  Content of individual items 
                       ↓ 
Stage 4  Determine form of response 
                       ↓ 
Stage 5  Determine wording of each questions 
                       ↓ 
Stage 6 Determine sequence of questions 
                       ↓ 
Stage 7  Determine layout and physical characteristics of the questionnaire 
                       ↓ 
Stage 8  Re-examine steps 1-7 and revision, if necessary 
                       ↓ 
Stage 9  Pre-test and pilot test questionnaire 
                       ↓ 
Stage 10  Administer the questionnaire 
Source: Maylor and Blackmon (2005) 
 
The researcher adopted the close ended and 5-point Likert scale response format in order 
to encourage and systemize the same quality of the questions (Frazer and Lawley 2000). 
This can minimize the bias, effort and time of answering the questions (Hair et al. 2006). 
The scales are basically nominal and ordinal so that it is easy and efficient to explore the 
respondents’ thoughts and opinions in a systematic way. The questionnaire sheets were 
sent with a cover letter that stated the confidentiality of the study. Also, the reason why 
this study was designed, the question that this study aimed to answer, voluntary 
withdrawal from the survey were all included as important information for all 
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respondents. Finally, contact details of the researcher were also included in the sheet so 
that the researcher could provide them with relevant information if the respondents 
wanted to know the results of the analysis. The questionnaire is composed of four parts. 
The first part is the Antecedents construct which is to measure the factors that affect the 
organizations to become more security oriented. The second part is the Supply Chain 
Security Orientation (SCSO) part which measures the main drivers for the construct. The 
third part is the Port Performance (PP) which measures the performance of ports from an 
effectiveness and efficiency point of view. The final part is the personal information page 
on which the respondents are required to offer their basic profiles. The researcher tried to 
keep all the words and sentences as simple as possible so that all the respondents could 
stay focused while they were filling out the form. It took a considerable period of time to 
collect a satisfactory number of responses. Thus, the respondents who returned the sheet 
by pre-paid post took longer to provide their responses for analysis. Finally, to encourage 
more people for the survey, the researcher offered a small prize for participating. The 
winner was duly awarded a gift with a surprise.  
 
Also, the questionnaire needed translating. This was reviewed by two Korean scholars in 
Korea who hold doctoral degrees in transport and shipping. The original English version 
was reviewed by two scholars in the United Kingdom, who also hold doctoral degrees 
from well-known British universities. This process was to avoid any problems that might 
take place in terms of differences in languages which would have needed an in-depth 
knowledge of the usage of words and terminologies in the questionnaire sheets. Also, pre-
testing of the translated questionnaire was conducted with respondents in the security 
departments in ports, and the ideas and suggestions gained from them were reflected in 
the final Korean version of the questionnaire.  
 
4. 5 Data analysis methods: Structural Equation Modelling  
In this study, the Structural Equation Model has been adopted for statistical hypotheses 
testing. This is a series of statistical tests with a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and 
multiple regression analysis (Hair et al. 2010). It is mainly used for confirmatory studies 
that test and analyze structural causal relationships (Byrne 2001). The model is suitable 
for testing diverse and complex causal relationships in that it tests complex research 
models with many observed, latent, and parameter variables. SEM can perform various 
testing techniques such as factor analysis and regression analysis at the same time (Garver 
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and Mentzer 1999). According to Hair et al. (2010), SEM can identify multiple-
dimensional causal relationships and latent variables that cannot be observed by other 
statistical tools. Thus, possible causal relationships should be identified before conducting 
the confirmatory study by having sound theoretical support from previous literature and 
exploratory study. 
 
There are two types of variables in SEM. First, latent variables are the ones that cannot be 
observed in the real world, and observed variables are used as measurement items in the 
questionnaires to gauge the latent ones. Each latent variable must have at least two 
observed variables, and a combination of multiple latent and observed variables is a 
single measurement construct. The structural model is the measurement model with 
multiple causal relationships. Jöreskog (1993) mentioned that SEM can be effective only 
if the research is confirmatory, model comparative, and model generating. The researcher 
should test the previous studies with a sample, build different and alternative models to 
determine the best model for the research, and construct a model combining qualitative 
and quantitative analysis.  
However, from a statistical analysis standpoint, SEM has many advantages. Most of all, 
SEM can conduct the complex analysis within a single framework. This gives the 
researcher a great advantage in identifying the whole relationship of the variables with the 
reliability and validity values of CFA. Second, the degree to which one variable affects 
the other can be measured precisely. Thirdly, SEM provides the measurement errors with 
the accepted model. Fourthly, SEM combines the CFA and multiple regression analysis 
with the graphical representation of the model at one single framework in one large 
research construct. With these advantages, SEM is the most powerful method to analyze 
the current study’s research model considering its number of variables, size of samples, 
and causal relationships. 
As with other statistical methodologies, SEM is not free from limitations. First, the 
findings from the SEM are strictly limited to the proposed model which fits the quality of 
the data. Thus, there can be many different models that can better satisfy the data 
(Dörnyei 2007). Second, relying on the modification indices too much might cause the 
model to become impossible to interpret. Third, the causal relationships identified may 
not be consistent with the studies unless variables are managed with perfect control. 
For the analysis of SEM, statistical analysis package Analysis of Moment Structures 
(AMOS) version 18 was used to explore the causal relationships proposed in the research 
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model. SEM was the best option for this study because: first, systematic analysis is 
possible in the single model with numerous variables between constructs (Hair et al. 
2006). Second, SEM is effective in analyzing complex models with multiple variables 
(Bryne 2001; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001; Hair et al. 2006). Finally, in the SEM, 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) tests the relationships among variables and 
constructs in the measurement model (Bentler 1995; Hair et al. 2006). Hair et al. (2010) 
suggested the 6 stage processes of applying the SEM which is a widely used method for 
many confirmatory studies. There are different types of procedures found in Schumacher 
and Lomax (2004) and Byrne (2001) which explains the process more in the research 
model specification, estimation, and testing oriented ways. This study follows the 
procedures introduced by Hair et al. (2010), which are explained in Figure 4. 5 below.  
 
Figure 4. 5 Seven-stage process for structural equation modelling 
Stage 1  Develop theoretical based model 
                 ↓ 
Stage 2 Construct a path diagram 
                 ↓ 
Stage 3 Convert the path diagram 
                 ↓  
Stage 4 Choosing the input matrix type and estimating the proposed model 
                 ↓ 
Stage 5 Assess the identification of the model 
                 ↓ 
Stage 6 Evaluate model’s estimates and goodness of fit 
                 ↓ 
Stage 7 Model interpretation and modification 
Source: Hair et al. (2010) 
 
Stage 1 is the process of having research constructs based on sound theoretical causal 
relationships. In this stage, Byrne (2001) argued that defining the meaning of the 
constructs should be specified in order to have good measurement scales for the SEM. 
Hair et al. (1998) argued that underlying theory is important because causal relationships 
of variables depend on the sound justification of the previous research. Bryne (2001) 
mentioned that specification is the process of translating the theory into the SEM. This 
approach is a necessary part of theory based research using SEM (Hair et al. 1998). In the 
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process of specification, the original definitions and measurement scales can be adopted 
from previous studies in the similar research field (Hair et al. 2010). This study adopts the 
framework proposed by Autry and Bobbit (2008), modifying it by adding and dropping 
variables, and testing the model quantitatively. Because there is little quantitative 
confirmatory research in the field of supply chain security, this study adopted 
measurement scales from other studies based on a wide range of literature to obtain 
reliability of the measurement process. Stage 2 is the process of developing the research 
model. The path diagram is the visual representation or mathematical equations of the 
relationship of variables (Bryne 2001). The model should be made after having robust 
support from theories and previous studies which can justify the proposed causal 
relationships. Figure 4. 6 illustrates the path diagram for SEM as a sample. Path diagram 
provides a graphical presentation of the relationships of the variables. The circled boxes 
stand for the latent variables (A, B, C, and D), and the squared boxes represent the 
observed variables (a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, and d3). Each observed 
variable (e.g. al, a2, and a3) represent the latent variable (A). The arrows delineate the 
relationships of the variables. In Figure 4. 6, the variable A is affecting the variables B 
and C, and they are affecting the variable D.  
 
Figure 4. 6 Example of a path diagram for SEM 
 
Source: Author 
Note: A, B, C, and D: latent variables, a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3, d1, d2, and d3 : observed variables, 
arrows: represent the relationships between variables  
d2 
d3 
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Although the constructs are composed of exogenous and endogenous variables, the SEM 
is able to predict other endogenous constructs which make it possible to make constructs 
be either dependent or independent at the same time. Since this study used the first-order 
analysis, the relationships between these variables can be depicted as 11   OVCB . 
Lambda is the parameter of the route between the variables and Theta is the measurement 
error. Also, in the path diagram, the straight arrows represent the direct impact of 
relationships and the curved ones show the correlations.  
 
Stage 3 is the process of initial analysis of the sample. After gaining the theoretical 
background and studies that can support the causal relationships, converting the path 
diagram and research model into the analysis is the next step. There are three basic 
constructs: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP. AMOS provide the graphical representation of 
the causal relationship which is shown in Figure 4. 8.  
 
Stage 4 is the process of testing and specifying the validity and reliability of the research 
model. The researcher can decide on the number of variables to load in the construct. 
However, there is no indication of the best number of items that can measure the variables. 
Generally, the number of items for the variables should be decided by the justification of 
the theoretical background (Bollen 1989; Baumgartner and Honburg 1996). Although it is 
suggested that many indicators are preferred, having five to seven items for each 
construct can be the general number of indicators because too many items can harm the 
accuracy of the measurement (Hair et al. 1998).  
 
Stage 5 and 6 are the process of analyzing and identifying the research model after 
obtaining the proper level of validity and reliability. This stage produces the values which 
can test the hypotheses that are proposed in the early stage of the analysis. By doing so, 
the whole research model will be tested. Shook et al. (2004) proposed a checklist of 
things that should be assessed and reported in the SEM studies which is presented in 
Table 4. 6 below. It was utilized to check the analysis process of the SEM in the following 
chapters. 
 
 
d2 
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Table 4. 6 Checklist of SEM analysis 
1 
Sample issues 
1. General description 2. Number of observations 3. Distribution of sample 4. Statistical power 
2 
Measurement issues 
1. Reliability of measures 2. Measures of discriminant validity 3. Measures of convergent validity 
3 
Reproduce-ability issues 
1. Input matrix 2. Name and version of software package utilized 3. Starting values  
4. Computational options used 5. Analytical anomalies encountered 
4 
Equivalent models issues 
1. Potential existence acknowledge as a limitation 
5 
Re-specification issues 
1. Changes cross-validated 2. Re-specified models not given status of hypothesized model 
Source: Shook et al. (2004) 
 
In this study, Antecedents, SCSO, and PP are tested. There are many hypotheses and 
variables in the model and they are examined whether the whole model, each construct, 
and variables have significant relationships among them. Statistical reliability and validity 
are widely used criteria for deciding whether the analysis has statistical significance. 
There are measures of absolute fit, incremental fit measures, and parsimonious fit 
measures in the analysis. The measurement can tell us how well the analysis can answer 
the research questions. These measurement criteria is discussed in detail in the following 
chapters with the sample collected. Figure 4. 8 shows the structural model for this study. 
This is just an example, and all variables are explained in detail in Chapter 5.  
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Figure 4. 7 Example of the research construct for this study 
 
Source: Author 
Note: RPSV: Risk Perception and Security Vulnerabilities, FR: Financial Resources, SCSI: Supply Chain 
Security Initiatives, SPP: Security Preparation and Planning, SRP: Security Related Partnership, OA: 
Organizational Adaptation, SDCT: Security Dedicated Communication and Technology, SC: Security 
Culture, SE: Security Education, EFC: Effectiveness, EFF: Efficiency 
 
As shown above, Hair et al. (2010) categorized and divided the fit measures into three 
different groups. The first group is the absolute measures which examine the whole 
measurement fit using the values of likelihood Chi Square statistic (χ2), Goodness of Fit 
Index (GFI), Root Mean Square Residual Index (RMR), and the Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA). These measures examine the model and the sample. The 
second group is the incremental measures which will compare the proposed model with 
the null model using values of Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), and 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). The third group is the parsimonious fit measures 
which primarily aim to examine the model fit with various coefficients (Hair et al. 2010). 
It includes Normed Chi-Square (NC), the Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RPSV 
FR 
SCSI 
SC 
SE 
SDCT 
OA 
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SPP 
EFC 
EFF 
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and the Parsimonious Normed Fit Index (PNFI). There are more than one measurement 
criteria that should be examined to determine the effectiveness of fit (Hair et al. 1998). It 
is widely recommended that various measures should be applied to decide on the 
acceptability of the model (Bryne 2001).  
 
4. 5. 1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis is one of the most crucial parts of the SEM (Kline 2005) 
and it is normally applied to the pre-established model which has the supporting academic 
literature, measurement items, and background logic (Byrne 2001). Hair et al. (1998), 
however, argued that it can be much more powerful in the analysis after performing the 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). The difference between the EFA and CFA is that the 
CFA is used when evaluating the research model with various indicators (measurement 
scales and items) and its latent variables. EFA is normally utilized when developing the 
measuring scales for the variables in the questionnaire in order to identify the structure of 
large number of variables in the research model. There are two ways to evaluate the 
research model in the CFA: firstly, meeting the goodness of fit (GOF) criteria indices, 
secondly, meeting the reliability and validity of the model (Hair et al. 2006). Thus, it is 
necessary to discuss the various methods to assess the reliability and validity of the SEM.  
 
4. 5. 2 Goodness of fit  
There are three different types of goodness of fit indices in the SEM: 1) absolute fit 
indices, 2) incremental fit indices, and 3) parsimonious fit indices (Hair et al. 1998). The 
absolute fit indices measure the overall fit of the model which includes chi-square (2), 
root mean square error or approximation (RMSEA), and the goodness of fit index (GFI). 
Next, the incremental fit indexes are used to compare and contrast the research model 
with the null model which includes the adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI), normed fit index 
(NFI), and Bollen’s goodness of fit (IFI). Finally, the parsimonious fit indices are 
comparative measures used when the model can be improved with modified parameters. 
This includes the parsimony comparative index (PCFI). Table 4. 7 has the specific 
explanation of the goodness of fit indices in SEM.  
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Table 4. 7 Summary of alternative goodness-of-fit indices 
Fit Index Description Acceptable fit 
1. Measure of absolute fit 
Chi-square (2) 
Test of the null hypothesis that the estimated variance-
covariance matrix deviated from the sample. Greatly 
affected by sample size. The larger the sample, the more 
likely it is that the p-value will imply a significant 
difference between model and data. 
Non significant (2) 
at least p–value > 
0.05. 
Normed Fit Chi-
square  
(2/df) = CMIN/DF 
Chi-square statistics are only meaningful taking into 
account the degrees of freedom. Also regarded as a 
measure of absolute fit and parsimony. Value close to 1 
indicates good fit but values less than 1 imply over fit. 
Value smaller than 2 
and as high as 5 is a 
reasonable fit. 
Standardized Root 
Mean Square 
Residuals (SRMR) 
Representing a standardized summary of the average 
covariance residuals. Covariance residuals are the 
differences between observed and model-implied 
covariances. 
Value < 0.05 good 
fit; 0.01_0.05 
adequate fit. 
Root Mean Square 
Error of 
Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
Representing how well the fitted model approximates 
per degree of freedom. 
Values 0.05_0.08 is 
adequate fit. 
Goodness-of-Fit 
(GFI) 
Representing a comparison of the square residuals for 
the degree of freedom. 
Value > 0.95 good 
fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
2. Incremental fit measures 
Adjusted Goodness-
of-Fit Index (AGFI) 
Goodness-of-Fit adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
Less often used due to not performing well in some 
applications. Value can fall outside 0-1 range. 
Value > 0.95 good 
fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
Bentler-Bonett 
Normed Fit Index 
(NFI) 
Representing a comparative index between the proposed 
and more restricted, nested baseline model (null model) 
not adjusted for degree of freedom, thus the effects of 
sample size are strong. 
Value > 0.95 good 
fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI) *also known 
as Bentler-Bonett 
Non-Normed Fit 
Index (NNFI) 
Comparative index between proposed and null models 
adjusted for degrees of freedom. Can avoid extreme 
underestimation and overestimation and robust against 
sample size. Highly recommended fit index of choice. 
Value > 0.95 good 
fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) 
*identical to 
Relative Non 
centrality Index 
(RNI) 
Comparative index between proposed and null models 
adjusted for degrees of freedom. Interpreted similarly as 
NFI but may be less affected by sample size. Highly 
recommended as the index of choice. 
Close to 1 very good 
fit; Value > 0.95 
good fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
Bollen’s Incremental 
Fit Index (IFI) 
Comparative index between proposed and null models 
adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
Value > 0.95 good 
fit; 0.90_0.95 
adequate fit. 
3. Parsimonious fit measures 
Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
Comparative index between alternative models. 
Value closer to 0 
better fit & greater 
parsimony. 
Parsimony Normed 
Fit Index (PNFI) 
This index takes into account both model being 
evaluated and the baseline model. 
Higher value 
indicates better fit, 
comparison between 
alternative models. 
Parsimony 
Comparative Index 
(PCFI) 
This index takes into account both model being 
evaluated and the baseline model. 
Same as above. 
Source: Adapted from Arbuckle (2003); Hair et al. (2010); Kline (2005) 
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4. 5. 3 Estimation of the model 
Previous sections mentioned how SEM works with numerous observed and unobserved 
variables and its identification of the relationships. CFA is the crucial part when 
identifying whether the entire construct of relationships and measurement scales are 
trustworthy (Kline 2005). The research model in this study was judged by using the 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation methods in the AMOS (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001). This is the most widely used estimation in the SEM analysis and normally 
unbiased compared to other ways of estimation in the research model (Bollen 1989; Kline 
1998). Many academic researchers suggest using likelihood estimation methods in the 
SEM because it creates a better estimation in parameters and other statistical evaluation 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Other than the methods mentioned above, there are other 
and alternative ways to measure the goodness of fit in the research model. Holmes-Smith 
(2002) included the factor loadings value for estimation, which should be 0.7 or more to 
be reliable. However, Hair et al. (2010) argued that it can be accepted when it is 0.5 or 
more. Also, the critical ratio values must be 1.96 or more to be reliable (Byrne 2001).  
 
4. 5. 4 Reliability and validity  
The reliability of the research model is probably one of the most important parts of 
identifying whether the result, measurement scales, and stability are trustable enough. 
Traditionally, Nunnaly (1978) mentioned that Cronbach’s alpha which is 0.7 or more is 
the way of evaluating reliability and internal consistency. Also, the validity has something 
to do with the accurate measurement (Sekaran 2000). It identifies the degree of reflection 
and relation in measurement items and construct. It is normally measured by convergent 
validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is the degree to which variables 
and the whole research construct have the same kind of variance. The Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE>0.5) are utilized in this study. It is calculated from the formula: 
 AVE = 


ji
i


2
2
( i : loading factor, j : error of the measurement)
. 
This is the representation of the whole variance of the indicators by the latent variables in 
the construct. The composite reliability measures the internal consistency of the indicators 
which requires 0.70 or higher and can be measured by the formula below: 
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Composite reliability = 
 
  

ji
i


2
2
( i : loading factor, j : error of the measurement)
.
 
The discriminant validity is the degree to which each variable and construct are 
differentiated from one another. This study, as other studies using SEM normally do, 
adopts the measurement model evaluation using CFA first, and then the hypotheses 
testing procedure will be followed. The main purpose of this study is to identify whether 
the whole model and variables have a direct or indirect relationships and influence one 
another with statistical reliability and validity obtained.  
 
4. 5. 5 Comparison of SEM, PLS, and Regression analysis  
This section aims to compare the analysis tools related to this study and provide 
justification as to why the researcher chose the SEM as a main statistical methodology. 
Because the overview of the SEM has been explained in detail, the differences of these 
methods will be delineated briefly. First, the regression analysis is a simple way of 
analyzing causal relationships which can provide the analysis of connections between 
independent variables and dependent variables. It was first started in 1896 by Karl 
Pearson with various inter-related coefficients. It is a variance based method and does not 
need a strong theoretical base for the analysis. The regression analysis and the SEM have 
a similarity in that they both conduct a statistical analysis on causal relationships with 
loadings from the measurement items on the construct. However, it has many 
disadvantages compared to the SEM. SEM conducts a series of analyses at the same time 
on multiple variables and constructs. Also, it provides the overall model fit which 
delineates the statistical reliability of the research model. Generally, SEM provides a 
wider acknowledgement on the result of the analysis based on validity and reliability 
measures (Schumacher and Lomax 2004). Table 4. 8 presents the comparison of SEM, 
PLS, and Regression.  
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Table 4. 8 Comparison of SEM, PLS, and Regression  
Issues SEM PLS Regression 
Analyses all the paths in both measurement 
and structural model in a analysis 
 
Provides statistics for following analysis: 
Overall model fit 
Individual paths 
Individual item loadings 
Residual non-common error 
All supported 
 
 
 
All supported 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
 
 
 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Examines interaction effect on: 
Cause-effect path 
Item loadings 
Non-common variance 
The entire model 
All supported 
Supported 
All not readily 
supported 
 
Supported 
All not readily 
supported 
 
Dealing with Possible over-fitting 
Suspected influential outliers 
Suspected heteroscedasticy 
Problematic 
Problematic 
Problematic 
Problematic 
Problematic 
Problematic 
All less 
problematic 
Reflective observed variables 
Formative observed variables 
Support 
Not supported 
Support 
support 
Support 
Not support 
Source: Gefen et al. (2000) 
 
Second, the Partial Least Squares (PLS) is a variance based analysis tool using linear 
combinations of algorithms that aims to predict the parameters in the construct. PLS is 
similar to SEM in that it provides the whole model fit and the analysis of single paths. 
However, there are some weaknesses in using PLS which are: 1) the interaction effect of 
variables cannot be analyzed by the PLS 2) it cannot test a set of multiple causal 
relationships at the same time 3) It cannot integrate the unobserved variables into the 
construct 4) it cannot analyze the residual non-common error. 5) it cannot analyze the 
interaction impacts of multiple groups. Also, the PLS relies on a rather small sample size 
(around 30 to 100) which can be utilized more in exploratory than confirmatory studies.  
 
Finally, SEM is the analysis that is best suited for confirmatory research (Byrne 2001; 
Gefen et al. 2000; Hair et al. 2010). It requires a strong theoretical base and a large 
sample size. Normally, it requires 200 or more but 250 would be the ideal number of 
respondents (Hair et al. 2010). It incorporates various statistical techniques such as factor 
analysis and regression analysis at the same time) in order to illustrate the relationships 
graphically with a mix of circles and lines. Thus, in order to analyze a complex model 
with confirmatory purposes, SEM is more suitable than the PLS. 
In terms of the analysis of the causal relationships, the most widely used techniques are 
introduced above. This study aims to test a complex research model integrating 11 latent 
variables in three constructs: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP with 61 observed variables. The 
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direct, indirect, total impacts and multi group analysis are conducted with these multiple 
variables and relationships. Hair et al. (2010) SEM is the best analytical tool to analyze 
and predict the estimates of the causal relationships of multiple relationships. The aim of 
the SEM is to ‘confirm’ the theory from statistical tests with an underlying theoretical 
base. Therefore, simple regression analysis is not appropriate for this study. Also, there 
are obvious reasons why the SEM is more suitable to apply than the PLS for this study. 
Firstly, this study is more confirmatory than exploratory which means it aims to test the 
model which has a strong theoretical base with a large sample size. Also, in terms of the 
multi group analysis, SEM is the only option for this study because it is not available to 
analyze it with the PLS (Gefen et al. 2000). Moreover, other than the statistical strengths 
that the SEM has compared to the PLS, this study has to chose SEM particularly for two 
special purposes: 1) this study is confirmatory research, 2) this study conducts multiple 
group analysis (port group and port user group each with more than 200 samples). 
Although the SEM is not free from limitations, it is the most suitable methodology for 
this study. 
 
4. 5. 6 Ethical issues 
Ethics in any Business research means a code of conduct that the researchers should abide 
by in every step of the process of data collection, analysis, report, and dissemination of 
the research (Sekaran 2003). Academic researchers sometimes make mistakes concerning 
ethical issues even though they have been trained by experts in academia (Cohen et al. 
2000). Eisener and Peshkin (1990) argued that sensitivity and responsibility are the two 
main considerations when avoiding ethical problems involving researchers. This is an 
indispensable part of any research although it is a hard and arduous task (Busher and 
Clarke 1990). In this research, privacy and confidentiality are the two main ethical 
considerations of the participants. Privacy is particularly related to the information of the 
participants, and confidentiality is concerned with safely protecting the people who take 
part in the research (Cohen et al. 2000). It is very important to have the consent of the 
participants from the beginning of the data collection process, and their personal 
identification should not be revealed to anybody without their consent. The participants of 
the research should have the right to participate and also withdraw their participation 
from the study. Therefore, approval and access to the participation are vital processes 
when many participants are involved in the research. Ethical issues are taken seriously in 
this study and particularly in the data collection process. Cardiff University requires an 
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approval form by the research ethics committee for any kind of human participation in 
research. Every process for ethical consideration was granted and the form was signed by 
the researchers and submitted as part of this study.  
 
4. 6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained in detail the methodology this research adopted. Starting from 
the research design, this chapter discussed philosophical traditions, data collection 
methods (qualitative: semi-structured interview, quantitative: questionnaire survey), and 
data analysis methods (SEM). In this study, mixed methods using both a qualitative and 
quantitative approach are utilized and they are explained in detail with more emphasis on 
confirmatory statistical analysis. However, considering the importance of the 
confirmatory purpose using statistical analysis this study adopted, it can be classified as 
more positivism and deductive research than an interpretivist and inductive approach. In 
terms of the data collection method, semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
process was presented. As for the data analysis methods, an overview of the SEM is 
provided, and compared to other statistical methods, the reason why the SEM was 
selected for this study has been explained. The next chapter discusses the findings from 
the semi-structured interviews and provides information about how the research model 
and hypotheses are modified, analyzed, and tested. Chapter 6 and 7 provide the detailed 
descriptive and empirical analysis results testing hypotheses with the SEM.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
5. 1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the process of developing and justifying the research model for 
this study. The previous chapters discussed the critical literature review and research 
methodology. This chapter is mainly devoted to developing and justifying the research 
model before conducting a confirmatory analysis using SEM. This chapter is composed 
of five sections. The section 5. 2 introduces the process of research model development 
and hypotheses building. Then, the section 5. 3 presents the findings from the semi-
structured interviews. This process completes the research model for quantitative analysis. 
The purpose of the interviews can be summarized as: 1) find out whether Korean ports 
are security oriented or not, 2) find out whether the security of the ports should be viewed 
from a supply chain perspective 3) find out whether SCSO is a critical strategy for ports 
4) find/reevaluate components of each construct and create the framework for a complete 
research model for this study by adding and dropping variables in the framework. The 
interviews were conducted between February to June 2012. 20 interviewees including 3 
director level employees in the U.N. (London, United Kingdom and Bangkok, Thailand), 
6 managerial level employees in the port/terminal security offices (Busan and Incheon, 
Republic of Korea), 6 practitioners of the companies using these ports (Busan and 
Incheon, Republic of Korea), and 3 academics (Busan and Incheon, Republic of Korea) 
were invited to take part in the interview process. All the interviewees were initially 
suggested by Academic scholars in Korea who had connections and relationships with 
practitioners in the industry of port and supply chain security in Korea. Based on the 
findings from the interviews, the complete research model is presented with various 
hypotheses in section 5. 4. Finally, section 5. 5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5. 2 The research model and hypotheses development 
Although the framework suggested by Autry and Bobbitt (2008) has never been tested 
quantitatively before, it has been mentioned in the study that it was based on a limited 
number of samples with a limited number of industries that needs a bigger number of 
samples to validate the findings (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). Thus, this study adopts the 
framework as an initial starting point, and modifies it by adding/dropping variables 
through conducting interviews with various experts, practitioners, and academics in the 
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field. Reflecting the ideas and perceptions of the experts in the particular supply chain 
and ports for this study is a critical part of the complete research model development 
procedure. This is the process of building the ‘initial framework’ into the ‘complete 
research model’ for this study. This chapter also introduces how the variables in the 
framework are measured and developed in the questionnaire survey using the relevant 
sources. The basic features of the interview as a research methodology are introduced in 
Chapter 4, and this chapter focuses on the development of research model and hypotheses.  
 
SCSO can be defined as ‘a firm-level orientation representing the firm’s collective 
attention to both supply chain security management and supply chain risk management 
principles’ (Autry and Bobbit 2008). In this study, the most important players for SCSO 
are ports, their security task-devoted subsidiary companies, and security program certified 
companies as port users in the supply chain (KITA 2008; KMI 2009). These companies 
may have different thoughts and perception about security related issues and their 
strategies. The Antecedents are proposed as the driving factors for the organization. 
Considering the fact that most global security initiatives such as the ISPS Code and 
ISO28000 are implemented across supply chains, SCSO can be achieved only if the 
members of the supply chain are sensitive to the security regulations and initiatives which 
will affect the attitude and behavior of supply chain practices. Thus, the questions for 
statistical analysis are developed as follows: 
 
Q1: Variables in the Antecedents have positive individual impacts on variables in the 
SCSO  
 
Ports and their supply chain members want to gain a strategic competitive edge by 
pursuing security oriented services which can improve the performance of the 
organization. Thus, adopting SCSO is expected to upgrade the performance of ports 
which is abbreviated as PP in the research model (Q2a). Also, according to Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008), Antecedents have an indirect positive impact on organizational 
performance, which is described in Q2b. Q3 presents the total impacts of variables in the 
Antecedents and SCSO on variables in PP. 
 
Q2a: Variables in the SCSO have positive individual direct impacts on variables in 
the PP 
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Q2b: Variables in the Antecedents have indirect and positive individual impacts on 
PP through SCSO 
Q3: Variables in the Antecedents and SCSO have positive individual total impacts 
on PP 
Q4: Perceptions of ports and port users are different in the variables of the research 
model 
 
The questions suggested above are designed to examine the causal relationships of the 
variables in the three constructs: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP. The specific and complete 
hypotheses are introduced when the research model is complete after the discussion and 
findings from the interviews. Moreover, this study attempts to answer the different 
perceptions of the two groups (ports and port users) in the research model. Considering 
the nature and strategy of security related activities and their behavior, it is necessary to 
answer these questions as to whether these two groups have statistically significant 
differences in the way they are perceived.  
  
Q1, Q2a, Q2b, Q3 are explored through hypotheses testing, and Q4 is investigated 
through comparing and contrasting the differences in perceptions of variables in the 
research model.  
 
5. 2. 1 Latent and observed variables 
In order to gain theoretical justification, it has been mentioned that the basic constructs of 
the research framework were adopted from previous studies. Supply chain security 
related concepts have emerged after 9/11 in the U.S.A, and it is difficult to accurately 
gauge the terminologies and concepts. The latent variables are the abstract concepts. The 
observed variables are normally composed of multiple questions that actually stand for 
each latent variable and measure the degree to which the respondents agree. Therefore, 
several observed variables constitute a single latent variable. Generally, the observed 
variables (measurement items) are adopted from widely referred previous studies to 
justify the usage of those questions to represent each latent variable. In the SEM, it is 
vital to develop the right variables for each construct and justify the usage of observed 
variables for each latent variable.  
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(1) Antecedents (Antecedents) 
The variables that represent the Antecedents have been clearly identified in previous 
studies. Therefore, the interim research model can be introduced from the literature 
review. Although the components may change after the qualitative semi-structured 
interviews, it is worthwhile discussing the latent and observed variables for the 
Antecedents and their related sources for justification. There are three components of 
Antecedents: Security Vulnerability (SV), Risk Perception (RP), and Partner Directive 
(PD). Table 5. 1 shows the potential latent and observed variables for the Antecedents. 
The measurement items are the actual questions for the questionnaire and they are 
presented in the observed variable columns. These are merely an initial starting point for 
conceptualizing the Antecedents, and will change after the semi-structured interviews. 
Table 5. 1 presents the potential latent and observed variables for Antecedent construct 
and their sources from previous studies.  
 
Table 5. 1 The potential latent and observed variables for Antecedent construct 
Latent variable Observed variable Sources 
Security 
Vulnerability 
Political instability, war, civil unrest or other 
sociopolitical crises; Diseases or epidemics; 
Natural disasters; International terror attacks; 
market system immature; laggard logistics 
infrastructure development 
Wagner and Bode (2008); 
Wagner and Bode (2006); 
Sheffi (2005); 
Cavinato (2004) 
Risk Perception 
Perturbation or breakdown of internal IT 
infrastructure; Changes in the political 
environment due to the introduction of new laws, 
stipulations 
Wagner and Bode (2008); 
Wagner and Bode (2006); 
Sheffi (2005) 
Partner Directive 
Willingness to make cooperative changes; working 
together for success; showing mutual support for 
partner; having common values; being a strategic 
aligned partners; having exclusive strategic 
partnering alignment with partners 
Shin et al. (2002); 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Berry et al. (199); 
Min et al. (2007) 
Source: Author 
 
(2) Supply Chain Security Orientation (SCSO) 
The SCSO has four latent variables which are shown in Table 5. 2 below. Traditional 
indicators were adopted by Panayides and Song (2008) in the security-dedicated 
communications and technology. Other latent variables adopted items from various 
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sources (Martens et al. 2011; Closs and McGarell 2004; Helferich and Cook 2002). 
Especially, Min and Mentzer (2004) and Min et al. (2007) provide widely used 
measurement items in Supply Chain Management, and some of them have also been 
adopted to measure the latent variables in the SCSO. Table 5. 2 presents the potential 
latent and observed variables for SCSO and their sources.  
 
Table 5. 2 The potential latent and observed variables for SCSO construct 
Latent variables Observed variable Sources 
Security 
Preparation and 
Planning 
The involvement of security implementation; 
targeting highest-risk activities; integration with 
the overall plans and operations 
Martens et al. (2011); 
Closs and McGarrell (2004); 
Helferich and Cook (2002) 
Security Related 
Partnerships 
Willingness to make cooperative changes; 
working together for success; 
Shin et al. (2002); 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Min et al. (2007) 
Organizational 
Adaptation 
Objectives consistent with supply chain 
members; sharing similar philosophy with 
supply chain members 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Min et al. (2007); 
Panayides (2007) 
Security-Dedicated 
Communications 
and 
Technology 
Using EDI; using integrated information 
systems; adopting computerized port service 
system; using the latest IT e.g. RFID 
Panayides and Song (2008) 
Source: Author 
 
(3) Port Performance (PP) 
The measurement items for port performance have been widely discussed in various 
studies. In particular, effectiveness and efficiency measurements is proposed by many 
studies (Bichou and Gray 2004; Brooks 2006; Woo 2010). In this study, effectiveness is 
related to security orientated behavior and the attitude of the organization, and how well it 
is utilized according to the customers’ needs and services. Efficiency is related to the 
balance between the resources and their maximized utilization, and how well they are 
operated in terms of port operation and land transport. Table 5. 3 presents the potential 
latent and observed variables for PP and their sources. 
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Table 5. 3 The potential latent and observed variables for PP construct 
Latent variables Observed variable Sources 
External 
Effectiveness 
-Service Quality 
-Customer 
Orientation 
-Service Price 
Reliability; timeliness; lead time; shipment 
information provision 
Responsiveness; flexibility 
Total price; handling charge 
Marlow and Paixão Casaca 
(2003); 
Tongzon and Ganesalingam 
(1994); 
Tongzon (1995) 
Internal Efficiency 
-Sea and land 
-operation 
Cargo operation 
Cargo throughput per crane; cargo throughput 
per acre; ship waiting time; ship turnaround 
time; time for loading/unloading cargo 
Tongzon (1995); 
Marlow and Paixão Casaca 
(2003) 
Source: Author 
 
(4) Potential SCSO moderators  
Potential SCSO moderators are shown in Table 5. 4. The measurement scales have been 
found from various sources that have been utilized in many studies such as Marlow and 
Paixão Casaca (2003) and Tongzon (1995). These are widely used measurement scales 
which this study has adopted in order to gain validity and reliability. However, these 
potential variables are also subject to change after the interviews. Table 5. 4 presents the 
potential latent and observed variables for SCSO moderators and their sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  112 
Table 5. 4 The potential latent and observed variables for SCSO moderators construct 
Latent variables Observed variable Sources 
Internal 
Moderators 
Top Management 
support 
Top management attitudes to 
adaptation to supply chain 
management; More education 
chances; rewards to and with the 
supply chain 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Min et al. (2007); 
Hambrick and Mason (1984);  
Hitt et al. (2001); Andraski 
(1998); Li and Lin (2006) 
Employee Security 
Attitudes 
Being consistent and patient 
with the supply chain members; 
being protective to the outside 
entities 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Min et al. (2007) 
Employee Integrity/ 
Loyalty 
Being reliable; being loyal; 
being open; being open to 
making mistakes 
Min and Mentzer (2004); 
Min et al. (2007) 
External 
Moderators 
Political/Legal 
Factors/Support 
The involvement of security 
implementation; targeting 
highest-risk activities; 
integration with the overall 
plans and operations 
Martens et al. (2011); 
Closs and McGarrell (2004); 
Helferich and Cook (2002) 
Partner Cooperation 
Willing to cooperate with the 
supply chain partners; willing to 
work together; willing to 
cooperate with respect to quality 
management/forecasting and 
planning 
Min and Mentzer (2004);  
Min et al. (2007); 
Balsmeier and Voisin (1996); 
Closs and Mollenkopf (2004) 
Partner Support 
Willing to support the supply 
chain strategic aligned partners; 
willing to allocate profit evenly 
with our partners 
Min and Mentzer (2004);  
Min et al. (2007); Lee (2008);  
Balsmeier and Voisin (1996);  
Closs and Mollenkopf (2004) 
Source: Author 
 
5. 3 Interview findings from semi-structured interviews 
This part of the chapter introduces the findings from the semi-structured interviews. It 
presents the following themes: 1) whether Korean ports are security oriented or not; 2) 
whether SCSO is critical strategy for ports or not; 3) the supply chain standpoint in 
analyzing the security of ports and their supply chains; 4) identification of components 
and causal links of Antecedents, SCSO, Potential moderators of SCSO, and the PP 
construct. These issues were re-discussed in the process of the semi-structured interviews. 
The first, second, and third theme of the interviews are the background questions, while 
the fourth theme is the core part which identifies the qualified variables and links in the 
framework. As introduced in Chapter 4, there are three types of interviewees in port 
security, terminal security, the U.N. (international institution), academic, domestic 
carriers, and forwarders. The first type is the port security and terminal security officers 
who can be categorized as the people actually working in the port security area. The 
second type is the domestic carriers and forwarders who can be categorized as people 
working in the port user field. The third type is the people from the U.N. and academics. 
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In particular, the interviewees from the U.N. all have experience in working for the 
Korean port authorities, and now in setting global security standards for ports and 
maritime supply chains. Academics in port security are also included in order to gain the 
academic insights into the knowledge and experience in reflecting the reality of Korean 
port security into developing the SCSO framework. For most of the questions, 
interviewees gave similar answers despite some differences in certain areas which are 
explained in detail in the next sections. Table 5. 5 presents the main points of the semi-
structured interviews for these three groups of interviewees. 
 
Table 5. 5 The main points of semi-structured interviews 
Port group Port user group Academic and the U.N. 
-Port/supply chain security from 
port’s perspective 
-Terminal security officers 
 opinion on port security and 
ISPS code/CSI 
-Ports’ perspective on SCSO and 
performance as ISPS code 
 implementing organization 
-Components of the framework 
-Adding/dropping variables 
-Port/supply chain security from 
port users’ perspective 
-Port users’ opinion on SCSO and 
performance as AEO, 
  ISO28000 certified companies 
of Korean port users 
-Components of the framework 
-Adding/dropping variables 
-Port/supply chain security from 
U.N.’s perspective 
-Policy builder’s opinions on 
 SCSO and performance of 
 Korean ports 
-Academic support for SCSO 
from supply chain security and 
ports 
-Components of the framework 
-Adding/dropping variables 
Source: Author 
 
5. 3. 1 Security orientation of Korean ports  
This section re-discusses the issues related to Korean ports and supply chain orientation 
raised in Chapter 3 as they were brought up during the interviews. Previous studies 
indicated that Korean ports are definitely security oriented mainly after the adoption of 
the security measures such as the ISPS code and CSI (KMI 2008; Han 2008; Han and 
Choi 2010). All the interviewees showed no doubt about the fact that ports, especially 
Korean ports are definitely security oriented. Many interviewees in port/terminal security, 
academics, the United Nations, domestic carriers, and forwarders shared similar opinions 
such as: “the U.S. has been the biggest, and the most important traditional trading 
partner for Korea for a long time. If the U.S. and the U.N. are driving these programs to 
strengthen cargo security, Korea should follow these rules to at least export goods as they 
did before to the U.S. to keep the Korean national economy alive”. In particular, one 
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director-level employee of a Korean port security department stated: “I do believe that we 
are absolutely security oriented because we have our own subsidiary company that 
primarily works on specialized security procedures for our port management which 
doesn’t happen often in foreign ports. We do have our own security teams, security 
education system, and security processes to keep our security level as high as the 
regulations of the ISPS code require”. However, one CEO of the security specialized 
subsidiary company stated that: “we have to be security oriented. If we are not, Korean 
ships cannot even reach most of the destination ports in the world. It is the trend of the 
global logistics, and for Korean ports, we have to be. It is a must, rather than an option”.  
According to the interviews, it was identified that ports in Korea are definitely security 
oriented which is a critical part of modern port management in the 21
st
 century.  
 
5. 3. 2 Supply chain perspective of Korean port security  
The integration of ports into supply chains is a widely recognized topic of maritime 
transport (Notteboom and Winkelmans 2001). However, it has been pointed out in recent 
literature that port security should be viewed from the supply chain standpoint because of 
the involvement of different organizations in the supply chain (Brooks and Pelot 2008; 
Bichou 2004; KMI 2008). As a regulation, it has also been indicated that the ISPS code 
and CSI for port security involve various supply chain members such as ship security 
officers, port security officers, and people from the government (Goulielmos and 
Anastasakos 2005; Bichou 2004; KMI 2006). The interviewees showed profound 
knowledge of the security regulations of ports from the supply chain perspective using 
expressions such as ‘container transport security in the supply chain’, ‘CSI 
implementation of Korean ports’, and ‘security issues during transport in the Malacca 
Strait’. One Director level interviewee in the United Nations stated that: “From the 
standpoint of the IMO policy, security goes beyond a port as a single entity. It involves 
origin and destination ports, ships, and other organizations to keep the security level high 
all through the supply chain from piracy and terrorism threats. Our policy is aiming to 
secure the cargo, people, and infrastructure in the supply chain. Security involving ports 
as a single entity can only cover a limited perspective of modern security of supply 
chains”. Most interviewees including port/terminal security officers and 
forwarding/shipping companies agreed with the fact that port security is driven by 
security regulations which involves supply chain members which should be viewed from 
the supply chain perspective. One academic interviewee stated that: “the topic of supply 
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chain integration of ports is widely studied by researchers. However, analyzing port 
security from the point of the supply chain is quite new and timely for the current state of 
supply chain and port security research because security should be guaranteed all 
through the supply chain not just in ports only”. However, although interviewees in 
terminal security, domestic carriers, and forwarders agreed with this standpoint, they held 
different opinions on the effectiveness of the security programs in the supply chain. “Port 
security involves many organizations in the supply chain. The security programs that we 
have been certified are AEO and ISO28000, and these programs are both strengthening 
and facilitating trade and flow of goods in the supply chain. However, security programs 
that ports have certified are the ISPS code and CSI which seems to us to hinder the 
efficiencies of port operation rather than facilitating trade. We think port security is a 
part of supply chain security, but in terms of the effectiveness of these programs, these 
perceptions should be analyzed separately. We think that it is necessary to analyze the 
research model by dividing the sample into port group and port user group and see how 
differently they perceive about the security issues in ports”. KMI (2008) found that 
supply chain and port security members perceive security measures differently because 
they have different benefits and obligations concerning security regulations and their 
effectiveness in the supply chain. This study analyzes this point raised by the interviewees 
by conducting a multi-group analysis in Chapter 7. However, the point is that ports and 
port users in the supply chain are definitely security oriented and it was clearly confirmed 
that it should be analyzed from a supply chain perspective.  
 
5. 3. 3 SCSO: critical strategy for ports? 
The interviewees were asked whether the SCSO framework is suitable for analyzing the 
security of ports and port users. As was identified from previous studies, ports and 
security program certified port users are security oriented firms. Therefore, this study 
adopts the SCSO framework as an initial starting point for the analysis. Although the 
research gap was identified in the literature review, interviewees were asked about the 
validity of adopting the framework. All the interviewees gave positive answers in 
adopting it with expressions such as “SCSO is a critical strategy for port management in 
the era of terrorism” and “SCSO will enhance the ports’ competitive edge because those 
who act first in the security technology industry can set the standard which might easily 
become the global standard”. However, although they all agree with the adoption of the 
construct, some interviewees in the port security industry, forwarders and domestic 
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carriers showed doubt about the construct of the SCSO, which was: “not all variables 
seem highly related to the reality of port and supply chain security situation in Korea”. 
Moreover, one academic answered: “the framework looks good to apply to ports and their 
supply chains, but rather than testing the framework as it is, it might be better to apply 
more opinions from the people in the Korean port security industry especially with the 
validity of the variables and links if the framework is developed from a limited number of 
people in limited industries”. Furthermore, many interviewees showed signs of concern 
about adopting the framework as it is by using expressions such as: “limited reflection of 
the reality in Korean ports and supply chains” and “a few improper variables in the 
construct”.  
 
It was clearly identified from the interviews that the framework is good to adopt as an 
initial standpoint, but it needs modification on the variables and the causal relationships. 
The next section discusses the findings from the interviews focusing on the components 
of the SCSO construct. This is the core procedure of making the ‘adopted framework’ into 
‘a complete research model’ by adding/dropping the variables in the construct.  
 
5. 3. 4 Components of the SCSO construct 
5. 3. 4. 1 Variables of Antecedents  
The variables of Antecedents are well explained in the previous chapters. They are based 
on previous studies, and most of the variables are good variables for representing the 
Antecedents. However, many of the interviewees expressed their opinions about the 
variables that need to be dropped or modified in the Antecedent construct. To make the 
model reflect the realities of port and supply chain security in Korea, the variables for the 
model had to be changed. This part of the chapter discusses how the components of the 
variables have been changed from the interview process.  
 
(1) Risk Perception (RP) and Security Vulnerability (SV)/Financial Resources (FR) 
The Risk Perception (RP) variable can be found in various studies especially in 
economics and social science papers (Bettman 1973; Dowling and Staelin 1994; Zsidisin 
2003). Perceived risk is defined by Zsidisin (2003) as “the consequences and certainty 
with which an undesirable event may occur”. In this study, Risk Perception (RP) is 
included because it can have a negative impact on the constructs when people in the 
organization have a perception of risks in distribution, supply management, and crisis 
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situation (Autry and Bobbitt 2008). The foundation of the Security Vulnerability (SV) 
concept can be found in papers on crime and the fear of victimization (Warr 1987; 
LaGrange 1995). This is also related to supply problems and inbound and outbound 
transportation. Interviewees in terminal security and forwarding companies stated that: 
“in terms of the supply chain, I believe the two variables of Risk Perception (RP) and 
Security Vulnerability (SV) are highly related to each other because Risk Perception (RP) 
is the outcome of Security Vulnerability (SV). We have a lot of risks and security 
vulnerabilities in our operations of the terminals and relationships with our supply chain 
members, and it will be difficult to clearly differentiate the difference between the two. 
They have subtle differences but I suggest that they need to be merged into one because 
they are measuring a similar concept in slightly different ways.” Another interviewee 
from port security mentioned that: “In our transport security operations, safety, secure 
storage, and transport of our products should be guaranteed, so Security Vulnerability 
(SV) can be seen as risks identified, and Risk Perception (RP) is the possible risks in the 
future. They are somewhat similar concepts which can be measured as one variable.” It 
was clearly shown from most of the interviewees that these two variables have no definite 
differences in measuring the security of ports and supply chains. Based on the findings, 
the variables of Risk Perceptions (RP) and Security Vulnerabilities (SV) are merged into 
one from now on as Risk Perceptions and Security Vulnerabilities (RPSV) in this study.  
On the other hand, many interviewees from all the groups suggested that Financial 
Resources (FR) is a crucial and the most important variable of the antecedent factor for 
being security oriented. All the interviewees shared a similar opinion that “it is the 
financial resources that enable us to invest more in security which will make us more 
security oriented. It is the most important foundation of being security oriented of any 
organization”. One interviewee from terminal security stated: “we need a huge amount of 
financial investment in security in order to have better facilities, human resources, and 
information technology. The ISPS code and CSI require a variety of things which cannot 
be achieved without financial support”. One interviewee from the U.N. also mentioned: 
“Security is a cost. The U.N. knows the significance of security issues and financial 
investment, but it is crucial for ports and maritime transport operators around the world 
to implement security measures at a high level. The ISPS code and CSI need some 
financial investment, and if any organization can be security oriented, it must have a 
certain level of financial resources. If you do not have financial availability, you cannot 
be security oriented”. It was clearly identified from the interviews that financial resources 
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are strongly suggested by most interviewees as the antecedent factor for being security 
oriented. Thus, from the findings of the interviews, Financial Resources (FR) is included 
as a suitable variable in the Antecedent. 
 
(2) Partner Directive (PD)/Supply Chain Security Initiatives (SCSI) 
The variable Partner Directive (PD) was suggested in the framework. Because of the 
concerns of the partners and members in the supply chain, the security measures may be 
taken more. However, one interviewee from port security stated: “from a Korean 
perspective, it is not the partner directives that require us to become more security 
oriented, it is rather the security initiatives such as the ISPS code that almost forces us to 
become more security oriented, and that variable needs to be excluded from the research 
framework.” Also, another interviewee in a domestic carrier stated: “in terms of security, 
we are optional in being security oriented because we can be security certified or not only 
based on the fact that it is beneficial to us being so in terms of import and export 
operations.” Many previous studies have shown the importance of supply chain security 
initiatives. In this study, the sample organizations are all supply chain security initiative 
certified companies because it was suggested that the thoughts and behaviors of the 
members of these organizations are highly affected by these programs. Moreover, 
interviewees from the U.N. and academic interviewees shared similar opinions: “In Korea, 
the ISPS code, AEO, and other programs are driving maritime society towards more 
security oriented organizations. If this variable is not included, the framework is missing 
the biggest external environmental factor that drives the supply chain security orientation. 
Considering the fact that partner directives cannot be urgent and critical, it is obvious 
that compulsory supply chain security initiatives as a variable are much more important 
and should be included as a substitute for partner directives”. Furthermore, one 
interviewee in a forwarding company stated: “the biggest reason why we are security 
oriented is that we have to follow the rules and regulations of security initiatives such as 
the ISPS code, AEO, and ISO28000 which require certified organizations to follow their 
stipulated rules.” Thus, the new variable of Supply Chain Security Initiatives (SCSI) is 
added to the Antecedents construct as a substitute for Partner Directive (PD) in the 
research framework.  
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5. 3. 4. 2 Variables of SCSO  
The participants of the interview were asked to answer questions about the variables of 
supply chain security orientation (SCSO). Based on the research framework developed by 
Autry and Bobbitt (2008), they were asked to explore the predetermined variables and 
modify by adding and dropping variables if necessary. It was discovered that there was no 
variable that needed to be dropped, but two variables: Security Culture (SC) and Security 
Education (SE) were found to be the additional components of the SCSO.  
 
(1) Security Preparation and Planning (SPP) 
The theme of Security Preparation and Planning (SRP) is suggested as the component of 
SCSO. Previous studies (Zsidisin et al. 2005; Sheffi 2001; Helferich and Cook 2002) 
provide the basic background for understanding the planning and preparation for security. 
It was found from the interviews that the theme was appropriate for being one of the 
variables of the SCSO. One interviewee from terminal security mentioned that “security 
planning and preparation is definitely one of the variables of the SCSO because it is the 
first thing to consider when you think about the security aspects of port logistics. We all 
have security divisions in our company and it is vital to have the right planning for the 
security.” Also, two other interviewees from a forwarding company and a shipping 
company stated that “the ports we use have their own subsidiary companies devoted only 
to the security tasks which show how important it is to have security planning and 
preparation for being security oriented. It makes the whole organization more sensitive 
towards the security aspects of logistics.” 
This discovery from the interviews indicated that the theme of Security Preparation and 
Planning is closely related to the control and risk reduction strategy of the supply chain 
that can minimize any risk of a crisis situation that companies may face.  
 
(2) Security-related Partnership (SRP) 
Another theme: Security Related Partnership (SRP) is suggested as the component of 
SCSO. It was found from the interviews that SRP was closely related to security 
initiatives. One interviewee in a forwarding company mentioned: “the security related 
partnership is very important because we get a lot of benefits from being AEO security 
program certified especially in trading and customs procedures. Particularly, when we 
have to meet the urgent deadline of transportation, a faster and more efficient customs 
process can play a vital role in our company’s reputation.” Also, three of the other 
  120 
interviewees from port security and a shipping company stated that “security orientation 
is directly related to the security initiatives. The ISPS code and other certification 
programs force us to work together with our supply chain members or else we are not 
allowed to export cargo to the United States and other countries that follow the 
regulations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). A security related 
partnership is definitely an important part of security orientation for any organization” 
It was found from the interviews that this theme is highly related to the regulations and 
rules of the security initiatives rather than the crisis or risk management strategies that 
several previous studies have suggested.  
 
(3) Organizational Adaptation (OA) 
An additional theme that was also suggested in the framework is Organizational 
Adaptation (OA). In terms of security, OA is related to taking adaptive processes of 
procedures to cope with the urgent risks and security vulnerabilities in the supply chain. 
One interviewee from a forwarding company stated: “in case of a crisis or disruption of 
the supply chain, we use the common warehouse to cope with the situation to transport 
goods to the place of disruption as soon as possible.” Another interviewee from terminal 
security management mentioned: “We have an electric security seal (E-seal) in our 
terminals which will considerably enhance the entrance of people and containers to our 
terminals which is definitely a part of being a security orientated organization.” Two of 
the interviewees from port security also mentioned: “we have our own security teams and 
a subsidiary company so we try our best to have the best possible facilities and equipment 
in the port area in Korea if financial resources allow. We have walkie-talkies, closed 
circuit television, and radio transmissions that no other ports can match”. In summary, 
Organizational Adaptation (OA) is definitely a component of SCSO in Korea considering 
the high level of equipment and facilities that can cope with the sudden changes and risks 
that Korean ports have.  
 
(4) Security-dedicated Communications and Technology (SDCT) 
The fourth element of SCSO is the Security Dedicated Communications and Technology 
(SDCT). There have been related studies that showed a high level of visibility throughout 
the supply chain because of the better technology applications such as RFID (Radio 
frequency Identification). Three interviewees from terminal and port security shared the 
opinion: “we are using the RFID on our terminals which considerably enhances the 
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security of the container transport and also reduces the required number of people 
working for us.” Also, four interviewees from shipping companies and forwarding 
companies shared the same vision: “information sharing by adopting technology is 
essential for our work because the product we transport has to be secure and safe at all 
times throughout the supply chain. Furthermore, we are ISO28000 certified which we 
need to view all the products at the right time and the right place” Four interviewees 
from academic institutions and the United Nations also agreed with the SDCT and stated: 
“technology is a critical part of the security of ports and supply chains. The IMO 
encourages member states to enhance the level of technology that can upgrade the level 
of security in maritime supply chains. Also, there are several academic supports for this 
link which you can also justify and test whether this connection has any significance in a 
Korean maritime context”. In summary, it is clearly shown that the SDCT is definitely a 
component of SCSO based on interviews and it is therefore included. 
 
(5) Security Culture (SC) 
The additional component of the SCSO is the Security Culture (SC). The concept of the 
culture of an organization has been well defined in many academic themes (Williams et al. 
2009). One interviewee from a shipping company stated: “since the 9/11 attacks, we are 
making the supply chain security focus throughout the organization because it is 
necessary to cope with the global interest on security initiatives. Also, the growth of 
piracy and terrorism threats drove us to become more security sensitive and aware of 
security related issues. We are definitely building our own security based culture in our 
organization”. Another interviewee from terminal security stated that: “Our terminal is 
ISPS code certified, so it is very important that all the employees are vigilant and 
sensitive to the regulations and process of container security. We have our own security-
sensitive culture which is pervasive throughout the organization”. The last interviewee in 
the forwarding company mentioned that: “we became more security oriented after we 
were AEO certified, and we are trying to create security-dedicated employees in our 
organization which creates the security culture. The security culture is clearly a part of 
organizations’ being security oriented”. Therefore, the component of Security Culture 
(SC) was added to the SCSO construct in the framework. The measurement scales for 
Security culture are adopted from Williams et al. (2009) which were recently developed 
for quantitative analysis.  
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(6) Security Education (SE) 
The final additional element of the SCSO is Security Education (SE). The training and 
education of workforce are a critical part of the ISPS code and security orientation. This 
component was also found and added to the original research framework. One 
interviewee from port security mentioned: “It is our obligation to educate the workforce 
of our organization about security issues because it will affect the knowledge and 
behavior of employees. Also, in order to follow the regulations of the security initiatives 
such as the ISPS code and ISO 28000, it is vital to have an educational division in our 
organization.” Also, the other interviewee from terminal security management 
mentioned: “we are already educating and providing exams to give the employees credit 
which will make them more competitive in getting promotions”. Interviewees from the 
United Nations showed the importance of security education in the organization: “the 
education and training of the security in ports and supply chains is one of the most 
important parts of human resource management of ports. In the ISPS code, it is well 
documented as a regulation to have a certain level of education and training on regular 
basis. Therefore, it is definitely a part of security orientation because it is the people who 
create the security culture, and education is what is driving the people towards security 
orientation”. Thus, Security Education (SE) is included in the framework as an additional 
variable to the SCSO.  
 
5. 3. 4. 3 Variables of PP 
Port performance has been well discussed in previous studies (UNCTAD 1976; Tongzon 
1995; Marlow and Paixao 2003; Tongzon and Ganesalingam 1994). Since the link 
between supply chain security and organizational performance has not been identified yet 
as a research gap (Williams et al. 2008), the interviews were conducted to identify the 
specific component of the Supply Chain Outcome (PP) in the framework. However, many 
interviewees expressed opinions about measuring the performance of ports only rather 
than measuring all the variables in the construct, such as “rather than testing all the 
variables in the construct, I think performance is something that can encompass all the 
other variables according to how you define that concept. In terms of ports and supply 
chains in Korea, the link between port performance and security orientation should be 
identified. However, supply chain continuity can be excluded from the discussion because 
the measurement should be limited to the operational standpoint of ports in Korea”. One 
interviewee from port security stated: “The performance can be defined in a myriad of 
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ways, but in terms of the topic of security orientation and its impact, the performance 
should be defined as external effectiveness and internal efficiency. The quality and 
outcome of security oriented organizations should be revealed in an external effectiveness 
variable, and internal efficiency should be measuring how different notions and behaviors 
of the employees can have a positive impact on efficiency. Customer satisfaction is 
definitely an important part of port performance, and it should be included as a part of 
external effectiveness”. Another academic interviewee mentioned: “The impact of 
security regulations, orientations, and policies on port performance in Korea especially 
from effectiveness and efficiency is not identified yet in any previous research so far, and 
this should be analyzed as soon as possible. The framework of supply chain security 
orientation and its impact on efficiency and effectiveness will shed light on many things 
that have never been identified before. The traditional measurement of port performance 
covers the internal efficiency and external effectiveness which includes customer 
satisfaction”. The final interviewee from the forwarding and shipping companies said: “it 
is vital to empirically identify the link between the security orientation and efficiency and 
effectiveness as a part of performance because there has been a lot of speculation that 
there was a negative relationship between the two constructs, but we do not really know 
whether it is negative or positive.” Thus, from the interviews, Port Performance (PP) is 
adopted with two traditional sub-components identified from the interviews: external 
effectiveness and internal efficiency from which many studies define performance the 
same way (Brooks 2006; Bichou and Gray 2004). The variable of supply chain continuity 
is excluded from the discussion, and customer satisfaction is included as the sub-
component of performance. The interviewees stressed the fact that the external 
effectiveness and internal efficiency are the two components of Port Performance, and the 
relationship between security orientation and the two variables should be identified. 
External effectiveness is about providing customers with a better quality of service, and 
internal efficiency is about taking advantage of most of the available resources, and 
minimizing the waste of resources in that process. Since this study uses interviews and 
questionnaire for the data collection, the performance of ports is mainly based on 
subjective perceptions of people in ports and supply chains in Korea. 
 
5. 3. 4. 4 Variables in the Potential SCSO Moderators 
Potential SCSO Moderators are initially suggested in the framework. Internal and 
external facilitators and inhibitors are proposed based on qualitative interviews. They 
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include variables such as top management support, employee security attitudes, and 
partner cooperation and partner support. However, many interviewees from all groups 
shared the opinions that: “we do not feel any connection to the proposed external/internal 
moderating factors of the causal relationships. Top management support is already 
guaranteed as a top management priority because the ISPS code and employee security 
attitude is basically part of the level of security education and corporate culture of our 
organization rather than a moderating variable. It seems there is no logical base for this 
link as a potential moderator”. Also, three interviewees from a shipping company, 
academic institution and a forwarding company mentioned that “partner cooperation and 
support variables are basically a part of the supply chain security initiative. If this study 
involves those who are security program certified organizations such as the ISPS code 
and AEO, partner cooperation and support should be eliminated because it measures the 
sub-component of the variable SCSI in the Antecedents construct”. Another interviewee 
also pointed out that “all the variables in the potential SCSO moderators are not 
applicable to our security operations because we do not feel there are any moderating 
effects in our perceptions of being security oriented. It is more like a forced mentality 
without any moderation effects because of the significance of the security of supply chains 
these days. The link as a causal relationship, the moderating effects should be eliminated 
from the research framework”. 
 
Therefore, it was identified that the construct “Potential SCSO Moderators” was to be 
dropped from the research model because it was clearly found that it is an unnecessary 
construct to apply to the current state of the security of ports and their supply chains in 
Korea. All the interviewees shared the opinions that the link and the variables in Potential 
Supply chain Security Orientation Moderators do not reflect the port and supply chain 
security in the supply chain. The interviewees showed very simple but in-depth opinions 
and insights about the questions. Based on the interviews, the complete research model 
has been built based on multiple semi-structured interviews and it is suggested in Figure 5. 
1 below. 
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-RPSV 
-SCSI 
-FR 
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-SPP 
-SRP 
-OA 
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-SC 
-SE 
PP 
-EFC 
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Potential SCSO Moderators 
-IM 
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moderators construct 
 
Figure 5. 1 Development of research model 
-Literature Review: propose interim research framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-After the interviews: propose the complete research model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Note: SCSO: Supply Chain Security Orientation, PP: Port Performance, RP: Risk Perception, SV: Security 
Vulnerabilities, SPP: Security Preparation and Planning, SRP: Security Related Partnership, OA: 
Organizational Adaptation, SDCT: Security Dedicated Communication and Technology, IM: Internal 
Moderators, EM: External Moderators, RPSV: Risk Perception and Security Vulnerabilities, SCSI: Supply 
Chain Security Initiatives, FR: Financial Resources, SC: Security Culture, SE: Security Education, EFC: 
Effectiveness, EFF: Efficiency 
 
5. 4 The complete research model development 
After the in-depth interview process and literature review, the complete research model 
was developed in Figure 5. 2. As can be seen from the figure above, modifications have 
been made after the interviews. First, the components of Antecedents have been changed. 
The Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability variables are merged into Risk Perception 
and Security Vulnerability (RPSV). Also, the Partner Directive (PD) variable was 
dropped, and replaced by Financial Resources (FR) and Supply Chain Security Initiatives 
(SCSI). Also, in the supply chain security orientation construct, two variables are added 
Antecedents 
-RP 
-SV 
-PD 
SCSO 
-SPP 
-SRP 
-OA 
-SDCT 
Outcome 
-Performance 
 
-Customer 
Satisfaction 
 
-Supply Chain 
Continuity 
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which are: Security Culture (SC) and Security Education (SE). Thirdly, the components 
of Port Performance (PP) were identified which are: Effectiveness (EFC) and Efficiency 
(EFF). Finally, the potential SCSO moderator construct was dropped from the framework. 
The link of the moderator construct was found to be unnecessary in the causal 
relationship of the research model. Thus, the model became much simpler with 
added/dropped variables. These modifications on the interim research model from the 
semi-structured interview can better measure the security orientation concept because it 
reflects the perceptions and ideas of the people who actually work in the field of ports and 
supply chain security in Korea. Since the complete research model is now built, research 
hypotheses are shown in the next sections. 
 
Figure 5. 2 Complete research model  
Source: Author 
 
5. 4. 1 Research hypotheses 
The hypotheses proposed in the earlier part of this chapter remain the same after the 
extensive interview process. However, although each and every hypothesis is introduced 
in Chapter 7, the basic questions concerning Antecedents, SCSO, and PP at this stage are:  
 
Q1: Variables in the Antecedents have positive individual direct impacts on variables in 
the SCSO  
Q2a: Variables in the SCSO have positive individual direct impacts on variables in PP 
Q2b: Variables in the Antecedents have individual indirect and positive impacts on 
variables in PP through SCSO 
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-Risk Perception and 
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 (SCSI) 
Supply Chain Security Orientation 
-Security Preparation and Planning 
(SPP) 
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-Organizational Adaptation (OA) 
-Security-dedicated Communications 
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-Security Culture (SC) 
-Security Education (SE) 
Port Performance 
-Effectiveness (EFC) 
-Service Quality 
-Service Level 
-Customer 
Satisfaction 
-Efficiency (EFF) 
-Maritime Efficiency 
-Cargo Transport 
  127 
Q3: Variables in the Antecedents and SCSO have positive indirect total impact on 
variables in PP 
 
As the complete research model has been made, it is necessary to discuss the specific 
level of the hypotheses which will be tested. This study attempts to test the causal 
relationships using the constructs: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP. Each variable is tested in 
the boundaries of those three constructs. The empirical analysis will be conducted in three 
different processes: total impact, direct impact, and indirect impact and multi-group 
analysis in Chapter 7. The hypotheses for direct impact are shown in Table 5. 6, indirect 
impact in Table 5. 7, and total impact in Table 5. 8. 
 
Table 5. 6 The hypotheses for direct impacts among variables  
H1-1. RPSV has a positive impact on SPP H1-2. RPSV has a positive impact on SRP 
H1-3. RPSV has a positive impact on OA H1-4. RPSV has a positive impact on SDCT 
H1-5. RPSV has a positive impact on SC H1-6. RPSV has a positive impact on SE 
H1.7. RPSV has a positive impact on EFC H1.8. RPSV has a positive impact on EFF 
H2-1. FR has a positive impact on SPP H2-2. FR has a positive impact on SRP 
H2-3. FR has a positive impact on OA H2-4. FR has a positive impact on SDCT 
H2-5. FR has a positive impact on SC H2-6. FR has a positive impact on SE 
H2-7. FR has a positive impact on EFC H2-8. FR has a positive impact on EFF 
H3-1. SCSI has a positive impact on SPP H3-2. SCSI has a positive impact on SRP 
H3-3. SCSI has a positive impact on OA H3-4. SCSI has a positive impact on SDCT 
H3-5. SCSI has a positive impact on SC H3-6. SCSI has a positive impact on SE 
H3-7. SCSI has a positive impact on EFC H3-8. SCSI has a positive impact on EFF 
H4-1. SPP has a positive impact on EFC H4-2. SPP has a positive impact on EFF 
H5-1. SRP has a positive impact on EFC H5-2. SRP has a positive impact on EFF 
H6-1. OA has a positive impact on EFC H6-2. OA has a positive impact on EFF 
H7-1. SDCT has a positive impact on EFC H7-2. SDCT has a positive impact on EFF 
H8-1. SC has a positive impact on EFC H8-2. SC has a positive impact on EFF 
H9-1. SE has a positive impact on EFC H9-2. SE has a positive impact on EFF 
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Table 5. 7 The hypotheses for indirect impacts among variables  
H10-1. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SPP 
H10-2. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SRP 
H10-3. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through OA 
H10-4. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SDCT 
H10-5. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SC 
H10-6. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SE 
H11-1. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SPP 
H11-2. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SRP 
H11-3. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through OA 
H11-4. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SDCT 
H11-5. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SC 
H11-6. RPSV has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SE 
H12-1. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SPP 
H12-2. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SRP 
H12-3. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through OA 
H12-4. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SDCT 
H12-5. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SC 
H12-6. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SE 
H13-1. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SPP 
H13-2. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SRP 
H13-3. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through OA 
H13-4. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SDCT 
H13-5. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SC 
H13-6. FR has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SE 
H14-1. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SPP 
H14-2. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SRP 
H14-3. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through OA 
H14-4. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SDCT 
H14-5. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SC 
H14-6. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFC through SE 
H15-1. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SPP 
H15-2. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SRP 
H15-3. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through OA 
H15-4. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SDCT 
H15-5. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SC 
H15-6. SCSI has an indirect and positive 
impact on EFF through SE 
 
 
Table 5. 8 The hypotheses for total imparts among variables  
H16-1. RPSV has a positive impact on SPP H16-2. RPSV has a positive impact on SRP 
H16-3. RPSV has a positive impact on OA 
H16-4. RPSV has a positive impact on 
SDCT 
H16-5. RPSV has a positive impact on SC H16-6. RPSV has a positive impact on SE 
H16-7. RPSV has a positive impact on EFC H16-8. RPSV has a positive impact on EFF 
H17-1. FR has a positive impact on SPP H17-2. FR has a positive impact on SRP 
H17-3. FR has a positive impact on OA H17-4. FR has a positive impact on SDCT 
H17-5. FR has a positive impact on SC H17-6. FR has a positive impact on SE 
H17-7. FR has a positive impact on EFC H17-8. FR has a positive impact on EFF 
H18-1. SCSI has a positive impact on SPP H18-2. SCSI has a positive impact on SRP 
H18-3. SCSI has a positive impact on OA 
H18-4. SCSI has a positive impact on 
SDCT 
H18-5. SCSI has a positive impact on SC H18-6. SCSI has a positive impact on SE 
H18-7. SCSI has a positive impact on EFC H18-8. SCSI has a positive impact on EFF 
H19-1. SPP has a positive impact on EFC H19-2. SPP has a positive impact on EFF 
H20-1. SRP has a positive impact on EFC H20-2. SRP has a positive impact on EFF 
H21-1. OA has a positive impact on EFC H21-2. OA has a positive impact on EFF 
H22-1. SDCT has a positive impact on EFC H22-2. SDCT has a positive impact on EFF 
H23-1. SC has a positive impact on EFC H23-2. SC has a positive impact on EFF 
H24-1. SE has a positive impact on EFC H24-2. SE has a positive impact on EFF 
 
  129 
5. 4. 2 Latent and observed variables in the research model  
Based on the interim model developed in the early part of this chapter, some variables 
have been dropped, and some variables have been added to the complete model after the 
in-depth semi-structured interviews. The latent variables are presented based on the 
previous research by Autry and Bobbitt (2008) and interview findings. The observed 
variables are the real questions that were used to measure the respondents’ perceptions, 
and they are all adopted based on relevant studies in the supply chain management and 
port research.  
 
5. 4. 2. 1 Antecedents 
Table 5. 1 showed the latent and observed variables for the Antecedents. The existing 
literature provided the latent variable of Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability 
(RPSV), and the variables of Financial Resources (FR) and Supply Chain Security 
Initiatives (SCSI) were adopted based on the findings from the interviews. The variables 
of FR and SCSI are new to the research model, and the variables of Risk Perception (RP) 
and Security Vulnerability (SV) were integrated based on the interviews because they 
were found to be measuring the similar and same concept in different ways from the 
interviews. Table 5. 9 presents the complete version of latent and observed variables for 
the Antecedents construct. 
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Table 5. 9 Latent and observed variable for the Antecedents (complete version) 
Measurement items Source 
RPSV(Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability) 
1. Having the risk perception of possible negative experience due to 
perturbation or breakdown of security related internal IT infrastructure 
(RPSV1) 
2. Having the risk perception of possible negative experience due to 
perturbation or breakdown of security related external IT infrastructure 
(RPSV2) 
3. Having the risk perception of possible negative experience due to 
downtime or loss of down production capacity caused by security related 
local disruptions (RPSV3) 
4. Obsolescent logistics infrastructure can cause negative security experience 
(RPSV4) 
5. Having the security threats, critical resources secured and impacts of 
successful security threats should be identified, analyzed, evaluated (RPSV5) 
6. Having the minimum security requirements for resources to be secured 
and risk acceptance level should be established (RPSV6)  
Wagner and Bode (2008) 
Wagner and Bode (2006) 
Sheffi (2005) 
Cavinato (2004) 
FR(Financial Resources) 
7. Having the financial resources to invest for supply chain security (FR1) 
8. Having the willingness to invest for supply chain security (FR2) 
9. Having the high priority for supply chain security (FR3) 
10. Having the cooperative relationship with supply chain members in 
financing capital equipment (FR4) 
Interview findings, 
Woo (2010) 
SCSI (Supply Chain Security Initiatives) 
11. Global supply chain security initiatives such as the ISPS Code are 
important (SCSI1)  
12. Adoption of supply chain security initiatives has a positive impact on our 
organization (SCSI2) 
13. Security related initiatives will be more important to our organization in 
the future (SCSI3) 
14. Having a proper plan to cope with the various global security initiatives 
(SCSI4) 
15. Willingness to invest more on supply chain security (SCSI5) 
16. Willingness to collect more information on global supply chain security 
initiatives (SCSI6) 
Interview findings, 
Lee et al. (2010) 
Source: Author 
 
5. 4. 2. 2 SCSO 
The variables for the SCSO are presented in Table 5. 2. Also, from the interview, the new 
variable of Security Culture (SC) and Security Education (SE) are added to the research 
model. The sources and measuring items are shown. Table 5. 10 presents the complete 
version of latent and observed variables for the SCSO construct. 
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Table 5. 10 Latent and observed variable for the SCSO (complete version)  
Measurement items Source 
SPP(Security Preparation and Planning) 
1. The people who develop the security plan are involved in its implementation 
(SPP1) 
2. Targeting the security plan on the highest risk activities (SPP2) 
3. Security planners are seeking input from employees who implement the plan on a 
day to day basis (SPP3) 
4. Security preparedness plan is integrated with the overall enterprise plans and 
operations (SPP4) 
5. Security plan is coordinated with outside groups(governments, first responders, 
utilities, and nonprofit emergency service providers (SPP5) 
6. Security planning is coordinated across the organization’s internal functional areas 
(SPP6) 
Martens et al. (2011) 
Closs and McGarrell (2004) 
Helferich and Cook (2002) 
SRP (Security Related Partnership) 
7. Having reduced channel complexity over the previous years to closely work with a 
selected set of security related supply chain members (SRP1) 
8. Having facilitated a strong and long-term supply chain relationship fostering 
security related cooperation with each other (SRP2) 
9. Having relationship with supply chain members are based on trust rather than 
contractual obligations (SRP3) 
10. Having guidelines for developing long term supply chain security related 
relationships with supply chain members (SRP4) 
11. Having guidelines for developing, maintaining, and monitoring long term supply 
chain partnerships with each other (SRP5) 
Shin et al. (2002) 
Min and Mentzer (2004) 
Min et al. (2007) 
OA (Organizational Adaptation) 
12. Having goals and objectives which are consistent with our supply chain 
members(OA1) 
13. Having the willingness to make cooperative changes with our supply chain 
members (OA2) 
14. Having the beliefs that supply chain members must work together to be 
successful (OA3) 
15. Our supply chain members trust each other (OA4) 
16. Our CEO and CEOs of our supply chain members have similar operation 
philosophies (OA5) 
Min and Mentzer (2004) 
Min et al. (2007) 
Panayides (2007) 
Security-Dedicated Communications and Technology (SDCT) 
17. Using integrated electronic data interchange to communicate with partners in the 
supply chain (SDCT1) 
18. Using integrated information systems to share data/information with partners in 
the supply chain (SDCT2) 
19. Adopting computerized port service systems for our supply chain security 
(SDCT3) 
20. Using the latest IT technology available to the industry to support supply chain 
security (SDCT4) 
21. Providing security information concerning shipments to customers (SDCT5) 
Panayides and Song (2008) 
SC (Security Culture) 
22. Creating a supply chain security focus among all employees (SC1) 
23. Making supply chain security the norm for all employees (SC2) 
24. Dedicating effort to creating a supply chain security focused workforce (SC3) 
25. Making sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply chain security (SC4) 
Williams et al. (2009) 
SE (Security Education) 
26. Providing security-related education and training of company personnel (SE1) 
27. Benchmarking best practices of competitors, suppliers, customers, and other 
parties to improve our organization’s security program (SE2) 
28. Conducting scheduled mock-exercise training programs or simulations to test our 
internal security program (SE3) 
29. Hiring and promoting security conscious personnel (SE4) 
30. Viewing security training as long term investment and service quality 
improvement facilitator (SE5) 
Martens et al. (2011) 
Closs and McGarrell (2004) 
Sheffi (2001) 
Source: Author 
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5. 4. 2. 3 PP 
The two main variables for measuring port performance have been found from the 
interviews: Effectiveness (EFC) and Efficiency (EFF). Table 5. 11 presents the complete 
version of latent and observed variables.  
 
Table 5. 11 Latent and observed variable for the PP (complete version)  
Measurement items Source 
EFC (Effectiveness) 
1. Providing a consistent reliable service (EFC1) 
2. Handling cargoes on quoted or anticipated time (EFC2) 
3. Handling cargoes on customers’ time requirements (EFC3) 
4. Our service lead-time is appropriate (EFC4) 
5. Providing shipment information accurately (EFC5) 
6. Responding promptly to the need of customers (EFC6) 
7. Having a quick decision making process (EFC7) 
8. Being flexible in terms of volume and type of cargo handling (EFC8) 
Marlow and  
Paixão Casaca (2003) 
Tongzon and 
Ganesalingam (1994) 
Tongzon(1995) 
Woo (2010) 
EFF(Efficiency) 
9. Our cargo throughput per crane is at the satisfactory level (EFF1) 
10. Our cargo throughput per acre is at the satisfactory level (EFF2) 
11. Our ship waiting time is at the satisfactory level (EFF3) 
12. Our ship turnaround time is at the satisfactory level (EFF4) 
13. Our time for loading/unloading cargo is at the satisfactory level (EFF5) 
14. Our time for mode transit is at the satisfactory level (EFF6) 
15. Our time for truck entry is at the satisfactory level (EFF7) 
Tongzon (1995) 
Marlow and  
Paixão Casaca (2003) 
Woo (2010) 
Source: Author 
 
5. 4. 2. 4 The complete measurement model  
The complete measurement model is shown in Figure 5. 3. The model is illustrated 
simply by drawing latent and observed variables by AMOS 18.0. The variables are all 
tested in the category of three constructs: Antecedents, SCSO, and PP. It also shows the 
variables and their causal relationships in the complete research model.  
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Figure 5. 3 The complete measurement model for this study 
 
Source: Author 
Note: RPSV: Risk Perception and Security Vulnerabilities, FR: Financial Resources, SCSI: Supply Chain 
Security Initiatives, SPP: Security Preparation and Planning, SRP: Security Related Partnership, OA: 
Organizational Adaptation, SDCT: Security Dedicated Communication and Technology, SC: Security 
Culture, SE: Security Education, EFC: Effectiveness, EFF: Efficiency 
 
5. 5 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the research framework that was suggested in the previous studies 
using in-depth semi-structured interviews. There are four constructs in the adopted 
framework: Antecedents, SCSO, PP, and SCSO moderators. Based on the semi-structured 
interviews, the components of the constructs were extensively explored for the validity of 
their adoption. The variables in the Antecedents were modified the most. ‘Risk Perception 
(RP)’ and ‘Security Vulnerability (SV)’ have been integrated as one variable and new 
variables ‘Financial Resources’ (FR) and ‘Supply Chain Security Initiatives (SCSI)’ have 
been added to the construct. Also, in the SCSO construct, the variable ‘Security Culture 
(SC)’ and ‘Security Education (SE)’ have been added. Moreover, ‘Port Performance (PP)’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RPSV 
FR 
SCSI 
SC 
SE 
SDCT 
OA 
SRP 
SPP 
EFC 
EFF 
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was defined as ‘Effectiveness (EFC)’ and ‘Efficiency (EFF)’ by the respondents from the 
interviews. Finally, the potential SCSO moderator construct has been dropped from the 
framework because it was found that the variables are not shown to be effective in 
reflecting the reality of the supply chain security by the respondents. There are also other 
issues mentioned in this chapter such as whether the SCSO is a critical strategy or not, 
measurement scales and their supporting literature, and hypotheses building process. All 
the findings from the interviews are reflected in the complete research model, and all the 
measurement items and sources are presented in this chapter. The next chapter discusses 
the descriptive statistics which is mainly concerned with the respondents’ profiles and the 
questionnaire collection process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
 
6. 1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the basic profile of the respondents for the survey. It is vital to 
check the eligibility and quality of the data by analyzing the respondents’ profiles because 
it is their subjective notions and ideas that can highly affect the quality of this study. This 
chapter is composed of 7 sections. Section 6. 2 provides the process of preparation for the 
data such as the missing data and outliers. Then, section 6. 3 presents basic demographic 
profile of the respondents such as age, gender, field of work, and education level. Section 
6. 4 offers the basic statistics of the survey data such as missing values and response rates 
related to the measured constructs of the questionnaire. Section 6. 5 reports the 
descriptive statistics of each variable and the constructs: Antecedents, Supply Chain 
Security Orientation, and Port Performance. Section 6. 6 provides the descriptive 
statistics of two groups: port group and port users. The section compares and contrasts the 
two groups and show how similar or different they are in the analysis. Finally, section 6. 7 
summarizes and concludes the chapter.  
 
6. 2 Preparation of the data for the analysis 
Identifying the eligibility of the data for the sound analysis is an essential part of 
quantitative analysis. In particular, it is necessary to figure out the quality of the data by 
identifying the missing data, outliers, and the normality of the data before conducting the 
SEM analysis.  
 
6. 2. 1 Missing data  
First, the numbers of the missing data are presented in Table 6. 1. None of the variables 
and questions had more than 5 percent of missing data, and the pattern was irregular 
which can be judged to be completely random. Hair et al. (2010) mentioned that missing 
data can cause a biased analysis which reduces the power of the results and hence 
threaten the statistical significance. The maximum number of the missing data was 4.9% 
which can be ignored according to Cohen and Cohen (1983) who mentioned that less than 
10% of the missing data can be neglected as having little statistical significance. Although 
the percentage of the missing data is very low, it is important to discuss how to deal with 
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the problem. As recommended by Byrne (2001), Frane (1976), and Arbuckle (2003), the 
regression imputation method has been adopted in this study. It was conducted in two 
ways: first, the relationships among the variables were quantified and estimated with the 
missing values. Then, by using the coefficients, the estimation of the missing data was 
conducted which is provided by the SPSS version 18.0.  
 
6. 2. 2 Outliers  
Outliers are generally regarded as actual observations which are considerably different 
from most of the data near the average (Hair et al. 2010). The univariate outliers are 
normally identified by distributions of the Z-scores of the data (Kline 2005). The 
multivariate outliers are examined by the Mahalanobis D2. This examines the distance of 
all the mean values of the variables in relation to the standard deviation (Byrne 2001). 
AMOS software provides the computation tools which suggested that there were very few 
outliers in the data which are: 
· 3 responses from Antecedents, 2 responses from SCSO, No response from PP 
 
As shown above, there are very few outliers in the data. Although Hair et al. (2006) 
mentioned that deleting the outliers can enhance the quality of the data. Here, outliers are 
retained and neglected as a minor anomaly in the dataset considering the large sample 
size (427 respondents).  
 
As for the normality of the dataset, minimum, maximum, average, standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis are concerned. The skewness and kurtosis are all between ±1, 
which is an indication of the sound dataset for the analysis. All the observed variables are 
negatively skewed. In the Antecedents construct, SCSI3 was skewed the most (-0.863), 
followed by SCSI4 (-0.756) and RPSV4 (-.0728). In the SCSO construct, OA3 was 
negatively skewed the most (-0.731), and EFC2 (-0.506) in the PP. In terms of the 
kurtosis, SCSI3 had the highest value (0.634), OA3 (0.730) in the SCSO, and EFC 
(0.434) in the PP. In conclusion, the data have no problem with the non-normality tests. 
Table 6. 1 presents the missing data in the dataset.  
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Table 6. 1 Summary statistics of the missing data 
Construct Sub-construct Items Count Percentage Construct Sub-construct Items Count Percentage 
Antecedents 
RPSV 
RPSV1 3 .7  
SDCT 
 
SDCT1 16 3.7 
RPSV2 7 1.6 SDCT2 26 6.1 
RPSV3 2 .5 SDCT3 12 2.8 
RPSV4 7 1.6 SDCT4 20 4.7 
RPSV5 5 1.2 SDCT5 21 4.9 
RPSV6 12 2.8 
SC 
SC1 13 3.0 
FR 
FR1 19 4.4 SC2 11 2.6 
FR2 21 4.9 SC3 12 2.8 
FR3 20 4.7 SC4 8 1.9 
FR4 19 4.4 
SE 
 
SE1 18 4.2 
SCSI 
SCSI1 13 3.0 SE2 14 3.3 
SCSI2 13 3.0 SE3 20 4.7 
SCSI3 5 1.2 SE4 24 5.6 
SCSI4 7 1.6 SE5 13 3.0 
SCSI5 10 2.3 
Port Performance 
(PP) 
EFC 
EFC1 7 1.6 
SCSI6 8 1.9 EFC2 14 3.3 
Supply Chain Security 
Orientation 
(SCSO) 
SPP 
SPP1 13 3.0 EFC3 15 3.5 
SPP2 10 2.3 EFC4 16 3.7 
SPP3 11 2.6 EFC5 19 4.4 
SPP4 8 1.9 EFC6 20 4.7 
SPP5 5 1.2 EFC7 22 5.2 
SPP6 14 3.3 EFC8 22 5.2 
SRP 
SRP1 17 4.0 
EFC 
EFF1 31 7.3 
SRP2 16 3.7 EFF2 36 8.4 
SRP3 12 2.8 EFF3 32 7.5 
SRP4 14 3.3 EFF4 34 8.0 
SRP5 21 4.9 EFF5 29 6.8 
OA 
OA1 8 1.9      
OA2 9 2.1      
OA3 8 1.9      
OA4 5 1.2      
OA5 23 5.4      
Source: Author 
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6. 3 Response rate and non-response bias 
In total, 743 questionnaires were distributed, and it was reported that 730 were delivered 
safely. Because of the wrong address, 13 were returned. Among the distributed 
questionnaires, 429 of them were returned, and the total response rate was 57.4%. The 
researcher visited and met many people (around 120) in Korea for the questionnaire 
survey in order to get the best response for the research rather than relying entirely on 
mail or on-line questionnaire using the Internet. Among the collected questionnaires, 2 
responses were discarded because one had no answers at all, and the other one had the 
same answer (1) on all questions in the Likert scale. Therefore, the remaining 427 
questionnaires were used in this study (Table 6. 2).  
 
Table 6. 2 Questionnaire response rate summary 
 
Survey 
distributed 
Non 
deliverable 
Safely 
delivered 
Total 
responses 
discarded 
Effective 
questionnaire 
Response 
rate 
Total 743 13 730 429 2 427 57.4% 
Source : Author 
 
Non-response bias is one of the basic concerns when conducting research using 
questionnaires. It is hard to receive all the demographic information about both 
respondents and non-answered respondents. It is often assumed that the non answering 
respondents spent more time and delayed the filling out procedure of the questionnaire 
(Babbie, 1990). Therefore, it is necessary to compare and contrast the questionnaires 
received at different periods of time. This study employs the method suggested by 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) and Lambert and Harrington (1990) which conducts an 
independent t-test for all items (Table 6. 3). 
 
Table 6. 3 Comparison of respondent/non-respondent groups  
Category Significant difference No significant difference 
Antecedents 0 10 
Supply chain security orientation 1 12 
Performance 0 11 
Total 1 33 
Source: Author 
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The last quarter of the collected questionnaires are compared to the first quarter using 
independent t-tests. This is because the non-respondent groups are assumed to be the most 
similar to the last quarter of the questionnaires in that they took the longest time to fill out 
and respond to the questionnaire. As shown in Table 6. 2, there was only one significant 
difference in the non-response bias of the respondents between the two groups. In 
conclusion, non-response bias is not considered to be a primary concern in this study. The 
collection of questionnaire sheets took five months because the sample for this study is 
very big (427 respondents) which include many different organizations. The respondents 
answered the questionnaire at a particular time. 
 
6. 4 Demographic characteristics of respondents 
This section provides the demographic profile of the survey respondents. Table 6. 4 
shows the basic demographic characteristics of the respondents in work experience, 
gender, age, and education level.  
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Table 6. 4 Profile of survey respondents 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Work experience in the 
industry(years) 
No response 3 0.7 % 
3 to 5 years 84 19.7 % 
5 to 10 years 122 28.6 % 
10 to 20 years 181 42.4 % 
More than 20 years 37 8.7 % 
Total 427 100 % 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Gender 
No response 4 0.9 % 
Male 320 74.9 % 
Female 103 24.1 % 
Total 427 100 % 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Age of respondents 
No response 4 0.9 % 
20’s 69 16.2 % 
30’s 194 45.4 % 
40’s 106 24.8 % 
50’s 51 11.9 % 
60’s 3 0.7 % 
Total 427 100 % 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Education level of 
respondents 
No response 6 1.4 % 
High School 41 9.6 % 
Bachelors 333 78.0 % 
Master Degree 41 9.6 % 
MBA 3 0.7 % 
Ph.D. 3 0.7 % 
Total 427 100 % 
Source: Author 
 
Firstly, the majority of the respondents (181, 42%) had 10 to 20 years of experience in the 
field. 122 (28%) people had 5 to 10 years of experience. Also, the researcher included 
people who had 3 to 5 years of experience because it is necessary to have those people’s 
perception because they are working in the field of port terminals where they directly 
contact the port users classified in this study. Secondly, the majority of the respondents 
were male (320, 74%), females accounted for 103 (24%). It can be inferred that the 
majority of people work in the areas of port management, supply chain operations, 
logistics, export and import, and warehousing management. Thirdly, the majority of the 
respondents (70%) were in their thirties (45%) and forties (24%). The number of 
respondents in their twenties was 69 (16%), and people in their fifties, 51 (11%). Finally, 
education wise, the majority of respondents had a bachelor’s degree (77%) followed by a 
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master’s degree and a high school diploma (both 9.6%). Only a few people had a Ph.D. or 
an MBA degree (both 0.7%).  
 
Table 6. 5 shows the respondents’ field of work in detail. The port management group 
combining port A and B had 201 respondents (47%). Port A had 102 people and port B 
had 99. These ports are the biggest trading ports in Korea that are implementing the ISPS 
code (port A and B) and CSI (port A). In order to collect better data for this study, the 
researcher tried to collect questionnaires not only from the port authorities, but also the 
security oriented subsidiary companies belonging to them. As for port A and B, because 
the entry level employees are working more like guards and police focusing more on 
passenger control at the field of port terminals, the researcher limited the respondents 
only to the managerial level of cargo security teams of both ports with at least more than 
3 years of experience in the field. 
 
Table 6. 5 Respondents’ field of work  
Category Frequency Percentage 
Port Management(ports A and B) 201 47.072% 
Port group total 201(Port A:102, Port B: 99) 47.072% 
Trade(export and import) 26 6.088% 
Land Transport 37 8.665% 
Manufacturing 22 5.152% 
Warehouse Management 23 5.386% 
Forwarding 44 10.304% 
Maritime Transport 74 29.039% 
Port user group total 226 52.928% 
Total 427 100% 
Source: Author 
 
Also, Table 6. 6 shows the overview of port A and B’s security companies. There are 
subsidiary companies for both ports focusing only on security related tasks such as 
conforming to the ISPS code, CSI, cargo safety, and passenger control. They are the 
perfect match for the current study, and the researcher collected 51 from port A’s 
subsidiary security company, and 48 from port B’s. Also, the port user group for port A 
and B (trade, land transport, manufacturing, warehouse management, forwarding, and 
maritime transport) had 226 respondents (53%). They are all from supply chain security 
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program (AEO and ISO28000) certified firms. The reason why the group was divided 
into two groups is explained in Chapter 3, which is to compare and contrast the 
perception of people working for port authorities and port users. Also, as is discussed in 
the methodology chapter, having more than 200 or more respondents in each group 
enables multi-group analysis to compare and contrast their opinions and perceptions for 
different variables.  
 
Table 6. 6 Profile of respondents in port management group 
Ports Category 
Number of 
respondents 
Number of 
Personnel 
Main Role 
Port A 
Port A 51 140 Container trading focused 
Port A’s security related 
subsidiary company 
51 301 
ISPS code and CSI focused/terror 
control/cargo and passenger safety 
Total 102 441  
Port B 
Port B 51 177 Bulk focused trading 
Port B’s security related 
subsidiary company 
48 200 
ISPS code and CSI focused/cargo 
safety/passenger and terror control 
Total 99 377  
Source: Busan/Incheon Port Security Authority Online 2013 
 
6. 4. 1 Characteristics of port A and B 
Tables 6. 7 and 6. 8 present data on the seaborne trade and container port traffic of the 
world and of the Republic of Korea. From 2008 to 2010, the Republic of Korea accounted 
for around 5.5 percent of the global seaborne trade, and 3.4 percent of the global 
container port traffic. It can be inferred that the gap between the seaborne trade and 
container traffic is the proportion of bulk and liquid cargo trade, conventional cargo and 
specialist flows such as project cargo.  
 
Table 6. 7 World and Republic of Korea seaborne trade (in million tons) 
Category 2008 2009 2010 
World 
Republic of Korea 
16,515 
895 
15,690 
848 
16,852 
966 
Percentage(/world) 5.4 5.4 5.7 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
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Table 6. 8 World and Republic of Korea container port traffic (in million tons) 
Category 2008 2009 2010 
World 
Republic of Korea 
506,921 
17,297 
472,273 
15.699 
540,693 
18,542 
Percentage 3.4 3.3 3.4 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
 
Tables 6. 9 and 6. 10 provide macro data on seaborne cargo trade and container cargo 
throughput the Republic of Korea. Port A and B; the main research targets for this study, 
accounted for around 42 percent of the seaborne cargo trade in the Republic of Korea 
from 2008 to 2010. The container cargo throughput, on the other hand, accounted for 
around 83% of all the container traffic in the country which shows these two ports play a 
major role in container transport and trade, plus other ad hoc trades such as conventional 
cargo and specialist flows (e.g. project cargo). 
 
Table 6. 9 Seaborne cargo trade in the Republic of Korea (in million tons) 
Category 2008 2009 2010 
 Republic of Korea 
Port A 
Port B 
Subtotal 
895 
241 
142 
383 
848 
226 
132 
358 
966 
262 
150 
412 
Percentage 42.7 42.2 42.6 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
 
Table 6. 10 Container cargo throughput in The Republic of Korea (in 1,000 TEU) 
Category 2008 2009 2010 
The Republic of Korea 
Port A 
Port B 
Subtotal 
17,927 
13,453 
1,703 
15,156 
16,341 
11,980 
1,578 
13,558 
19,369 
14,194 
1,903 
16,097 
Percentage 84.5 82.9 83.1 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
 
Tables 6. 11 and 6. 12 show the percentage of seaborne cargo and container throughput of 
port A with the entire traffic of the Republic of Korea. Port A accounted for around 27% 
of the entire seaborne cargo, and 75% of the container cargo traffic. It is clear that port A 
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is the main container trading port of the country, with the berthing infrastructure shown in 
Table 6. 12.  
 
Table 6. 11 Cargo throughput of Port A 
Variable Category 2008 2009 2010 
Total seaborne 
cargo 
(in million tons) 
Republic of Korea 895 848 966 
Port A 241 226 262 
Percentage 26.9 26.6 27.1 
Container cargo 
throughput 
(1000 TEU) 
Republic of Korea 17,297 16.341 19.369 
Port A 13,453 11,980 14.194 
Percentage 77.8 73.3 73.2 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
 
Table 6. 12 Berthing facilities of Port A  
Category Quay Length(m) Breakwater Pier(No.) 
Berthing 
Capacity(No.) 
Port Infrastructure 28,371 6,069 4 146 
Source: Port MIS 2013 
 
Tables 6. 13 and 6. 14 show the percentage of seaborne cargo and container throughput of 
port B with the entire traffic of the Republic of Korea. Port B accounted for around 15% 
of the entire seaborne cargo, and 10% of the container cargo traffic. It can be inferred that 
port B is focused more on bulk trade, with the berthing infrastructure, which is rather 
small compared to port A, shown in the Table 6. 14. 
 
Table 6. 13 Cargo throughput of Port B 
Variable Category 2008 2009 2010 
Total seaborne 
cargo 
(in million tons) 
Republic of Korea 895 848 966 
Port B 142 132 150 
Percentage 15.8 15.5 15.5 
Container cargo 
throughput 
(1000 TEU) 
Republic of Korea 17.297 16.341 19,369 
Port B 1,703 1,578 1,903 
Percentage 9.8 9.6 9.8 
Source: UNCTAD 2012; MLTM 2013 
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Table 6. 14 Berthing facilities of Port B  
Category Quay Length(m) Breakwater Pier(No.) 
Berthing 
Capacity(No.) 
Port Infrastructure 17,991 2,113 21 107 
Source: Port MIS 2013 
 
Table 6. 15 shows the comparison of ports A and B. Port A, the biggest port in Korea, is a 
container focused hub port, and port B, the second biggest port, is a bulk focused feeder 
port. 
 
Table 6. 15 Summary of comparisons of port A and B in 2010 
Category Port A Port B 
Implementing security program ISPS code, CSI ISPS code 
Percentage of cargo handling 
-total seaborne cargo 
-containerized cargo 
 
27.1% 
73.2% 
 
15.5% 
9.8% 
Container throughput(1000 TEU) 14,194 1,903 
Main role Container focused hub port Bulk focused feeder port 
Source: Port MIS 2012; MLTM 2013 
 
The companies (trade, land transport, manufacturing, forwarding warehouse management, 
and maritime transport) using Port A and B are security program certified firms (AEO and 
ISO2800). This means that they are aware of the rules and regulations concerning security 
issues in maritime transport. The number of companies is almost evenly divided in port A 
and B in all job categories to avoid statistical bias. The reason why the researcher chose 
to select the companies that were all security program certified (AEO and ISO28000) was 
based on previous studies that stated that security certified firms are security oriented 
companies which should be included when measuring the performance of ports(KMI 
2008). Table 6. 16 presents the detail of the analysis of the security program certified 
companies in port users.  
This study aims to identify how the port user groups view and perceive the whole process 
of security orientation and its effect on performance in contrast to that of the ports. 
Because the security program of port user groups and port authorities have different 
benefits and characteristics, it is vital to see how these environmental and regulation 
changes affect the perception and performance. The tradeoffs of the benefits of these 
  146 
programs will be analyzed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The analysis of the 
causal relationship between port and port user group is presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6. 16 Analysis of the security program certified companies in port users  
Category Frequency Port A Port B Voluntary security program 
Trade(export and import) 26 13 13 AEO, ISO28000 certified 
Land Transport 37 20 17 AEO certified only 
Manufacturing 22 10 12 AEO certified only 
Warehouse Management 23 11 12 AEO, ISO28000 certified 
Forwarding 44 20 24 AEO certified only 
Maritime Transport 74 43 31 AEO, ISO28000 certified 
Port user group total 226 117 109 AEO, ISO28000 certified 
Source: Author 
 
6. 5 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the responses, divided into three sub-
sections according to the construct of the research model in this study. Table 6. 17 shows 
the measurement items for the questionnaire. This is applied to all the questions 
measuring the construct: Antecedents, Supply Chain Security Orientation, and Port 
Performance. The extent of the agreement is measured from 1: strongly disagree to 5: 
strongly agree. 
 
Table 6. 17 Response scale in the questionnaire sheet 
Items 
Response Scale 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Antecedents All items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Not 
applicable 
SCSO All items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Not 
applicable 
Port 
Performance 
All items 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Not 
applicable 
Source: Author 
 
6. 5. 1 Analysis of Antecedents construct 
As for the overall descriptive statistics for the Antecedents, all the mean values for the 
Antecedents were above 3 (min: 3.37, max: 4.03) according to Appendix A (1). It 
encompasses the percentage of frequencies in each item and their mean and standard 
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deviation. The findings of the Antecedents construct are: 
 
1. 60.1% agreed that they may have a negative experience due to a perturbation or 
breakdown of the security related internal IT infrastructure (RPSV1: mean=3.63; 
SD=1.04). 
2. 58.0% agreed that they may have a negative experience due to a perturbation or 
breakdown of the security related internal IT infrastructure (RPSV2: mean=3.57; 
SD=1.03). 
3. 69.3% agreed that they have had a negative experience due to downtime or loss of own 
production capacity due to security related local disruptions (RPSV3: mean=3.86; 
SD=0.97) 
4. 50.6% agreed that they may have had a negative security experience due to an 
obsolescent logistics infrastructure (RPSV4: mean=3.37; SD=1.08). 
5. 55.5% agreed that they should have security threats, critical resources to be secured 
and that impacts of successful security threats should be identified, analyzed and 
evaluated (RPSV5; mean=3.54; SD=0.96). 
6. 56.4% agreed that they should have the minimum security requirements for resources 
to be secured and risk acceptance level should be established (RPSV6; mean=3.55; 
SD=0.86). 
7. 47.0% agreed that they have the financial resources to invest in supply chain security 
when necessary (FR1; mean= 3.40; SD=0.94). 
8. 55.9% agreed that they are willing to invest in supply chain security when necessary 
(FR2; mean=3.55; SD=0.90). 
9. 44.7% agreed that they place a high priority on investment for supply chain security 
(FR3; mean=3.38; SD=0.94). 
10. 48.6% agreed that their supply chain members help each other finance capital 
equipment (FR4; mean=3.43; SD=0.90). 
11. 69% agreed that global supply chain security initiatives such as the ISPS CODE and 
AEO are important to them (SCSI1; mean=3.88; SD=0.94). 
12. 67.9% agreed that adopting supply chain security initiatives has a positive impact on 
their performance (SCSI2; mean=3.80; SD=0.89). 
13. 76.2% agreed that security-related global initiatives will be more important to them in 
the future (SCSI3; mean=4.03; SD=0.90). 
14. 77.8% agreed that they need to have a proper plan to cope with the various global 
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security initiatives (SCSI4; mean=3.99; SD=0.85). 
15. 70.0% agreed that they need to invest more in supply chain security (SCSI5; 
mean=3.89; SD=0.85). 
16. 78.0% agreed that they need to collect more information on global supply chain 
security initiatives (SCSI6; mean=4.02; SD=0.81). 
 
SCSI3 had the highest mean value (4.03), which was “Global supply chain security 
initiatives such as the ISPS CODE are important to our organization”, and the lowest was 
RPSV4 (3.37), which was “We may have had a negative security experience due to an 
obsolescent logistics infrastructure”. As for the standard deviation, the highest was 
RPSV4 (1.08), which was “We may have had a negative security experience due to an 
obsolescent logistics infrastructure”, and the lowest was SCSI6, which was “We need to 
collect more information on global supply chain security initiatives”. On average, 58.31% 
of the respondents agreed to RPSV, 49.05% agreed to FR, and 73.15% agreed to SCSI. 
Among the respondents, the highest percentage of people agreed to SCSI and lowest was 
FR in all the variables. 
 
Table 6. 18 shows the mean values and standard deviation of two groups: ports and port 
users. There were 8 items for both groups that had higher values than the other. In 
financial resources, ports had higher mean values than port users in FR1, FR2, and FR3. 
This may imply that ports are more sensitive to financial resources as the Antecedent for 
supply chain security orientation. In RPSV (Risk Perception and Security Vulnerabilities), 
port users had higher values in RPSV1, RPSV2, RPSV3, and RPSV4. This may imply 
that port users are more sensitive to risk perception and security vulnerabilities than ports 
in being security oriented. A graphic comparison between ports and port users is 
illustrated in Figure 6. 1 In order to explore the differences in the two groups of these 
items, one way ANOVA(Analysis of Variance) was conducted. The result of the analysis 
is shown in Table 6. 19 below. Both groups follow the similar pattern of response in all 
the measurement items, and strong agreement in the variable SCSI was shown in all the 
questions.  
 
 
 
 
  149 
Table 6. 18 Mean values of items in the Antecedents (ports and port users) 
Category Overall Ports Port user groups 
Items Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
RPSV1 3.63 1.04 3.6 1.05 3.66 1.04 
RPSV2 3.57 1.03 3.55 0.95 3.59 1.09 
RPSV3 3.86 0.97 3.8 0.97 3.91 0.97 
RPSV4 3.37 1.08 3.33 1.09 3.41 1.06 
RPSV5 3.54 0.96 3.63 1.01 3.46 0.9 
RPSV6 3.55 0.86 3.57 0.84 3.53 0.87 
FR1 3.4 0.94 3.46 0.96 3.32 0.93 
FR2 3.55 0.9 3.58 0.98 3.49 0.85 
FR3 3.38 0.94 3.4 1.02 3.35 0.89 
FR4 3.43 0.9 3.41 0.93 3.43 0.88 
SCSI1 3.88 0.94 3.93 0.98 3.82 0.92 
SCSI2 3.8 0.89 3.82 0.88 3.76 0.91 
SCSI3 4.03 0.9 4.02 0.95 4.03 0.86 
SCSI4 3.99 0.85 3.96 0.88 4.02 0.82 
SCSI5 3.89 0.85 3.93 0.9 3.86 0.81 
SCSI6 4.02 0.81 3.99 0.86 4.05 0.76 
Source: Author 
 
It was shown from the above analysis that both groups agreed to a moderate level to 
RPSV variable. Nevertheless, there were extreme responses in two variables: FR and 
SCSI. FR showed very low agreement and SCSI showed the highest level of agreement of 
all variables to the measurement scales. This means port group and port user group both 
perceive they do not have sufficient level of financial resources for security measures. On 
the other hand, both groups highly agreed to the fact that Supply Chain Security 
Initiatives such as ISPS code, CSI, AEO, and ISO28000 are important for their 
organizational competitiveness and performances. Especially, port user group showed that 
ports they use have little intensions for investing security measures which indicates that in 
terms of financial resources, ports and port users are reluctant to invest their financial 
resources for security enhancement. Figure 6. 1 presents the mean values of variables, 
and Figure 6. 2 introduces the comparison between ports and port users of each 
measurement scales in the Antecedents construct.  
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Figure 6. 1 Mean values of variables in Antecedents construct  
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Figure 6. 2 Comparison between ports and port users in Antecedents  
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Source: Author  
Note: X axis: each questions in the Antecedents, Y axis: 5 point Likert scale 
 
Table 6. 19 presents the ANOVA result. It shows the mean values of the F-statistics which 
is 8.997
***
, and its p-value is 0.000 (<0.05). Although Figure 6. 1 shows very similar 
response patterns in both groups, this means the differences between the two groups are 
statistically very significant which needs more detailed analysis. Specifically, the variable 
RPSV2 and RPSV5 showed significant differences (0.047, 0.024), and SCSI5 showed 
♦-♦ Blue line: Ports 
■-■ Red line: Port users 
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marginal significance (0.062). Although other individual variables showed no statistical 
significance, ANOVA analysis of the Antecedents as a whole in both groups showed very 
statistically significant results, which requires the need for multi-group analysis. These 
differences in the two groups are explored in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6. 19 ANOVA results for Antecedents 
Category Port and port users Category Port and port users 
Items F-statistics p-value<0.05 Items F-statistics p-value<0.05 
Mean values: 8.997
***
 , p-value: .000 
RPSV1 1.510 .199 FR3 .179 .949 
RPSV2 2.430
*
 .047 FR4 1.402 .233 
RPSV3 .424 .791 SCSI1 .811 .519 
RPSV4 .330 .858 SCSI2 1.075 .369 
RPSV5 2.839
*
 .024 SCSI3 .244 .913 
RPSV6 .953 .433 SCSI4 .343 .849 
FR1 .159 .959 SCSI5 2.264 .062 
FR2 1.792 .130 SCSI6 1.558 .185 
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value< 0.05 
 
6. 5. 2 Analysis of SCSO construct 
As for the overall descriptive statistics for SCSO, all the mean values for the Antecedents 
were above 3 (max: 3.88, min: 3.39) According to Appendix A (2). It encompasses the 
percentage of frequencies in each item and their mean and standard deviation. The 
findings of the SCSO are:  
 
1. 53.0% agreed that the people who develop their security plan are involved in its 
implementation (SPP1; mean=3.53; SD=0.84). 
2. 57.4% agreed that their security plan selectively targets highest-risk activities (SPP2; 
mean=3.58; SD=0.81). 
3. 57.8% agreed that their security planners sought input from employees who implement 
the plan on a day to day basis (SPP3; mean=3.63; SD=0.93). 
4. 56.9% agreed that their security preparedness plan is integrated with the overall 
enterprise plans and operations (SPP4; mean=3.60; SD=0.82). 
5. 53.6% agreed that their security plan is coordinated with outside groups (SPP5; 
mean=3.56; SD=0.87). 
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6. 58.3% agreed that their security planning is coordinated across the organization’s 
internal functional areas (SPP6; mean=3.61; SD=0.78). 
7. 48.0% agreed that they have substantially reduced channel complexity over the 
previous years to work closely with a selected set of security related supply chain 
members (SRP1; mean=3.44; SD=0.87). 
8. 49.7% agreed that they have facilitated a strong and long-term supply chain 
relationship fostering security related cooperation with each other (SRP2; mean=3.46; 
SD=0.84).  
9. 47.7% agreed that their relationship with supply chain members is based on trust rather 
than contractual obligations (SRP3; mean=3.39; SD=0.94). 
10. 54.4% agreed that they have guidelines for developing long term supply chain 
security related relationships with supply chain members (SRP4; mean=3.56; SD=0.88). 
11. 48.7% agreed that their supply chain members have guidelines for developing, 
maintaining, and monitoring long term supply chain partnerships with each other (SRP5; 
mean=3.48; SD=0.85). 
12. 50.8% agreed that their goals and objectives are consistent with those of their supply 
chain members (OA1; mean=3.49; SD=0.84). 
13. 62.6% agreed that they are willing to make cooperative changes with their supply 
chain members (OA2; mean=3.69; SD=0.81). 
14. 70.8% agreed that they believe their supply chain members must work together to be 
successful (OA3; mean=3.88; SD=0.89).  
15. 57.8% agreed that their supply chain members trust each other (OA4; mean=3.60; 
SD=0.85). 
16. 45.9% agreed that the CEO and CEOs of their supply chain members have similar 
operating philosophies (OA5; mean=3.41; SD=0.90). 
17. 56.2% agreed that they use integrated electronic data interchange to communicate 
with partners in the supply chain (SDCT1; mean=3.61; SD=0.95). 
18. 48.7% agreed that they use integrated information systems to share data/information 
with partners in the supply chain (SDCT2; mean=3.44; SD=0.96). 
19. 63.0% agreed that they adopt computerized port service systems for their supply chain 
security (SDCT3; mean=3.72; SD=0.83). 
20. 57.4% agreed that they use the latest IT technology available to the industry to 
support supply chain security (SDCT4; mean=3.66; SD=0.95). 
21. 61.4% agreed that they create a supply chain security focus among all employees 
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(SC1; mean=3.69; SD=0.92). 
22. 56.2% agreed that they make supply chain security the norm for all employees (SC2; 
mean=3.62; SD=0.86). 
23. 58.3% agreed that they dedicate effort to creating a supply chain security focused 
workforce (SC3; mean=3.66; SD=0.85). 
24. 61.9% agreed that they make sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply chain 
security (SC4; mean=3.72; SD=0.90). 
25. 54.5% agreed that they provide security-related education and training of company 
personnel (SE1; mean=3.56; SD=0.90). 
26. 53.4% agreed that they benchmark best practices of competitors, suppliers, customers, 
and other parties to improve their organization’s security program (SE2; mean=3.56; 
SD=0.83) 
27. 53.8% agreed that they conduct scheduled mock-exercise training programs or 
simulations to test their internal security program (SE3; mean=3.54; SD=0.88) 
28. 49.2% agreed that they are hiring and promoting security conscious personnel (SE4; 
mean=3.47; SD=0.92). 
29. 62.8% agreed that they view security training as long-term investment and service 
quality improvement facilitator (SE5; mean=3.73; SD=0.85).  
 
OA3 had the highest mean value (3.88), which was “We believe our supply chain 
members must work together to be successful”, and the lowest was SRP3 (3.39), which 
was “Our relationship with supply chain members is based on trust rather than contractual 
obligations”. As for the standard deviation, the highest was SPP6 (0.78), which was “Our 
security planning is coordinated across the organization’s internal functional areas”, and 
the lowest was SDCT5 (0.95), which was “We provide security information concerning 
shipments to customers”. On average, 56.1% of the respondents agreed to the variable 
SPP, 49.7% agreed to SRP, 57.58% agreed to OA, 56.32% agreed to SDCT, 59.45 agreed 
to SC, and 54.74% agreed to SE. 
 
Table 6. 20 shows the mean values and standard deviation of two groups: ports and port 
users. Other than all the SDCT items, SC2, and SE2, all the mean values for the port 
group were higher than those for the port users. This may imply that ports are more 
sensitive in all the measuring variables except SDCT in SCSO. The port users showed 
higher mean values in all the items only in SDCT. This may mean that port users are more 
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sensitive to security related communication and technology than ports among all the 
variables in the SCSO. Comparison between ports and port users in SCSO is illustrated in 
Figure 6. 3. Other than the variable SDCT, port users showed lower agreement in most of 
the measurement items than those of ports. In particular, variables SPP and SRP 
graphically showed a big gap between the two groups. Variable SC and SE showed a 
small margin between the two groups, and still ports showed stronger agreement on most 
of the items than those of port users. Since it is clearly shown that there were big 
differences in the mean values of many variables, one way ANOVA(Analysis of Variance) 
was conducted. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6. 21. 
 
Table 6. 20 Mean values of items for SCSO 
Category Overall Ports Port users 
Items Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
SPP1 3.53 0.84 3.68 0.84 3.4 0.82 
SPP2 3.58 0.81 3.7 0.81 3.48 0.8 
SPP3 3.63 0.93 3.71 0.94 3.55 0.93 
SPP4 3.6 0.82 3.69 0.85 3.54 0.79 
SPP5 3.56 0.87 3.68 0.89 3.47 0.85 
SPP6 3.61 0.78 3.69 0.8 3.54 0.76 
SRP1 3.44 0.87 3.51 0.81 3.37 0.92 
SRP2 3.46 0.84 3.56 0.79 3.37 0.88 
SRP3 3.39 0.94 3.46 0.97 3.34 0.9 
SRP4 3.56 0.88 3.63 0.97 3.47 0.8 
SRP5 3.48 0.85 3.55 0.91 3.4 0.82 
OA1 3.49 0.84 3.51 0.87 3.48 0.81 
OA2 3.69 0.81 3.78 0.83 3.61 0.79 
OA3 3.88 0.89 3.9 0.97 3.85 0.81 
OA4 3.6 0.85 3.66 0.92 3.55 0.79 
OA5 3.41 0.9 3.47 0.92 3.36 0.87 
SDCT1 3.61 0.95 3.44 0.97 3.75 0.91 
SDCT2 3.44 0.96 3.42 1.06 3.46 0.9 
SDCT3 3.72 0.83 3.68 0.87 3.75 0.79 
SDCT4 3.66 0.88 3.62 0.94 3.67 0.84 
SDCT5 3.66 0.95 3.57 1.04 3.71 0.91 
SC1 3.69 0.92 3.7 0.94 3.68 0.91 
SC2 3.62 0.86 3.61 0.88 3.63 0.84 
SC3 3.66 0.85 3.72 0.89 3.62 0.81 
SC4 3.72 0.9 3.76 0.94 3.69 0.86 
SE1 3.56 0.9 3.6 0.91 3.51 0.89 
SE2 3.56 0.83 3.55 0.85 3.57 0.8 
SE3 3.54 0.88 3.59 0.89 3.5 0.87 
SE4 3.47 0.92 3.51 0.93 3.44 0.93 
SE5 3.73 0.85 3.79 0.84 3.67 0.85 
Source: Author 
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Other than all the SDCT items, SC2, and SE2, all the mean values for the port group were 
higher than those of port users. This may imply that ports are more sensitive in all the 
variables except SDCT than port users. Port users showed higher mean values than port 
group only in SDCT. This means that port users are more sensitive in security related 
communication and technology than ports among all the variables in the SCSO. Other 
than the variable SDCT, port users showed lower agreement in most of the measurement 
items than those of ports. Especially, variables SPP and SRP graphically showed a big gap 
between the two groups. Variable SC and SE showed little differences between two 
groups. Figure 6. 3 illustrates the comparison between ports and port users in the SCSO 
construct.   
 
Figure 6. 3 Comparison between ports and port users in SCSO  
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Source: Author  
Note: X axis: each questions in the Antecedents, Y axis: 5 point Likert scale 
 
In terms of the mean values, it is clearly shown from the above figure that ports perceived 
more important in all the variables except SDCT. It is the only variable that port user 
group perceived more important than port group. It was also shown that port group 
perceived security related planning, partnership, organizational adaptation, culture, and 
education are more important for the organization than port user group. This might be 
because of the compulsory security measures such as ISPS code affects the perception of 
people in the organization more compared to those companies that are implementing 
♦-♦ Blue line: Ports 
■-■ Red line: Port users 
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security measures based on voluntary participation such as AEO and ISO28000. Figure 6. 
4 presents the mean values of variables in SCSO construct.  
 
Figure 6. 4 Mean values of variables in Supply Chain Security Orientation construct  
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Table 6. 21 shows the ANOVA result for SCSO. It shows the mean values of the F-
statistics which is 6.772
***
, and its p-value of 0.000(<0.05). This means the differences 
between the two groups are statistically very significant which needs more detailed 
analysis. Specifically, variables SPP1 (0.003), SDCT1 (0.000), SDCT4 (0.002), SE1 
(0.032), SE2 (0.011) showed statistical significance, and SRP4 (0.059) showed a marginal 
difference in the two groups. Although other variables showed no statistical significance, 
ANOVA analysis of the SCSO showed very highly significant results, which also requires 
a multi-group analysis of the SCSO in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6. 21 ANOVA results for SCSO 
Category Ports and port users Category Ports and port users Category Ports and port users 
Items F p-value<0.05 Items F p-value<0.05 Items F p-value<0.05 
Mean values: 6.772
***
,  p-value: .000 
SPP1 4.068
**
 .003 OA1 1.206 .308 SC1 2.067 .085 
SPP2 .380 .823 OA2 .791 .500 SC2 1.096 .359 
SPP3 .326 .861 OA3 1.716 .146 SC3 .825 .510 
SPP4 .914 .456 OA4 .974 .422 SC4 1.679 .155 
SPP5 2.100 .081 OA5 .876 .478 SE1 2.668
*
 .032 
SPP6 1.276 .279 SDCT1 7.167
***
 .000 SE2 3.752
*
 .011 
SRP1 1.462 .214 SDCT2 1.434 .212 SE3 .404 .806 
SRP2 1.585 .178 SDCT3 .833 .505 SE4 .569 .686 
SRP3 .643 .632 SDCT4 4.253
**
 .002 SE5 1.526 .194 
SRP4 2.295 .059 SDCT5 1.825 .124    
SRP5 1.053 .380       
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value< 0.05 
 
6. 5. 3 Analysis of PP construct 
As for the overall descriptive statistics for PP, all the mean values for PP were above 3 
(max: 3.80, min:3.44) according to Appendix A (3). It encompasses the percentage of the 
frequencies in each item, their mean, and standard deviation. 
 
The findings of PP are: 
1. 65.6% agreed that they provide a consistently reliable service (EFC1; mean=3.80; 
SD=0.83). 
2. 66.5% agreed that they handle cargo on quoted or anticipated time (EFC2; mean=3.78; 
SD=0.83). 
3. 47.1% agreed that they handle cargo according to customers’ time requirements (EFC3; 
mean=3.44; SD=0.85). 
4. 56.9% agreed that their service lead-time is appropriate (EFC4; mean=3.62; SD=0.83). 
5. 53.4% agreed that they provide shipment information accurately (EFC5; mean=3.56; 
SD=0.84). 
6. 60.2% agreed that they respond promptly to the need of customers (EFC6; mean=3.67; 
SD=0.85). 
7. 51.7% agreed that they have a quick decision making process (EFC7; mean=3.52; 
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SD=0.81). 
8. 55.7% agreed that they are flexible in terms of volume and type of cargo handling 
(EFC8; mean=3.58; SD=0.88). 
9. 53.4% agreed that their cargo throughput per crane is at a satisfactory level (EFF1; 
mean=3.57; SD=0.88). 
10. 56.4% agreed that their cargo throughput per acre is at a satisfactory level (EFF2; 
mean=3.59; SD=0.87). 
11. 54.3% agreed that their ship waiting time is at a satisfactory level (EFF3; mean=3.59; 
SD=0.89). 
12. 53.4% agreed that their ship turnaround time is at a satisfactory level (EFF4; 
mean=3.58; SD=0.84). 
13. 54.1% agreed that their time for loading/unloading cargo is at a satisfactory level 
(EFF5; mean=3.59; SD=0.82). 
14. 53.1% agreed that their time for mode transit is at a satisfactory level (EFF6; 
mean=3.55; SD=0.86). 
15. 54.1% agreed that their time for truck entry is at a satisfactory level (EFF7; 
mean=3.56; SD=0.90). 
 
The highest mean value was EFC1 (3.80), which was “We provide a consistently reliable 
service”, and the lowest was EFC3 (3.44), which was “We handle cargo on customers’ 
time requirements”. As for the standard deviation, the highest was EFF7 (0.90), which 
was “Our time for truck entry is at a satisfactory level”, and the lowest was EFC7 (0.81), 
which was “We have a quick decision making process”. On average, 57.13% of the 
respondents agreed to EFC and 54.11% agreed to EFF variable. 
 
Table 6. 22 shows the mean values and standard deviation of two groups: ports and port 
users. In the EFC variable, ports had higher values in all the items except EFC4, EFC6, 
and EFC7. However, the port users showed higher mean values in all the items except 
EFF5 and EFF7. This may imply that ports are more positive in effectiveness, while port 
users are more positive in efficiency aspects of performance. Comparison between ports 
and port users in PP is illustrated in Figure 6. 5. Ports and port users showed no similar 
response pattern. Especially, in the EFF variable, port user group showed a stronger 
agreement than the port group. Since it is clearly shown that there were distinct 
differences of the mean values in two variables of the PP, one way ANOVA (Analysis of 
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Variance) was conducted. The result of the analysis is shown in Table 6. 23. 
 
Table 6. 22 Mean values of items for PP 
Category Overall Ports Port users 
Items Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
EFC1 3.8 0.83 3.91 0.79 3.68 0.86 
EFC2 3.78 0.83 3.82 0.8 3.75 0.87 
EFC3 3.44 0.85 3.52 0.84 3.38 0.88 
EFC4 3.62 0.83 3.57 0.88 3.67 0.8 
EFC5 3.56 0.84 3.59 0.82 3.53 0.85 
EFC6 3.67 0.85 3.64 0.88 3.71 0.83 
EFC7 3.52 0.81 3.43 0.8 3.58 0.83 
EFC8 3.58 0.88 3.59 0.84 3.57 0.91 
EFF1 3.57 0.88 3.44 0.95 3.65 0.8 
EFF2 3.59 0.87 3.46 0.93 3.66 0.82 
EFF3 3.59 0.89 3.49 0.92 3.67 0.87 
EFF4 3.58 0.84 3.54 0.87 3.62 0.84 
EFF5 3.59 0.82 3.6 0.87 3.57 0.79 
EFF6 3.55 0.86 3.55 0.88 3.56 0.84 
EFF7 3.56 0.9 3.57 0.88 3.56 0.91 
Source: Author 
 
In terms of average of all items of each variable, port group showed that they perceived 
positively in Effectiveness, while Efficiency was a bit lower. Port user group showed 
almost the same level of perceptions in both Effectiveness and Efficiency. This may be 
because ports perceive more hindered by the compulsory security measures while port 
users are implementing security programs that are providing some benefits to facilitate 
trade. Also, compared to the level of effectiveness that ports perceive, port users showed 
lower responses to the measurement scales. This gap should be bridged by providing 
better services to port users and strengthening the efficient cargo transportation in port 
operation. Figure 6. 5 illustrates the comparison of ports and port users in each 
measurement scales of the PP construct. 
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Figure 6. 5 Comparison of ports and port users in PP 
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Source: Author  
Note: (X axis: each questions in the Antecedents, Y axis: 5 point Likert scale) 
 
The comparison of mean values in Port Performance construct is shown below in Figure 
6. 6. It is interesting that ports perceive much positively in effectiveness of ports than port 
user groups. On the other hand, ports perceive a little lower in efficiency of ports than 
port user groups. Since it is obviously shown that there were clear differences of the mean 
values in two variables of the PP, one way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was conducted. 
 
Figure 6. 6 Mean values of variables in PP construct  
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Table 6. 23 shows the ANOVA result. It shows the mean values of the F-statistics which is 
10.384
***
, and its p-value is 0.000 (<0.05). This means that the differences between the 
two groups in the PP are statistically very significant which needs more detailed analysis. 
Specifically, variables EFC3 (0.001), EFF2 (0.032), EFF (0.043) showed significant 
differences, and EFC (0.052), EFC7 (0.088) showed marginal significant differences. 
Although other variables showed no statistical significance individually, the ANOVA 
analysis of the mean value of the PP showed very significant results, which justifies the 
need for two-group analysis of each item in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6. 23 ANOVA results for PP 
Category Ports and port users Category Ports and port users 
Mean values: 10.384
***,
  p-value: .000 
Items F p-value Items F p-value 
EFC1 2.220 .052 EFF1 1.061 .376 
EFC2 .087 .986 EFF2 2.480
*
 .032 
EFC3 4.554
**
 .001 EFF3 2.485
*
 .043 
EFC4 2.064 .085 EFF4 1.311 .265 
EFC5 .976 .420 EFF5 2.039 .088 
EFC6 1.297 .271 EFF6 1.835 .121 
EFC7 2.045 .088 EFF7 .634 .639 
EFC8 .829 .507    
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value< 0.05 
 
This section of the chapter briefly discusses the descriptive statistics of both port group 
and port user group according to Appendix A (4), A (5), and A (6). As for the port group, 
the findings of the descriptive statistics with the mean values and the average of the 
standard deviation for each variable are:  
1. 59.5% agreed to the items of the RPSV on average (RPSV1-6, SD=0.985). 
2. 52.25% agreed to the items of the FR on average (FR1-4, SD=0.972). 
3. 74.5% agreed to the items of the SCSI on average (SCSI1-6, SD=0.908). 
4. 62.1% agreed to the items of the SPP on average (SPP1-6, SD=0.855). 
5. 54.1% agreed to the items of the SRP on average (SRP1-5, SD=0.902). 
6. 61.1% agreed to the items of the OA on average (OA1-OA5, SD=0.902). 
7. 54.1% agreed to the items of the SDCT on average (SDCT1-SDCT6, SD=0.976). 
8. 62.8% agreed to the items of the SC on average (SC1-SC4, SD=0.912). 
9. 58.2% agreed to the items of the SE on average (SE1-SE5, SD=0.884). 
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10. 56.9% agreed to the items of the EFC on average (EFC1-8, SD=0.831). 
11. 50.2% agreed to the items of the EFF on average (EFF1-6, SD=0.900). 
 
As for the port users, the findings of the descriptive statistics with the mean values and 
the average of the standard deviation for each variable are:  
1. 57.7% agreed to the items of the RPSV on average (RPSV1-6, SD=0.988). 
2. 45.52% agreed to the items of the FR on average (FR1-4, SD=0.887). 
3. 71.41% agreed to the items of the SCSI on average (SCSI1-6, SD=0.846). 
4. 51.53% agreed to the items of the SPP on average (SPP1-6, SD=0.825). 
5. 45.4% agreed to the items of the SRP on average (SRP1-5, SD=0.864). 
6. 54.02% agreed to the items of the OA on average (OA1-OA5, SD=0.814). 
7. 58.34% agreed to the items of the SDCT on average (SDCT1-SDCT6, SD=0.87). 
8. 56.67% agreed to the items of the SC on average (SC1-SC4, SD=0.855). 
9. 52.02% agreed to the items of the SE on average (SE1-SE5, SD=0.868). 
10. 57.23% agreed to the items of the EFC on average (EFC1-8, SD=0.853). 
11. 56.58% agreed to the items of the EFF on average (EFF1-6, SD=0.838). 
 
In the Antecedents, it is shown that the port group had higher mean values in RPSV5, 
RPSV6, FR1, FR2, FR3, SCSI1, SCSI2, and SCSI5. This is evenly divided so each group 
had 8 variables that had higher mean values than the other. In the SCSO, the port group 
had higher mean values in all the items in SPP, SRP, OA, and SC1, SC3, SC4, SE1, SE3, 
SE4, and SE5. Port users had higher mean values in all the items in SDCT, SC2, and SE2. 
It can be seen that the port group showed higher mean values in most of the items and 
variables in the SCSO except SDCT. In the PP, the port group showed higher mean values 
in EFC1, EFC2, EFC3, EFC4, and EFC8. However, in the EFF, it was shown that only in 
EFF5 and EFF7, the port group showed higher mean values. 
 
6. 5. 4 Managerial implications of the findings 
This chapter analyzed the basic statistics of variables such as mean values and standard 
deviation proposed in the research model that was developed from the work undertaken 
by Autry and Bobbitt (2008). It is based on big sample size (201 respondents: port group, 
226 respondents: port user group). Firstly, in the Antecedent construct, the result showed 
that ports and port users both agreed to the high level of importance in SCSI. This means 
that SCSI is important for both port and port user group. However, they presented low 
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levels of agreement on the FR in the Antecedent construct. This means that ports and port 
users both think that they do not have enough financial availability to invest on security 
issues in ports. Both groups showed similar levels of agreement on all variables in the 
Antecedent construct. Secondly, in the SCSO construct, ports showed higher perception 
of importance in most of the variables in the SCSO construct except SDCT compared to 
port user group. This means that port users perceive security related technology is more 
important for the organization than ports. Port group showed higher agreement on all the 
other variables: SPP, SRP, OA, SC, and SE. This means that those variables are highly 
related to the security orientation of ports which is clearly shown in the levels of 
agreement in previous analysis. Especially, SPP and SRP showed big gaps between the 
agreements of both groups which means for ports, SPP and SRP are much more important, 
and SDCT is more important for port users. Interestingly, ports showed higher agreement 
on most of the variables related to SCSO construct than port users. This might be because 
of the fact that ports are following mandatory regulations while port users are 
implementing voluntary security programs. Thirdly, in the PP construct, ports showed 
higher agreement in EFC, while port users presented higher agreement on EFF variable. 
The gap was much bigger in EFF where port users perceived ports are much more 
efficient than ports. In terms of performance measurement, it was shown that port group 
showed more positive agreement on EFC variable to upgrade the level of security-related 
port operation while port users showed more positive agreement on EFF variable which is 
facilitated by implementing voluntary security programs such as AEO and ISO28000. 
The point is, ports need to focus more on SCSI and SDCT to upgrade the level of EFC 
and EFF to attract more customers. Especially, by focusing on better technologies such as 
RFID and supply chain security programs of ports, port users could think these ports are 
competitive and reliable. This may upgrade the level of EFC and EFF in the PP construct. 
However, the variables are analyzed only on the level of agreements so far, the causal 
relationships of variables using SEM are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
 
6. 6 Summary of results  
This chapter analyzed the descriptive statistics collected from the questionnaire survey. In 
the Antecedents construct, the result showed that ports and port users both agreed to the 
highest level of importance in Supply Chain Security Initiatives variable, but they 
presented very low level of agreement on the Financial Resources and security related 
investment issues. The RPSV variable showed a moderate level of agreement in both 
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groups. In the SCSO construct, port group showed higher perception of agreement to the 
measurement scales in most of the variables in the construct except SDCT variable 
compared to the port user group. This means that port user group perceived more 
important only in security dedicated communication and technology in comparison to the 
port group in SCSO construct. This might be because of the fact that ports are following 
mandatory security regulations such as ISPS code in port terminals while port users are 
implementing voluntary security programs which might be hard for them to fully 
comprehend the mandatory security operations of ports. In terms of performance 
measurement, ports showed higher measurement in Effectiveness, while port users 
presented higher agreement on Efficiency variables. This means that ports think their 
effectiveness is more competitive than efficiency, while port users perceive efficiency is 
more effective than the effectiveness. In summary, it can be inferred that both groups 
agreed similarly in the Antecedents, agreed very oppositely in the PP. In the SCSO, port 
group showed higher agreement than port user group to all the variables except SDCT. In 
addition, there were significant statistical differences in mean values of all three 
constructs which needed further investigation using multi-group analysis.  
 
6. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported the descriptive statistics collected from the data. Because there 
are a large number of respondents (427), the researcher tried to explain all the information 
related to the answers to the survey. The response rate was 57.4% and the non-response 
bias was proved to be no problem in analyzing the data using SEM. Also, general 
information about the respondents is provided including the employment period, field of 
work, and education level, etc. In particular, specific information about the port 
authorities and their subsidiary companies implementing the ISPS code and CSI is 
provided. Also, the respondents’ information about security program (AEO and 
ISO28000) certified companies as port users is provided. This chapter explains how the 
two biggest major trading ports in Korea, and major port users in the supply chain which 
those ports are located in, are selected for analysis in the survey. The responses of all the 
questions in the questionnaire were all around 3 (except SCSI3 and SCSI6) in the Likert 
scale, which is an indication that most respondents showed rather moderate agreement in 
most of the questions in the survey. However, the ANOVA results of the two groups of the 
construct showed statistically significant results, which require more detailed analysis in 
Chapter 7. This chapter also provided the demographic information about the respondents, 
  165 
a general overview of the data collected, and a comparison of the two groups regarding 
how people perceive and feel about the research questions of this study. Next chapter tests 
the research model and report the results using the SEM.  
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
 
7. 1 Introduction  
This Chapter conducts hypotheses tests based on the general information about the survey 
sample explained in Chapter 6. The major methodology of the analysis is the Structural 
Equation Model (SEM) which is thoroughly explained in Chapter 5. The research model 
is examined which is composed of three major constructs: Antecedents, Supply Chain 
Security Orientation (SCSO), and Port Performance (PP). This Chapter is divided into 
five sections. Section 7. 2 discusses the qualifying requirements for the SEM analysis: 
missing data, outliers, and multivariate normality of the data. Section 7. 3 presents the 
CFA results of the research model, causal relationship of the variables, and hypotheses 
testing which are the core parts of this Chapter. Lastly, section 7. 4 presents the multi-
group analysis between the port group and the port user group which is followed by a 
summary and conclusion in section 7. 5.  
 
7. 2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
In order to conduct the validity and reliability of the analysis, Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) has been conducted. The summary of the criteria for the sound analysis is 
presented in Table 7. 1 by Woo (2010) which is a summary of the requirements for the 
sound statistical significance for the SEM.  
 
Table 7. 1 Criteria for assessing the measurement model in the current study 
Validity Criteria 
Convergent Validity Factor loadings are significant and greater than 0.50 
Overall Model Fit 
Unidimensionality 
2/df <3; GFI>0.90; CFI>0.90; TLI>0.90; SRMR<0.08;  
0.05<RMSEA<0.08 
Reliability 
Composite Reliability>0.70 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE)>0.50 
Cronbach’s Alpha>0.70 
Discriminant Validity 
Inter-construct correlations<0.85 
AVE>Squared inter-construct Correlations 
Source: Adapted from Jang (2012) and Woo (2010) 
 
In terms of overall model fit, GFI>0.90, CFI>0.90, SRMR<0.08, and 0.05<RMSEA<0.08 
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are widely used requirements. As for the reliability, composite reliability (>0.70), AVE 
(>0.50), and Cronbach’s Alpha (>0.70) are widely used criteria. Discriminant validity 
needs inter construct correlations (<0.85) with AVE greater than squared inter-construct 
correlations. These are the requirements that the data should meet before conducting the 
actual analysis for the SEM. The Cronbach’s Alpha of the variables are shown in Table 7. 
2.  
 
Table 7. 2 Reliability of the variables (Cronbach’s Alpha) 
Variables 
Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Variables 
Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
RPSV 6 .730 SDCT 5 .842 
FR 4 .858 SC 4 .886 
SCSI 6 .892 SE 5 .870 
SPP 6 .852 EFC 8 .911 
SRP 5 .871 EFF 7 .923 
OA 5 .843    
Source: Author 
 
Since all the variables showed over .7 in Cronbach’s Alpha, it is fair to say that the 
reliabilities of the variables are high. Since the basic requirements for the statistical 
analysis are in descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha, the next step is to explore the 
reliability and validity in all the variables in detail using Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA). The entire measurement model is shown in Figure 7. 1. Each latent variable in 
circled boxes has two or more observed variables in squared boxes with measurement 
errors in small circled boxes. The inter-construct correlations in every variable in circled 
arrows are also shown in the figure. All the values are lower than .85 which proves the 
fact that this model meets the requirement for the inter-construct correlations.  
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Figure 7. 1 The entire measurement model  
 
 
7. 2. 1 Construct 1: Antecedents  
The Antecedents construct is the three factor measurement model composed of: RPSV 
(Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability), FR (Financial Resources), and SCSI 
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(Supply Chain Security Initiatives). During the analysis, many items with low 
standardized regression weights (less than 0.7) were deleted in order to enhance the 
quality of the dataset and the analysis. Four items (RPSV2, RPSV4, RPSV 5, RPSV6) in 
the RPSV variable, two items (FR2 and FR3) in the FR variable, and three items (SCSI1, 
SCSI2, and SCSI6) in the SCSI variable were deleted. As a result, seven items survived in 
the Antecedent construct (Figure 7. 2). This process makes the quality of the data and the 
analysis much better.  
 
Figure 7. 2 The measurement model 1: Antecedents  
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7. 3 presents the CFA results for the Antecedents. As shown above, all the items and 
variables showed a higher than 0.70 standardized regression weight and their critical 
ratios using the t-value are highly significant. In the Antecedent construct, overall 
goodness of fit indices suggest that all the values meet the requirement of the validity. 
CFI (0.993), GFI (0.988), SRMR (0.023), RMSEA (0.038) values all meet the 
requirements and the 2/df value is 1.167 which also satisfies the assessment criteria. 
Composite reliability showed that all the variables had a value higher than 0.70, Average 
Variance Extracted was higher than 0.50, and Cronbach Alpha was higher than 0.70. This 
also shows that the requirement for the reliability has been satisfied. Since all the items in 
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the Antecedents meet the requirements, the Antecedents construct is ready for analysis 
using SEM. 
 
Table 7. 3 CFA results for the measurement model 1: Antecedents 
Construct 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Critical Ratio 
(t-value) 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
RPSV 
RPSV1 0.766 6.711
***
 
0.746 0.595 0.748 
RPSV3 0.782  
FR 
FR1 0.779 12.482
***
 
0.771 0.628 0.739 
FR4 0.753  
SCSI 
SCSI3 0.837 18.002
***
 
0.885 0.720 0.852 SCSI4 0.821  
SCSI5 0.776 16.784
***
 
Overall Goodness of Fit Indices 
2/df=1.617   
GFI = 0.988, CFI = 0.993,  
SRMR = 0.023, RMSEA = 0.038 
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001 
 
7. 2. 2 Construct 2: Supply Chain Security Orientation (SCSO) 
The SCSO is the six factor measurement model composed of: SPP (Security Preparation 
and Planning), SRP (Security Related Partnership), OA (Organizational Adaptation), 
SDCT (Security Dedicated Communication Technology), SC (Security Culture), and SE 
(Security Education). During the analysis, many items with low standardized regression 
weights (less than 0.7) were deleted in order to enhance the quality of the dataset and the 
analysis. Four items (SPP1, SPP2, SPP5, SPP6) in the SPP variable, three items (SRP1, 
SRP3, and SRP4) in the SRP variable, three items (OA1, OA2, and OA3) in the OA 
variable were deleted. Also, two items (SDCT1, and SDCT2) in the SDCT variable, two 
items (SC3 and SC4) in the SC variable, and one item (SE5) were deleted in the SE 
variable. As a result, fifteen items survived in the SCSO construct (Figure 7. 3). 
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Figure 7. 3 The measurement model 2: SCSO 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7. 4 shows the CFA results for the SCSO. As shown above, all the items and 
variables showed higher than 0.70 in standardized regression weight and their critical 
ratios using the t-value are highly significant. In the SCSO construct, overall goodness of 
fit indices suggest that all the values meet the requirement of the validity. CFI (0.970), 
GFI (0.951), SRMR (0.027), RMSEA (0.056) values all meet the requirements and the  
2/df value is 2.357 which also satisfies the assessment criteria. Composite reliability 
showed that all the variables had values higher than 0.70, Average Variance Extracted 
showed values higher than 0.50, and Cronbach Alpha showed values higher than 0.70. 
This also shows that the requirement for the reliability of the data has been satisfied. 
Since all the items in the SCSO construct meet the requirement, the SCSO construct is 
ready for analysis using SEM. 
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Table 7. 4 CFA results for the measurement model 2: SCSO 
Construct 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Critical Ratio 
(t-value) 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
SPP 
SPP3 0.738 13.246
***
 
0.892 0.675 0.745 
SPP4 0.811  
SRP 
SRP2 0.837 15.277
***
 
0.816 0.69 0.757 
SRP5 0.728  
OA 
OA4 0.812 16.634
***
 
0.831 0.711 0.789 
OA5 0.803  
SDCT 
SDCT3 0.729 15.832
***
 
0.847 0.650 0.804 SDCT4 0.854  
SDCT5 0.724 15.699
***
 
SC 
SC1 0.859 19.166
***
 
0.86 0.754 0.827 
SC2 0.823  
SE 
SE1 0.79 16.883
***
 
0.887 0.664 0.857 
SE2 0.778  
SE3 0.811 17.373
***
 
SE4 0.733 15.471
***
 
Overall Goodness of Fit Indices 
2/df =2.357 
GFI = 0.951, CFI = 0.970, TLI=0.958,  
SRMR = 0.027, RMSEA = 0.056 
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001 
 
7. 2. 3 Construct 3: Port Performance (PP) 
The PP is the two factor measurement model composed of: EFC (Effectiveness) and EFF 
(Efficiency). During the analysis, many items with low standardized regression weights 
(less than 0.7) were deleted in order to enhance the quality of the dataset and the analysis. 
Three items (EFC1, EFC3, and EFC7) in the EFC variable, and four items (EFF3, EFF5, 
EFF6, and EFF7) in the EFF variable were deleted. As a result, seven items for the PP 
survived (Figure 7. 4). 
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Figure 7. 4 The measurement model 3: PP 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7. 5 shows the CFA results for the PP. As shown above, all the items and variables 
in the PP showed higher than 0.70 in standardized regression weight and their critical 
ratios using the t-value are highly significant. In the PP construct, overall goodness of fit 
indices suggest that all the values meet the requirement of the validity. CFI (0.984), GFI 
(0.972), SRMR (0.026), RMSEA (0.062) values all meet the requirements and the 2/df 
value is 2.648 which also satisfies the assessment criteria. Composite reliability showed 
that all the variables were higher than 0.70, Average Variance Extracted showed higher 
than 0.50, and Cronbach Alpha showed higher than 0.70. This also shows that the 
requirement for the reliability of the data has been satisfied. 
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Table 7. 5 CFA results for the measurement model 3 : PP  
Construct 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Critical Ratio 
(t-value) 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
EFC 
EFC2 0.704 14.976
***
 
0.908 0.665 0.876 
EFC4 0.783  
EFC5 0.746 16.046
***
 
EFC6 0.822 17.986
***
 
EFC8 0.768 16.596
***
 
EFF 
EFF1 0.877 23.611
***
 
0.905 0.761 0.868 EFF2 0.9  
EFF4 0.724 17.664
***
 
Overall Goodness of Fit Indices 
2/df =2.648 
GFI = 0.972, CFI = 0.984, TLI=0.976,  
SRMR = 0.026, RMSEA = 0.062 
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001 
 
Table 7. 6 presents the summary of the CFA results for all the items and variables. All the 
variables showed 0.70 or more in regression weight, and more than one item of each 
variable showed statistical significance in the t-value. Composite reliability, Average 
Variance Extracted, and Cronbach Alpha showed reliable results for all the items and 
variables. Overall goodness of fit indices also satisfied the criteria of the assessing 
measurement model in Table 7. 1 with the GFI (0.911>0.90), CFI (0.957>0.90), RMR 
(0.029<0.08), and RMSEA (0.05<0.045<0.08) values.  
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Table 7. 6 Summary of CFA results of all variables 
Construct 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Critical Ratio 
(t-value) 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
RPSV 
RPSV1 0.766 6.711
***
 
0.746 0.595 0.748 
RPSV3 0.782  
FR 
FR1 0.779 12.482
***
 
0.771 0.628 0.739 
FR4 0.753  
SCSI 
SCSI3 0.837 18.002
***
 
0.885 0.720 0.852 SCSI4 0.821  
SCSI5 0.776 16.784
***
 
SPP 
SPP3 0.738 13.246
***
 
0.892 0.675 0.745 
SPP4 0.811  
SRP 
SRP2 0.837 15.277
***
 
0.816 0.69 0.757 
SRP5 0.728   
OA 
OA4 0.812 16.634
***
 
0.831 0.711 0.789 
OA5 0.803  
SDCT 
SDCT3 0.729 15.832
***
 
0.847 0.650 0.804 SDCT4 0.854  
SDCT5 0.724 15.699
***
 
SC 
SC1 0.859 19.166
***
 
0.86 0.754 0.827 
SC2 0.823  
SE 
SE1 0.79 16.883
***
 
0.887 0.664 0.857 
SE2 0.778  
SE3 0.811 17.373
***
 
SE4 0.733 15.471
***
 
EFC 
EFC2 0.704 14.976
***
 
0.908 0.665 0.876 
EFC4 0.783  
EFC5 0.746 16.046
***
 
EFC6 0.822 17.986
***
 
EFC8 0.768 16.596
***
 
EFF 
EFF1 0.877 23.611
***
 
0.905 0.761 0.868 EFF2 0.9  
EFF4 0.724 17.664
***
 
Overall Goodness of Fit Indices 
=1.864 
GFI = 0.911, CFI = 0.957, RMR = 0.029 
RMSEA = 0.045 
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001 
 
Table 7. 7 presents the AVE values according to the variables. It is clearly shown in the 
shadowed cells that all the values do not exceed 0.85 or go below the point of 0.50 
explained in Table 7. 1. The comparison of AVE and inter-construct correlation shows that 
the data satisfy the discriminant validity. The validity and reliability requirements are all 
satisfied in all the items and variables of the measurement model. 
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Table 7. 7 AVE and inter-construct correlations 
 RPSV FR SCSI SPP SRP OA SDCT SC SE EFC EFF 
RPSV .595 .003 .096 .000 .000 -.000 .007 .010 .002 -.002 .003 
FR -.055 .628 .112 .337 .447 .372 .393 .234 .316 .182 .226 
SCSI .310 .336 .720 .209 .304 .229 .241 .361 .187 .178 .103 
SPP .016 .581 .458 .675 .506 .459 .278 .414 .458 .288 .167 
SRP .003 .669 .552 .712 .690 .657 .389 .509 .488 .408 .236 
OA -.029 .610 .479 .678 .811 .711 .417 .480 .561 .363 .291 
SDCT .085 .627 .491 .528 .624 .646 .650 .491 .362 .357 .369 
SC .100 .484 .601 .644 .714 .693 .701 .754 .633 .375 .238 
SE .054 .563 .433 .677 .699 .749 .602 .796 .664 .346 .244 
EFC -.048 .427 .422 .537 .639 .603 .598 .613 .589 .665 .532 
EFF .055 .476 .321 .409 .486 .540 .608 .488 .494 .730 .761 
Source: Author 
Note: Diagonal numbers are the AVE values, inter-construct correlations are located below the AVE values, 
and square root of the inter-construct correlations are located above the AVE values.   
 
Table 7. 8 shows the final observed variables and their definitions of the measurement in 
the construct. As mentioned above, many of the items were deleted in order to have a 
better regression weight and reliability of the construct. The observed variables that had 
70% or more regression weights survived in the final version of measuring scales. This is 
the process of refining and upgrading the quality of the dataset that can best measure the 
causal relationships in the research model. These observed variables stand for each latent 
variable which are now ready for the analysis process. 
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Table 7. 8 Construct and observed variables in the measurement model  
Category Construct Observation Variable (indicator) 
Antecedents 
Risk Perception 
and Security 
Vulnerability 
(RPSV) 
· (RPSV1): perception of negative experience related to security related 
internal IT infrastructure 
· (RPSV3): perception of negative experience related to security related local 
disruptions(e.g. labor strike, explosion, fire, industrial 
accidents) 
Financial 
Resources (FR) 
· (FR1): Availability of financial investment on supply chain security 
· (FR4): Support and help of supply chain members finance capital 
equipment 
Supply Chain 
Security 
Initiatives (SCSI) 
· (SCSI3): Importance of global security initiatives in the future 
· (SCSI4): Importance of plans to cope with the global security initiatives 
· (SCSI5): Importance of investment in global supply chain security 
initiatives 
Supply Chain 
Security 
Orientation 
(SCSO) 
Security 
Preparedness and 
Planning (SPP) 
· (SPP3): Belief that security planners sought input from employees everyday 
· (SPP4): Belief that security preparedness is coordinated with the overall 
plan of the company 
Security Related 
Partnership 
(SRP) 
· (SRP2): Thinking that there is a strong and long term security relationship 
with the supply chain members. 
· (SRP5): Thinking that there are security guidelines for developing, 
maintaining, and monitoring the long term supply chain 
partnerships. 
Organizational 
Adaptation (OA) 
· (OA4): Belief that our supply chain members trust each other 
· (OA5): Belief that CEOs of our supply chain members share similar 
operating philosophies. 
Security 
Dedicated 
Communication 
Technology 
(SDCT) 
· (SDCT3): Feeling that we use computerized port service systems for our 
supply chain security 
· (SDCT4): Feeling that we use the latest IT available to the industry to 
support the supply chain security 
· (SDCT5): Feeling that we provide our customers with the security 
information concerning shipments 
Security Culture 
(SC) 
· (SC1): Belief that we create a supply chain security focus among all 
employees 
· (SC2): Belief that we make supply chain security the norm for all 
employees 
Security 
Education (SE) 
· (SE1): Thinking that we provide security related education and training 
· (SE2): Thinking that we benchmark best practices around us to improve our 
security program. 
· (SE3): Thinking that we conduct scheduled training program to test internal 
security program. 
· (SE4): Thinking that we hire and promote security conscious personnel. 
Port 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
(EFC) 
· (EFC2): Feeling that we handle cargoes on quoted or anticipated time 
· (EFC4): Feeling that our service lead time is appropriate 
· (EFC5): Feeling that we provide shipment information accurately 
· (EFC6): Feeling that we respond promptly to the need of customers 
· (EFC8): Feeling that we are flexible in terms of volume and type of cargo 
handling 
Efficiency (EFF) 
· (EFF1): Thinking that our cargo throughput per crane is at the satisfactory 
level 
· (EFF2): Thinking that our cargo throughput per acre is at the satisfactory 
level 
· (EFF4): Thinking that our ship turnaround time is at the satisfactory level 
Source: Author 
 
In order to assess the reliability of the structural model, overall model fit should meet the 
criteria shown in Table 7. 9. Also, structural parameters should be significant and 
identified causal relationships should be consistent with the theory.  
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Table 7. 9 Assessment of the structural model 
Validity Criteria 
Overall model fit 
2/df<3; CFI>0.90; TLI>0.90; SRMR<0.08;  
0.05<RMSEA<0.08 
Structural parameter estimates The estimates are significant. 
Nomological validity 
Causal relationships make sense and are consistent with 
theoretical expectations. 
Source: Adapted from Jang (2012) and Woo (2010) 
 
7. 3 Direct, indirect, and total impacts 
7. 3. 1 Direct impacts 
Table 7. 10 presents the parameter estimates of the direct impacts. The significance is 
highlighted as the * mark (*: p-value<0.05, **: p-value<0.01, and ***: p-value<0.001). 
First of all, in the Antecedent construct, RPSV had low causal relationships with all the 
variables in the construct except SPP (regression weight: 0.741***) in the SCSO. RPSV 
also had negative relationships with both EFC (-0.281) and EFF (-0.079), and this can be 
neglected because they are statistically insignificant. The FR showed a significant 
relationship with most of the variables (SRP: 0.808***, OA: 0.872***, SDCT: 0.665***, 
SC:0.657***, and SE:0.827***) in the construct except SPP(0.043). Also, with EFC (-
2.577***) and EFF (-2.409***), it is unique to find that there was a significant negative 
relationship between them. SCSI had a significant relationship only with SC (0.265***) 
and a marginal significant relationship with SRP (0.164, p: 0.068). In summary, in the 
Antecedent construct, RPSV had only one variable that is significant, FR had all 
positively significant variables except SPP, and showed negatively significant 
relationships with the EFC and EFF. The SCSI had only two variables that are at least 
marginally significant in the construct.  
In the SCSO construct, all the variables showed significant positive relationships with the 
variables in the PP except the relationship between SC and EFF (0.085). SPP showed a 
significant relationship with both EFC (0.423***) and EFF(0.194*, p-value:0.045). SRP 
also showed significant relationships with EFC (1.064***) and EFF (0.529**, p-value: 
0.003). SDCT showed both significant relationships with EFC (0.561***) and EFF 
(0.635***). OA also showed significant outcome with EFC (0.867***) and EFF 
(0.73***). SC showed significant result only with the EFC (0.286*, p-value: 0.027). SE 
showed both significant relationships with the EFC (0.498***) and the EFF (0.339**, p-
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value:0.005).  
In the PP construct, all the variables (SRP:1.064***, SDCT: 0.561***, OA: 0.867***, 
SPP: 0.423***, SE: 0.498***, SC: 0.286*) except RPSV, SCSI, and FR (-2.577***) 
showed statistically positive relationships on EFC, and the SMC of the EFC was 0.997, 
which is the highest of all the variables. Also, all the variables (SRP: 0.529**, SDCT: 
0.635***, OA: 0.73***, SPP: 0.194*, SE: 0.339**) except SC (0.085), SCSI (-0.144), 
RPSV (-0.079), and FR (-1.571***).  
In terms of the SMC (Squared Multiple Correlation), which is the ability of predictability 
of the independent variables on the dependent variable, EFC (0.997) showed the highest. 
SRP (0.808), OA (0.806) also showed a high degree of predictability. Other variables 
(SC:0.680, SE: 0.683, SPP: 0.620, EFF: 0.608, SDCT: 0.568) also showed a decent level 
of predictability which proves the fact that the variables and the construct were well 
defined and established. Figure 7. 5 and Table 7. 11 show the summary of the regression 
weights, their p-values, and hypotheses tests in all the variables. 
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Table 7. 10 The parameter estimate of the direct impacts of the variables  
Paths 
Regression 
Parameter 
Standardized 
Regression 
Parameter 
Standard 
Error 
T-value p-value SMC 
FR → SPP .039 .043 .073 .528 .598 .620 
SCSI → SPP .092 .088 .095 .969 .333  
RPSV → SPP 1.011 .741 .131 7.718 ***  
FR → SRP 1.103 .808 .125 8.799 *** .808 
SCSI → SRP .172 .164 .094 1.824 .068  
RPSV → SRP .005 .005 .072 .067 .947  
FR → OA 1.235 .872 .14 8.846 *** .806 
SCSI → OA .058 .053 .102 .566 .572  
RPSV → OA .015 .016 .078 .188 .851  
FR → SDCT .903 .665 .12 7.526 *** .568 
SCSI → SDCT .155 .149 .088 1.77 .077  
RPSV → SDCT .079 .089 .067 1.178 .239  
FR → SC 1.019 .657 .127 8.045 *** .680 
SCSI → SC .316 .265 .097 3.274 .001  
RPSV → SC .07 .068 .073 .951 .342  
FR → SE 1.147 .827 .134 8.531 *** .683 
SCSI → SE -.002 -.002 .097 -.02 .984  
RPSV → SE .104 .113 .075 1.384 .166  
FR → EFC -3.007 -2.577 .382 -7.873 *** .997 
SCSI → EFC -.107 -.12 .225 -.476 .634  
RPSV → EFC -.216 -.281 .171 -1.26 .208  
SRP → EFC .91 1.064 .216 4.22 ***  
SDCT → EFC .482 .561 .08 6.022 ***  
OA → EFC .714 .867 .185 3.863 ***  
SPP → EFC .362 .423 .093 3.878 ***  
SE → EFC .419 .498 .112 3.749 ***  
SC → EFC .215 .286 .097 2.218 .027  
FR → EFF -2.409 -1.571 .369 -6.534 *** .608 
SCSI → EFF -.169 -.144 .195 -.87 .384  
RPSV → EFF -.08 -.079 .145 -.551 .581  
SRP → EFF .594 .529 .199 2.985 .003  
SDCT → EFF .717 .635 .102 7.052 ***  
OA → EFF .79 .73 .201 3.934 ***  
SPP → EFF .218 .194 .109 2.001 .045  
SE → EFF .375 .339 .133 2.824 .005  
SC → EFF .084 .085 .119 .705 .481  
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
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Figure 7. 5 The structural model and its coefficients of direct impacts of the variables 
 
Source: Author (straight lines: significant impact, dotted lines: insignificant impact) 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
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Table 7. 11 The results of the hypotheses tests (direct impact) 
Hypotheses 
Standardized 
regression weight 
(regression weight) 
Critical 
ratios 
(p-value) 
Paths Result 
H1-1. RPSV has a positive impact on SPP 0.741(1.011) 7.718*** RPSV → SPP Supported 
H1-2. RPSV has a positive impact on SRP 0.005(0.005) 0.067 RPSV → SRP Rejected 
H1-3. RPSV has a positive impact on OA 0.016(0.015) 0.0188 RPSV → OA Rejected 
H1-4. RPSV has a positive impact on SDCT 0.149(0.155) 
1.77 
(.077) 
RPSV→SDCT 
Partially 
supported 
H1-5. RPSV has a positive impact on SC 0.068(0.07) 0.951 RPSV → SC Rejected 
H1-6. RPSV has a positive impact on SE 0.113(0.104) 1.384 RPSV → SE Rejected 
H1.7. RPSV has a positive impact on EFC -0.281(-0.216) -1.26 RPSV → EFC Rejected 
H1.8. RPSV has a positive impact on EFF -0.079(-0.08) -0.551 RPSV → EFF Rejected 
H2-1. FR has a positive impact on SPP 0.043(0.039) 0.528 FR → SPP Rejected 
H2-2. FR has a positive impact on SRP 0.808(1.103) 8.799*** FR → SRP Supported 
H2-3. FR has a positive impact on OA 0.872(1.235) 8.846*** FR → OA Supported 
H2-4. FR has a positive impact on SDCT 0.665(0.903) 7.526*** FR → SDCT Supported 
H2-5. FR has a positive impact on SC 0.657(1.019) 8.045*** FR → SC Supported 
H2-6. FR has a positive impact on SE 0.827(1.147) 8.531*** FR → SE Supported 
H2-7. FR has a positive impact on EFC -2.577(-3.007) -7.873*** FR → EFC Rejected 
H2-8. FR has a positive impact on EFF -1.571(-2.409) -6.534*** FR → EFF Rejected 
H3-1. SCSI has a positive impact on SPP 0.088(0.092) 0.333 SCSI → SPP Rejected 
H3-2. SCSI has a positive impact on SRP 0.164(0.172) 
1.824 
(.068) 
SCSI → SRP 
Partially 
supported 
H3-3. SCSI has a positive impact on OA 0.053(0.058) 0.566 SCSI → OA Rejected 
H3-4. SCSI has a positive impact on SDCT 0.149(0.155) 
1.77 
(.077) 
SCSI → SDCT 
Partially 
supported 
H3-5. SCSI has a positive impact on SC 0.265(0.316) 3.274 SCSI → SC Supported 
H3-6. SCSI has a positive impact on SE -0.002(-0.002) -0.02 SCSI → SE Rejected 
H3-7. SCSI has a positive impact on EFC -0.12(-0.107) -0.476 SCSI → EFC Rejected 
H3-8. SCSI has a positive impact on EFF -0.144(-0.169) -0.87 SCSI → EFF Rejected 
H4-1. SPP has a positive impact on EFC 0.423(0.362) 3.878*** SPP → EFC Supported 
H4-2. SPP has a positive impact on EFF 0.194(0.218) 2.001 SPP → EFF Supported 
H5-1. SRP has a positive impact on EFC 1.064(0.91) 4.22*** SRP → EFC Supported 
H5-2. SRP has a positive impact on EFF 0.529(0.594) 2.985 SRP → EFF Supported 
H6-1. OA has a positive impact on EFC 0.867(0.714) 3.863*** OA → EFC Supported 
H6-2. OA has a positive impact on EFF 0.73(0.79) 3.934*** OA → EFF Supported 
H7-1. SDCT has a positive impact on EFC 0.561(0.482) 6.022*** SDCT → EFC Supported 
H7-2. SDCT has a positive impact on EFF 0.635(0.717) 7.052*** SDCT → EFF Supported 
H8-1. SC has a positive impact on EFC 0.286(0.215) 2.218 SC → EFC Supported 
H8-2. SC has a positive impact on EFF 0.085(0.084) 0.705 SC → EFF Rejected 
H9-1. SE has a positive impact on EFC 0.498(0.419) 3.749*** SE → EFC Supported 
H9-2. SE has a positive impact on EFF 0.339(0.375) 
2.824 
(.05) 
SE → EFF 
Partially 
supported 
Source: Author  
Note: supported values: p-value<0.05, rejected value: p-value>0.10 partially supported 
values: 0.05<p-value<0.10 
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7. 3. 2 Indirect impacts 
In order to conduct in-depth analysis, indirect effects are also analyzed. Direct impact was 
analyzed in the previous sections. However, direct impact can not analyze the indirect 
impact of variables which needs to be analyzed in order to find out the in-depth analysis 
of the causal relationships. In the AMOS, the Bootstrapping method is widely utilized in 
order to analyze the indirect effects. It does not rely on the assumption of normality. It 
estimates the standard errors from the non-parametric re-sampling method from the 
sample collected in the population. However, in this study, the Sobel test is utilized to 
analyze the indirect impacts of variables. Preacher and Hayes (2004) mentioned that data 
follow the multivariate normal distribution if the skewness is less than 3 and kurtosis is 
less than 10. The data for this study follow this description, and the indirect impacts are 
analyzed by going through a formula:  (a: raw regression coefficient 
for the association between independent variable and the mediator, sa: standard error of a, 
b: raw coefficient for the association between the mediator and the dependent variable, sb: 
standard error of b). Also, if the Z-value is bigger than +1.965 or smaller than -1.965, the 
null hypotheses are rejected (Kline 2005). This method is primarily used to identify the 
statistical significance in the mediation effect of the variables.  
It assumes that the data follow the multivariate normal distribution and test the 
significance among variables. The impact of variables in the Antecedents (RPSV, FR, and 
SCSI) on PP (EFC and EFF) through SCSO (SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE) will be 
tested. Since this study adopts the first order analysis only, there are thirty six hypotheses 
and they test and analyze the indirect impacts of the variables in the construct. 
 
The indirect effects of the variables in the Antecedents on PP through SCSO are shown in  
Figure 7. 6. The FR variable showed a statistically positive relationship with the EFF and 
EFC. The FR showed negative direct relationships with the EFF (1.966*) and EFC 
(2.902*), and now the indirect impact showed a positive relationship. Since it has been 
shown that indirect impact was identified, the more specific path analysis of variables is 
conducted in the following sections.  
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Figure 7. 6 Indirect impacts of variables in Antecedents on PP through SCSO construct 
 
Source: Author  
Note: straight lines: significant impact, dotted lines: insignificant impact 
*: significant impact (p-value:<0.05) 
 
Table 7. 12 shows the results of the indirect effect of the variables from the Antecedents 
(RPSV, FR, and SCSI) on PP (EFC and EFF). FR is the only variable that showed 
significant results in most of the paths from FR to EFC and EFF. In particular, from FR to 
EFC showed positive significant results in all the indirect paths. From FR to EFC through 
SPP showed 0.313 (regression weight) and 3.475*** (Z-value). From FR to EFC through 
SRP showed 0.860 (regression weight) and 3.802*** (Z-value). From FR to EFC through 
OA showed 0.756 (regression weight) and 3.536*** (Z-value). From FR to EFC through 
SDCT showed 0.373 (regression weight) and 4.703*** (Z-value). From FR to EFC 
through SC showed 0.188 (regression weight) and 2.136* (Z-value). Finally, from FR to 
EFC through SE showed 0.412 (regression weight) 3.428*** (Z-value).  
On the other hand, FR to EFF also showed significant results except through SPP (0.144: 
regression weight) and SC (0.056: regression weight). From FR to EFF through SRP 
showed 0.427 (regression weight) and 2.828**. From FR to EFF through OA showed 
0.637 (regression weight) and 3.590*** (Z-value). From FR to EFF through SDCT 
showed 0.422 (regression weight) and 5.137*** (Z-value). Finally, from FR to EFF 
through SE showed 0.280 (regression weight) and 2.678** (Z-value).  
In summary, all the indirect paths starting from FR to PP via SCSO showed significant 
results without going through the variable SPP and SC variables in the SCSO construct.  
 
 
SCSO 
construct 
RPSV 
FR 
EFF 
SCSI 
EFC 
 
 
.163
 
 
.123
 
 
2.902*
 
 
1.966*
 
 
.416
 
 
.259
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Table 7. 12 Summary of indirect effects of standardized estimates (p-value) 
Category SCSI FR RPSV 
EFF 259 (.293) 1.966 (.032*) .123 (.577) 
EFC .416 (.295) 2.902 (.021*) .163 (.619) 
Source: Author  
Note: *: p-value<0.05 
 
Table 7. 13 shows the indirect impact hypotheses and their test results for this study. 
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Table 7. 13 The result of the hypotheses tests (indirect impact) 
Hypotheses 
Standardized  
Regression Weight 
(Regression Weight) 
Z-Value Paths Result 
H10-1. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SPP 0.018 (0.014) 0.529 RPSV → SPP → EFC Not supported 
H10-2. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SRP 0.005 (0.005) 0.069 RPSV → SRP → EFC Not supported 
H10-3. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through OA 0.014 (0.011) 0.192 RPSV → OA → EFC Not supported 
H10-4. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SDCT 0.050 (0.038) 1.157 RPSV → SDCT → EFC Not supported 
H10-5. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SC 0.019 (0.015) 0.880 RPSV → SC → EFC Not supported 
H10-6. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SE 0.056 (0.044) 1.300 RPSV → SE → EFC Not supported 
H11-1. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SPP 0.008 (0.009) 0.516 RPSV → SPP → EFF Not supported 
H11-2. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SRP 0.003 (0.003) 0.069 RPSV → SRP → EFF Not supported 
H11-3. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through OA 0.012 (0.012) 0.192 RPSV → OA → EFF Not supported 
H11-4. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SDCT 0.057 (0.057) 1.163 RPSV → SDCT → EFF Not supported 
H11-5. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SC 0.006 (0.006) 0.568 RPSV → SC→ EFF Not supported 
H11-6. RPSV has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SE 0.038 (0.039) 1.244 RPSV → SE → EFF Not supported 
H12-1. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SPP 0.313 (0.366) 3.475*** FR → SPP → EFC Supported 
H12-2. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SRP 0.860 (1.004) 3.802*** FR → SRP → EFC Supported 
H12-3. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through OA 0.756 (0.882) 3.536*** FR → OA → EFC Supported 
H12-4. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SDCT 0.373 (0.435) 4.703*** FR → SDCT → EFC Supported 
H12-5. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SC 0.188 (0.219) 2.136* FR → SC → EFC Supported 
H12-6. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SE 0.412 (0.481) 3.428*** FR → SE → EFC Supported 
H13-1. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SPP 0.144 (0.220) 1.936 FR → SPP → EFF Not supported 
H13-2. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SRP 0.427 (0.655) 2.828** FR → SRP → EFF Supported 
H13-3. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through OA 0.637 (0.976) 3.590*** FR → OA → EFF Supported 
H13-4. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SDCT 0.422 (0.647) 5.137*** FR → SDCT → EFF Supported 
H13-5. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SC 0.056 (0.086) 0.703 FR → SC→ EFF Not supported 
H13-6. FR has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SE 0.280 (0.430) 2.678** FR → SE → EFF Supported 
H14-1. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SPP 0.037 (0.033) 0.940 SCSI → SPP → EFC Not supported 
H14-2. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SRP 0.174 (0.157) 1.678 SCSI → SRP → EFC Not supported 
H14-3. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through OA 0.046 (0.041) 0.563 SCSI → OA → EFC Not supported 
H14-4. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SDCT 0.084 (0.075) 1.691 SCSI → SDCT → EFC Not supported 
H14-5. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SC 0.076 (0.068) 1.833 SCSI → SC → EFC Not supported 
H14-6. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFC through SE -0.001 (-0.001) -0.021 SCSI → SE → EFC Not supported 
H15-1. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SPP 0.017 (0.020) 0.872 SCSI → SPP → EFF Not supported 
H15-2. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SRP 0.087 (0.102) 1.560 SCSI → SRP → EFF Not supported 
H15-3. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through OA 0.039 (0.046) 0.563 SCSI → OA → EFF Not supported 
H15-4. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SDCT 0.095 (0.111) 1.709 SCSI → SDCT → EFF Not supported 
H15-5. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SC 0.023 (0.027) 0.690 SCSI → SC→ EFF Not supported 
H15-6. SCSI has an indirect and positive impact on EFF through SE -0.001 (-0.001) -0.021 SCSI → SE → EFF Not supported 
Source : Author, (supported values: : p-value<0.05, rejected value: p-value>0.10 partially supported values: 0.05<p-value<0.10) 
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7. 3. 3 Total impacts 
Based on the discussion of direct and indirect effects of all the variables in the construct, 
Table 7. 14 shows the total effects of the variables of parameter estimates. First of all, the 
FR, showed significant positive relationships with all the variables (SPP: 0.741**, SRP: 
0.808**, OA: 0.872**, SDCT: 0.665*, SC: 0.657*, SE: 0.827*, EFC: 0.326*, EFF: 
0.395**). This had significant negative direct effects on EFC (regression weight: -
2.577***) and EFF (regression weight: -1.571***) which is explained in detail in Table 7. 
11. However, it was shown in Table 7. 12 that the indirect impacts of FR were shown as 
positive on EFC (2.902*) and EFF (1.966*). In total, the total effects, the sum of direct 
and indirect effects, were shown as positive. This means that although FR has a negative 
direct impact on both EFC and EFF, its impact is positive through the variables in the 
SCSO construct. Although the direct impact of variables stays the same, indirect impacts 
were changed by adding both of them at the same time. Also, RPSV shows insignificant 
results for all the variables except showing a significant negative effect on the EFC (-
0.117*). SCSI showed significant results on SC (0.265*) and EFC (0.296*). This also 
showed marginal significance on SDCT (0.149, p-value: 0.082). The variables SE, SDCT, 
OA, SRP all showed significant positive impacts on the EFC and EFF. Also, SC showed 
marginal significance on the EFC (0.286, p-value: 0.069). SPP also showed significant 
result with the EFC and marginal significance on EFF (0.194, p-value: 0.082). Figure 7. 7 
shows the illustration of the total effects of the variables in the entire construct. 
 
Table 7. 14 Parameter estimates of total effect (p-value) 
Category SCSI FR RPSV SE SC SDCT OA SRP SPP EFF EFC 
SE 
-0.002 0.827 0.113         
(0.984) (0.019*) (0.292)         
SC 
0.265 0.657 0.068         
(0.026*) (0.013*) (0.451)         
SDCT 
0.149 0.665 0.089         
(0.082) (0.020*) (0.344)         
OA 
0.053 0.872 0.016         
(0.731) (0.007**) (0.849)         
SRP 
0.164 0.808 0.005         
(0.275) (0.008**) (0.981)         
SPP 
0.088 0.741 0.043         
(0.490) (0.008**) (0.561)         
EFF 
0.115 0.395 0.044 0.339 0.085 0.635 0.73 0.529 0.194   
(0.259) (0.009**) (0.556) (0.028*) (0.445) (0.009**) (0.003**) (0.050*) (0.082)   
EFC 
0.296 0.326 -0.117 0.498 0.286 0.561 0.867 1.064 0.423   
(0.015*) (0.046*) (0.048*) (0.005**) (0.069) (0.011*) (0.005**) (0.010*) (0.008**)   
Source: Author 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
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Figure 7. 7 Total effects of variables 
 
Source: Author  
Note: straight lines: significant impact, dotted lines: insignificant impact 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
 
Table 7. 15 shows the result of the total impact hypotheses for this study. The hypotheses 
for all the variables in the Antecedents, SCSO, and PP were included. Since this study 
adopts the first order analysis only, there are thirty hypotheses, and they are tested based 
on the analysis of the data. First of all, from the variables in the Antecedents, the impact 
of Financial Resource was shown to be very strong in all the variables in the construct 
(from H17-1 to H17-8). They all showed statistical significance which is the contribution 
of this study based on the interviews that no other studies have identified. It can be 
inferred that based on the Financial Resources and investment, the security orientation 
can be strengthened, and this leads to a better performance in Efficiency and 
Effectiveness. Also, the impact of SCSI showed significant results on SC (H18-5), SDCT 
(p-value: 0.082, H18-4), and EFC (H18-7). This indicates that global security related 
initiatives have a positive impact on the Security Culture in the organization which leads 
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to the better performance of Effectiveness. However, the RPSV showed no significant 
positive impacts in all the variables in the construct. Based on the study of Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008), this study adopted the Supply Chain Security Orientation framework, 
modified by adding and dropping variables through interviews, and tested the model. It 
was confirmed that the RPSV variable had no impact on the model except EFC (H16-7). 
Also, in the SCSO, all the variables showed significant results. SPP had a positive impact 
on EFF (H19-2) and EFC (H19-1). SRP also had a positive impact on EFF (H20-2) and 
EFC (H20-1). OA (H21-1, H21-2), SDCT (H22-1, H22-2), and SE (H24-1, H24-2) 
showed positive results. The variables SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT were tested based on the 
research by Autry and Bobbitt (2008), and it was confirmed that they are positively 
related. Also, based on the interview in this study, the relationship between SC, SE and PP 
was confirmed. SC showed positive significant results only on EFC (H23-1), and SE 
showed a significant positive relationship with the PP (H24-1, H24-2). 
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Table 7. 15 The results of the hypotheses tests (total impact) 
Hypotheses 
Standardized 
regression weight 
(p-value) 
Paths Result 
H16-1. RPSV has a positive impact on SPP 0.043(0.561) RPSV → SPP Rejected 
H16-2. RPSV has a positive impact on SRP 0.005(0.981) RPSV → SRP Rejected 
H16-3. RPSV has a positive impact on OA 0.016(0.849) RPSV → OA Rejected 
H16-4. RPSV has a positive impact on SDCT 0.089(0.344) RPSV→SDCT Rejected 
H16-5. RPSV has a positive impact on SC 0.068(0.451) RPSV → SC Rejected 
H16-6. RPSV has a positive impact on SE 0.113(0.292) RPSV → SE Rejected 
H16-7. RPSV has a positive impact on EFC -0.117(0.048*) RPSV → EFC Rejected 
H16-8. RPSV has a positive impact on EFF 0.044(0.556) RPSV → EFF Rejected 
H17-1. FR has a positive impact on SPP 0.741(0.008**) FR → SPP Supported 
H17-2. FR has a positive impact on SRP 0.808(0.008**) FR → SRP Supported 
H17-3. FR has a positive impact on OA 0.872(0.007**) FR → OA Supported 
H17-4. FR has a positive impact on SDCT 0.665(0.020*) FR → SDCT Supported 
H17-5. FR has a positive impact on SC 0.657(0.013*) FR → SC Supported 
H17-6. FR has a positive impact on SE 0.827(0.019*) FR → SE Supported 
H17-7. FR has a positive impact on EFC 0.326(0.046*) FR → EFC Supported 
H17-8. FR has a positive impact on EFF 0.395(0.009**) FR → EFF Supported 
H18-1. SCSI has a positive impact on SPP 0.088(0.490) SCSI → SPP Rejected 
H18-2. SCSI has a positive impact on SRP 0.164(0.275) SCSI → SRP Rejected 
H18-3. SCSI has a positive impact on OA 0.053(0.731) SCSI → OA Rejected 
H18-4. SCSI has a positive impact on SDCT 0.149(0.082) SCSI → SDCT Partially supported 
H18-5. SCSI has a positive impact on SC 0.265(0.026*) SCSI → SC Supported 
H18-6. SCSI has a positive impact on SE -0.002(0.984) SCSI → SE Rejected 
H18-7. SCSI has a positive impact on EFC 0.296(0.015*) SCSI → EFC Supported 
H18-8. SCSI has a positive impact on EFF 0.115(0.259) SCSI → EFF Rejected 
H19-1. SPP has a positive impact on EFC 0.423(0.008**) SPP → EFC Supported 
H19-2. SPP has a positive impact on EFF 0.194(0.082) SPP → EFF Partially supported 
H20-1. SRP has a positive impact on EFC 1.064(0.010*) SRP → EFC Supported 
H20-2. SRP has a positive impact on EFF 0.529(0.050*) SRP → EFF Supported 
H21-1. OA has a positive impact on EFC 0.867(0.005**) OA → EFC Supported 
H21-2. OA has a positive impact on EFF 0.73(0.003**) OA → EFF Supported 
H22-1. SDCT has a positive impact on EFC 0.561(0.011*) SDCT → EFC Supported 
H22-2. SDCT has a positive impact on EFF 0.635(0.009**) SDCT → EFF Supported 
H23-1. SC has a positive impact on EFC 0.286(0.069) SC → EFC Partially supported 
H23-2. SC has a positive impact on EFF 0.085(0.445) SC → EFF Rejected 
H24-1. SE has a positive impact on EFC 0.498(0.005**) SE → EFC Supported 
H24-2. SE has a positive impact on EFF 0.339(0.028*) SE → EFF Supported 
Source: Author  
Note: supported values: p-value<0.05, rejected value: p-value>0.10 partially supported 
values: 0.05<p-value<0.10 
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7. 3. 4 Implication from the direct, indirect, and total impact analysis 
Firstly, the most important and novel discovery of this study is that FR has a positive 
impact on PP through all the variables in the SCSO although it has negative direct impact 
on EFF and EFC. The port managers are advised to invest their financial resources and 
availability very wisely on SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC and SE which will eventually lead 
to a higher level of EFC and EFF. This discovery has proved the fact that investment on 
security issues around ports is worthwhile in terms of EFC and EFF of ports if it is well 
invested through SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE. SC variable only has a positive 
partial impact on EFC and has no significant impact on EFF. Although other variables in 
the Antecedents construct such as SCSI has a positive impact on EFC, the impact of FR is 
dominant in every single variable in the entire research model. Since this study found that 
financial investment on security is beneficial, it will be vital for ports to have more 
budget for security based on variables suggested in this study: SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, 
and SE.  
 
Secondly, the impact of SCSI variable was confirmed. Although the respondents highly 
agreed to the questions of the SCSI, the impact of the variable was quite limited 
compared to FR except the link: SCSI→SRP and SDCT (partially significant), and SCSI
→SC (significant) in direct impact. In total impact, the impact of SCSI on EFC became 
statistically significant, but the impact of SC to EFC turned out to be partially significant. 
The impact of SCSI on SRP became insignificant. Port managers are advised to develop 
SCSI to build better partnership building, communication technology with other members 
in the supply chain, and security focused culture. SRP, SDCT, and SC all have positive 
impacts on EFC, it is necessary to implement SCSI as a tool to develop ports to be more 
security oriented organization. On the other hand, RPSV initially had positive impact on 
SPP and SDCT in direct impact, but in total impact, it was insignificant in all variables. It 
had even negative total impact on EFC. Although it had positive impact on two variables, 
if it is insignificant in all the variables, it is fair to say that port managers can ignore the 
RPSV variable. They are advised to focus more on FR and SCSI to upgrade the level of 
SCSO and PP.  
  
Thirdly, all the variables in the SCSO construct: SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE 
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showed significant results on EFC and EFF. SC only showed insignificant impact on EFF 
both in direct and total impact analysis. When security related culture is widespread in the 
organization, port managers are advised to think about upgrading the level of EFF at the 
same time because it is the only variable that does not have a significant impact. It is 
interesting to see that all the variables are affecting EFC and EFF with significant 
statistical result. This proves the findings from previous studies (Autry and Bobbitt; KMI 
2009; KITA 2008) and semi-structured interviews. Port managers are advised to operate 
their logistics activities vigorously in security related planning, partnerships, 
organizational resilience, communication technology, security focused culture, and 
education. The variables suggested in this study are highly valuable and reliable for 
practitioners because of the large sample size (427 respondents) and they are found to be 
critical in generating a higher level of EFC and EFF. 
 
7. 4 Multi-group analysis 
This section of the chapter presents the multi-group analysis which was shown to be a 
necessary procedure from previous studies (KMI 2008) and the process of the analysis in 
this study. The descriptive statistics is briefly introduced with the introduction to the ports 
and port user groups for this study. Then, the measurement invariance is explained 
between the port group (port A and B) and port user group (forwarding companies, 
shipping companies, warehousing companies, etc.). Since the SEM analysis generally has 
to meet 200 or more for each sample (Reinartz et al. 2009; Schumacher and Lomax 2004), 
the port group is composed of two groups combining 102 and 99 respondents each (201 
in total), and the port user group is composed of port users in the supply chain combining 
117 and 109 respondents (226 in total) each.  
 
7. 4. 1 Descriptive statistics of two groups 
Considering the difficulty of collecting a large number of responses from the security 
department of each port and the supply chain, two ports are combined as the port group 
which represents Korean port security and so the port users of two groups are categorized 
and integrated as one port user group. This represents the Korean port users of the port 
group (Table 7. 16). As indicated in previous studies, ports are affected by the maritime 
security initiatives (ISPS code, CSI) while supply chain members are affected by supply 
chain security initiatives (AEO, ISO28000). However, ports and the security program 
certified companies that are using these ports should be analyzed as a whole and as a 
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separate group respectively (KMI 2008) because maritime security and supply chain 
security have different characteristics and features (KMI 2008). Thus, the multi group 
analysis for this study has been designed. Each group has 200 or more respondents which 
made it possible to check and explore the different levels of perceptions of the variables 
of these two groups using SEM.  
 
Table 7. 16 Basic characteristics of two groups 
Category Port A Port B In total 
Responses 102 99 201 
Main 
cargoes 
Hub container port  
(14,194 TEU in 2010) 
Bulk cargo port 
(1,903 TEU in 2010) 
Both biggest trading 
ports 
Security 
programs 
ISPS code, CSI ISPS code 
Both ports have 
security devoted 
subsidiary firms 
Category Port users of Port A Port users of Port B In total 
Responses 117 109 226 
Main role 
Trade, land transport, 
warehousing, forwarding, 
shipping companies, etc. 
Trade, land transport, 
warehousing, forwarding, 
shipping companies, etc. 
Security certified 
firms of Port users A 
and B 
Security 
programs 
AEO and ISO28000 AEO and ISO28000 
Both AEO and 
ISO28000 certified 
firms 
Source: Author 
 
As is explained in detail in Chapter 6, port A and B are the biggest trading ports in Korea 
that are implementing the ISPS code and CSI programs. They accounted for 73.2% and 
9.8% of container cargo in 2010. Only these two ports have security dedicated subsidiary 
companies that are also included in the respondents of the questionnaire survey for this 
study. On the other hand, the port user groups are composed of various companies 
including trading, land transport, manufacturing, warehouse management, forwarding, 
and maritime transport. In total, port users comprise 117 companies for port A, and 109 
for port B.  
 
The basic descriptive statistics are shown in the Table 7. 17 below. The average mean 
values, average standard deviation, average skewness, and average kurtosis in all the 
variables are shown. Instead of showing all the values of the variables of two groups, the 
researcher briefly introduced the average values because the focus of this Chapter is to 
present the differences of the perception of the variables in multi-group analysis. The gap 
between the average values in the variables of two groups was the biggest (0.195) in the 
SPP variable and the gap of the standard deviation was the biggest in the SDCT variable 
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(0.106). The gap of skewness was the biggest (0.4332) in the variable OA, and kurtosis 
was the biggest (0.66288) in the variable EFC. It is not necessarily true that these basic 
descriptive statistics will lead to statistical differences in multi-group analysis, but it is the 
first sign of showing the difference between these two groups. Specifically, there were 
some differences in mean and standard deviation values in the two groups. The gap 
between the mean values was the biggest in the variable SDCT1, which was 3.44 in the 
port group and 3.75 in the port user group. The gap between the standard deviation was 
the biggest in SRP4, which was 0.97 in the port group and 0.8 in the port user group. The 
in-depth analysis of the differences and its statistical significance are analyzed in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
Table 7. 17 Average descriptive values of variables in two groups 
Category 
Port group Port user group 
Average SD Skewness Kurtosis Average SD Skewness Kurtosis 
RPSV 3.58 0.985 -0.58667 0.064667 3.593333 0.988333 -0.48667 -0.10483 
FR 3.4625 0.9725 -0.243 0.645 3.3975 0.8875 -0.21875 0.02525 
SCSI 3.941667 0.908333 -0.82383 0.6045 3.923333 0.846667 -0.48917 -0.03367 
SPP 3.691667 0.855 -0.4295 0.138333 3.496667 0.825 -0.25867 0.063833 
SRP 3.542 0.89 -0.4158 0.218 3.39 0.864 -0.1644 -0.1156 
OA 3.664 0.902 -0.6376 0.5844 3.57 0.814 -0.2044 0.0168 
SDCT 3.546 0.976 -0.3628 -0.1254 3.668 0.87 -0.222 -0.3332 
SC 3.6975 0.9125 -0.54725 0.16725 3.655 0.855 -0.10625 -0.4645 
SE 3.608 0.884 -0.4344 0.172 3.538 0.868 -0.0808 -0.4718 
EFC 3.63375 0.83125 -0.19075 -0.166 3.60875 0.85375 -0.44613 0.496875 
EFF 3.521429 0.9 -0.16429 -0.124 3.612857 0.838571 -0.25386 -0.034 
Source: Author 
 
As was introduced briefly in Chapter 6, the ANOVA results of the mean values showed 
very highly significant statistical differences in the research model. The summary of the 
ANOVA results of variables is shown in Table 7. 18. In the Antecedents construct, the F 
statistics was 8.997***, the SCSO was 6.772***, and PP was 10.384***. The p-value 
was all less than 0.001 which is the indication of significant differences in the two groups. 
Thus, the actual multi-group analysis will begin from now on. The process of the analysis 
will follow that which has been suggested by many researchers (Byrne 2001; Hair et al. 
2010; Koufteros and Marcoulides 2006) and which has two important stages: compare the 
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measurement invariance and structural invariance among the models with different levels 
of constraints. The models are compared with levels of constraints and are shown below. 
The model fit was shown as adequate in the earlier sections of this chapter as the whole 
group, and each group of the discussion here (port group and port user group) both meet 
the adequate model fit of the SEM. Since the focus of the multi-group analysis is to 
measure the different perceptions of variables between the two groups, this section aims 
to explain the basic requirements of the multi-group analysis which is basically composed 
of two stages: measurement invariance among two groups and invariance of structural 
models. The analysis is suggested by Arbuckle (2007) that after the invariance of the 
measurement process is obtained, the difference of the structural models is analyzed. 
Then, the different parameters of variables and their statistical difference are explained.  
 
Table 7. 18 The summary of the ANOVA results of variables 
Antecedents SCSO PP 
Items F p-value Items F p-value Items F p-value Items F p-value 
Mean 8.997*** 0.000 Mean 6.772*** 0.000    Mean 10.384*** 0.000 
RPSV1 1.51 0.199 SPP1 4.068** 0.003 SDCT1 7.167*** 0 EFC1 2.22 0.052 
RPSV2 2.430* 0.047 SPP2 0.38 0.823 SDCT2 1.434 0.212 EFC2 0.087 0.986 
RPSV3 0.424 0.791 SPP3 0.326 0.861 SDCT3 0.833 0.505 EFC3 4.554** 0.001 
RPSV4 0.33 0.858 SPP4 0.914 0.456 SDCT4 4.253** 0.002 EFC4 2.064 0.085 
RPSV5 2.839* 0.024 SPP5 2.1 0.081 SDCT5 1.825 0.124 EFC5 0.976 0.42 
RPSV6 0.953 0.433 SPP6 1.276 0.279 SC1 2.067 0.085 EFC6 1.297 0.271 
FR1 0.159 0.959 SRP1 1.462 0.214 SC2 1.096 0.359 EFC7 2.045 0.088 
FR2 1.792 0.13 SRP2 1.585 0.178 SC3 0.825 0.51 EFC8 0.829 0.507 
FR3 0.179 0.949 SRP3 0.643 0.632 SC4 1.679 0.155 EFF1 1.061 0.376 
FR4 1.402 0.233 SRP4 2.295 0.059 SE1 2.668* 0.032 EFF2 2.480* 0.032 
SCSI1 0.811 0.519 SRP5 1.053 0.38 SE2 3.752* 0.011 EFF3 2.485* 0.043 
SCSI2 1.075 0.369 OA1 1.206 0.308 SE3 0.404 0.806 EFF4 1.311 0.265 
SCSI3 0.244 0.913 OA2 0.791 0.5 SE4 0.569 0.686 EFF5 2.039 0.088 
SCSI4 0.343 0.849 OA3 1.716 0.146 SE5 1.526 0.194 EFF6 1.835 0.121 
SCSI5 2.264 0.062 OA4 0.974 0.422    EFF7 0.634 0.639 
SCSI6 1.558 0.185 OA5 0.876 0.478       
Source: Author 
 
As can be seen from the Table 7. 19, the constraints are becoming tougher at each stage 
from model 1 to model 8. Model 1 has no constraints on the analysis among the groups. 
The factor loadings are equal on both groups in model 2. Models 3 and 5 are imposing 
constraints on measurement intercepts and factor means among groups, which are 
suggested to be unnecessary and can be omitted because of the model becoming more 
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complicated (Arbuckle 2005). Then, models 6 and 7 are tougher on the constraints by 
making factor invariances, covariances, and structural residuals equal among groups. The 
last model, 8 is the toughest criteria to meet because all the parameters are equal among 
the groups. In summary, the measurement invariance is the process of comparing the 
models with different levels of constraints and if the measurement weights (Model 2) and 
the unconstrained (model 1) has no statistical difference, the measurement of invariance 
is obtained. For the analysis, the researcher expects no statistical difference in the 
measurement invariance among the models. 
 
Table 7. 19 Invariance measurement models with different levels of constraints 
Model Constraints 
1. Unconstraint No constraints 
2. Measurement weights Among all of the above, Factor loadings are equal 
3. Measurement intercepts Among all of the above, measurement intercepts are equal among groups 
4. Structural weights Among all of the above, regression weights are equal among groups 
5. Structural means Among all of the above, factor means are equal among groups 
6. Structural co-variances Among all of the above, factor variances and co-variances are equal  
among groups 
7. Structural residuals Among all of the above, structural residuals are equal among groups 
8. Measurement residuals Among all of the above, all parameters are equal among groups 
Source: Adapted from Arbuckle 2005 
 
7. 4. 2 Empirical analysis of two groups 
The measurement invariance is shown in Table 7. 20. In order to compare and contrast the 
multiple groups, it is necessary to confirm the fact that there is no statistical significance 
between the constrained model and unconstrained model. Between the two groups, it is 
shown that there is no statistical significance between model 1 and model 2 (p-value: 
0.09). Also, /DF was 2.151 and the difference in the Degree of Freedom was 27, which 
represents the 27 factor loadings which were constrained to be the same between two 
groups. Although there were statistical significances in the measurement invariance of 
model 6 and model 8, the discussion continues because they are highly constrained 
models and if the first criteria of comparing the model 1 and model 2 are satisfied, the 
structural invariance is considered to be satisfied and analysis moves on to the next step. 
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Table 7. 20 Measurement invariance 
Model  DF /DF  p-value 
M1: Unconstrained 2645.015 1220 2.168 - - 
M2: Measurement weights 2682.279 1247 2.151 37.264 .09 
M6: Structural co-variances 2822.52 1313 2.15 177.505 <.001 
M8: Measurement residuals 2935.498 1351 2.173 290.483 <.001 
Source: Author 
 
In contrast to the measurement invariance, the researcher expects that there are significant 
statistical differences in structural model invariance. It was tested from different models 
with increasing constraints from models 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8. In all the models from model 
1 to model 8, all the differences between the two groups are all highly significant (< .01) 
in Table 7. 21. This means there are significance differences in the variables between the 
two groups.  
 
Table 7. 21 Multi-group measurement invariance 
Model  DF /DF  p-value 
M1: Unconstrained 1464.642 730 2.006 - - 
M2: Measurement weights 1501.383 749 2.005 36.741 .009 
M4: Structural weights 1568.744 785 1.998 104.102 <.0001 
M6: Structural covariances 1577.876 791 1.995 113.234 <.0001 
M7: Structural residuals 1626 799 2.035 161.358 <.0001 
M8: Measurement residuals 1671.573 830 2.014 206.931 <.0001 
Source: Author 
 
In order to explore the specific differences in parameters, the comparison of port group 
and port users is shown in Table 7. 22. According to the table, the parameters that showed 
statistical significance between the two groups are presented. All the parameters are 
shown in Appendix C. The Diff column is the CR (Critical Ratio) of the difference in 
parameters, and it is generally judged that there is a significant difference if the CR values 
are bigger or smaller than 1.965 (Arbuckle 2007). According to this standard, there are 12 
different paths in the parameters. The relationship between SCSI → OA showed a 
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different statistical significance. The port group showed the statistical outcome (p-value: 
0.047), and the port user group showed no significant result (p-value: 0.349). This means 
the port group thinks SCSI is more important in affecting OA than the port user group. 
Also, the port group showed a statistical significance in the relationship between RPSV 
→ SE (p-value: 0.024), and the port user group showed no statistical difference (p-value: 
0.997). This means the port group thinks RPSV is more important in affecting SE than the 
port users. The relationship between FR → EFC both showed a statistical significance. 
However, the port group showed a positive relationship, and the port user group showed a 
negative relationship. This means the port group is positive in the relationship between 
FR and EFC, and port users think they are in a negative relationship. The relationship 
between SRP → EFC also showed a statistical significance in both groups. However, the 
port group showed more significant results (p-value: 0.012) than the port users (p-value: 
0.017). This means the port group thinks SRP is more important to the EFC than the port 
users do. The relationship between SDCT and EFC showed marginal negative statistical 
significance in the port group (p-value: 0.065), and a positive relationship in port users 
(p-value<0.0001). This means the port group thinks SDCT is almost negative in affecting 
EFC, and port users are very positive in the same relationship. The relationship between 
SE and EFC showed the opposite results. Port users showed a significant positive 
relationship between the two variables, and the port group showed no statistical 
significance. This means port users think SE is more important to the EFC than the port 
group does. The relationship between SPP and EFC showed statistical differences. Port 
users showed positive statistical significance and the port group showed no statistical 
significance. It means that port users think SPP is more important in affecting EFC. The 
variables SPP and SE are more important in measuring the EFC to the port users than the 
port group. The relationship between OA and EFC also showed opposite statistical 
significance. The port group showed negative significance and port users showed a 
positive statistical result. This means the port group is negative in measuring the effect of 
OA on EFC, and port users are totally opposite in perceiving the relationship of the two. 
The relationship between FR and EFF showed statistical negative results in the port users 
group, and no statistical significance in the port group. This means that port users think 
FR is negative in affecting the EFF. The relationship between SRP and EFF showed 
statistical significance. The port users group showed a positive statistical relationship, and 
the port group showed no statistical significance. This means port users think the SRP is 
more important to EFF than the port group. The relationship between SE and EFF also 
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showed a statistical significance. Ports users showed a marginal positive statistical 
significance (p-value:0.078), and the port group showed no significant result. This means 
that the port users think SE is more important to EFF than the port group. Finally, the 
relationship between SPP and EFF showed statistical results. The port group showed 
negative statistical significance, and port users showed a positive relationship between the 
two. 
 
Table 7. 22 Comparison of significant parameters between port group and port user group 
Category Port group Diff Port user group 
Path Coef Std.coef S.E. C.R. p-value CR Coef Std.coef S.E. C.R. p-value 
SCSI→OA 0.263 0.25 0.132 1.987 0.047 -2.207 -0.147 -0.134 0.157 -0.937 0.349 
RPSV→SE 0.273 0.288 0.121 2.263 0.024 -2.161 0 0 0.09 -0.004 0.997 
FR→EFC 1.604 1.325 0.52 3.088 0.002 -8.216 -2.939 -2.756 0.476 -6.172 *** 
SRP→EFC 1.355 1.329 0.539 2.515 0.012 2.481 0.626 0.738 0.262 2.389 0.017 
SDCT→EFC -0.257 -0.315 0.139 -1.846 0.065 4.359 0.492 0.565 0.112 4.382 *** 
SE→EFC -0.157 -0.189 0.127 -1.236 0.217 3.533 0.769 0.905 0.238 3.224 0.001 
SPP→EFC -0.196 -0.233 0.121 -1.613 0.107 3.662 0.455 0.513 0.136 3.339 *** 
OA→EFC -1.083 -1.351 0.357 -3.029 0.002 4.31 0.773 0.864 0.237 3.268 0.001 
FR→EFF -17.435 -10.648 57.869 -0.301 0.763 -6.794 -2.099 -1.645 0.438 -4.792 *** 
SRP→EFF 21.02 15.248 54.849 0.383 0.702 3.649 0.935 0.921 0.301 3.101 0.002 
SE→EFF -0.392 -0.348 0.252 -1.552 0.121 2.099 0.399 0.392 0.226 1.762 0.078 
SPP→EFF -0.63 -0.553 0.26 -2.423 0.015 3.138 0.321 0.303 0.142 2.256 0.024 
Source: Author  
Note: statistically significant if the CR value is bigger than +1.965 or smaller than -1.965 
 
The summary of the differences are shown in Table 7. 23 below. As can be seen the table, 
there are many different levels of perception in many causal relationships between the 
variables. The port group perceived more statistically significant relationships than the 
port user group in the relationships between: SCSI→OA, RPSV→SE, SPP→EFF, and 
SRP→EFC. All the relationships in the port group were statistically significant and the 
standard coefficients were positive except the SPP→EFF. The port group negatively 
perceived its relationship while the port user group positively perceived the relationship. 
The port user group perceived the following relationships to be more statistically 
significant: SDCT→EFC, SE→EFC, SPP→EFC, OA→EFC, FR→EFF, SRP→EFF, 
SE→EFF, and FR→EFC. In particular, the port user group showed a positively significant 
perception in OA→EFC while the port group was shown to be negatively significant. The 
port user group showed a positive perception in all the relationships except FR→EFF and 
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FR→EFC. The port user group showed a highly and negatively significant relationship in 
FR→EFC while the port group showed it to be positively significant. The port user group 
also showed negative significance in the FR→EFF relationship while the port group 
perceived it to be not significant.  
 
Table 7. 23 Summary of the different perceptions in two groups 
Category 
Port group Differences Port user group 
Std. coef p-value C.R. Result Std. coef p-value 
SCSI→OA 0.25 0.047 -2.207 P(+)*, PU(-) -0.134 0.349 
RPSV→SE 0.288 0.024 -2.161 P(+)*, PU(+) 0 0.997 
SPP→EFF -0.553 0.015 3.138 P(-)*, PU(+)* 0.303 0.024 
SRP→EFC 1.329 0.012 2.481 P(+)*, PU(+)* 0.738 0.017 
SDCT→EFC -0.315 0.065 4.359 PU(+)***, P(-) 0.565 *** 
SE→EFC -0.189 0.217 3.533 PU(+)**, P(-) 0.905 0.001 
SPP→EFC -0.233 0.107 3.662 PU(+)***, P(-) 0.513 *** 
OA→EFC -1.351 0.002 4.31 PU(+)**, P(-)** 0.864 0.001 
FR→EFF -10.648 0.763 -6.794 PU(-)***, P(-) -1.645 *** 
SRP→EFF 15.248 0.702 3.649 PU(+)**, P(+) 0.921 0.002 
SE→EFF -0.348 0.121 2.099 PU(+)*, P(-) 0.392 0.078 
FR→EFC 1.325 0.002 -8.216 PU(-)***, P(+)** -2.756 *** 
Source: Author (*: p-value<0.05, **: p-value<0.01, ***: p-value<0.001) 
Note: In the Result column, P: port group, PU: port user group, (+): positive relationship, 
(-): negative relationship. 
 
The findings of the multi-group analysis are as follows: 
1. The entire group combining the port group and the port user group mostly showed a 
positive relationship in most of the analysis. However, there are many perceptions that 
showed the negative impacts of relationships. The port group showed negative perception 
of the SPP→EFF relationship while the port user group showed positive perceptions. 
OA→EFC and FR→EFC also showed different directions of statistical significance 
between two groups. This shows that in particular variables and factors, there are different 
perceptions according to the type of groups and their characteristics. 
 
2. The variable FR also showed negative impacts which was similarly shown in the 
analysis of the direct impacts of the combined group. The port user groups perceived 
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FR→EFC to be negative while the port group perceived it to be positive. The two groups 
showed a negative perception of FR→EFF although statistical results of the port group 
were not significant. This also proves the point that the variable FR has a direct negative 
impact on both EFC and EFF in the multi-group analysis except for the relationship 
between FR→EFC of the port group. The total group showed that the direct impacts of the 
variable FR were negative, and multi group analysis also showed mostly strong negative 
perceptions. 
 
3. It is fair to say that the port group perceived the following relationships more positively 
important in: SCSI→OA, RPSV→SE, SRP→EFC, FR→EFC. The port user group 
perceived the following relationships positively more important in: SPP→EFF, 
SDCT→EFC, SE→EFC, SPP→EFC, OA→EFC, SRP→EFF, and SE→EFF. This means 
that the port group perceived more important variables in the Antecedents while the port 
user group perceived the variables to be positively more important in the SCSO construct.  
4. The only variable which was shown to be equally important for both groups in a 
positive direction was SRP→EFC. This means that both groups perceived the security 
related partnership to be equally important for the effectiveness of ports. The rest showed 
either a different direction with both statistical significance or only one group with 
statistical significance.  
 
The illustration of causal relationships of two groups is shown in the Figure 7. 8 and 7. 9. 
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Figure 7. 8 Causal relationship of the port group  
 
Source: Author (straight lines: significant impact, dotted lines: insignificant impact)  
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
 
Figure 7. 9 Causal relationship of port users  
 
Source: Author (straight lines: significant impact, dotted lines: insignificant impact) 
Note: ***: p-value<0.001, **: p-value<0.01, *: p-value<0.05 
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It is shown that there are many differences in the perceptions of variables in the research 
model. Most variables showed positive relationships when the two groups are combined. 
However, for each group individually, there are many differences between them. It is 
interesting to find that there are many negative relationships between the causal 
relationships of variables. The port user group showed negative results in the relationship 
between FR → EFC, and FR → EFF. Port group showed negative results only in SPP → 
EFF and OA → EFC. It is fair to say that each group has a different and sometimes, 
negative perception of the causal relationship of the variables in the research model.  
 
7. 5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the main part of the quantitative analysis for this thesis. The 
missing data were small in number and they were replaced by the estimation methods in 
the SPSS program. The skewness was less than 3 and kurtosis was less than 10 which is 
the indication of having no problems in continuing the analysis with the data. After that, 
the CFA (Confirmatory Factor Analysis) was conducted to check whether the data was 
eligible for the SEM. The model showed that there was no problem with the validity and 
reliability in the CFA, and the Antecedents, SCSO, and PP constructs showed a good 
model fit. Furthermore, the measurement items were rearranged and reduced to increase 
the Overall Goodness of Fit. Then, the causal relationships were tested with a three step 
process.  
 
First, the direct impact was analyzed. In this stage, RPSV had low causal relationships 
with all the variables in the entire construct except SPP. FR had positive impacts on all 
the variables in the SCSO except SPP, and it is unique to find that FR had negative 
impacts on EFC and EFF in the PP construct. SCSI showed significant impacts on SC and 
SRP. Also, all the variables in the SCSO had positive impacts on EFC, and SDCT and OA 
only had a positive impact on EFF. SE had positive impacts on both EFC and EFF. The 
SMC (Squared Multiple Correlation) of the variables in the entire construct proved a high 
degree of predictability between variables.  
 
Second, the indirect impact was analyzed between the Antecedents and PP through SCSO. 
This time FR only showed positive significant impacts on EFF and EFC which was 
significantly negative in direct impacts on the same variables. All the indirect paths 
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starting from FR to PP via SCSO construct except SPP and SC showed significant results. 
This means that FR is indirectly supporting SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE to have positive 
impacts on EFC and EFF. This result requires the total impact analysis because FR had 
negative direct impacts on EFC and EFF, and positive indirect impacts on the same 
variables. The total impact analysis can identify which impact outweighs the other. RPSV 
and SCSI showed no significant results.  
 
Third, the total impact showed that FR had a positive impact on all the variables in the 
construct. This particularly means that the sum of direct and indirect impacts was positive. 
It showed that indirect positive impacts that FR had on EFC and EFF through variables in 
the SCSO construct outweigh the direct negative impacts that FR had on the same 
variables. The statistical findings suggest that out of all the relationships, the impact of 
FR was widespread and very strong in all the variables in the construct. It is fair to say 
that the Financial Resources for security improvements on SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE 
lead to better EFC and EFF. Moreover, RPSV had a positive impact only on EFC, and 
SCSI had a positive impact on SC, SDCT, and EFC. SRP, OA, SDCT, and SE showed 
significant positive impacts on both EFC and EFC. Furthermore, SPP showed significant 
impact on EFC, and partially significant impact on EFF. SC showed a partially positive 
impact on EFC only. It was found that all the variables in the SCSO construct showed 
either partially significant or significant positive impacts on EFC and EFF except 
SC→EFF.  
 
Since there were significant differences identified in two groups which was clearly 
presented in Chapter 6 (Table 6. 19, 6. 21, and 6. 23), multi-group analysis was conducted. 
The analysis aimed at identifying the different levels of perceptions between two groups. 
The entire data set was divided into port group and port user group. Each group had two 
hundred or more respondents for the questionnaire which made possible to see the levels 
of perceptions in every causal relationship in the construct. It was found that there are 
many different levels of perceptions in multiple relationships between the variables. The 
port group perceived statistically more significant than port user group in the 
relationships between: SCSI→OA, RPSV→SE, SPP→EFF, and SRP→EFC. The port 
user group perceived the following relationships to be more statistically significant than 
port group: SDCT→EFC, SE→EFC, SPP→EFC, OA→EFC, FR→EFF, SRP→EFF, 
SE→EFF, and FR→EFC. Especially, the SPP→EFF and OA→EFC relationships showed 
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positive significant results from port user group while port group showed negative 
significant outcome. Also, FR→EFC showed positive significant perceptions in port 
group while port user group showed negative significant result.  
 
The findings of the empirical analysis in this chapter were considered as a critical step in 
understanding the SCSO as a confirmatory and quantitative research which tests and 
analyzes the conceptualized ideas and concepts with rigorous hypotheses and robust 
analysis methods. It is important to note that as an antecedent factor, Financial Resources 
(FR) is the most significant factor in being supply chain security oriented. The 
significance of indirect impacts that FR had exceeds the direct impacts which lead to 
better Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports. SCSI and RPSV showed only three positive 
relationships in the entire construct which means they are not significant antecedent 
factors for being supply chain security oriented. Most variables in the SCSO construct 
showed positive impact on EFC and EFF which confirms and validates the findings from 
previous research. The next chapter covers the discussion of these statistical findings, 
implications, contributions, limitations, and direction for future research.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
8. 1 Introduction  
The main purpose of this study is to explore the impact of Supply Chain Security 
Orientation on Port Performance. In order to achieve that goal, it was essential to build up 
the research model with suitable variables, draw causal relationships, hypothesize them, 
and examine them using statistical analysis. These tasks were accomplished through the 
literature review (Chapter 3), qualitative methods using semi-structured interviews 
(Chapter 5), and quantitative analysis using SEM (Chapter 7). The purpose of the 
interviews was to develop a research model that can be best applied to the research topic 
of this thesis by identifying the best variables and causal relationships. Many people took 
part in the interviews, and the best research model was proposed after going through a 
series of qualitative exploration (Chapter 5). The empirical examination using the 
questionnaire surveys was conducted using SEM. Chapter 6 presented the descriptive 
information of the participants, and Chapter 7 empirically examined the causal 
relationships with a multi-group analysis.  
 
8. 2 Research findings and implications 
The research questions suggested in Chapter 1 were:  
-Research question 1. What are the main components and dimensions of the Supply Chain 
Security Orientation framework in relation to particular supply chains in Korean ports? 
-Research question 2. What are the impacts of the Supply Chain Security Orientation on 
port performance?  
-Research question 3. What are the differences in perceptions of Supply Chain Security 
Orientation on port group and port user group? 
 
Research question 1 pertains to how well Supply Chain Security Orientation is 
conceptualized and operationalized. Chapters 3 and 5 explored the development of the 
construct through literature review and interviews. The questions that delineate the 
current situation of supply chain security in Korea can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. The growth of terrorism and threats in the supply chain in the 2000s 
2. The development of compulsory maritime security initiatives such as ISPS code and 
CSI  
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3. Adoption of voluntary supply chain security initiatives such as AEO and ISO28000 by 
Korean companies in order to secure the cargo and facilitate the trade at the same time  
4. Strategies for maintaining the balance between higher level of security and efficiency 
 
Before conducting the questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
from February to June 2011 in the United Kingdom, Thailand, and Republic of Korea. 
The primary aim of the interviews was to identify the components of the SCSO 
qualitatively by reflecting the experts’ ideas and perceptions in the context of Korea. 
Every participant in the interviews agreed that ports in Korea are security oriented 
because of the security regulations such as ISPS code and global trend towards higher 
level of security. Also, it was confirmed from the interviews that security of ports should 
be analyzed from supply chain perspective, not as a single entity. This has been pointed 
out in recent literature that port security should be analyzed from supply chain 
perspective because of involvement of different organizations in the supply chain (Brooks 
and Pelot 2008; Bichou 2004; KMI 2008). The interviewees showed positive answers in 
the SCSO as a critical strategy for ports in the era of terrorism, but showed doubt and 
concerns about adopting the variables and the construct as it is because the initial 
framework reflects limited realities of Korean ports and supply chains. Moreover, it was 
mentioned that the analysis of perceptions should be conducted separately between port 
group and port user group which was also pointed by KMI (2008). Hence, this study 
adopted the initial framework from previous literature, and applied many experts’ 
opinions and ideas to modify it to overcome the limited number of respondents the 
original framework had, and reflect the reality of particular features of Korean ports and 
maritime supply chains. Through the interviews, a few variables were adopted and 
dropped in the Antecedents, Potential SCSO Moderators, and SCSO construct. Also, PP 
was operationalized by identifying two main variables: external Effectiveness and internal 
Efficiency. Then, the complete model went through statistical reliability and validity tests 
using CFA in Chapter 7. Research question 2 relates to an empirical examination of the 
hypotheses in this study which is summarized as questions Q1, Q2a, Q2b, and Q3:  
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Q1: Variables in the Antecedents have positive individual direct impacts on variables in 
the SCSO  
Q2a: Variables in the SCSO have positive individual impacts on variables in the PP  
Q2b: Variables in the Antecedents have positive individual impacts on PP through SCSO 
Q3: Variables in the Antecedents and SCSO have positive individual total impacts on 
variables in the PP  
 
Questions Q1, Q2a, Q2b, and Q3 each stand for research question 2. Also, Q4 relates to 
research question 3 that involves the multi-group analysis explained at the end of Chapter 
7.  
 
Q4: Perceptions of ports and port users are different in the variables of the research model 
 
8. 2. 1 Research question 1: research model and measurement development  
The Antecedents construct was identified to have three variables from the literature 
review and the semi-structured interviews: RPSV (Risk Perception and Security 
Vulnerabilities), FR (Financial Resources), and SCSI (Supply Chain Security Initiatives). 
In particular, the original variables of RP (Risk Perception) and SV (Security 
Vulnerabilities) were integrated and the PD (Partner Directives) variable was dropped. FR 
variable stands for not only the financial availability for security measures, but also the 
willingness to invest in higher level of security in the organization. SCSI variable stands 
for the level of importance that supply chain security initiatives have and how 
respondents agree to the importance to varying degrees. The construct with new variables 
showed a high level of validation and reliability with the CFA. The Antecedent construct 
was found to be a multi-dimensional construct combining intra-organizational and inter-
organizational factors which influenced variables in the SCSO and PP construct. The 
empirical analysis showed that the FR variable was affecting most of the variables in the 
construct, whereas RPSV and SCSI showed that they were affecting few variables in the 
construct. This particularly emphasizes the fact that FR is especially important for 
implementing SCSO and it leads to better organizational performances.  
 
The SCSO construct was identified to have six variables from the literature review and 
semi-structured interviews: SPP (Security Planning and Preparation), SRP (Security 
Related Partnership), OA (Organizational Adaptation), SDCT (Security Dedicated 
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Communication and Technology), SC (Security Culture), and SE (Security Education). 
SC and SE were added to the construct without any modification to the original variables 
from the literature. The measurement model SCSO also showed a high level of validity 
and reliability with these variables. The SC stands for the security sensitive culture that is 
pervasive across firms and SE delineates the educational aspects offered by the company. 
These two variables also showed a high level of influence on the EFC and EFF variables 
in PP which means that these two new variables are a necessary part of the organization’s 
implementation of SCSO.  
 
The PP construct was identified to have two variables from the literature review and the 
semi-structured interviews: EFC (Effectiveness) and EFF (Efficiency). These two 
variables were suggested from the interviews for Port Performance (PP). From the 
perspective of port security in Korea, respondents suggested Port Performance instead of 
identifying all the other dependent variables such as Customer Satisfaction and Supply 
Chain Continuity. Instead, Customer Satisfaction was suggested to be a part of the EFC 
variable and the Supply Chain Continuity variable needed to be dropped considering the 
performance measurement of port and supply chain security based on interview findings. 
Thus, the PP construct was made with traditional EFC and EFF variables. This is because 
they needed to know more about ‘how externally effective’ and ‘how internally efficient’ 
it is to implement SCSO to their organization, and supply chain continuity as a dependent 
variable was not a major concern for their performance measurement. The two 
dimensional construct using external effectiveness and internal efficiency are widely 
utilized construct in port research, and it was suggested as the dependent variables in the 
research model considering its adequacy and the dearth of related research in the field.  
The measurement scales utilized in this study showed a high level of reliability through 
CFA. Although they are all based on previous studies, it is true that this is the first time to 
use the measurement scales on SCSO issues. On a practical level, managers can also use 
those to provide strategic policy towards security orientation and evaluate the 
performance level of firms. In particular, the construct of PP with effectiveness and 
efficiency represents a multi-dimensional construct which reflects factors with internal 
and external direction. Although there is a growing trend of applying a supply chain 
management context in port research, the two factor construct using these variables 
should be taken into account for future research.  
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8. 2. 2 Research question 2: hypotheses examination (Q1, Q2a, Q2b, and Q3) 
Since this study conducted a first-order analysis, there are numerous relationships among 
the variables in the construct. The specific hypotheses are tested in Chapter 7, and in 
order to gain insights from the identified relationships, this section synthesizes all the 
statistical results and provides insights from the analysis.  
 
Q1: Variables in the Antecedents have positive individual direct impact on variables in the 
SCSO  
Q2a: Variables in the SCSO have positive individual direct impacts on variables in the PP 
Q2b: Variables in the Antecedents have indirect and positive individual impacts on PP 
through SCSO 
Q3: Variables in the Antecedents and SCSO have positive individual total impacts on PP 
 
There were 36 hypotheses under Q1 and Q2a. There were 17 supported, 15 rejected, and 
4 partially supported relationships. It is fair to say that as for direct impacts, it is almost 
evenly divided. However, individually, there were significant differences among the 
variables. Most importantly, the FR showed very high level of significant results on all 
the other variables except for FR → SPP. Also, it was shown that FR showed negative 
significant direct impacts on EFC and EFF. SCSI showed significant results only on SRP 
and SC. All the variables in the SCSO showed positive relationships on EFC and EFF 
except the relationship SC → EFF. The important findings from the direct impact analysis 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Financial resources are critical in driving ports to be security oriented and this has 
negative direct impacts on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports. The financial 
investments and availability for higher level of security have been in the spotlight in 
many studies (OECD 2003; Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; Saywell and Borsuk; 
UNCTAD 2007), and it was verified that financial resources for security have negative 
impact on Efficiency and Effectiveness (H2-7 and H2-8). Also, financial resources have 
positive impacts on SRP, SDCT, OA, SC and SE (H2-2, H2-3, H2-4, H2-5, H2-6). This 
means that financial resources are affecting the main components of the SCSO which 
verifies the findings from the semi-structured interviews. Based on the result, it can be 
argued that financial resources should be considered as the most important factor for 
driving ports to be supply chain security oriented.  
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2. The importance of SCSI in supply chains and ports has been stressed by many studies 
and researchers (KMI 2007; Lee and Whang 2005; Choi and Choi 2010; Lee et al. 2010). 
SCSI was added to the research model in terms of its importance and significance in 
driving ports to be supply chain security oriented. It was verified that SCSI has a positive 
impact on SRP, SDCT, and SC (H3-2, H3-4, and H3-5). It can be argued that SCSI can 
develop partnership building, communication technology with supply chain members, 
and security sensitive culture within the organization. This result also supports the 
findings from the semi-structured interviews. 
 
3. The variable RPSV has almost no impact on ports except for developing SDCT and 
SPP for ports being security oriented. Autry and Bobbitt (2008) suggested the variables 
Risk Perception and Security Vulnerabilities and they were merged into one based on the 
findings from the interviews. However, although the variable was suggested by several 
studies in social science context (Zsidisin 2003; Dowling and Staelin 1994) it was 
verified that the variable has almost no impact on other variables in the construct except 
SDCT (H1-4). It can be argued that RPSV is not a major component of driving ports to be 
supply chain security oriented.  
 
4. As for the relationships between the variables in the SCSO and PP, all the hypotheses 
were supported except H8-2. SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE are all critical parts of 
directly affecting the EFC and EFF of ports except for the relationship between SC and 
EFF. SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, and SE are mentioned as major components for ports being 
security dedicated organizations by several studies (KMI 2008; KITA 208; Kim et al. 
2007). SC and SE were also added based on the previous literature (Williams et al. 2009; 
KMI 2008), and the findings from the interviews. It was shown that SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, 
SC, and SE are all critical parts of SCSO, and it was confirmed that all the variables are 
affecting Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports positively. This result verifies the findings 
from Autry and Bobbitt (2008) and semi-structured interviews. Every variable is 
important part of ports being supply chain security oriented, and they are critical for ports 
to generate a higher level of Effectiveness and Efficiency.  
 
In summary, the direct impacts of the variables in the SCSO are mostly all positive on PP. 
This shows that variables in the SCSO are important parts of ports being security oriented. 
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On the other hand, the variables in the Antecedents showed quite extreme outcomes. FR 
showed significant impacts on almost all variables except on SPP. SCSI showed a few 
significant relationships, but not that many. RPSV was shown not to be effective in 
affecting other variables in the construct except for SPP and SDCT. Thus, in the 
Antecedents, FR was the most important variable, SCSI showed an average level of 
importance, and RPSV showed little importance in the causal relationships. This means 
that FR is the most important factor for ports being security oriented, but negative in EFF 
and EFC. Also, in the SCSO, all the variables showed a high level of positive causal 
relationship on PP.  
 
Q2b: Variables in the Antecedents have indirect and positive individual impacts on PP 
through SCSO  
 
The indirect relationships between variables in the Antecedents and PP showed very clear 
and simple outcomes. Out of all the 36 hypotheses, only 10 were found to be statistically 
significant (H12-1, H12-2, H12-3, H12-4, H12-5, H12-6, H13-2, H13-3, H13-4, H13-6). 
The variables RPSV and SCSI showed statistically no positive indirect relationships at all. 
This means that RPSV and SCSI have no indirect impacts on EFC and EFF through 
variables in the SCSO. Only the FR variable showed significant positive relationships 
through all the variables in the SCSO except the relationships FR→SPP→EFF and 
FR→SC→EFF. Several studies support the findings by mentioning the direct negative 
impacts and indirect positive impacts Financial Resources had on port performance in 
Korea (Han 2008; Han and Choi 2010; KMI 2009). The result verifies that Financial 
Resources have positive indirect impacts on Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports through 
all the variables in the SCSO except for the relationship between FR → EFF through SPP 
and SC. In this research, the positive relationship was confirmed, and therefore, it can be 
concluded that by having Financial Resources for security, it is possible to make the 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of ports better through SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE. 
Although it was pointed out that FR had negative direct impacts on EFF and EFC, it was 
shown that the impact was positive through variables in the SCSO indirectly. This needs 
total impact analysis which identifies which impact is bigger than the other.  
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Q3:Variables in Antecedents and SCSO have total and positive impacts on PP 
 
Total impacts are the sum of direct impacts and indirect impacts. This stage is the final 
step of the causal relationship analysis. Out of 36 hypotheses, 20 were supported, 3 were 
partially supported, and 13 were rejected. More than half of the relationships were 
supported in total impact analysis. The findings can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. As for the variable RPSV, only one relationship between RPSV and EFC was found to 
be negatively significant (H16-7). It is fair to say that RPSV was not very effective in the 
causal relationships in the construct. Although previous studies indicate that RPSV is the 
driving component of the SCSO, it was verified that it is not effective neither in direct 
impact nor total impact analysis. It is fair to say that RPSV is not a critical antecedent for 
ports to be supply chain security oriented. 
 
2. The variable FR showed positive relationships in all the relationships which means that 
positive indirect impacts outweigh the negative direct impacts (H17-1, H17-2, H17-3, 
H17-4, H17-5, H17-6, H17-7, and H17-8). It was shown that the financial investments 
and availability directly and negatively affect the Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports. 
However, this is indirectly and ultimately positive in affecting Effectiveness and 
Efficiency through the variables in the SCSO. This means that it is beneficial indirectly 
through the variables in the SCSO, and ultimately leads to better performance. This 
finding confirms the previous studies (KMI 2007; KMI 2009; Huh 2008) that pointed out 
the short-term direct negative impacts and long-term positive total impacts Financial 
Resources had on performance. It can be argued that initially, financial investments on 
security seem negative, it is ultimately positive and contribute to the higher level of 
Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports by investing on SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE.  
 
3. SCSI showed positive total impacts on SDCT, SC, and EFC (H18-4. H18-5, and H18-
7). Direct impact analysis showed that SCSI → SDCT, and SCSI → SC had positive 
relationships. The relationships between SCSI and EFC were also found to be effective in 
the total impact analysis. This means that implementing security programs and their 
perceptions lead to better security related technologies and culture which also lead to 
better external effectiveness. It was confirmed that SCSI facilitates SDCT and creates a 
security sensitive corporate culture that leads to a higher level of effectiveness of ports.  
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4. All the variables the in SCSO showed positive relationships except SC → EFC. This 
means that the variables suggested by Autry and Bobbitt (2008) are tested to be mostly 
positive in the causal relationships in the construct. It was shown that all the variables in 
the construct are critical parts of the SCSO. It was also identified that the two dependent 
variables: EFC and EFF are highly affected by most of the variables in the SCSO, and the 
FR variable in the Antecedents construct. SCSI showed a few positive relationships with 
other variables, but not too many. This means that ports and their supply chains in Korea 
are highly affected by FR to be security oriented, and all the variables in the SCSO except 
SC lead to better EFC and EFF as a performance. Thus, it is fair to say that if ports are 
security oriented, a higher level of external effectiveness and internal efficiency they can 
have. Also, if ports are to be security oriented, financial resources and their investments 
are the most important factors for success. Interestingly, many studies predicted that the 
security regulations and measures will lead to lower efficiencies of organizations (KMI 
2006; Shin 2006). However, in the context of cultural phenomenon of Supply Chain 
Security Orientation in ports and their maritime supply chain in Korea, it was clearly 
verified that most of the suggested variables lead to better efficiency and effectiveness at 
the same time. It can be argued that if ports are supply chain security oriented by 
developing various aspects of SPP, SRP, OA, SDCT, SC, and SE, both effectiveness and 
efficiency can be enhanced. It is true that security regulations and procedures require 
more work and tasks for ports, but it was shown that if ports are supply chain security 
oriented, its positive impact outweighs the negative impact on effectiveness and 
efficiency. This is also the original discovery of this study.  
 
8. 2. 3 Research question 3: multi-group analysis (Q4) 
Q4: Perceptions of ports and port users are different in the variables of the research model 
 
As for the security related issues, different perceptions between port group and port user 
group were found which requires a multi-group analysis (KMI 2008; Lee et al. 2010). 
Based on the findings, this study conducted a multi-group analysis in order to identify the 
different perceptions of SCSO in two groups. Out of 36 relationships, there were 12 
significant differences between the perceptions in the two groups. This stage does not test 
the hypotheses because it requires comparing and contrasting the differences of variables 
in two groups rather than identifying the causal relationships. The findings can be 
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summarized as follows: 
 
1. The port group perceived more importance in these relationships than the port user 
groups: SCSI → OA, RPSV → SE, and SRP → EFC. Also, the port group perceived SPP 
to be negatively affecting EFF while the port user group perceived the relationship to be 
positive. SCSI was important for the port group in affecting OA, and SRP was also 
important in affecting EFC. This means that port group should implement and develop 
SCSI, RPSV, and SRP more to develop OA, SE, and EFC.  
 
2. The port user group perceived more importance in these relationships than the port 
group: SDCT → EFC, SE → EFC, SPP → EFC, OA → EFC, SRP → EFF, and SE → 
EFF. Also, the port user group perceived FR → EFF and EFC very negatively. This 
means that the port user group perceived more negatively about financial investment in 
security and its impact on efficiency and effectiveness than the port group did. The port 
user group generally puts more importance on security education, and perceived SRP is 
positively affecting the EFF, while the port group perceived SRP is positively affecting 
EFC. Also, SDCT and SPP were identified as important factors for port users in affecting 
EFC. Thus, in order to gain competitive advantage, ports need to focus more on SCSI, 
RPSV, and SRP which leads to better OA and SE, and this will eventually lead to a higher 
level of EFC and EFF of ports. Since port user group perceived FR has a negative direct 
impact on EFC and EFF, it is vital for ports to invest on the SDCT, SE, SPP, OA, SRP, 
and SE that will have a positive impact FR on EFC and EFF. It is a good strategy for ports 
to attract cargoes by providing better security dedicated service based on these variables.  
 
3. The most significant differences between the two groups are: SPP → EFF (port group: 
negative, port user group: positive), OA → EFC (port group: negative, port user group: 
positive), and FR → EFC (port group: positive, port user group: negative). They were all 
found to be both statistically significant. Especially, FR was negatively affecting the EFC 
in port user group, while port group perceived it was positive. This means that the port 
group thinks it is more important to have financial resources and availability for security 
than the port user group does. Also, the port group perceived the relationship SPP → EFF 
and FR → EFC to be significantly positive, while the port user group perceived them to 
be significantly negative. However, the port user group perceived OA → EFC to be 
significantly positive while the port group perceived them to be significantly negative. In 
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addition, there are a few more relationships that are more important to the port user group 
than the port group. The port user group perceived that security education is more 
important than the port group did. Also, the port user group perceived security related 
investments to be negative in affecting EFF and EFC, while the port group perceived 
them to be positive in EFC. In order to gain competitive advantage for ports in Korea, it is 
important to have security related education and resilient organizational adaptation to 
have a reputation in being security dedicated organization for port users. For ports, it is 
more important to have financial resources, implement security programs, and build 
security related partnerships. This will eventually lead to a higher level of performance of 
ports. It was shown that there were many different perceptions between two groups. The 
point is, in order to appeal to the port users, port group should focus more on the variables 
in the Antecedents such as FR and SCSI to develop and implement variables in the SCSO 
such as SPP, SRP, SDCT, and SE to gain competitive advantage by becoming a security 
dedicated organization.  
 
In summary, there were four types of analysis conducted: direct, indirect, total impacts, 
and multi-group analysis. This made it possible to offer deeper insights on how each 
variable works in the research model. For example, the variable FR showed negative 
direct significant relationships with EFC and EFF which were positive in indirect 
relationships. This ended up being positive in the total impact analysis which means that 
positive indirect impacts outweigh the negative direct impacts on performance. These 
findings enable managers and policy makers to allocate financial resources in a much 
more efficient way based on the variables and their causal relationships in this study. Also, 
FR was found to be positive in total impacts which justify the financial investments of 
ports in Korea. This study provides evidence for the fact that the financial investment 
through several aspects of port security management can be beneficial to the organization. 
In particular, as was identified in the multi-group analysis, the port group perceived 
financial investment in security to be positive while the port user group did not. However, 
the total impact of FR was shown to be positive which means that the port group 
perceived its importance more seriously. This may be based on the fact that while port 
security initiatives such as the ISPS code are mandatory which requires a certain level of 
financial investment, security initiatives for supply chain members are voluntary. It is 
possible to perceive mandatory regulations more seriously and their investment strategies 
than security program based on voluntary participation. Furthermore, the variables 
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developed from the interviews: FR, SC, and SE showed a high level of positive 
relationships in the construct. However, SCSI presented few positive relationships despite 
the fact that the level of agreement of the respondents was very high among all variables.  
Finally, multi-group analysis discovered that the port user group perceived more 
importance in the impact of variables in the SCSO construct (SE, SRP, SPP, SE, SDCT) 
while the port group perceived more importance in the impact of variables in the 
Antecedents (SCSI and FR). Thus, it is important for ports to develop SPP, SRP, OA, 
SDCT, SC, and SE which will lead to better performance which can attract more port 
users based on FR and SCSI.  
 
8. 3 Conclusion: contributions, limitations and future research direction  
First, this study has made a significant original contribution in terms of being the first 
study to empirically test and analyze the SCSO concept in a holistic manner on ports and 
their maritime supply chains in Korea. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, not only 
was this study investigated the concept thoroughly as a confirmatory and quantitative 
study, but it has explored it in ports and maritime supply chain context for the first time. 
Combining academic theories and exploratory investigation, the SCSO construct was 
developed and examined. This study can be regarded as the pioneer research that 
examined the SCSO concept in ports and maritime supply chain context. Hence, this 
study has made a great contribution to the field in being the first confirmatory and 
quantitative study that has tested and analyzed the concept in maritime supply chain 
context using SEM. Also, as for the measurement scales, well-defined and widely 
accepted scales have been developed to investigate the SCSO construct, and they are 
proved to be reliable enough to be used in future research. Recent measurement scales 
have also been adopted conceptualizing Supply Chain Security Culture introduced by 
various studies including Williams et al. (2009a).  
Second, components of Antecedents, SCSO, and PP have been identified through semi-
structured interviews and each construct showed statistical reliability through CFA for 
empirical analysis. This research developed the adopted initial research framework by 
conducting interviews and made ‘a complete research model’ that best reflects the reality 
of ports’ security and their maritime supply chains in Korea. This modification of the 
model aimed at expanding the scope of the initial framework by applying various types of 
ideas and opinions on security orientation in ports and supply chains. Thus, existing 
studies on supply chain security were expanded and modified through semi-structured 
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interviews in this study to find a best fit for ports and the maritime supply chain context. 
Thus, the new variables Security Culture, Security Education, Financial Resources, and 
Supply Chain Security Initiatives were successfully incorporated in the research model 
and it was clearly identified the Effectiveness and Efficiency of ports are driven by these 
factors. Port managers are suggested to understand the importance of these factors when 
providing security related services to their customers.  
Third, another contribution this study can provide is the methodology aspects. 
Considering the dearth of quantitative and confirmatory research in supply chain security, 
SEM was not utilized before. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this is the fist 
study to use SEM by developing measurement scales and test the relationships of the 
variables in the field of supply chain security. The SEM showed a high level of analysis 
techniques in this study which can be utilized in other supply chain and maritime studies. 
The analysis process and proposed hypotheses can provide guidance to supply chain 
security researchers who will use similar analysis tools and measurement scales. 
Fourth, based on the theoretical justification, the perspective of port security has been 
expanded and analyzed from a supply chain security standpoint. Based on intra-
organizational and inter-organizational aspects, variables were added and multi-group 
analysis was conducted to see how differently the two groups perceived the variables in 
the research model. In terms of maritime supply chain and port security research, this was 
also the first time to do this as a confirmatory study. More specifically, this study 
conducted a multi-group analysis between the two groups based on collecting a large 
number of questionnaires totaling more than 200 for each group to gain the statistical 
reliability. This is also a significant contribution because it analyzed the different 
perceptions of the variables between port authorities and their port users in Korea. 
Considering the growth of Asian transport industries, a set of robust methodology was 
applied to empirically test in Korean ports and port users. This process can provide 
significant managerial implications on how to set security related corporate strategies for 
their organizations. It made it possible to identify which variables and factors are more 
important for each group which shed light on different marketing and operating strategies 
for the security related activities of ports and their supply chains. Port managers are 
suggested to invest financial resources wisely on SDCT, SE, SRP, and OA to provide 
better services to their customers which will eventually lead to increase port 
performances.  
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Finally, regarding to a considerable amount of studies that suggest negative relationship 
between a higher level of security and efficiency, this study can be considered as one of 
the studies that disagree with those. It was identified in this study that if ports are security 
oriented, the higher level of efficiency and effectiveness can be obtained. Moreover, the 
impact of financial resources is identified. It is also noteworthy that financial resources 
are the critical factors for ports to be security oriented, and if ports are security oriented, 
improved level of efficiency and effectiveness can be obtained. Port security managers 
are suggested to understand the importance of financial resources and their investment on 
security issues related to the variables suggested in this study to improve their 
performances.  
 
However, despite the significant contributions this study can offer, this study is not free 
from limitations just like any other research. Probably, the first limitation this study has is 
the generalization issue. Because this study tested the model in one country, the answers 
and analysis are also limited to that geographical area. Despite the large number of 
respondents (427 answers), the model still needs to be applied in different countries and 
different industries to gain a higher level of generalization.   
 
Second, the research model is modified to provide a best fit for Korean ports and supply 
chains context which may not be suitable for other situations and industries. During the 
interviews, many variables were added to the model and the potential moderator construct 
was dropped. Although this process is suitable for port and maritime supply chain context, 
it might not be suitable for other industries and their supply chains. Thus, comparative 
studies should be carried out to identify generalization issues.  
 
Third, although the model showed a high level of reliability and validity in all 
measurement scales and variables, it does not mean they are now perfectly reliable. For 
example, the measurement scales for the SC variable suggested by Williams et al. (2009a) 
have been tested and were found to be reliable for the first time in this study. However, it 
needs more empirical research to validate and strengthen the usage of the scales in other 
industries and context in the future to gain more reliability and validity.  
 
8. 3. 1 Future research direction 
For future research direction, first, it is obvious that more quantitative research in 
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different context (e.g. countries, other organizations) should be conducted. Since the 
research model in this study is highly reliable and focused more on port operation in the 
supply chain, it should be tested especially in other ports and supply chains to gain a 
higher level of generalization. Also, the answers for the questionnaire in this study were 
gained at a particular periods of time which makes it difficult to identify whether they 
maintain the same view and opinions about the topic over long periods of time. Thus, 
more quantitative study should be included in the future study in terms of different 
context and time as a longitudinal study.  
 
Second, this study has some qualitative side, but it is mainly quantitative by developing 
hypotheses and testing the relationships using SEM. The research model is based on 
previous studies and semi-structured interviews. However, other variables (e.g. 
government support and relationship quality) and relationships can be added to the 
construct. It can extend the current research into another level by investigating unknown 
aspects of supply chain security. Moreover, variables with moderating effect were 
dropped in this study based on the findings from the semi-structured interviews. However, 
this can be analyzed in different context and industries if necessary.  
 
Third, port performance in this study is defined as external effectiveness and internal 
efficiency which is widely used traditional measures in port research. However, there can 
be many different ways to define port performance. Since there are a number of studies 
that stress the fact that ports are part of the supply chains, supply chain performance 
could be analyzed on the basis of factors and variables proposed in this study. This can 
examine the SCSO thoroughly at a supply chain level which can verify the themes and 
trends in different settings.  
 
There are some limitations in this study, but this research has definitely filled the gaps in 
previous studies by answering research questions using qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies.  
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Appendix A Descriptive Statistics  
(1) Overall descriptive statistics for the Antecedents  
Construct 
Response scale(%) 
Mean SD 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
RPSV1  3.7 10.5 25.5 39.3 20.8 3.63  1.04  
RPSV2 4.2 10.5 26.2 41.9 17.1 3.57  1.03  
RPSV3 2.1 7.0 21.5 41.7 27.6 3.86  0.97  
RPSV4 5.4 16.4 27.6 36.8 13.8 3.37  1.08  
RPSV5 2.3 11.7 30.4 40.7 14.8 3.54  0.96  
RPSV6 2.1 7.7 33.7 46.1 10.3 3.55  0.86  
FR1 3.5 10.3 39.1 37.2 9.8 3.40  0.94  
FR2 2.6 8.0 33.5 44.5 11.4 3.55  0.90  
FR3 2.6 12.9 39.8 34.0 10.7 3.38  0.94  
FR4 2.3 10.8 38.2 39.3 9.3 3.43  0.90  
SCSI1 1.4 6.6 23.0 40.7 28.3 3.88  0.94  
SCSI2 .9 7.5 23.7 46.6 21.3 3.80  0.89  
SCSI3 1.4 4.2 18.3 42.2 34.0 4.03  0.90  
SCSI4 .5 6.1 15.7 49.9 27.9 3.99  0.85  
SCSI5 .7 4.4 24.8 45.2 24.8 3.89  0.85  
SCSI6 .7 3.0 18.3 49.9 28.1 4.02  0.81  
 
(2) Overall descriptive statistics for the SCSO  
Construct 
Response scale(%) 
Mean SD 
1 2 3 4 5 
SPP1 .9 9.1 37.0 42.2 10.8 3.53 0.84 
SPP2 .7 8.2 33.7 47.1 10.3 3.58 0.81 
SPP3 1.9 8.7 31.6 40.7 17.1 3.63 0.93 
SPP4 .9 6.8 35.4 45.0 11.9 3.60 0.82 
SPP5 1.4 8.0 37.0 40.0 13.6 3.56 0.87 
SPP6 .9 5.4 35.4 48.2 10.1 3.61 0.78 
SRP1 1.6 10.3 40.0 37.9 10.1 3.44 0.87 
SRP2 1.6 9.1 39.6 41.0 8.7 3.46 0.84 
SRP3 3.7 10.8 37.7 37.9 9.8 3.39 0.94 
SRP4 1.9 8.0 35.8 41.5 12.9 3.56 0.88 
SRP5 1.6 8.2 41.5 37.9 10.8 3.48 0.85 
OA1 1.9 7.3 40.0 41.2 9.6 3.49 0.84 
OA2 .7 6.1 30.7 48.5 14.1 3.69 0.81 
OA3 1.9 3.7 23.7 46.4 24.4 3.88 0.89 
OA4 1.6 6.8 33.7 45.2 12.6 3.60 0.85 
OA5 2.3 10.5 41.2 35.6 10.3 3.41 0.90 
SDCT1 1.9 9.6 32.3 38.2 18.0 3.61 0.95 
SDCT2 2.8 12.2 36.3 35.6 13.1 3.44 0.96 
SDCT3 1.2 4.7 31.1 47.1 15.9 3.72 0.83 
SDCT4 .7 8.0 34.0 39.8 17.6 3.66 0.88 
SDCT5 1.6 8.7 32.3 36.8 20.6 3.66 0.95 
SC1 1.2 9.1 28.3 42.4 19.0 3.69 0.92 
SC2 .9 7.5 35.4 41.2 15.0 3.62 0.86 
SC3 .5 7.3 34.0 42.4 15.9 3.66 0.85 
SC4 1.4 6.6 30.2 42.2 19.7 3.72 0.90 
SE1 1.2 10.3 34.0 40.7 13.8 3.56 0.90 
SE2 .7 8.2 37.7 41.7 11.7 3.56 0.83 
SE3 .9 10.5 34.7 41.2 12.6 3.54 0.88 
SE4 1.4 12.9 36.5 36.1 13.1 3.47 0.92 
SE5 .9 5.4 30.9 45.0 17.8 3.73 0.85 
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(3) Overall descriptive statistics for PP 
Construct 
Response scale(%) 
Mean SD 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
EFC1 .7 4.2 29.5 45.9 19.7 3.80 0.83 
EFC2 1.2 4.2 28.1 48.0 18.5 3.78 0.83 
EFC3 2.1 8.2 42.6 37.5 9.6 3.44 0.85 
EFC4 1.4 5.2 36.5 43.6 13.3 3.62 0.83 
EFC5 1.2 7.3 38.2 41.7 11.7 3.56 0.84 
EFC6 1.4 5.4 33.0 44.7 15.5 3.67 0.85 
EFC7 1.2 7.0 40.0 41.9 9.8 3.52 0.81 
EFC8 1.6 8.2 34.4 42.4 13.3 3.58 0.88 
EFF1 .9 9.1 36.5 38.9 14.5 3.57 0.88 
EFF2 1.4 8.0 34.2 43.3 13.1 3.59 0.87 
EFF3 .9 8.7 36.1 38.6 15.7 3.59 0.89 
EFF4 .9 6.8 38.9 39.8 13.6 3.58 0.84 
EFF5 .5 7.0 38.4 41.2 12.9 3.59 0.82 
EFF6 1.4 8.0 37.5 40.5 12.6 3.55 0.86 
EFF7 2.1 7.5 36.3 40.0 14.1 3.56 0.90 
 
(4) Descriptive statistics of port group 
Items 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Mean SD 
RPSV1 4.0 10.4 27.4 37.8 20.4 3.60 1.05 
RPSV2 3.5 8.5 30.8 43.8 13.4 3.55 0.95 
RPSV3 2.5 8.0 20.4 45.8 23.4 3.80 0.97 
RPSV4 6.0 18.4 24.4 39.3 11.9 3.33 1.09 
RPSV5 4.0 9.5 23.9 44.8 17.9 3.63 1.01 
RPSV6 1.5 8.5 31.8 48.3 10.0 3.57 0.84 
FR1 3.5 10.4 34.3 41.3 10.5 3.46 0.96 
FR2 3.5 9.5 26.9 47.3 12.9 3.58 0.98 
FR3 3.5 13.9 34.8 35.3 12.4 3.40 1.02 
FR4 2.5 12.9 35.3 40.8 8.5 3.41 0.93 
SCSI1 2.0 6.5 20.4 38.8 32.3 3.93 0.98 
SCSI2 1.5 5.5 23.4 48.8 20.9 3.82 0.88 
SCSI3 2.0 5.5 14.9 43.3 34.3 4.02 0.95 
SCSI4 1.0 7.0 13.9 51.7 26.4 3.96 0.88 
SCSI5 1.0 6.5 18.9 46.3 27.4 3.93 0.90 
SCSI6 1.0 4.5 17.9 48.3 28.4 3.99 0.86 
SPP1 1.0 6.0 32.3 45.3 15.4 3.68 0.84 
SPP2 .5 6.5 29.9 49.3 13.9 3.70 0.81 
SPP3 1.0 8.5 31.8 36.3 22.4 3.71 0.94 
SPP4 1.0 7.0 29.4 47.8 14.9 3.69 0.85 
SPP5 1.0 8.5 29.4 44.3 16.9 3.68 0.89 
SPP6 1.5 5.5 26.9 54.7 11.4 3.69 0.80 
SRP1 .5 8.5 40.3 40.8 10.0 3.51 0.81 
SRP2 1.0 6.5 37.3 46.3 9.0 3.56 0.79 
SRP3 4.5 9.5 33.3 41.3 11.4 3.46 0.97 
SRP4 3.5 6.5 31.8 40.3 17.9 3.63 0.97 
SRP5 3.0 6.5 36.8 40.3 13.4 3.55 0.91 
OA1 3.0 6.5 36.3 44.8 9.5 3.51 0.87 
OA2 1.0 5.5 25.4 50.7 17.4 3.78 0.83 
OA3 3.5 2.5 23.9 41.3 28.9 3.90 0.97 
OA4 3.0 5.5 30.3 44.8 16.4 3.66 0.92 
OA5 3.0 10.0 34.3 42.3 10.4 3.47 0.92 
SDCT1 3.0 12.4 35.8 35.3 13.4 3.44 0.97 
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SDCT2 4.0 14.9 31.8 33.8 15.4 3.42 1.06 
SDCT3 2.0 5.0 31.8 45.8 15.4 3.68 0.87 
SDCT4 1.5 9.0 33.8 37.3 18.4 3.62 0.94 
SDCT5 4.0 10.0 30.3 36.3 19.4 3.57 1.04 
SC1 2.0 9.0 24.9 45.3 18.9 3.70 0.94 
SC2 2.0 7.0 32.3 45.3 13.4 3.61 0.88 
SC3 1.0 7.5 28.9 44.3 18.4 3.72 0.89 
SC4 2.0 7.5 24.9 44.3 21.4 3.76 0.94 
SE1 2.0 8.5 31.8 42.8 14.9 3.60 0.91 
SE2 1.0 9.0 35.8 42.8 11.4 3.55 0.85 
SE3 1.5 9.0 32.3 43.3 13.9 3.59 0.89 
SE4 2.0 11.9 31.3 42.3 12.4 3.51 0.93 
SE5 2.0 2.5 28.4 48.8 18.4 3.79 0.84 
EFC1 .0 3.0 26.9 46.8 23.4 3.91 0.79 
EFC2 .0 5.0 27.4 48.3 19.4 3.82 0.80 
EFC3 1.0 9.0 37.8 41.8 10.4 3.52 0.84 
EFC4 1.0 8.0 39.3 36.8 14.9 3.57 0.88 
EFC5 .5 7.5 36.8 42.8 12.4 3.59 0.82 
EFC6 1.5 6.5 35.3 40.3 16.4 3.64 0.88 
EFC7 .5 10.0 43.8 37.3 8.5 3.43 0.80 
EFC8 1.0 7.5 35.8 43.3 12.4 3.59 0.84 
EFF1 2.0 12.4 39.3 31.8 14.4 3.44 0.95 
EFF2 2.0 10.9 39.3 34.8 12.9 3.46 0.93 
EFF3 1.5 10.9 38.3 35.3 13.9 3.49 0.92 
EFF4 1.5 7.0 40.8 37.3 13.4 3.54 0.87 
EFF5 1.0 7.0 38.8 37.3 15.9 3.60 0.87 
EFF6 1.5 7.5 39.8 36.8 14.4 3.55 0.88 
EFF7 1.5 7.5 37.3 39.8 13.9 3.57 0.88 
 
(5) Descriptive statistics of port users group  
Items 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Mean SD 
RPSV1 3.5 10.5 23.7 41.2 21.1 3.66 1.04 
RPSV2 4.8 12.3 21.9 41.2 19.7 3.59 1.09 
RPSV3 1.8 6.1 22.4 38.6 31.1 3.91 0.97 
RPSV4 4.4 15.4 30.3 34.6 15.4 3.41 1.06 
RPSV5 .9 13.6 36.4 37.3 11.8 3.46 0.90 
RPSV6 2.6 7.0 36.0 43.9 10.5 3.53 0.87 
FR1 3.5 12.3 42.5 32.5 9.2 3.32 0.93 
FR2 1.8 7.9 39.9 40.4 10.1 3.49 0.85 
FR3 1.3 14.0 42.5 32.5 9.6 3.35 0.89 
FR4 2.2 10.1 39.9 38.2 9.6 3.43 0.88 
SCSI1 .9 7.0 26.3 40.8 25.0 3.82 0.92 
SCSI2 .4 9.2 26.3 42.1 21.9 3.76 0.91 
SCSI3 .9 3.1 21.5 41.7 32.9 4.03 0.86 
SCSI4 .0 5.3 17.1 48.2 29.4 4.02 0.82 
SCSI5 .4 2.6 29.8 44.7 22.4 3.86 0.81 
SCSI6 .4 1.8 18.4 51.3 28.1 4.05 0.76 
SPP1 .9 12.3 39.0 41.2 6.6 3.40 0.82 
SPP2 .9 9.6 37.3 44.7 7.5 3.48 0.80 
SPP3 2.6 10.1 29.8 44.3 13.2 3.55 0.93 
SPP4 .9 6.6 39.5 43.9 9.2 3.54 0.79 
SPP5 1.8 7.5 43.4 36.8 10.5 3.47 0.85 
SPP6 .4 5.7 42.5 42.1 9.2 3.54 0.76 
SRP1 2.6 12.3 40.4 34.6 10.1 3.37 0.92 
SRP2 2.2 11.8 40.8 36.8 8.3 3.37 0.88 
SRP3 2.6 13.2 40.4 35.5 8.3 3.34 0.90 
SRP4 .4 10.1 39.5 41.7 8.3 3.47 0.80 
SRP5 .4 11.0 45.2 34.6 8.8 3.40 0.82 
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OA1 .9 7.9 43.4 38.2 9.6 3.48 0.81 
OA2 .4 7.0 35.1 46.5 11.0 3.61 0.79 
OA3 .4 4.8 24.6 50.0 20.2 3.85 0.81 
OA4 .4 7.9 37.3 44.7 9.6 3.55 0.79 
OA5 1.8 11.0 46.9 30.7 9.6 3.36 0.87 
SDCT1 .9 7.0 30.7 39.5 21.9 3.75 0.91 
SDCT2 1.8 11.4 36.8 38.6 11.4 3.46 0.90 
SDCT3 .4 4.8 29.8 49.1 15.8 3.75 0.79 
SDCT4 .0 7.0 36.0 40.4 16.7 3.67 0.84 
SDCT5 .4 7.9 33.3 36.4 21.9 3.71 0.91 
SC1 .4 9.6 31.1 39.5 19.3 3.68 0.91 
SC2 .0 7.0 39.0 37.7 16.2 3.63 0.84 
SC3 .0 7.0 37.7 41.7 13.6 3.62 0.81 
SC4 .9 5.7 34.6 41.2 17.5 3.69 0.86 
SE1 .4 12.3 36.0 38.2 13.2 3.51 0.89 
SE2 .4 7.0 38.6 42.5 11.4 3.57 0.80 
SE3 .4 11.8 36.4 39.5 11.8 3.50 0.87 
SE4 .9 13.6 39.9 31.6 14.0 3.44 0.93 
SE5 .0 7.9 34.2 41.2 16.7 3.67 0.85 
EFC1 1.3 5.7 32.5 44.3 16.2 3.68 0.86 
EFC2 2.2 3.9 28.9 46.9 18.0 3.75 0.87 
EFC3 3.1 7.9 46.1 33.8 9.2 3.38 0.88 
EFC4 1.8 3.5 32.9 49.6 12.3 3.67 0.80 
EFC5 1.8 7.0 38.6 41.7 11.0 3.53 0.85 
EFC6 1.3 4.8 30.7 48.2 14.9 3.71 0.83 
EFC7 1.8 5.3 37.3 44.3 11.4 3.58 0.83 
EFC8 2.2 8.3 33.3 42.1 14.0 3.57 0.91 
EFF1 .0 6.6 35.5 43.9 14.0 3.65 0.80 
EFF2 .9 6.1 32.0 47.8 13.2 3.66 0.82 
EFF3 .9 6.6 34.2 41.2 17.1 3.67 0.87 
EFF4 .9 6.1 37.7 40.4 14.9 3.62 0.84 
EFF5 .0 8.3 36.8 44.7 10.1 3.57 0.79 
EFF6 1.3 7.9 35.5 44.3 11.0 3.56 0.84 
EFF7 2.6 6.6 37.3 39.5 14.0 3.56 0.91 
 
(6) Comparison of mean values (port group and port users) 
Category Overall Port group Port users 
Items Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
RPSV1 3.63 1.04 3.6 1.05 3.66 1.04 
RPSV2 3.57 1.03 3.55 0.95 3.59 1.09 
RPSV3 3.86 0.97 3.8 0.97 3.91 0.97 
RPSV4 3.37 1.08 3.33 1.09 3.41 1.06 
RPSV5 3.54 0.96 3.63 1.01 3.46 0.9 
RPSV6 3.55 0.86 3.57 0.84 3.53 0.87 
FR1 3.4 0.94 3.46 0.96 3.32 0.93 
FR2 3.55 0.9 3.58 0.98 3.49 0.85 
FR3 3.38 0.94 3.4 1.02 3.35 0.89 
FR4 3.43 0.9 3.41 0.93 3.43 0.88 
SCSI1 3.88 0.94 3.93 0.98 3.82 0.92 
SCSI2 3.8 0.89 3.82 0.88 3.76 0.91 
SCSI3 4.03 0.9 4.02 0.95 4.03 0.86 
SCSI4 3.99 0.85 3.96 0.88 4.02 0.82 
SCSI5 3.89 0.85 3.93 0.9 3.86 0.81 
SCSI6 4.02 0.81 3.99 0.86 4.05 0.76 
SPP1 3.53 0.84 3.68 0.84 3.4 0.82 
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SPP2 3.58 0.81 3.7 0.81 3.48 0.8 
SPP3 3.63 0.93 3.71 0.94 3.55 0.93 
SPP4 3.6 0.82 3.69 0.85 3.54 0.79 
SPP5 3.56 0.87 3.68 0.89 3.47 0.85 
SPP6 3.61 0.78 3.69 0.8 3.54 0.76 
SRP1 3.44 0.87 3.51 0.81 3.37 0.92 
SRP2 3.46 0.84 3.56 0.79 3.37 0.88 
SRP3 3.39 0.94 3.46 0.97 3.34 0.9 
SRP4 3.56 0.88 3.63 0.97 3.47 0.8 
SRP5 3.48 0.85 3.55 0.91 3.4 0.82 
OA1 3.49 0.84 3.51 0.87 3.48 0.81 
OA2 3.69 0.81 3.78 0.83 3.61 0.79 
OA3 3.88 0.89 3.9 0.97 3.85 0.81 
OA4 3.6 0.85 3.66 0.92 3.55 0.79 
OA5 3.41 0.9 3.47 0.92 3.36 0.87 
SDCT1 3.61 0.95 3.44 0.97 3.75 0.91 
SDCT2 3.44 0.96 3.42 1.06 3.46 0.9 
SDCT3 3.72 0.83 3.68 0.87 3.75 0.79 
SDCT4 3.66 0.88 3.62 0.94 3.67 0.84 
SDCT5 3.66 0.95 3.57 1.04 3.71 0.91 
SC1 3.69 0.92 3.7 0.94 3.68 0.91 
SC2 3.62 0.86 3.61 0.88 3.63 0.84 
SC3 3.66 0.85 3.72 0.89 3.62 0.81 
SC4 3.72 0.9 3.76 0.94 3.69 0.86 
SE1 3.56 0.9 3.6 0.91 3.51 0.89 
SE2 3.56 0.83 3.55 0.85 3.57 0.8 
SE3 3.54 0.88 3.59 0.89 3.5 0.87 
SE4 3.47 0.92 3.51 0.93 3.44 0.93 
SE5 3.73 0.85 3.79 0.84 3.67 0.85 
EFC1 3.8 0.83 3.91 0.79 3.68 0.86 
EFC2 3.78 0.83 3.82 0.8 3.75 0.87 
EFC3 3.44 0.85 3.52 0.84 3.38 0.88 
EFC4 3.62 0.83 3.57 0.88 3.67 0.8 
EFC5 3.56 0.84 3.59 0.82 3.53 0.85 
EFC6 3.67 0.85 3.64 0.88 3.71 0.83 
EFC7 3.52 0.81 3.43 0.8 3.58 0.83 
EFC8 3.58 0.88 3.59 0.84 3.57 0.91 
EFF1 3.57 0.88 3.44 0.95 3.65 0.8 
EFF2 3.59 0.87 3.46 0.93 3.66 0.82 
EFF3 3.59 0.89 3.49 0.92 3.67 0.87 
EFF4 3.58 0.84 3.54 0.87 3.62 0.84 
EFF5 3.59 0.82 3.6 0.87 3.57 0.79 
EFF6 3.55 0.86 3.55 0.88 3.56 0.84 
EFF7 3.56 0.9 3.57 0.88 3.56 0.91 
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Appendix B Assessment of normality 
Variable Min Max Average SD Skew Kurtosis 
Antecedents 
RPSV1 1.00 5.00 3.630 1.043 -0.573 -0.172 
RPSV2 1.00 5.00 3.571 1.026 -0.599 -0.051 
RPSV3 1.00 5.00 3.857 0.972 -0.728 0.203 
RPSV4 1.00 5.00 3.372 1.079 -0.377 -0.530 
RPSV5 1.00 5.00 3.539 0.959 -0.407 -0.206 
RPSV6 1.00 5.00 3.548 0.858 -0.530 0.427 
FR1 1.00 5.00 3.400 0.938 -0.259 0.454 
FR2 1.00 5.00 3.548 0.904 -0.403 0.676 
FR3 1.00 5.00 3.379 0.943 -0.079 0.172 
FR4 1.00 5.00 3.431 0.902 -0.207 0.443 
SCSI1 1.00 5.00 3.881 0.943 -0.637 0.025 
SCSI2 1.00 5.00 3.799 0.892 -0.552 0.034 
SCSI3 1.00 5.00 4.030 0.905 -0.863 0.634 
SCSI4 1.00 5.00 3.986 0.850 -0.756 0.408 
SCSI5 1.00 5.00 3.890 0.853 -0.495 0.035 
SCSI6 1.00 5.00 4.016 0.806 -0.705 0.692 
SCSO 
SPP1 1.00 5.00 3.527 0.840 -0.241 -0.088 
SPP2 1.00 5.00 3.581 0.811 -0.343 0.026 
SPP3 1.00 5.00 3.625 0.929 -0.405 -0.077 
SPP4 1.00 5.00 3.602 0.820 -0.304 0.108 
SPP5 1.00 5.00 3.564 0.873 -0.262 -0.028 
SPP6 1.00 5.00 3.611 0.777 -0.375 0.412 
SRP1 1.00 5.00 3.445 0.869 -0.219 -0.030 
SRP2 1.00 5.00 3.459 0.839 -0.313 0.165 
SRP3 1.00 5.00 3.393 0.937 -0.411 0.082 
SRP4 1.00 5.00 3.555 0.882 -0.364 0.129 
SRP5 1.00 5.00 3.480 0.854 -0.211 0.112 
OA1 1.00 5.00 3.494 0.837 -0.343 0.351 
OA2 1.00 5.00 3.691 0.812 -0.381 0.136 
OA3 1.00 5.00 3.876 0.886 -0.731 0.730 
OA4 1.00 5.00 3.604 0.853 -0.442 0.316 
OA5 1.00 5.00 3.410 0.895 -0.230 0.020 
SDCT1 1.00 5.00 3.609 0.952 -0.347 -0.243 
SDCT2 1.00 5.00 3.440 0.961 -0.276 -0.223 
SDCT3 1.00 5.00 3.719 0.828 -0.432 0.356 
SDCT4 1.00 5.00 3.656 0.883 -0.213 -0.367 
SDCT5 1.00 5.00 3.660 0.954 -0.335 -0.310 
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SC1 1.00 5.00 3.689 0.921 -0.411 -0.223 
SC2 1.00 5.00 3.618 0.862 -0.237 -0.152 
SC3 1.00 5.00 3.660 0.847 -0.197 -0.319 
SC4 1.00 5.00 3.721 0.901 -0.428 -0.003 
SE1 1.00 5.00 3.557 0.895 -0.272 -0.244 
SE2 1.00 5.00 3.555 0.830 -0.176 -0.148 
SE3 1.00 5.00 3.541 0.878 -0.241 -0.268 
SE4 1.00 5.00 3.466 0.925 -0.160 -0.397 
SE5 1.00 5.00 3.733 0.847 -0.369 0.058 
PP 
EFC1 1.00 5.00 3.796 0.827 -0.356 0.025 
EFC2 1.00 5.00 3.785 0.834 -0.506 0.434 
EFC3 1.00 5.00 3.443 0.855 -0.262 0.257 
EFC4 1.00 5.00 3.623 0.831 -0.334 0.315 
EFC5 1.00 5.00 3.555 0.836 -0.248 0.078 
EFC6 1.00 5.00 3.674 0.850 -0.406 0.276 
EFC7 1.00 5.00 3.522 0.812 -0.244 0.194 
EFC8 1.00 5.00 3.576 0.881 -0.368 0.071 
EFF1 1.00 5.00 3.569 0.881 -0.180 -0.285 
EFF2 1.00 6.00 3.590 0.871 -0.322 0.126 
EFF3 1.00 5.00 3.595 0.887 -0.188 -0.303 
EFF4 1.00 5.00 3.583 0.842 -0.157 -0.088 
EFF5 1.00 5.00 3.590 0.818 -0.098 -0.240 
EFF6 1.00 5.00 3.550 0.864 -0.266 0.021 
EFF7 1.00 5.00 3.564 0.897 -0.361 0.129 
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Appendix C Comparison of parameters between port group and port user group 
Category Port group Diff Port user group 
Path Coef Std.coef S.E. C.R. P CR Coef Std.coef S.E. C.R. P 
FR→SPP 1.018 0.708 0.174 5.863 *** 0.164 0.868 0.72 0.156 5.576 *** 
SCSI→SPP 0.109 0.109 0.125 0.875 0.381 0.019 0.13 0.118 0.143 0.909 0.363 
RPSV→SPP 0.172 0.184 0.124 1.393 0.164 -1.675 -0.046 -0.054 0.079 -0.574 0.566 
FR→SRP 1.072 0.902 0.158 6.767 *** 1.055 1.092 0.868 0.164 6.651 *** 
SCSI→SRP 0.22 0.266 0.115 1.918 0.055 -0.864 0.069 0.06 0.151 0.456 0.648 
RPSV→SRP 0.149 0.193 0.113 1.316 0.188 -1.759 -0.067 -0.076 0.084 -0.789 0.43 
FR→OA 1.252 0.828 0.181 6.903 *** 1.474 1.144 0.96 0.171 6.705 *** 
SCSI→OA 0.263 0.25 0.132 1.987 0.047 -2.207 -0.147 -0.134 0.157 -0.937 0.349 
RPSV→OA 0.12 0.122 0.13 0.919 0.358 -1.182 -0.036 -0.043 0.087 -0.408 0.683 
FR→SDCT 1.074 0.724 0.173 6.214 *** 0.202 0.867 0.707 0.151 5.736 *** 
SCSI→SDCT 0.229 0.222 0.123 1.859 0.063 -0.787 0.091 0.081 0.14 0.654 0.513 
RPSV→SDCT -0.003 -0.004 0.121 -0.029 0.977 0.97 0.153 0.178 0.079 1.941 0.052 
FR→SC 1.034 0.637 0.168 6.157 *** 0.719 0.971 0.719 0.165 5.865 *** 
SCSI→SC 0.409 0.362 0.124 3.305 *** -1.231 0.173 0.139 0.155 1.116 0.264 
RPSV→SC 0.186 0.176 0.122 1.523 0.128 -1.277 0.026 0.028 0.085 0.312 0.755 
FR→SE 1.037 0.712 0.166 6.248 *** 1.544 1.212 0.966 0.18 6.741 *** 
SCSI→SE 0.139 0.137 0.12 1.163 0.245 -1.897 -0.214 -0.185 0.164 -1.306 0.192 
RPSV→SE 0.273 0.288 0.121 2.263 0.024 -2.161 0 0 0.09 -0.004 0.997 
FR→EFC 1.604 1.325 0.52 3.088 0.002 -8.216 -2.939 -2.756 0.476 -6.172 *** 
SCSI→EFC 0.291 0.345 0.231 1.26 0.208 -0.541 0.43 0.439 0.356 1.206 0.228 
RPSV→EFC 0.058 0.073 0.184 0.313 0.754 -1.289 -0.094 -0.127 0.195 -0.486 0.627 
SRP→EFC 1.355 1.329 0.539 2.515 0.012 2.481 0.626 0.738 0.262 2.389 0.017 
SDCT→EFC -0.257 -0.315 0.139 -1.846 0.065 4.359 0.492 0.565 0.112 4.382 *** 
SE→EFC -0.157 -0.189 0.127 -1.236 0.217 3.533 0.769 0.905 0.238 3.224 0.001 
SPP→EFC -0.196 -0.233 0.121 -1.613 0.107 3.662 0.455 0.513 0.136 3.339 *** 
OA→EFC -1.083 -1.351 0.357 -3.029 0.002 4.31 0.773 0.864 0.237 3.268 0.001 
SC→EFC -0.133 -0.179 0.134 -0.996 0.319 0.378 -0.037 -0.047 0.184 -0.202 0.84 
FR→EFF -17.435 -10.648 57.869 -0.301 0.763 -6.794 -2.099 -1.645 0.438 -4.792 *** 
SCSI→EFF -3.9 -3.427 12.31 -0.317 0.751 -0.919 0.104 0.088 0.281 0.368 0.713 
RPSV→EFF -2.496 -2.344 8.33 -0.3 0.764 -1.351 0.048 0.054 0.152 0.317 0.751 
SRP→EFF 21.02 15.248 54.849 0.383 0.702 3.649 0.935 0.921 0.301 3.101 0.002 
SDCT→EFF -0.269 -0.244 0.285 -0.944 0.345 1.7 0.489 0.469 0.122 4.008 *** 
SE→EFF -0.392 -0.348 0.252 -1.552 0.121 2.099 0.399 0.392 0.226 1.762 0.078 
SPP→EFF -0.63 -0.553 0.26 -2.423 0.015 3.138 0.321 0.303 0.142 2.256 0.024 
OA→EFF -1.49 -1.376 0.844 -1.766 0.077 1.603 0.384 0.358 0.206 1.861 0.063 
SC→EFF -0.429 -0.426 0.264 -1.628 0.104 0.869 0.068 0.072 0.188 0.361 0.718 
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Appendix D Research Ethics Form 
 
ETHICS  
 
FULL ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM 
(STAFF/PhD STUDENTS) or students 
referring their form for a full ethical review 
 
(For guidance on how to complete this form, please see Learning Central – CARBS RESEARCH 
ETHICS) 
 
 
If your research will involve patients or patient data in the NHS then you should secure approval 
from the NHS National Research Ethics Service. Online applications are available on 
http://www.nres.npsa.nhs.uk/applicants/ 
 
Name of Lead Researcher :  Hong Gyue Park 
 
School: Cardiff Business School  
 
Email: ParkHG@cardiff.ac.uk, ny1525@hotmail.com  
 
Names of other Researchers: N/A  
 
 
 
Email addresses of other Researchers : N/A 
 
 
Title of Project: Impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on Port Performance 
  
 
 
Start and Estimated End Date of Project: 25. 04. 2012 – 01. 09. 2013.  
 
 
 
Aims and Objectives of the Research Project: This project aims to find the sources of security 
oriented behaviour of port authorities in Korea and test the research model by conducting 
questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate any sources of funding for this project:  
 
 
 
 
1. Describe the methodology to be applied in the project  
For the data collection purposes, a two-stage methodology, interview and questionnaire survey will be 
applied. Interview will be conducted for exploratory study to find sources and criteria of the main concept 
“Supply Chain Security Orientation”. It will be conducted by face to face meetings with all interviewees, 
and each interview will be covered by a notification letter addressing the ethical issues regarding the 
participants and the benefits of their participation. Also, the questionnaire will be conducted by e-mails, 
posts, and online survey. It is a confirmatory study to test the research model identified from extensive 
review of literature on supply chain security. Several important causal relationships will be tested and 
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verified whether they are relevant to their operations or not. It consists of four sections including measures 
regarding the antecedents of Supply Chain Security Orientation(section 1), Supply Chain Security 
Orientation(section 2), Performance of Ports(section 3), and profile of the respondent and the company 
he/she is working for(section 4). Interval scales, such as agree-disagree options(1-strongly agree, 5-strongly 
disagree) for measures and nominal scale for profile questions are used in this survey.  
 
 
 
     
2. Describe the participant sample who will be contacted for this Research Project. 
You need to consider the number of participants, their age, gender, recruitment 
methods and exclusion/inclusion criteria 
 This research will focus on the impact of Supply Chain Security Orientation on performance of ports in 
Korea. For the exploratory study, interview of the prospective participants will involve policy makers in the 
United Nations, managerial level employees in port authorities in Korea, and export and import executives 
in customs department of the Korean government.  The researcher will conduct approximately from fifteen 
to twenty interviews to obtain data. The age and gender of participants are not critical for the research, but 
the work experience and the participants’ job title will be considered to ensure that they have sufficient 
practical experience and the sound knowledge of security issues in port operation in Korea. The majority of 
practitioners will be contacted through a list of major Trading and Logistics associations via telephone and 
e-mails. As for the confirmatory study, questionnaire will be conducted. The sample will be around two 
hundred and fifty, and it will be mainly based on major port authorities in Korea. The sample is divided into 
three groups which are managerial transport operators in port authorities, import and export officers in the 
Korean government, shipping companies and terminal operators. They will be selected from the 2011 
Maritime and Logistics Information Directory published by the Korean shipping gazette. For the multi-
group analysis, the target of the survey will involve approximately three port authorities, two government 
bodies, ten terminal operating companies, and fifteen shipping companies. The questionnaire will be sent 
together with a cover letter explaining the content and aims of the study, the confidentiality issues, 
importance or the research and a brief information about the researcher. 
 
3. Describe the method by which you intend to gain consent from participants.  
 Brief information will be provided before conducting interviews concerning the subject area to which the 
research relates. The purpose of the research and the reason why they were asked to participate, as well as 
the anticipated benefits of the research will be notified. Confidentiality and anonymity will be assured for 
the participants. De-briefing will take place right after the interview has taken place. This will involve an 
overview of the response given to ensure clarity between interviewer and interviewee. The researcher will 
ask whether the respondents require a summary of the findings of the study or not and summary will be sent 
to those who request it when it becomes available.  
 As for the questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the aims and the importance of the research will be sent 
to the participants together with the questionnaire and brief amount of information will be provided 
including the confidentiality and anonymity issues. The importance of their participation will be highlighted 
and they will be thanked for their participation. The findings will also be available after the research upon 
request of the participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE ATTACH A COPY OF ALL INFORMATION WHICH WILL BE 
GIVEN TO PROSPECTIVE PARTICIPANTS (including invitation letter, 
briefing documents and, if appropriate, the consent form you will be using). 
PLEASE ATTACH COPIES OF QUESTIONNAIRES OR INTERVIEW TOPIC 
GUIDES TO THIS APPLICATION 
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4. Please make a clear and concise statement of the ethical and health and safety 
considerations - http://www.cf.ac.uk/osheu/index.html - raised by the project and 
how you intend to deal with them (please use additional sheets where necessary) 
 
For maintaining confidentiality and anonymity of participants, first, permission will be asked to record and 
take notes before conducting interviews. The private information about participants will be removed and the 
personal identifiers will be expected to change into code(i.e. respondent A) when taking notes. The recorded 
materials will be kept locked in a suitable case when not being used. Participants will be informed that they 
have a right to review the note and not to answer any questions if they feel uncomfortable about the 
questions. As for the questionnaire, the information sought in this study is not related to personal nature and 
the results of the study will be generalized so that no individual answer will be attributable to any particular 
participant. At the last page of the questionnaire, participant’s name and e-mail address will be asked if they 
request a copy of the findings about the survey and they are for the researcher’s use only. It will be assured 
that the contribution of the participant will be kept confidential in terms of ethical issues. The participants 
will be provided with the researcher’s contact details so that they can directly contact the researcher when 
any questions arising or for further information.  
 
Please complete the following in relation to your research project: 
 
  Ye
s 
N
o 
n/
a 
(a) Will you describe the main details of the research process to participants in advance, 
so that they are informed about what to expect? 
   
(b) Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?    
(c) Will you obtain written consent for participation?    
(d) Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at any time and 
for any reason? 
   
(e) If you are using a questionnaire, will you give participants the option of omitting 
questions they do not want to answer? 
   
(f) Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full confidentiality and 
that, if published, it will not be identifiable as theirs? 
   
(g) Will you offer to send participants findings from the research (e.g. copies of 
publications arising from the research)?   
 
 
 
(h) If working with children and young people please confirm that you have given due 
consideration to University guidance available at: 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/govrn/cocom/resources/2010%20November%20Safeguarding%20Children%20
&%20VA's.doc 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDENTS SHOULD BIND THE SIGNED AND APPROVED FORM INTO THEIR REPORT, 
DISSERTATION OR THESIS 
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PLEASE NOTE: 
If you have ticked No to any of 5(a) to 5(g), please give an explanation on a separate sheet. 
(Note: N/A = not applicable) 
There is an obligation on the principal researcher/student to bring to the attention of Cardiff Business 
School Ethics Committee any issues with ethical implications not clearly covered by the above checklist. 
 
 
Signed: Hong Gyue Park 
(Principal Researcher/Student) 
Print Name: Hong Gyue Park 
 
Date: 15. Apr. 2012. 
 
 
SUPERVISOR'S DECLARATION (Student researchers only):  As the supervisor for this student 
project I confirm that I believe that all research ethical issues have been dealt with in accordance with 
University policy and the research ethics guidelines of the relevant professional organization. 
 
Signed: Stephen Pettit 
 
Print Name: Dr. Stephen Pettit 
 
Date: 15. Apr. 2012.  
 
 
TWO copies of this form (and attachments) MUST BE OFFICIALLY STAMPED by 
Ms Lainey Clayton, Room F43, Cardiff Business School 
 
STATEMENT OF ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
This project has been considered using agreed School procedures and is now approved. 
 
 
Official stamp of approval of the 
School Research Ethics Committee: 
 
 
Date:  
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Appendix E. Informed Consent Declaration Form 
 
Informed Consent Declaration – For Research Participants 
 
 
This study is being conducted by Hong Gyue Park who is a Ph.D. student of the Cardiff 
Business School under the supervision of Dr. Stephen Pettit (Pettit@Cardiff.ac.uk). 
 
Participation in the project will involve being interviewed on supply chain security 
orientation and performance of ports in Korea.  
 
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and participants can withdraw from the 
study at any time without giving a reason. Participants may also ask questions at any time 
and discuss any concerns with either the researcher (ny1525@hotmail.com) or Dr. 
Stephen Pettit (Pettit@cardiff.ac.uk).    
 
The findings of the study will form part of my Ph.D. thesis.  
 
All information provided during the interview will be held anonymously so that it will not 
be possible to trace information or comments back to individual contributors.  
Information will be stored in accordance with the current Data Protection Act. 
 
 
Participants can request information and feedback about the purpose and results of the 
study by applying directly to the researcher (Hong Gyue Park, ParkHG@cardiff.ac.uk, 
ny1525@hotmail.com). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hong Gyu Park 
Aberconway Build, Column Drive, Cardiff, Wales CF10 3EU 
Ph.D. student  
13 Apr. 2012 
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Appendix F Questionnaire in English 
 
Questionnaire in English 
 
 
 
 
Dear sir, 
 
I am a Ph.D. student in the Logistics and Operations Management section of Cardiff 
Business School. I am currently conducting a research on supply chain security 
orientation of ports in Korea. This study aims to identify the relationship between the 
Antecedents of being security oriented, Supply Chain Security Orientation, and 
performance. This study aims to explain and assist port organizations to obtain 
competitive advantage from security and risk management perspective. I would 
appreciate it if you would kindly support me by completing the attached questionnaire 
from the perspective of your organization. Please note that your participation is totally 
voluntary. You can withdraw or omit any questions if you do not want to answer, or if the 
question does not apply to your company, in either case, please circle or tick ‘N’.  
 
This questionnaire is for research purposes only. Thus, your responses will be dealt with 
confidentially and will not be disclosed to anybody. Any geographical or other 
comparisons will not identify companies by name. 
 
This questionnaire will take about 15 minutes to complete. Please return the completed 
questionnaire via e-mail(ny1525@hotmail.com). If you are not sure of the answer to a 
question, please provide your best estimated response. If you wish to receive a summary 
of the survey findings, please e-mail me and I will be happy to send the summary to you 
when the research has been completed.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and patience. Please feel free to contact me if you 
would like to talk about the study or have any questions.  
 
 
Best regards, 
 
Hong Gyue Park 
PhD student 
Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authenticated by 
Dr. Stephen Pettit(supervisor) 
 
Stephen Pettit 
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(1) Port group questionnaire 
 
Section 1. Antecedents of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
 
This section measures the antecedents of supply chain security orientation of ports. It has three 
different variables. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related 
to supply chain security orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 
3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
 
Antecedents of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability 
1. We may have negative experience due to perturbation or breakdown of 
security related internal IT infrastructure.  
      
2. We may have negative experience due to perturbation or breakdown of 
security related external IT infrastructure. 
      
3. We may have negative experience due to downtime or loss of own 
production capacity due to security related local disruptions (e.g., labor 
strike, fire, explosion, industrial accidents). 
      
4. We may have negative experience due to security related laggard logistics 
infrastructure development. 
      
5. We should have security threats, critical resources to be secured and 
impacts of successful security threats should be identified, analyzed and 
evaluated. 
      
6. We should have minimum security requirements for resources to be secured 
and risk acceptance level should be established. 
      
Financial Resources 
7. We have the financial resources to invest for supply chain security when 
necessary.  
      
8. We are willing to invest for supply chain security when necessary.        
9. We play a high priority on investment for supply chain security.        
10. Our supply chain members help each other finance capital equipment.                                                                   
Supply Chain Security Initiatives 
11. We believe global supply chain security initiatives such as the ISPS code 
are important to our organization. 
      
12. We believe adopting supply chain security initiatives has a positive impact 
on the performance. 
      
13. We believe security-related global initiatives will be more important to our 
organization in the future.  
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14. We believe our organization needs to have a proper plan to cope with the 
various global security initiatives. 
      
15. We believe our organization needs to invest more on supply chain security.        
16. We believe our organization needs to collect more information on global 
supply chain security initiatives.  
      
 
 
Section 2. Supply Chain Security Orientation 
 
 
This section measures the supply chain security orientation of ports. It has six variables. Please 
indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related to supply chain security 
orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 
5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
Supply Chain Security Orientation of Ports 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Security Preparation and Planning 
1. In our organization, the people who develop our security plan are involved 
in its implementation. 
      
2. Our security plan selectively targets highest-risk activities.       
3. Our security planners sought input from employees who implement the 
plan on a day to day basis. 
      
4. Our security preparedness plan of our organization is integrated with the 
overall enterprise plans and operations. 
      
5. Our security plan is coordinated with outside groups (i.e., government, first 
responders, utilities, and nonprofit emergency service providers). 
      
6. Our security planning is coordinated across the organization’s internal 
functional areas. 
      
Security related Partnership 
7. We substantially reduced the channel complexity over the previous years to 
closely work with a selected set of security related supply chain members.  
      
8. We have facilitated a strong and long-term supply chain relationship 
fostering security related cooperation with each other. 
      
9. Our relationships with supply chain members are based on trust rather than 
contractual obligations. 
      
10. We have guidelines for developing long term supply chain security related 
relationships with supply chain members. 
      
11. Our supply chain members have guidelines for developing, maintaining, 
and monitoring long term supply chain partnerships with each other. 
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Organizational Adaptation 
12. Our goals and objectives of our organization are consistent with those or 
our supply chain members.  
      
13. We are willing to make cooperative changes with our supply chain 
members. 
      
14. We believe our supply chain members must work together to be 
successful. 
      
15. Our supply chain members trust each other.       
16. Our CEO and CEOs of our supply chain members have similar operating 
philosophies. 
      
Security-dedicated Communications and Technology 
17. We use integrated electronic data interchange to communicate with 
partners in the supply chain. 
      
18. We use integrated information systems to share data/information with 
partners in the supply chain. 
      
19. We adopt computerized port service systems for our supply chain security.       
20. We use the latest IT technology available to the industry to support supply 
chain security. 
      
21. We provide security information concerning shipments to customers.       
Security Culture 
22. We create a supply chain security focus among all employees.       
23. We make supply chain security the norm for all employees.       
24. We dedicate effort to creating a supply chain security focused workforce.       
25. We make sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply chain security.        
Security Education  
26. We provide security-related education and training of company personnel.        
27. We benchmark best practices of competitors, suppliers, customers, and 
other parties to improve our organization’s security program. 
      
28. We conduct scheduled mock-exercise training programs or simulations to 
test our internal security program. 
      
29. We are hiring and promoting security conscious personnel.        
30. We view security training as long-term investment and service quality 
improvement facilitator.  
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Section 3. Port Performance 
 
This section measures the port performance. It has three variables. Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following statements related to supply chain security 
orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 
4=agree; 5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
Port Performance 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Effectiveness 
1. We provide a consistent reliable service.       
2. We handle cargoes on quoted or anticipated time.       
3. We handle cargoes on customers’ time requirements.       
4. Our service lead-time is appropriate.       
5. We provide shipment information accurately.       
6. We respond promptly to the need of customers.       
7. We have a quick decision making process.       
8. We are flexible in terms of volume and type of cargo handling.       
Efficiency 
9. Our cargo throughput per crane is at the satisfactory level.       
10. Our cargo throughput per acre is at the satisfactory level.       
11. Our ship waiting time is at the satisfactory level.       
12. Our ship turnaround time is at the satisfactory level.       
13. Our time for loading/unloading cargo is at the satisfactory level.       
14. Our time for mode transit is at the satisfactory level.       
15. Our time for truck entry is at the satisfactory level.       
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(2) Port user group questionnaire 
 
Section 1. Antecedents of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
 
This section measures the antecedents of supply chain security orientation of ports. It has three 
different variables. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related 
to supply chain security orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 
3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
 
Antecedents of Supply Chain Security Orientation 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Risk Perception and Security Vulnerability 
1. The port we use may have negative experience due to perturbation or 
breakdown of security related internal IT infrastructure.  
      
2. The port we use may have negative experience due to perturbation or 
breakdown of security related external IT infrastructure. 
      
3. The port we use may have negative experience due to downtime or loss of 
own production capacity due to security related local disruptions(e.g., 
labor strike, fire, explosion, industrial accidents). 
      
4. The port we use may have negative experience due to security related 
laggard logistics infrastructure development. 
      
5. The port we use should have security threats, critical resources to be 
secured and impacts of successful security threats should be identified, 
analyzed and evaluated. 
      
6. The port we use should have minimum security requirements for resources 
to be secured and risk acceptance level should be established. 
      
Financial Resources 
7. The port we use has the financial resources to invest for supply chain 
security when necessary.  
      
8. The port we use is willing to invest for supply chain security when 
necessary.  
      
9. The port we use plays a high priority on investment for supply chain 
security.  
      
10. The supply chain members of the port we use help each other finance 
capital equipment.                                                                   
      
Supply Chain Security Initiatives 
11. Global supply chain security initiatives such as the ISPS code are 
important to the port we use. 
      
12. Adopting supply chain security initiatives has a positive impact on the 
performance of the port we use. 
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13. Security-related global initiatives will be more important to the port we 
use in the future.  
      
14. The port we use needs to have a proper plan to cope with the various 
global security initiatives. 
      
15. The port we use needs to invest more on supply chain security.        
16. The port we use needs to collect more information on global supply chain 
security initiatives.  
      
 
Section 2. Supply Chain Security Orientation 
 
 
This section measures the supply chain security orientation of ports. It has six variables. Please 
indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related to supply chain security 
orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 
5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
Supply Chain Security Orientation of Ports 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Security Preparation and Planning 
1. In the port we use, the people who develop our security plan are involved in 
its implementation. 
      
2. The security plan of the port we use selectively targets highest-risk 
activities. 
      
3. The security planners of the port we use sought input from employees who 
implement the plan on a day to day basis. 
      
4. The security preparedness plan of the port we use is integrated with the 
overall enterprise plans and operations. 
      
5. The security plan of the port we use is coordinated with outside groups (i.e., 
government, first responders, utilities, and nonprofit emergency service 
providers). 
      
6. The security planning of the port we use is coordinated across the 
organization’s internal functional areas. 
      
Security related Partnership 
7. The port we use has substantially reduced channel complexity over the 
previous years to closely work with a selected set of security related 
supply chain members.  
      
8. The port we use has facilitated a strong and long-term supply chain 
relationship fostering security related cooperation with each other. 
      
9. The relationship with supply chain members of the port we use is based on 
trust rather than contractual obligations. 
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10. The port we use has guidelines for developing long term supply chain 
security related relationships with supply chain members. 
      
11. The supply chain members of the port we use have guidelines for 
developing, maintaining, and monitoring long term supply chain 
partnerships with each other. 
      
Organizational Adaptation 
12. The goals and objectives of the port we use are consistent with those or 
our supply chain members.  
      
13. The port we use is willing to make cooperative changes with our supply 
chain members. 
      
14. The port we use believes our supply chain members must work together to 
be successful. 
      
15. The supply chain members of the port we use trust each other.       
16. The CEO and CEOs of the port we use have similar operating 
philosophies. 
      
Security-dedicated Communications and Technology 
17. The port we use implements integrated electronic data interchange to 
communicate with partners in the supply chain. 
      
18. The port we use implements integrated information systems to share 
data/information with partners in the supply chain. 
      
19. The port we use adopts computerized port service systems for our supply 
chain security. 
      
20. The port we use implements the latest IT technology available to the 
industry to support supply chain security. 
      
21. The port we use provides security information concerning shipments to 
customers. 
      
Security Culture 
22. The port we use creates a supply chain security focus among all 
employees. 
      
23. The port we use makes supply chain security the norm for all employees.       
24. The port we use dedicates effort to creating a supply chain security 
focused workforce. 
      
25. The port we use makes sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply 
chain security.  
      
Security Education  
26. The port we use provides security-related education and training of 
company personnel.  
      
27. The port we use benchmarks best practices of competitors, suppliers, 
customers, and other parties to improve the organization’s security 
program. 
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28. The port we use conducts scheduled mock-exercise training programs or 
simulations to test our internal security program. 
      
29. The port we use is hiring and promoting security conscious personnel.        
30. The port we use views security training as long-term investment and 
service quality improvement facilitator.  
      
 
 
Section 3. Port Performance 
 
This section measures the port performance. It has three variables. Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following statements related to supply chain security 
orientation which your organization has: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 
4=agree; 5=strongly agree; N=not applicable. 
 
Port Performance 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree      Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
Effectiveness 
1. The port we use provides a consistent reliable service.       
2. The port we use handles cargoes on quoted or anticipated time.       
3. The port we use handles cargoes on customers’ time requirements.       
4. The service lead-time of the port we use is appropriate.       
5. The port we use provides shipment information accurately.       
6. The port we use responds promptly to the need of customers.       
7. The port we use has a quick decision making process.       
8. The port we use is flexible in terms of volume and type of cargo handling.       
Efficiency 
9. The cargo throughput per crane of the port we use is at the satisfactory 
level. 
      
10. The cargo throughput per acre of the port we use is at the satisfactory 
level. 
      
11. The ship waiting time of the port we use is at the satisfactory level.       
12. The ship turnaround time of the port we use is at the satisfactory level.       
13. The time for loading/unloading cargo of the port we use is at the 
satisfactory level. 
      
14. The time for mode transit of the port we use is at the satisfactory level.       
15. The time for truck entry of the port we use is at the satisfactory level.       
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Section 4. Respondent Profile 
 
Please check where appropriate.  
 
1. Please briefly specify your position in your company. 
  (          ) port, (         ) department, (        ) team 
 
2. Please specify the type of business of your company? (pick more than one if necessary) 
1) port operation (     )  2) shipping (     )  3) warehousing (     )   
4) Land transportation  (     )  5) Manufacturing  (      )  6) trade (     )   
7) forwarding  (     )  8) please specify (                ) 
 
3. How old are you?  
  1) 20s (     )  2) 30s (     )  3) 40s (     )  4) 50s (     )  5) 60s (     ) 
 
4. What is your gender?  
1) Male (     )  2) Female (     ) 
 
5. What is your educational level?  
1) Highschool (     )  2) Undergraduate (     )  3) Master’s Degree (     )   
4) MBA (      )  5) Ph.D. (     )  
  
6. How long have you been working for your company?  
1) less than 5 years (     )  2) 5 to 10 years (     )  3) 10 to 20 years (     ) 
4) more than 20 years (     ) 
 
7. What is the nature of your current position within your company? 
  1) Director or above (     )  2) Senior manager (     )   
3) General manager (     )  4) Staff (      )   
5) Other (please specify:              ) 
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Appendix G Questionnaires in Korean 
 
안녕하십니까? 귀사의 무궁한 발전을 기원합니다.  
저는 영국 카디프 경영대학에서 해운항만물류 박사과정을 이수하고 있습니다. 
 
제 연구주제는 9.11. 테러이후로 국제물류 보안제도가 강화되면서 항만이 보안지향
적으로 변화해가는 전략 또는 현상에 관한 것입니다. 실제 현장에서는 9.11. 테러 
이후에 강화되어가는 국제물류보안제도들과 관련한 항만의 보안강화전략과 현상이 
어떻게 일어나고 있으며 어떠한 이러한 변화를 원활하게 이끌어나가는지에 대한 연
구입니다.  
 
이와 관련하여 해운 항만 분야 및 공공부문에 종사하시는 여러분께 설문을 의뢰하게 
되었습니다. 이 설문은 연구목적으로만 활용될 것이며 따라서 모든 응답은 기밀로 
취급되며 어떤 제 3자에게도 공개되지 않을 것입니다. 귀하의 고견을 설문지에 담아
주시면 제 연구에 큰 도움이 될 것입니다.  
 
이 설문은 약 15분 정도 소요될 것이며 완성된 설문은 저장하여 ny1525@hotmail.com 
또는 u-god@daum.net으로 송부하여 주시기 바랍니다. 질문에 대한 답에 대해 확신이 
없으시다 하더라도 최대한 추정하여 답하여 주시면 감사하겠습니다. 설문 결과에 대
해 알고 싶으신 분은 저에게 이메일로 요청해 주시면 연구가 끝난 후에 요약본을 보
내드리겠습니다. 귀한 시간 할애해 주시셔 감사드리며 궁금한 사항이 있으시면 언제
든지 연락주시면 감사하겠습니다.  
 
---전문용어 참고사항--- 
 
공급사슬 구성원 : 해당 항만에서 처리하고 있는 화물의 공급을 담당하고 구성하고 있는 모
든 주체들을 말하며, 해운선사, 육상운송업체, 창고업체 뿐만 아니라 화주, 제3자 물류업체, 
포워더 등을 모두 포함함.  
 
물류보안 : 2001년 9. 11. 테러 이후 국제 테러 위협의 증가로 항공기, 선박 등의 화물에 대
한 보안검색이 강화되면서, 세계 각국에서는 자국영토로 반입되는 화물에 대한 보안이 강화
되어 가고 있는 현상을 말하며 국제기구와 미국을 중심으로 다양한 물류 보안제도가 실시되
고 있다.  
 
ISPS Code((International Ship and Port Facility Security Code) : 국제해사기구(IMO)에서 
각종 테러위협으로부터 선박 및 항만시설을 보호하기 위해서 제정한 국제해상보안규정이다. 
2004년 7월 1일부터 발효되었으며 해운, 항만분야에 적용되는 가장 대표적인 물류보안 제도
이다. 
 
 
 
 
 
영국 카디프 경영대학 박사과정 
 
박홍규  
 
 
 
Authenticated by 
Dr. Stephen Pettit(supervisor) 
 
Stephen Pettit 
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(1) 항만그룹대상 설문지 (Port group) 
 
제 1부. 항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성에 관한 선행요인 
 
다음은 항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성의 선행요인과 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 
있는 지표와 관련하여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀하가 동의하는 정도를 표시해 주시기 바랍
니다. 
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
 
 
항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성의 선행요인 
동의하지        동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
리스크 인식과 보안취약성 
1. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련해 내부 IT 시스템의 고장으로 
인해 부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.  
      
2. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련해 외부 IT 시스템의 고장으로 
인해 부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.  
      
3. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련한 파업, 화재, 사고와 같은 
사회정치적인 요인으로 인해 생산능력의 차질이 빚어질 
수도 있다.  
      
4. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련해 낙후된 인프라로 인해 
부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.   
      
5. 우리 터미널은 보안을 위협하는 주요요소와 원인들을 
효과적으로 찾아내고 분석하며 평가해야 한다.   
      
6. 우리 터미널은 보안과 관련한 최소한의 자원들을 보유해야 
하며 리스크를 감수하는 수준을 설정해야 한다.    
      
재정적 자원  
7. 우리 터미널은 필요하다면 물류보안을 위해 투자할 재정적 
자원을 보유하고 있다.  
      
8. 우리 터미널은 필요하다면 물류보안을 위해 투자할 의향이 
있다.   
      
9. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련한 투자에 높은 우선순위를 
둔다.   
      
10. 우리 터미널은 물류보안설비를 위한 재원확충을 위해 
협력한다.  
      
국제물류 보안제도 
11. 우리 터미널은 ISPS CODE와 같은 국제물류 보안제도의 
중요성을 인식하고 있다.  
      
12. 우리 터미널은 국제물류보안 제도의 도입이 우리 조직의 
성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 것이라 생각한다.  
      
13. 우리 터미널은 국제물류 보안제도가 미래에 더욱 중요해질 
것이라 생각한다. . 
      
14. 우리 터미널은 ISPS CODE와 같은 강화되는 국제물류보안 
제도의 도입과 관련해서 적절한 계획이 수립되어야 한다고 
생각한다.  
      
15. 우리 터미널은 공급사슬 보안과 관련한 투자가 필요하다고 
생각한다.  
      
16. 우리 터미널은 국제물류 보안제도와 관련해서 지속적으로 
정보수집이 이루어져야 한다고 생각한다.  
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제 2부. 항만의 공급사슬 보안 지향성 
 
다음은 공급사슬 보안지향성과 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 있는 지표와 관련하
여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀하가 동의하는 정도를 평가해 주시기 바랍니다. 
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성 
동의하지        동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
보안계획 수립 및 입안 
1. 우리 터미널에서 보안 관련 계획을 세우는 임직원은 실제로 
그것의 실행에 관여한다.  
      
2. 우리 터미널의 보안계획은 선택적으로 리스크가 큰 활동에 
집중한다.  
      
3. 우리 터미널의 보안계획 입안자들은 실제 현장에서 근무하는 
직원들의 조언을 중요하게 생각한다. 
      
4. 우리 터미널의 보안과 관련한 대비책은 조직전체의 계획 및 
활동과 조직적으로 운영된다.  
      
5. 우리 터미널의 보안계획은 정부, 공기업, 비영리단체 등 
외부 단체들과 조직적으로 운영된다.  
      
6. 우리 터미널의 보안계획은 우리 조직의 내부의 기능적 
운영분야와 함께 통합적으로 운영된다.  
      
물류보안관련 파트너십 
7. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련해서 공급사슬의 구성원들과 
지난 몇 년 동안 긴밀히 협력하여 공급사슬 유통경로의 
복잡성을 현저하게 줄였다. 
      
8. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련해 공급사슬 구성원들과 
장기적인 관계를 성공적으로 형성해 왔다. 
      
9. 우리 터미널과 공급사슬의 구성원들과의 관계는 계약, 
의무에 기초하기 보다는 신뢰에 바탕을 두고 있다.  
      
10. 우리 터미널과 공급사슬의 구성원들은 장기적인 관계를 
형성하고 관리해 나가는데 필요한 내부적인 방침이나 
지침이 있다. 
      
11. 우리 터미널을 포함한 공급사슬의 구성원들은 물류보안과 
관련한 장기적인 파트너십 관계를 형성하기 위한 
가이드라인을 보유하고 있다.  
      
조직 적응 
12. 우리 터미널의 목표는 공급사슬 내의 다른 구성원들의 
목표와 유사하거나 일치한다.   
      
13. 우리 터미널은 공급사슬내의 구성원들과 협력하여 변화를 
추진할 의향이 있다.  
      
14. 우리 터미널은 공급사슬 내 구성원들과 같이 협력해야 
성공할 수 있다고 믿는다.  
      
15. 우리 터미널을 포함하는 공급사슬 내 구성원들은 서로 
신뢰한다.  
      
16. 우리 터미널을 포함하는 공급사슬 내 CEO들은 비슷한 
조직운영철학을 공유한다.   
      
물류보안관련 정보교환 및 정보교환 시스템 
17. 우리 터미널은 EDI를 사용하여 공급사슬의 구성원들과 
보안과 관련한 정보 및 자료를 교환한다.  
      
18. 우리 터미널은 공급사슬 구성원들과 자료 및 정보를 
공유하기 위해 EDI 이외에 별도의 통합된 정보시스템을 
사용한다. 
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19. 우리 터미널은 컴퓨터화된 시스템을 이용하여 
물류보안업무를 운영한다. 
      
20. 우리 터미널은 물류보안을 위해 최신 IT 정보통신 기술을 
사용한다.  
      
21. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련한 화물 선적 및 추적관련 
정보를 고객들에게 제공한다.  
      
물류보안 문화 
22. 우리 터미널은 전 임직원들에게 물류보안의 중요성에 
대해서 강조한다. 
      
23. 우리 터미널은 전 임직원들에게 물류보안이 전체업무의 
일반적인 표준이 되도록 강조한다. 
      
24. 우리 터미널은 전 임직원들이 물류보안에 특별한 관심을 
쏟는 조직이 되도록 노력한다.  
      
25. 우리 터미널은 전 임직원들이 물류보안과 관련해서 항상 
경계를 늦추지 않도록 노력한다.  
      
물류보안 교육  
26. 우리 터미널은 임직원들을 위한 물류보안관련 교육, 훈련 
프로그램을 진행한다. 
      
27. 우리 터미널은 경쟁기업, 공급업자, 고객 등의 물류보안과 
관련한 훌륭한 업무수행절차를 벤치마킹한다. 
      
28. 우리 터미널은 내부 물류보안역량을 평가하기 위해서 
계획된 보안 교육 프로그램을 진행한다.   
      
29. 우리 터미널은 물류보안 업무에 뛰어난 사람을 고용하고 
승진시킨다.   
      
30. 우리 터미널은 물류보안과 관련한 교육은 장기적인 
투자이며 서비스의 질을 높여주는 역할을 할 것으로 
여긴다.  
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제 3부. 항만성과 
 
다음은 경쟁력 및 성과와 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 있는 성과 지표와 관련하
여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀사의 성과를 평가해 주시기 바랍니다.  
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
 
항만성과 
동의하지       동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
서비스 효과성 지표 
1. 우리 터미널은 고객에 대한 서비스를 신뢰성 있게 제공하고 
있다.  
      
2. 우리 터미널은 계약에 명시된 또는 통상 예상되는 작업시간 
안에 화물을 처리한다.  
      
3. 우리 터미널은 고객의 불만 제기 회수가 적은 편이다.        
4. 우리 터미널은 고객이 요구하는 작업시간 안에 화물을 
처리한다.  
      
5. 우리 터미널은 서비스 제공에 소요되는 시간이 짧다.        
6. 우리 터미널은 화물운송과 관련된 정보를 정확하게 
제공한다. 
      
7. 우리 터미널은 의사결정에 소요되는 시간이 짧다.       
8. 우리 터미널은 고객의 요구에 따라 화물처리 스케줄, 처리 
절차의 변경에 대한 의사결정이 신속하다.  
      
서비스 효율성 지표 
9. 우리 터미널의 크레인당 연간 화물처리량은 만족스러운 
수준이다.  
      
10. 우리 터미널의 면적당 화물 처리량은 만족스러운 수준이다.        
11. 우리 터미널의 선박대기 시간은 만족스러운 수준이다.       
12. 우리 터미널의 선박작업 시간은 만족스러운 수준이다.        
13. 우리 터미널의 컨테이너 당 양/적하 시간은 만족스러운 
수준이다.  
      
14. 우리 터미널은 화물이 육상 운송모드(트럭, 열차)으로 
이전되는데 소요되는 시간은 짧은 편이다.  
      
15. 우리 터미널은 화물이 진입하여 최종 빠져 나오는데 
소요되는 시간이 짧은 편이다.  
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(2) 항만이용자그룹대상 설문지 (Port user group) 
 
제 1부. 항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성에 관한 선행요인 
 
다음은 항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성의 선행요인과 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 
있는 지표와 관련하여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀하가 동의하는 정도를 표시해 주시기 바랍
니다. 
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
 
 
항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성의 선행요인 
동의하지        동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
리스크 인식과 보안취약성 
1. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련해 내부 IT 시스템의 
고장으로 인해 부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.  
      
2. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련해 외부 IT 시스템의 
고장으로 인해 부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.  
      
3. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련한 파업, 화재, 
사고와 같은 사회정치적인 요인으로 인해 생산능력의 
차질이 빚어질 수도 있다.  
      
4. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련해 낙후된 인프라로 
인해 부정적인 경험을 할 수도 있다.   
      
5. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 보안을 위협하는 주요요소와 
원인들을 효과적으로 찾아내고 분석하며 평가해야 한다.   
      
6. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 보안과 관련한 최소한의 자원들을 
보유해야 하며 리스크를 감수하는 수준을 설정해야 한다.    
      
재정적 자원  
7. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 필요하다면 물류보안을 위해 투자할 
재정적 자원을 보유하고 있다.  
      
8. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 필요하다면 물류보안을 위해 투자할 
의향이 있다.   
      
9. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련한 투자에 높은 
우선순위를 둔다.   
      
10. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안설비를 위한 재원확충을 
위해 협력한다.  
      
국제물류 보안제도 
11. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 ISPS CODE와 같은 국제물류 
보안제도의 중요성을 인식하고 있다.  
      
12. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 국제물류보안 제도의 도입이 우리 
조직의 성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 것이라 생각한다.  
      
13. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 국제물류 보안제도가 미래에 더욱 
중요해질 것이라 생각한다. . 
      
14. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 ISPS CODE와 같은 강화되는 
국제물류보안 제도의 도입과 관련해서 적절한 계획이 
수립되어야 한다고 생각한다.  
      
15. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 공급사슬 보안과 관련한 투자가 
필요하다고 생각한다.  
      
16. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 국제물류 보안제도와 관련해서 
지속적으로 정보수집이 이루어져야 한다고 생각한다.  
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제 2부. 항만의 공급사슬 보안 지향성 
 
다음은 공급사슬 보안지향성과 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 있는 지표와 관련하
여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀하가 동의하는 정도를 평가해 주시기 바랍니다. 
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
항만의 공급사슬 보안지향성 
동의하지        동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
보안계획 수립 및 입안 
1. 우리가 이용하는 항만에서 보안 관련 계획을 세우는 
임직원은 실제로 그것의 실행에 관여한다.  
      
2. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 보안계획은 선택적으로 리스크가 큰 
활동에 집중한다.  
      
3. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 보안계획 입안자들은 실제 현장에서 
근무하는 직원들의 조언을 중요하게 생각한다. 
      
4. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 보안과 관련한 대비책은 조직전체의 
계획 및 활동과 조직적으로 운영된다.  
      
5. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 보안계획은 정부, 공기업, 
비영리단체 등 외부 단체들과 조직적으로 운영된다.  
      
6. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 보안계획은 우리 조직의 내부의  
기능적 운영분야와 함께 통합적으로 운영된다.  
      
물류보안관련 파트너십 
7. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련해서 공급사슬의 
구성원들과 지난 몇 년 동안 긴밀히 협력하여 공급사슬 
유통경로의 복잡성을 현저하게 줄였다. 
      
8. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련해 공급사슬 
구성원들과 장기적인 관계를 성공적으로 형성해 왔다. 
      
9. 우리가 이용하는 항만과 공급사슬의 구성원들과의 관계는 
계약, 의무에 기초하기 보다는 신뢰에 바탕을 두고 있다.  
      
10. 우리가 이용하는 항만과 공급사슬의 구성원들은 장기적인 
관계를 형성하고 관리해 나가는데 필요한 내부적인 
방침이나 지침이 있다. 
      
11. 우리가 이용하는 항만을 포함한 공급사슬의 구성원들은 
물류보안과 관련한 장기적인 파트너십 관계를 형성하기 
위한 가이드라인을 보유하고 있다.  
      
조직 적응 
12. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 목표는 공급사슬 내의 다른 
구성원들의 목표와 유사하거나 일치한다.   
      
13. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 공급사슬내의 구성원들과 협력하여 
변화를 추진할 의향이 있다.  
      
14. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 공급사슬 내 구성원들과 같이 
협력해야 성공할 수 있다고 믿는다.  
      
15. 우리가 이용하는 항만을 포함하는 공급사슬 내 구성원들은 
서로 신뢰한다.  
      
16. 우리가 이용하는 항만을 포함하는 공급사슬 내 CEO들은 
비슷한 조직운영철학을 공유한다.   
      
물류보안관련 정보교환 및 정보교환 시스템 
17. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 EDI를 사용하여 공급사슬의 
구성원들과 보안과 관련한 정보 및 자료를 교환한다.  
      
18. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 공급사슬 구성원들과 자료 및 
정보를 공유하기 위해 EDI 이외에 별도의 통합된 
정보시스템을 사용한다. 
      
  278 
19. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 컴퓨터화된 시스템을 이용하여 
물류보안업무를 운영한다. 
      
20. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안을 위해 최신 IT 정보통신 
기술을 사용한다.  
      
21. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련한 화물 선적 및 
추적관련 정보를 고객들에게 제공한다.  
      
물류보안 문화 
22. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 전 임직원들에게 물류보안의 
중요성에 대해서 강조한다. 
      
23. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 전 임직원들에게 물류보안이 
전체업무의 일반적인 표준이 되도록 강조한다. 
      
24. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 전 임직원들이 물류보안에 특별한 
관심을 쏟는 조직이 되도록 노력한다.  
      
25. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 전 임직원들이 물류보안과 
관련해서 항상 경계를 늦추지 않도록 노력한다.  
      
물류보안 교육  
26. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 임직원들을 위한 물류보안관련 
교육, 훈련 프로그램을 진행한다. 
      
27. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 경쟁기업, 공급업자, 고객 등의 
물류보안과 관련한 훌륭한 업무수행절차를 벤치마킹한다. 
      
28. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 내부 물류보안역량을 평가하기 
위해서 계획된 보안 교육 프로그램을 진행한다.   
      
29. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안 업무에 뛰어난 사람을 
고용하고 승진시킨다.   
      
30. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 물류보안과 관련한 교육은 
장기적인 투자이며 서비스의 질을 높여주는 역할을 할 
것으로 여긴다.  
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제 3부. 항만성과 
 
다음은 경쟁력 및 성과와 관련한 질문문항들입니다. 다음 기술하고 있는 성과 지표와 관련하
여 주요 경쟁사와 비교하여 귀사의 성과를 평가해 주시기 바랍니다.  
(1=강하게 동의하지 않음; 2=동의하지 않음; 3=중립; 4=동의함; 5=아주 동의함; N=답할 수 없음) 
 
항만성과 
동의하지       동의함 
않음 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
서비스 효과성 지표 
1. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 고객에 대한 서비스를 신뢰성 있게 
제공하고 있다.  
      
2. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 계약에 명시된 또는 통상 예상되는 
작업시간 안에 화물을 처리한다.  
      
3. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 고객의 불만 제기 회수가 적은 
편이다.  
      
4. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 고객이 요구하는 작업시간 안에 
화물을 처리한다.  
      
5. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 서비스 제공에 소요되는 시간이 
짧다.  
      
6. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 화물운송과 관련된 정보를 정확하게 
제공한다. 
      
7. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 의사결정에 소요되는 시간이 짧다.       
8. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 고객의 요구에 따라 화물처리 
스케줄, 처리 절차의 변경에 대한 의사결정이 신속하다.  
      
서비스 효율성 지표 
9. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 크레인당 연간 화물처리량은 
만족스러운 수준이다.  
      
10. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 면적당 화물 처리량은 만족스러운 
수준이다.  
      
11. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 선박대기 시간은 만족스러운 
수준이다. 
      
12. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 선박작업 시간은 만족스러운 
수준이다.  
      
13. 우리가 이용하는 항만의 컨테이너 당 양/적하 시간은 
만족스러운 수준이다.  
      
14. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 화물이 육상 운송모드(트럭, 
열차)으로 이전되는데 소요되는 시간은 짧은 편이다.  
      
15. 우리가 이용하는 항만은 화물이 진입하여 최종 빠져 
나오는데 소요되는 시간이 짧은 편이다.  
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제 4 부. 응답자 정보 
해당란에 표기해 주시기 바랍니다.  
 
1. 귀하의 소속을 기재하여 주시기 바랍니다. 
예) (       ) 항만공사 (       ) 부 (        ) 팀 
 
2. 귀하가 종사하고 있는 산업 분야는 무엇입니까? (다중선택 가능) 
1) 항만운영 (     )  2) 해상운송 (     )  3) 창고관리 (     )   
4) 육상운송 (     )  5) 제조업 (     )  6) 무역업 (     )   
7) 포워딩 (      )  8) 그 외 (              ) 
 
3. 귀하의 연령은?  
1) 20대 (     )  2) 30대 (     )  3) 40대 (     )  4) 50대 (     )   
6) 60대 (     ) 
 
4. 귀하의 성별은? 
1) 남자 (      )  2) 여자 (      ) 
 
5. 귀하의 최종학력은 다음 중 무엇입니까?  
1) 고졸이하 (     )  2) 대졸 (     )  3) 석사 (     )  4) MBA (     )   
5) 박사 (     ) 
 
6. 귀하는 소속된 조직에서 얼마나 오랫동안 근무하셨습니까? 
1) 5년 이하 (      )  2) 5년에서 10년 사이 (      )  
3) 10년에서 20년 사이 (      )  4) 20년 이상 (      ) 
 
7. 귀하의 사내 직위를 표기하여 주십시오.  
1) 이사급 (      )  2) 상위관리직 (      )  3) 중간관리직 (      )   
4) 사원 및 대리 (      ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
설문에 응해주셔서 진심으로 감사드립니다.  
 
설문에 응해주신 모든 분들의 앞날에  
무한한 발전과 행복이 함께하길 기원합니다. 
 
감사합니다.  
 
카디프 경영대학 박사과정 박홍규 올림  
